Pearl Harbor

NOTES

This book was completed before publication by the Government Printing Office of the official proceedings of the Joint Congressional Committee to investigate the attack upon Pearl Harbor. Where the transcript of committee proceedings was available, citations of testimony are referred to the transcript; otherwise, references are to the specific dates of hearings on which testimony was given. These may be checked against the daily hearings as published by the Government Printing Office.

Other sources, with abbreviations employed in the Appendix, are as follows:

AP—Associated Press

APH—Army Pearl Harbor Board: Text as printed in extra number of the United States News, Sept. 1, 1945.

Atlantic—Battle Report: The Atlantic War, by Comdr. Walter Karig, USNR; Lieut. Earl Burton, USNR, and Lieut. Stephen L. Freeland, USNR (Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., New York, 1946).

BR—Battle Report: Pearl Harbor to Coral Sea, by Comdr. Walter Karig, USNR, and Lieut. Wellbourn Kelley, USNR (Farrar and Rinehart, New York, 1944).

Chron.—Events Leading Up to World War II: Chronological History, 1931-1944 (House Document No. 541, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1944).

CR—Congressional Record

CT—The Chicago Tribune

Fed. Reg.—Federal Register

For. Rel. I and II—Papers Pertaining to Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan, 1931-1941. Two volumes (House Document No. 339, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1943).

Grew—Ten Years in Japan, by Joseph C. Grew (Simon and Schuster, New York, 1944). Submitted before the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack as Exhibit 30.

Hart Report—Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack by Adm. Thomas C. Hart, USN, retired.

How War Came—How War Came, by Forrest Davis and Ernest K. Lindley (Simon and Schuster, New York, 1942).

Huie—The Case against the Admirals, by William Bradford Huie (E. P. Dutton, New York, 1946).

Intercepts—Pearl Harbor: Intercepted Japanese Diplomatic Messages, Joint Congressional Committee, Exhibit 1.

JCC—Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack: daily hearings.

Kimmel—Statement of Rear Adm. Husband E. Kimmel, USN, retired, to Joint Congressional Committee, Jan. 15, 1946; 108 pages (mimeograph).

Maj.— Majority Report of the Joint Congressional Committee (United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1946).

Min.—Minority Report of the Joint Congressional Committee (United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1946).

NCI—Report of the Naval Court of Inquiry which investigated the Pearl Harbor attack: Text as printed in extra number of the United States News, Sept. 1, 1945.

NYT—The New York Times

Papers—Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: 1936 Volume, Random House, New York; 1937-1940 Volumes, Macmillan, New York.

Peace—Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941 (United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1943).

Puleston—The Armed Forces of the Pacific, by Capt. W. D. Puleston, USN (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1941).

R.—Report of the Presidential Commission to Investigate Pearl Harbor, headed by Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts.

Safford—Statement of Capt. L. F. Safford, USN, to Joint Congressional Committee, Feb. 1, 1946 (22 pages, mimeograph). Incorporated in transcript of the committee, pp. 9622-54.

Stimson—Statement of former Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson to Joint Congressional Committee, March 21, 1946 (68 pages, mimeograph). Incorporated in volume 70 of the committee transcript.

Tr.—Report of Proceedings before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack (Ward and Paul, Washington, official reporters).

NOTES ON FOREWORD

  1.  Brittanica Book of the Year, 1938-1942, p. 1511.

  2.  Tr., p. 8693.

  3.  The Army Pearl Harbor Board was appointed pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 339, Seventy-eighth Congress, approved June 13, 1944, and by order dated July 8, 1944, of the adjutant general, War Department. The board was directed “to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on Dec. 7, 1941, and to make such recommendations as it may deem proper.” The board held sessions beginning July 20, 1944, and concluded its investigation on Oct. 20, 1944. Its record and exhibits cover 3,357 printed pages. Members of the board were Lieut. Gen. George Grunert, president; Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell, and Maj. Gen. Walter A. Frank.

  4.  The Navy Court of Inquiry was appointed pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 339, Seventy-eighth Congress, approved June 13, 1944, and by order dated July 13, 1944, of the Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal. The court was ordered to “inquire into the attack made by Japanese armed forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941 . . . and will include in its findings a full statement of the facts it may deem to be established. The court will further give its opinion as to whether any offenses have been committed or serious blame incurred on the part of any person or persons in the naval service, and in case its opinion be that offenses have been committed or serious blame incurred, will specifically recommend what further proceedings should be had.” The court held sessions beginning July 24, 1944, and concluded its inquiry on October 19, 1944. The record of its proceedings and exhibits covers 1,397 printed pages. Members of the court were Adm. Orin G. Murfin, retired, president; Adm. Edward C. Kalbfus, retired, and Vice Adm. Adolphus Andrews, retired.

  5.  The inquiry conducted by Adm. Thomas C. Hart, United States Navy, retired, was initiated by precept dated Feb. 12, 1944, from Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox to Adm. Hart “For an Examination of Witnesses and the Taking of Testimony Pertinent to the Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii.” The precept stated “. . . Whereas certain members of the naval forces, who have knowledge pertinent to the foregoing matters, are now or soon may be on dangerous assignments at great distances from the United States . . . it is now deemed necessary, in order to prevent evidence being lost by death or unavoidable absence of those certain members of the naval forces, that their testimony, pertinent to the aforesaid Japanese attack, be recorded and preserved, . . .” This inquiry was commenced on Feb. 12, 1944, and was concluded on June 15, 1944. The record of its proceedings and exhibits covers 565 printed pages.

