The Theory of Idle Resources

THIS ESSAY might be described as a study in definition. Now there have always been those who were impatient of the process of meticulous definition. Richard Jones, Auguste Comte and Thorold Rogers as well as Malthus are mentioned by J.N. Keynes as having held that concentration on definition is pedantic and useless. “Political economy is said to have strangled itself with definitions.”1 Some explanation or defense of our method of basing an analysis of idleness upon careful definition may therefore be called for. Of course, this essay is itself an obvious defense of the method, but the pronouncements of the logicians of economic science may also be relied upon. J.N. Keynes himself has not agreed with the writers he quotes. He says, “There is nothing arbitrary or unessential in analyzing the precise content of a notion in the various connections in which it is involved.”2 Cairnes, indeed, seemed to envisage the necessity for constant redefinition. “Students of the social sciences,” he said, “must be prepared for the necessity of constantly modifying their classifications and, by consequence, their definitions....”3 And in endeavoring “to make our conceptions as precise as possible,”4 we feel that we have been able to illustrate, in an important field, Sidgwick’s observations that “reflective contemplation is naturally stimulated by the effort to define”5 and that as much if not more importance attaches to the process of defining as to the resulting definition itself.

We have tried also, in the analysis which follows, to avoid the “formal definitions” of which Cannan disapproved, in the sense in which he disapproved of them; for we have taken heed of his other warning and endeavored to avoid “the formation of an economic language understood only by specialists.”6 Such new terms as we have introduced should be immediately comprehensible by the layman. The term “participating idleness” gave trouble, but Cannan would surely have approved of it. And, further, an attempt has been made to adhere to the rule that Cairnes quoted from J. S. Mill, namely, that in the nomenclature of definitions “the aids of derivation and analogy” should be “employed to keep alive a consciousness of all that is signified by them.”7 This applies, we believe, even to our original but seemingly highly important conception of “participating idleness” as well as to the vaguely recognized conceptions that we have termed “pseudo-idleness” and “aggressive idleness.” But in choosing terms for our definitions, we have not been able to make use of Malthus’s suggestion that, in introducing distinctions which cannot be described by “terms which are of daily occurrence,” the next best authority is that of the “most celebrated writers in the science.”8 For, strange as it may seem, our “celebrated writers” have never specifically analyzed idleness in the very simple but apparently basic way that is here attempted. Hence it has been quite impossible to avoid this attempt to burden economic science with new terms.

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9  J.N. Keynes, Scope and Method of Political Economy (London: Macmillan, 1891), p. 153.