  6.  Tr., Vol. 1, p. 8.

  7.  CR, p. 8480, Sept. 6, 1945.

  8.  The majority report of the committee stated, “An effort was made to elicit all facts having an immediate or remote bearing on the tragedy of Dec. 7, 1941. It is believed the committee has succeeded through its record in preserving for posterity the material facts concerning the disaster” (Maj., p. XIV).

The minority report differed. “When all the testimony, papers, documents, exhibits, and other evidence duly laid before the committee are reviewed,” it said, “it becomes apparent that the record is far from complete” (Min., p. 3).

The difficulties under which the committee prosecuted its investigation are outlined as follows in the minority report:

“The committee did not have an opportunity to cross-examine any of the high civil executive principals in the Pearl Harbor affair. President Roosevelt and Secretary Knox had died before the committee was created. Harry Hopkins, who was intimately and officially associated with President Roosevelt, died shortly after the committee began its work. The ill health of Secretary of War Stimson and Secretary of State Hull prevented the committee from getting the full benefit of their knowledge, except for the information they voluntarily furnished. . . .

“These difficulties were supplemented by even greater ones stemming from Presidential restraints on the committee and from the partisan character of the committee itself.

“Even before the committee commenced its work, it was confronted with an order issued on Aug. 28, 1945, and signed by President Truman, which severely limited the power of the committee to gain access to the full facts. The order is as follows (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 26):

‘AUGUST 28, 1945.

‘Memorandum for—The Secretary of State.

The Secretary of War.

The Secretary of the Navy.

The Attorney General.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Director of the Budget.

The Director of the Office of War Information.

‘Appropriate departments of the government and the joint chiefs of staff are hereby directed to take such steps as are necessary to prevent release to the public, except with the specific approval of the President in each case, of—

‘Information regarding the past or present status, technique or procedures, degree of success attained, or any specific results of any cryptanalytic unit acting under the authority of the United States government or any department thereof.

HARRY S. TRUMAN.”

‘Restricted.

“It was not until Oct. 23, 1945, that President Truman made the order less stringent by a new order. The modification left much to be desired.

“The application of the new order was limited to the State, War, and Navy Departments. It relaxed the secrecy of records only so far as ‘the Joint Committee” was concerned, while it continued to prevent ‘individual’ members of the committee from searching records as responsible members of Congress either alone, in groups, or even when accompanied by committee counsel. By one way or another, control over papers, records, and other information remained in the hands of the majority party members.

“The President’s October order also contained the unfortunate phrase ‘any information in their possession material to the investigation,’ which provided a cloak for those reluctant to yield information requested by members of the committee. It was always possible to confront individual members with the view that the papers, data, and information desired was not ‘material to the investigation.’ Decisions were made by the majority ruling out evidence as ‘not material to the investigation’ without members of the committee ever seeing the material about which the decision was made.

“No subsequent modifying orders wholly removed these restrictions. In an order of Nov. 7, 1945, President Truman relaxed restraints on executives of the government in order that they may speak freely to individual members of the committee, but the order closed with the direction: ‘This does not include any files or written material.’

“In this fashion every facility and concession afforded to members of the joint committee was hedged about with troublesome qualifications and restraints. The relaxation of restraints was often publicized while the continuing qualifications were but little discussed. The effect was to restrict individual members of the committee in practice while the appearance of their freedom of operations was held out to the public. In justice to committee counsel and to individual majority members of the committee, efforts made by them to overcome these restrictions should be recognized. It is a great tribute to their fairness that the committee did not break up over this issue but continued to work despite the handicaps which were never wholly removed.

“The plain fact that an investigation could not be an investigation if committee members remained mere spectators, persuaded some members that restraints on their freedom were not justified. The flimsiness of the argument for restrictions became even more evident when permission to search files and other records was denied by majority vote to individual members even when accompanied by committee counsel. Rightly or wrongly it was inferred from this that there was a deliberate design to block the search for the truth.

“Such a view was supported by the knowledge that restrictions on individual members of congressional investigatory bodies were contrary to the best practices in other investigations. Some celebrated instances were recalled. Speaking in the Senate on Nov. 9, 1945, during one of the discussions on committee powers, the Senator from Montana (Mr. Burton K. Wheeler) observed:

“‘I concur in what the Senator from Illinois has said with reference to the authorizing of a single member of the committee to hold hearings. I have served on a good many investigations since I have been a member of the Senate, and some very important ones. I assisted to quite an extent in the Teapot Dome investigation carried on by my colleague, Senator Walsh, of Montana, and likewise I carried on the investigation of the Department of Justice. I was a minority member of the committee.

“‘In all my experience with any investigating committee, I have never known of any one member of a committee not being permitted to go and look over the files in any department of the government of the United States. This is the first time I have ever known anything of that kind being questioned. . . .

“‘. . . I call attention to the fact that in the Daugherty investigation I sent for files myself, I asked for files from the attorney general of the United States, Mr. Daugherty. He refused to give them to me. I have forgotten the ground he stated, but at any rate he refused to give them to me. When he did so, the President of the United States, Mr. Coolidge, called him in and asked for his resignation, and Mr. Daugherty was eliminated from the office of attorney general. After that time, when the new attorney general was appointed, every single file I ever asked for, as a minority member of the committee, was furnished to me.

“‘. . . As I have stated, my colleague, Senator Walsh, of Montana, was a minority member of the committee investigating the Teapot Dome situation. I know of my own personal knowledge that he got from the department, and from officials in the department, information which he afterward used, and if he had not been permitted to do that, and if I had not been permitted to do it, I am sure there would have been a complete failure of the investigation of the Department of Justice. (Congressional Record, Vol. 91, No. 198, November 9, 1945, p. 10755.)’

“Another instance is the more recent one in which President Truman himself is well versed. As Senator, Mr. Truman headed a distinguished committee bearing the popular designation ‘The Truman Committee’ (now the Mead Committee). The cardinal principle of the Truman Committee in the four years during which it won the respect and confidence of the American people, rested on the proposition that every individual member of the committee was wholly free to search for any information deemed by him to be relevant wherever and whenever he thought it could be found. Never once did the chairman or the majority of the committee refuse to recognize that right and that responsibility of each individual member.

“Untrammeled freedom of individual committee members in these instances did not produce chaos or disorder as was argued would be the case in the Pearl Harbor inquiry. On the contrary, the procedure and results in each case did honor to the committees concerned and proved salutary for the nation. Complete concurrence with the most admirable outline of the purposes and scope of the investigation of the events leading up to Pearl Harbor and our entry into the World War as presented to the Senate by the author of the resolution at the time of its introduction and hearty approval of much that has been done by the committee must not blind us to the extent to which the investigation lived up to its advance billing by its distinguished sponsor.

“At the very inception the tested practices in investigations of this character that had demonstrated such extraordinary success in the entire history of the Truman Committee were very definitely rejected and neither of the two members of the committee who had received rather extended training under the then Senator Truman was allowed to follow the course in the investigation of Pearl Harbor that had repeatedly produced most gratifying results in his earlier experience.

“This firm refusal by the committee majority, consisting of six Democrats as against four Republicans, at the very outset to allow the scope to individual members even with every safeguard proposed against the alleged danger of abuse was both unfortunate and disquieting.

“Everything that has since developed must be viewed in the light of this iron curtain that was thus imposed.

“Permission was asked to conduct exploration for certain missing records. Vigorous and public denial was made—presumably on executive authority—that any records were missing. Subsequently it developed that several records were missing and most inadequate explanations were supplied. How any public interest could possibly have been prejudiced by affording any opportunity to examine the manner of keeping records of this character has never been satisfactorily explained.

“These incidents revealed a disquieting determination to keep entire control of the investigation in the hands of the committee majority who were thus put in the unusual position of arrogating to themselves the capacity to conduct an impartial and adequate investigation of their own administration. The history of human conduct furnishes few precedents to justify such confidence.

“Some of the effects of majority decision as well as gaps in the data and testimony due to other causes illustrate the great difficulty surrounding the work of the committee.

“Secretary Stimson declined to appear on the ground that his health did not permit him to undergo strain. Access to his diary was denied by majority vote.

“To accommodate Secretary Stimson because of his illness, Senator Ferguson on March 6, 1946, submitted 176 questions as part of the official record for Secretary Stimson to answer as if propounded in open hearing of the committee (Tr., Vol. 70, pp. 14437 ff.).

“Secretary Stimson did not answer any of these questions, and the committee made no effort to insist upon his answering these questions, which were highly pertinent to the inquiry.

“Later, Senator Ferguson submitted a supplementary list of 61 questions to be answered in the same manner (Tr., Vol. 70, p. 14476). Secretary Stimson answered these questions in writing, and his answers are part of the record. These answers did not, however, make up for the deficiencies in the failure to answer the earlier list of 176 questions.

“Secretary Hull made three appearances, in the course of which he gave his official version of the matters before the committee and was briefly examined by the counsel, but minority members of the committee were not permitted to cross-examine him. When his answers to written interrogatories from committee members proved unresponsive, there was no way to secure further information from him.

“The diary of former Ambassador Joseph C. Grew was likewise denied to the committee. The assertion of its confidential character was somewhat belied by its submission for examination to certain individuals with a view to its commercial publication.

“The denial to the committee of the Stimson and Grew diaries was particularly obstructive because these principles placed excerpts of the diaries in the record and withheld the rest. This was contrary to the prime rule in American law that if part of a document is put into the record by a witness in his own behalf, the court is entitled to demand the whole of the document. Concerning each of these diaries the committee, by majority vote, refused to issue subpenas for their production.

“Many messages, probably several hundreds, between Winston Churchill and President Franklin D. Roosevelt received prior to Dec. 7, 1941, were not available to the committee, although there is good reason to believe that they bore on the gathering crisis. Other messages between Mr. Churchill and the British embassy and American authorities were made available to the committee, but our government replies or action taken were not so available.