10  Ibid., p. 156 (italics added).

11  J.E. Cairnes, Character and Logical Method of Political Economy (London: Macmillan, 1875), p. 146.

12  H. Sidgwick, The Principles of Political Economy (London: Macmillan, 1901), p. 62.

13  Ibid., p. 60.

14  Palgrave’s Dictionary. Article on “Definition.”

15  J. S. Mill, quoted in Cairnes, Method of Political Economy, p. 151.

16  T. R. Malthus, Definitions in Political Economy (London: John Murray, 1836), pp. 4–5.

• 1 J.N. Keynes, Scope and Method of Political Economy (London: Macmillan, 1891), p. 153.
• 2 Ibid., p. 156 (italics added).
• 3 J.E. Cairnes, Character and Logical Method of Political Economy (London: Macmillan, 1875), p. 146.
• 4 H. Sidgwick, The Principles of Political Economy (London: Macmillan, 1901), p. 62.
• 5 Ibid., p. 60.
• 6 Palgrave’s Dictionary. Article on “Definition.”
• 7 J. S. Mill, quoted in Cairnes, Method of Political Economy, p. 151.
• 8 T. R. Malthus, Definitions in Political Economy (London: John Murray, 1836), pp. 4–5.
• 9THIS ESSAY might be described as a study in definition. Now there have always been those who were impatient of the process of meticulous definition. Richard Jones, Auguste Comte and Thorold Rogers as well as Malthus are mentioned by J.N. Keynes as having held that concentration on definition is pedantic and useless. “Political economy is said to have strangled itself with definitions.” Some explanation or defense of our method of basing an analysis of idleness upon careful definition may therefore be called for. Of course, this essay is itself an obvious defense of the method, but the pronouncements of the logicians of economic science may also be relied upon. J.N. Keynes himself has not agreed with the writers he quotes. He says, “There is nothing arbitrary or unessential in analyzing the precise content of a notion in the various connections in which it is involved.” Cairnes, indeed, seemed to envisage the necessity for constant redefinition. “Students of the social sciences,” he said, “must be prepared for the necessity of constantly modifying their classifications and, by consequence, their definitions....” And in endeavoring “to make our conceptions as precise as possible,” we feel that we have been able to illustrate, in an important field, Sidgwick’s observations that “reflective contemplation is naturally stimulated by the effort to define” and that as much if not more importance attaches to the process of defining as to the resulting definition itself.
• 10THIS ESSAY might be described as a study in definition. Now there have always been those who were impatient of the process of meticulous definition. Richard Jones, Auguste Comte and Thorold Rogers as well as Malthus are mentioned by J.N. Keynes as having held that concentration on definition is pedantic and useless. “Political economy is said to have strangled itself with definitions.” Some explanation or defense of our method of basing an analysis of idleness upon careful definition may therefore be called for. Of course, this essay is itself an obvious defense of the method, but the pronouncements of the logicians of economic science may also be relied upon. J.N. Keynes himself has not agreed with the writers he quotes. He says, “There is nothing arbitrary or unessential in analyzing the precise content of a notion in the various connections in which it is involved.” Cairnes, indeed, seemed to envisage the necessity for constant redefinition. “Students of the social sciences,” he said, “must be prepared for the necessity of constantly modifying their classifications and, by consequence, their definitions....” And in endeavoring “to make our conceptions as precise as possible,” we feel that we have been able to illustrate, in an important field, Sidgwick’s observations that “reflective contemplation is naturally stimulated by the effort to define” and that as much if not more importance attaches to the process of defining as to the resulting definition itself.
• 11THIS ESSAY might be described as a study in definition. Now there have always been those who were impatient of the process of meticulous definition. Richard Jones, Auguste Comte and Thorold Rogers as well as Malthus are mentioned by J.N. Keynes as having held that concentration on definition is pedantic and useless. “Political economy is said to have strangled itself with definitions.” Some explanation or defense of our method of basing an analysis of idleness upon careful definition may therefore be called for. Of course, this essay is itself an obvious defense of the method, but the pronouncements of the logicians of economic science may also be relied upon. J.N. Keynes himself has not agreed with the writers he quotes. He says, “There is nothing arbitrary or unessential in analyzing the precise content of a notion in the various connections in which it is involved.” Cairnes, indeed, seemed to envisage the necessity for constant redefinition. “Students of the social sciences,” he said, “must be prepared for the necessity of constantly modifying their classifications and, by consequence, their definitions....” And in endeavoring “to make our conceptions as precise as possible,” we feel that we have been able to illustrate, in an important field, Sidgwick’s observations that “reflective contemplation is naturally stimulated by the effort to define” and that as much if not more importance attaches to the process of defining as to the resulting definition itself.
• 12THIS ESSAY might be described as a study in definition. Now there have always been those who were impatient of the process of meticulous definition. Richard Jones, Auguste Comte and Thorold Rogers as well as Malthus are mentioned by J.N. Keynes as having held that concentration on definition is pedantic and useless. “Political economy is said to have strangled itself with definitions.” Some explanation or defense of our method of basing an analysis of idleness upon careful definition may therefore be called for. Of course, this essay is itself an obvious defense of the method, but the pronouncements of the logicians of economic science may also be relied upon. J.N. Keynes himself has not agreed with the writers he quotes. He says, “There is nothing arbitrary or unessential in analyzing the precise content of a notion in the various connections in which it is involved.” Cairnes, indeed, seemed to envisage the necessity for constant redefinition. “Students of the social sciences,” he said, “must be prepared for the necessity of constantly modifying their classifications and, by consequence, their definitions....” And in endeavoring “to make our conceptions as precise as possible,” we feel that we have been able to illustrate, in an important field, Sidgwick’s observations that “reflective contemplation is naturally stimulated by the effort to define” and that as much if not more importance attaches to the process of defining as to the resulting definition itself.