“The former Prime Minister of Great Britain was in this country not on official business while hearings of this committee were going on. His intimate knowledge of affairs leading up to Pearl Harbor would have cleared up many gaps in the evidence. By majority vote, a request for the appearance of Mr. Churchill was refused.

“President Roosevelt’s secretary, Miss Grace Tully, was permitted to determine for herself and the committee and the country what portions of the official correspondence of the late President had any relevancy to Pearl Harbor. This could hardly be a satisfactory substitute for the responsibility placed upon this committee.

“One of the very important questions concerning the defense of Hawaii dealt with the delays in building airfields and the failure to install radar and other warning devices. Members of the committee sought to inquire into the performance of one Col. Theodore Wyman in this connection, but the committee decided against it.

“The whole question of whether or not it would have been possible to avoid war by proper diplomatic action and thus avert the Pearl Harbor tragedy was left largely unexplored.

“We are permitted only occasional glimpses into this realm but these are fascinating. . . .

“In short, the committee labored under great difficulties and was not in possession of the full historical record pertinent to the case before it. Nevertheless an investigation was made and an amazing amount of material was developed in the limited time allowed to cover such a vast field. It is the duty of the committee to render a report, regardless of the inadequacies of evidence, if sufficient facts are at hand to pass on the issues of responsibility for the catastrophe at Pearl Harbor. A careful review of the evidence is convincing enough that these issues can be decided now” (Min., pp. 3-8).

Representative Keefe, in a statement of “additional views” appended to the majority report, said:

“This investigation has not brought to light all the facts about Pearl Harbor. We have been denied much vital information. Mr. Stimson did not answer certain important interrogations which, in consideration of the state of his health, were submitted to him in writing. He has also denied to the committee his diary entries for the days Dec. 2 to Dec. 6, 1941. These were significantly omitted from his written statement. Mr. Hull’s health permitted only a brief appearance before us and no examination by the minority members of the committee. Written interrogatories were submitted as to when he first saw or obtained information as to the contents of certain vital intercepted messages, including the 1:00 P.M. message. Mr. Hull answered: ‘I do not recall the exact times that I first saw or learned of the contents of the messages you cite’ (Tr., 14316). ‘I do not recall’ was an answer frequently received from other important witnesses. Messrs. Maxwell Hamilton, Eugene Dooman and Stanley Hornbeck, State Department officials who played important roles in 1941 in our Far Eastern diplomacy, have not testified. We have been denied Ambassador Grew’s diary. In December, 1941, Gen. Bedell Smith was secretary to the general staff of the Army. He did not testify. His possible knowledge of the distribution of intercepted messages to Gen. Marshall on Saturday evening, Dec. 6, was not investigated. Adm. (then Capt.) Glover was the duty officer in the office of the chief of naval operations on Dec. 6, 1941. His log for that night contained the vital information about Mr. Stimson’s interest in precise locations of the ships of the Pacific fleet. Adm. Glover sent the committee a telegram but did not testify. Mr. Welles’s memoranda of Atlantic Charter conferences was obtained from State Department only after his oral testimony before us had been completed” (Maj., pp. 266 S and T).

  9.  CT, Nov. 21, 1945, 2:6.

 10.  Senate Document No. 244.

 11.  In his statement of additional views, Representative Keefe said (Maj., p. 266-A):

“Throughout the long and arduous sessions of the committee in the preparation of the committee report, I continuously insisted that whatever ‘yardstick’ was agreed upon as a basis for determining responsibilities in Hawaii should be applied to the high command at Washington. This indicates in a general way my fundamental objection to the committee report. I feel that facts have been marshaled, perhaps unintentionally, with the idea of conferring blame upon Hawaii and minimizing the blame that should properly be assessed at Washington.

“A careful reading of the committee report would indicate that the analysis of orders and dispatches is so made as to permit criticism of our commands in Hawaii while at the same time proposing a construction which would minimize the possibility of criticism of those in charge at Washington.

“I think that the facts in this record clearly demonstrate that Hawaii was always the No. 1 point of danger and that both Washington and Hawaii should have known it at all times and acted accordingly. Consequently I agree that the high command in Hawaii was subject to criticism for concluding that Hawaii was not in danger. However, I must insist that the same criticism with the same force and scope should apply to the high command in Washington. It is in this respect that I think the tenor of the committee report may be subject to some criticism.

“I fully agree with the doctrine relating to the placing of responsibility on military officers in the field and their resulting duty under such responsibilities. I agree that they must properly sustain this burden in line with the high and peculiar abilities which originally gave them their assignments.

“In the execution of their vitally important duties, however, the officers at the front in the field are fairly entitled to all aids and help and all information which can reasonably be sent to them from the all-powerful high staff command in Washington. If both commands are in error, both should be blamed for what each should have done and what each failed to do respectively. The committee report, I feel, does not with exactitude apply the same yardstick in measuring responsibilities at Washington as has been applied to the Hawaiian commanders. I cannot suppress the feeling that the committee report endeavors to throw as soft a light as possible on the Washington scene.”

 12.  The Joint Congressional Committee conducted hearings on 70 days between Nov. 15, 1945, and May 31, 1946, receiving 183 exhibits and taking 15,000 pages of testimony from 43 witnesses. Testimony and exhibits of seven previous investigations were available to the committee: the inquiries of the Roberts Commission, Adm. Hart, the Army Pearl Harbor Board, the Navy Court of Inquiry, Col. Clarke, Maj. Clausen, and Adm. Hewitt. The records of these investigations total 9,754 printed pages of testimony from 318 witnesses, and 469 exhibits were filed with them. The records of these proceedings have been incorporated in the record of the Joint Congressional Committee, which encompasses approximately 10 million words (Maj., p. XIV).

NOTES ON CHAPTER I: WAR

  1.  Neville Chamberlain, Sept. 30, 1938.

  2.  See testimony of Baron Constantin von Neurath, former German foreign minister, at Nuernberg war crimes trials, reported in AP dispatch, June 24, 1946. Neurath asserted that signers of the Munich pact could have halted Hitler’s aggressions even after the absorption of Czechoslovakia.

  3.  Poland No. 1, 1945: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, Cmd. 6616, p. 4.

  4.  Ambrose Bierce, The Devil’s Dictionary (Tower Books Edition), p. 22.

  5.  AP dispatch from Tokyo, Dec. 19, 1945. (Konoye memoirs introduced as JCC Ex. 173.)

  6.  See dispatch of L.S.B. Shapiro, NYT, March 19, 1946, 10:4. Mr. Shapiro reported: “The key to Russia’s expansion program in Europe and the Near East has fallen into the hands of the State Department in Washington. Captured German documents detailing the final conversations between Russian Foreign Minister Vyaches-lav Molotov and German Foreign Minister Joachim Ribbentrop in the spring of 1941 have been collated and compared with the reports of American envoys and military attachés in European capitals at that time, with the result that Washington now possesses exact pictures of the aims and desires that lie behind the current Soviet troop movements and diplomatic pressures.

“A few weeks before Germany attacked Russia in June, 1941, Mr. Molotov traveled to Berlin in a final effort to divert the Wehrmacht spearheads, which were then clearly gathering for a thrust to the east. The transcript of these last conversations between Mr. Molotov and Ribbentrop became, in 1945, the chief objective of intelligence teams of every victorious nation scouring the ruins of the Third Reich.

“This correspondent has learned, on reliable authority, that the prized transcript was in a batch of captured German documents that were dispatched to Washington during the winter. From sources in an undisputable position to know the facts, I have learned that the salient points of the transcript are as follows:

“Mr. Molotov was coldly received by Ribbentrop, who interrupted the conversations abruptly at frequent points to consult with Hitler. The latter arranged his affairs to make himself quickly available to Ribbentrop at all stages of the conversations.

“The Soviet emissary arrived with authorization from the Kremlin to offer to Germany full military alliance in return for certain territorial concessions after victory, which were permanent possession of all Polish territory then occupied by Soviet forces; incorporation of Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, and the Karelian Isthmus, Bessarabia and Bukovina into the Soviet Union; complete control of the Dardanelles, a free hand in Iraq and Iran, and enough of Saudi Arabia to give the Soviets control of the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Aden guarding the approaches to the Red Sea.

“Ribbentrop questioned Mr. Molotov closely on whether he would interpret the terms of a full military alliance as necessarily meaning joining the war in the west. Russia would guarantee Germany’s eastern and southeastern flanks, and her own military program in the Near East would constitute military aid of an important nature.

“After numerous conferences with Hider, Ribbentrop arrived at certain private conclusions. The first was that Russia’s territorial demands were too great for acceptance. Secondly, Ribbentrop felt that even if these were suitable, he could not accept Russia’s friendly assurances at face value and that Germany would still require a huge force on her eastern frontiers to watch Russia’s every move.

“These decisions were put to Mr. Molotov in an extremely stormy final session and the conference broke up shortly thereafter.

“In the light of current Russian moves, this transcript has now assumed importance. American diplomats have known for several months that the apparently confusing Russian pressure all over the globe would be consolidated finally in a push toward the Persian Gulf.”

  7.  JCC, Jan. 3, 1946.

  8.  Ibid., Jan. 4, 1946.

  9.  CT, Dec. 7, 1941, 13:2.

10.  Papers, 1939 vol., pp. 201-5.

11.  Address to Reichstag, April 28, 1939.

12.  Grew, p. 493.

13.  Brittanica Book of the Year, 1938-1942, p. 1385.

14.  Capt. A. H. McCollum testified before the Joint Congressional Committee (Tr., p. 9260) that “I had . . . for many years felt that in the event of an outbreak of hostilities between the United States and Japan that the Japanese would make a very definite attempt to strike the fleet at or near the commencement time of those hostilities.”

The following committee examination of Capt. McCollum (Tr., pp. 9275-6) develops the same theme:

Question: “And you always felt that if the Japs were going to strike with her fleets the place to start was by attacking our fleet?”

Captain McCollum: “That is correct.”

Question: “The place they would start would be by attacking the fleet.”

Captain McCollum: “They not only would do that, but that there was historical precedent, if the Japanese wished to start a war with us. Their war with China in 1895 was started that way; their war with Russia in 1907 was started that way; their war against Germany in Tsingtao in 1914 was started in that way. . . . Attacking their fleet and timing a declaration of war on presentation of the final notes.”