• 13THIS ESSAY might be described as a study in definition. Now there have always been those who were impatient of the process of meticulous definition. Richard Jones, Auguste Comte and Thorold Rogers as well as Malthus are mentioned by J.N. Keynes as having held that concentration on definition is pedantic and useless. “Political economy is said to have strangled itself with definitions.” Some explanation or defense of our method of basing an analysis of idleness upon careful definition may therefore be called for. Of course, this essay is itself an obvious defense of the method, but the pronouncements of the logicians of economic science may also be relied upon. J.N. Keynes himself has not agreed with the writers he quotes. He says, “There is nothing arbitrary or unessential in analyzing the precise content of a notion in the various connections in which it is involved.” Cairnes, indeed, seemed to envisage the necessity for constant redefinition. “Students of the social sciences,” he said, “must be prepared for the necessity of constantly modifying their classifications and, by consequence, their definitions....” And in endeavoring “to make our conceptions as precise as possible,” we feel that we have been able to illustrate, in an important field, Sidgwick’s observations that “reflective contemplation is naturally stimulated by the effort to define” and that as much if not more importance attaches to the process of defining as to the resulting definition itself.
• 14We have tried also, in the analysis which follows, to avoid the “formal definitions” of which Cannan disapproved, in the sense in which he disapproved of them; for we have taken heed of his other warning and endeavored to avoid “the formation of an economic language understood only by specialists.” Such new terms as we have introduced should be immediately comprehensible by the layman. The term “participating idleness” gave trouble, but Cannan would surely have approved of it. And, further, an attempt has been made to adhere to the rule that Cairnes quoted from J. S. Mill, namely, that in the nomenclature of definitions “the aids of derivation and analogy” should be “employed to keep alive a consciousness of all that is signified by them.” This applies, we believe, even to our original but seemingly highly important conception of “participating idleness” as well as to the vaguely recognized conceptions that we have termed “pseudo-idleness” and “aggressive idleness.” But in choosing terms for our definitions, we have not been able to make use of Malthus’s suggestion that, in introducing distinctions which cannot be described by “terms which are of daily occurrence,” the next best authority is that of the “most celebrated writers in the science.” For, strange as it may seem, our “celebrated writers” have never specifically analyzed idleness in the very simple but apparently basic way that is here attempted. Hence it has been quite impossible to avoid this attempt to burden economic science with new terms.
• 15We have tried also, in the analysis which follows, to avoid the “formal definitions” of which Cannan disapproved, in the sense in which he disapproved of them; for we have taken heed of his other warning and endeavored to avoid “the formation of an economic language understood only by specialists.” Such new terms as we have introduced should be immediately comprehensible by the layman. The term “participating idleness” gave trouble, but Cannan would surely have approved of it. And, further, an attempt has been made to adhere to the rule that Cairnes quoted from J. S. Mill, namely, that in the nomenclature of definitions “the aids of derivation and analogy” should be “employed to keep alive a consciousness of all that is signified by them.” This applies, we believe, even to our original but seemingly highly important conception of “participating idleness” as well as to the vaguely recognized conceptions that we have termed “pseudo-idleness” and “aggressive idleness.” But in choosing terms for our definitions, we have not been able to make use of Malthus’s suggestion that, in introducing distinctions which cannot be described by “terms which are of daily occurrence,” the next best authority is that of the “most celebrated writers in the science.” For, strange as it may seem, our “celebrated writers” have never specifically analyzed idleness in the very simple but apparently basic way that is here attempted. Hence it has been quite impossible to avoid this attempt to burden economic science with new terms.
• 16We have tried also, in the analysis which follows, to avoid the “formal definitions” of which Cannan disapproved, in the sense in which he disapproved of them; for we have taken heed of his other warning and endeavored to avoid “the formation of an economic language understood only by specialists.” Such new terms as we have introduced should be immediately comprehensible by the layman. The term “participating idleness” gave trouble, but Cannan would surely have approved of it. And, further, an attempt has been made to adhere to the rule that Cairnes quoted from J. S. Mill, namely, that in the nomenclature of definitions “the aids of derivation and analogy” should be “employed to keep alive a consciousness of all that is signified by them.” This applies, we believe, even to our original but seemingly highly important conception of “participating idleness” as well as to the vaguely recognized conceptions that we have termed “pseudo-idleness” and “aggressive idleness.” But in choosing terms for our definitions, we have not been able to make use of Malthus’s suggestion that, in introducing distinctions which cannot be described by “terms which are of daily occurrence,” the next best authority is that of the “most celebrated writers in the science.” For, strange as it may seem, our “celebrated writers” have never specifically analyzed idleness in the very simple but apparently basic way that is here attempted. Hence it has been quite impossible to avoid this attempt to burden economic science with new terms.