15.  How War Came, p. 4.

16.  NYT, Dec. 7, 1941, 1:4.

17.  How War Came, p. 5.

NOTES ON CHAPTER II: MOUNT NIITAKA

  1.  Most of this chapter is based upon the testimony of Adm. T. B. Inglis before the Joint Congressional Committee Nov. 17, 1945. See Tr., pp. 430 ff.

  2.  Official American and Japanese estimates on the number of planes in the attacking force disagree. The American Navy estimates navy targets at Pearl Harbor were attacked by 105 Jap planes (testimony of Adm. Inglis, Tr., p. 145). The United States Army estimates that 105 enemy planes also attacked army targets on Oahu (testimony of Col. Bernard Thielen, Tr., p. 145). The total of enemy planes thus would be 210. From Japanese sources, Adm. Inglis testified that the attacking force consisted of 361 planes, supplemented by a combat patrol of 18 fighters launched before the takeoff of the attacking force (Tr., pp. 453-4). Three Zero type float planes were assigned to pre-dawn reconnaissance, according to Japanese accounts (Tr., p. 454). Capt. Mitsue Fuchida, commander of the flight groups in the attack, stated (AP dispatch from Tokyo, Oct. 16, 1945) that 350 planes participated.

  3.  Richard E. Lauterbach, “Secret Jap War Plans,” Life Magazine (March 4, 1946), p. 18.

  4.  Edwin Mueller, “Inside Story of Pearl Harbor,” Reader’s Digest, (April, 1944), pp. 25-27.

  5.  AP dispatch from Tokyo, Oct. 25, 1945.

  6.  Ibid.

  7.  AP dispatch from Tokyo, Oct. 16, 1945.

  8.  Tr., p. 457.

  9.  AP dispatch from Tokyo, Sept. 8, 1945.

10.  NYT, Dec. 6, 1942, 1:1.

11.  JCC, Jan. 24, 1946.

12.  AP dispatch from Tokyo, Oct. 25, 1945.

13.  JCC, Dec. 12, 1945.

14.  William Bradford Huie, The Case against the Admirals (E. P. Dutton, 1946), pp. 153-54.

15.  JCC, Jan. 19, 1946.

16.  Ibid., Jan. 21, 1946.

17.  Ibid., Feb. 1, 1946.

18.  AP dispatch from Pearl Harbor, Dec. 6, 1945.

NOTES ON CHAPTER III: THE RISING SUN

  1.  BR, p. 11.

  2.  JCC, Dec. 15, 1945.

  3.  Ibid., Feb. 1, 1945.

  4.  Ibid.

  5.  Tr., pp. 83-84.

  6.  BR, pp. 12-17; Tr., pp. 83-86.

  7.  Ibid., pp. 39-41.

  8.  APH, p. 45.

  9.  BR, pp. 17-18. Capture of the sampan was disputed by Adm. Inglis (Tr., p. 86) on the ground that no entry concerning the matter appeared in the “Ward’s” administrative log. No direct testimony was taken from the commander or crew of the destroyer.

10.  BR, p. 15.

11.  JCC, Feb. 20, 1946.

12.  Radar operations at Oahu are reported extensively in Tr., pp. 75-82, and APH, pp. 33, 38-40, 44.

13.  APH, p. 33.

14.  Tr., p. 81; JCC, Jan. 26, 1946; Tr., p. 230.

15.  APH, p. 33.

16.  Ibid., p. 17.

17.  NCI, p. 64.

18.  APH, pp. 44-45.

19.  BR, pp. 23-26; APH, p. 35.

20.  APH, p. 35.

21.  Tr., pp. 233-36.

22.  BR, p. 26.

23.  APH, p. 197; BR, pp. 27 and 36.

24.  JCC, Jan. 24, 1946.

25.  JCC, Ex. 100. It still is not clear whether Sakamaki reconnoitered the harbor before his submarine came to grief.

26.  Tr., p. 456; APH, p. 45.

27.  Tr., p. 50.

28.  BR, pp. 28-29.

29.  Adm. Inglis (Tr., p. 90) estimates that the first attack was at Ewa, at 7:53 A.M.

30.  BR, p. 42. Also see pp. 18-19 and 38.

31.  Estimates on American plane losses vary. Adm. Inglis (Tr., p. 460) gives Navy losses at 102 aircraft, and Col. Thielin (ibid.) Army losses at 96.

32.  APH, p. 43.

33.  JCC, Nov. 15, 1945, Navy ex., item 9.

34.  Tr., p. 87; BR, p. 30.

35.  Tr., p. 91; NCI, p. 67; BR, p. 32.

36.  Tr., p. 98; BR, pp. 36, 57, 73.

37.  Tr., pp. 130-31.

38.  The following tabulation of damage to the fleet is based upon Navy ex., item 15, introduced before JCC, Nov. 15, 1945:

“Arizona,” 33,100 tons: sank at her berth after being hit by one or more aircraft torpedoes and about eight heavy bombs. One bomb, estimated at 2,000 pounds, exploded the forward magazines. The ship was considered to be a total wreck except for material which could be salvaged.

“California,” 32,600 tons: sank at her berth as a result of two aircraft torpedo hits and one or more near-bomb misses. Also hit on starboard upper deck by a large bomb which caused a powder fire. Resting on bottom after attack with quarterdeck under 12 feet of water and port side of forecastle under three feet of water.

“West Virginia,” 31,800 tons: sank at her berth after four or five aircraft torpedo hits and at least two bomb hits. Rested on bottom with all spaces flooded up to two or three feet below main deck.

“Oklahoma,” 29,000 tons: capsized at her berth within eight to eleven minutes after receiving four aircraft torpedo hits. The hull was 20 to 30 degrees from being upside down, with a considerable portion of the bottom and starboard side above water.

“Nevada,” 29,000 tons: ran aground and was subsequently beached after being struck by one or more aircraft torpedoes and eight bombs. Two other bombs were near misses, causing rupturing of the hull on the port and starboard bows, respectively. Superstructure wrecked.

“Utah,” 19,800 tons: capsized at berth after being struck by two, and possibly three, aerial torpedoes. Ship was within a few degrees of being exactly upside down.

“Cassin,” 1,500 tons: struck by one bomb, while a second exploding aft between her and the “Downes” knocked her partly off the drydock blocking and caused her to capsize against the “Downes” in a crazy mass of twisted metal. This resulted in a serious structural failure amidships. Fires swept the ship; the hull, besides showing more than 200 holes, was wrinkled by extreme heat.

“Downes,” 1,500 tons: struck by two bombs and left ablaze from stem to stern, the resultant heat causing oil in her bunkers to reach the flash point and explode. Torpedo warheads in the starboard tube were set off and blew out the main deck and starboard side of the vessel in that area, damaging boilers and engines. A serious oil fire following the explosion caused extensive damage to both the “Downes” and “Cassin.” The hull of the “Downes” was riddled with more than 400 holes.

“Shaw,” 1,500 tons: hit by one bomb while docked in floating drydock number 2 and by many fragments from another bomb which struck the drydock. Fire followed, resulting in blowing up of forward magazine and breaking of the ship’s back just ahead of the number 1 stack. When the drydock settled at a 15-degree list, the “Shaw’s” upper works were still above the surface.

“Vestal,” 9,435 tons: struck by two bombs. One hit forward and caused no great damage. The other struck aft and exploded in the hold, causing a large number of fragment holes through the shell. Flooding aft caused the after part of the vessel to submerge to the main deck. The “Vestal” was beached to prevent further sinkage.

“Oglala,” 6,000 tons: sunk by one aircraft torpedo which passed under the ship and exploded against the starboard side of the “Helena.” Vessel sank slowly and capsized against 10-10 dock about an hour and a half later.

Floating drydock number 2: this large drydock took five bomb hits. It was set afire and its watertight compartments holed by more than 150 fragments. It settled with one side of the drydock still above water.

“Pennsylvania,” 33,100 tons: one bomb hit near the starboard side 5-inch gun. Damage from the explosion was considerable but did not extend below the second deck. One gun was put out of commission.

“Maryland,” 31,500 tons: two bomb hits in the forecastle. One of these bombs passed through the port side of the ship about 12 feet under water and exploded, wrecking flats and bulkheads in that area.

“Tennessee,” 32,300 tons: two 15-inch shells fitted with fins for use as aerial bombs struck numbers 2 and 3 turrets. Flames spreading from the oil fire on the nearby “Arizona” caused serious damage aft.

“Helena,” 10,000 tons: hit on starboard side by aircraft torpedo, causing flooding of numbers 1 and 2 firerooms and forward engine room. The starboard engine was seriously damaged.

“Honolulu,” 10,000 tons: damaged by large bomb which passed through deck and exploded 15 or 20 feet from the port side, causing considerable damage to the hull and resulting in flooding of storerooms and magazines.

“Raleigh,” 7,050 tons: hit by one aircraft torpedo amidships on port side, flooding the forward half of the machinery plant. Also hit by one bomb which passed through three decks and out the ship’s side, exploding about 50 feet away. Serious flooding occurred on the port side aft.

“Curtiss,” 13,880 tons: struck on starboard crane by Japanese airplane out of control. This resulted in some wreckage and fire damage. One bomb struck the forward end of the port side hangar, exploding on the second deck. The explosion and resulting fire caused a great amount of wreckage and loss of material.

39.  Tr., pp. 458-59.

NOTES ON CHAPTER IV: THE SCAPEGOATS

  1.  AP dispatch from Tokyo, Dec. 12, 1945.

  2.  Ibid., Oct. 25, 1945.

  3.  CR, vol. 87, part 9, 77th congress, 1st session, pp. 9506, 9536-37.

  4.  CT, Dec. 8, 1941, 1:7.

  5.  NYT, Dec. 12, 1941, 4:1.

  6.  CR, vol. 87, part 9, 77th congress, 1st session, pp. 9652-53, 9665-67.

  7.  Peace, pp. 848-49.

  8.  CT, Dec. 9, 1941, 4:2.

  9.  Ibid., 4:3.

10.  United States News, April 19, 1946, p. 24-B.

11.  How War Came, p. 4.

12.  NYT, Dec. 16, 1941, 1:7.

13.  BR, pp. 81-82.

14.  Tr., pp. 6221-48, especially pp. 6223 and 6237. In his “Summary and Recommendations,” Knox made no accusation against Kimmel or Short.

15.  JCC, Jan. 5, 1946.

16.  NYT, Dec. 18, 1941, 1:1.

17.  Ibid., Dec. 17, 1941, 9:1.

18.  See address made by Roberts as chairman of mass meeting of Council for Democracy in Madison Square Garden Aug. 19, 1941: NYT, Aug. 20, 1941, 1:7.

19.  CT, Jan. 25, 1942, 1:6.

20.  Maj., p. 269.

21.  JCC, Dec. 19, 1945.

22.  Ibid., Jan. 19, 1946.

23.  Ibid., Jan. 25, 1946.

24.  Ibid., Jan. 16, 1946.

25.  Tr., Vol. 42, pp. 8007-8.

26.  Ibid., pp. 8544-45.

NOTES ON CHAPTER V: THE BASING OF THE FLEET

  1.  Papers, 1940, pp. 193-94.

  2.  Puleston, pp. 214-15.

  3.  JCC, Dec. 19, 1945.

  4.  That simple logic dictated an attack upon the fleet at Pearl Harbor is attested by the minority report of the Joint Congressional Committee (pp. 28-30):

“The fleet was stationed at Pearl Harbor in a large measure, if not entirely, for the purpose of exercising a deterring effect on the aggressive propensities of the Japanese government during the diplomatic negotiations and of making the government more likely to yield to the diplomatic representations of the United States in matters of policy. This was done contrary to the advice of the commander-in-chief of the U. S. Fleet, Adm. Richardson (who was removed because of protest on that issue), and with which Adm. William D. Leahy, former chief of naval operations agreed (Tr., Vol. 6, p. 916). The fleet could produce this effect only as an instrument of war that constituted a potential threat to the Japanese; that is, a powerful instrument which could be used effectively to strike Japanese armed forces if they moved too far southward in the direction of British, Dutch, and/or American possessions in that region.

“Having determined to move far southward and having moved far on the way early in December toward that region, the Japanese were warned by every principle of sound naval strategy to destroy, if possible, the American fleet at Hawaii on their left flank.

“High authorities in Washington definitely knew from a message received from Ambassador Winant in London at 10:40 A.M. Dec. 6, 1941 (Washington time) that two large Japanese forces had been seen sailing toward the Kra Peninsula and were distant only fourteen hours in time (Ex. 21). Washington authorities should have known, therefore, that this would bring the strategic principle of what to do about Hawaii into immediate military calculations. They took no steps to alert Hawaii.

“The Japanese were fully aware of this strategic principle in December, 1941, as their attack on Pearl Harbor demonstrated. . . .

“Judging by the testimony and documents before the committee, most of the high authorities in Washington, especially after the Atlantic conference in August, 1941, so concentrated their attention on American-British-Australian-Dutch plans for combined actions against the Japanese in Southeastern Asia that they failed to give sufficient, if any, careful consideration to the strategic principle which enjoined the Japanese to destroy, if they could, the American fleet at Hawaii on their left flank before advancing too deeply into southeastern waters. . . .

“The whole raison d’etre of the powerful naval and military installations in Hawaii, as publicly announced, was defense against a Japanese attack. Preparations for defense against attack necessarily implied the possibility of an attack. . . .

“Witnesses before the committee, it may be noted, in extenuation of their lack of emphasis on the probability of an attack on Pearl Harbor, called attention to the fact that Japanese agents were also reporting on the military and naval installations of the United States at Panama, the Philippines, the West Coast, and other points. But to men, competent, careful, and watchful, men alert on their all-around and indivisible responsibility, this fact provided no excuse whatever for minimizing the probability of an attack on Pearl Harbor any more than at any other American outpost. Nor does it excuse the failure of Washington authorities to note that far greater detail was being asked for by the Japanese about Hawaii at a time when Japanese movements in the Southwestern Pacific had to contend with the strategic position of Hawaii where the real American striking force, the fleet, rested.

“A full review of the testimony and documents before the committee confirms the conclusion reached by the Army Pearl Harbor Board after its survey of relevant facts: ‘We must therefore conclude that the responsible authorities, the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Staff in Washington, down to the generals and admirals in Hawaii, all expected an air attack before Pearl Harbor (that is Dec. 7, 1941).’ As a general statement, when testifying after the Pearl Harbor attack, they did not expect it. Apparently the only person who was not surprised was the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, who testified: ‘Well, I was not surprised!’ “

  5.  JCC, Jan. 30, 1946.

  6.  Ibid., Nov. 19-20, 1945.

  7.  JCC, Ex. 9, Stark to Richardson, May 7, 1940.

  8.  Ibid., Richardson to Stark, May 13, 1940.

  9.  JCC, Nov. 20, 1945.

10.  Ibid., Jan. 4, 1946.

11.  Ibid., Nov. 19, 1945.

12.  Papers, 1940, p. 517.

13.  JCC, Nov. 20, 1945.

14.  Ibid.

15.  Ibid., Jan. 5, 1946.

16.  Ibid.

17.  Ibid., Nov. 23, 1945.

18.  Ibid., Nov. 26, 1945.

19.  Ibid., Nov. 20, 1945.

20.  Ibid., Ex. 9, Richardson to Stark, Oct. 22, 1940.

21.  JCC, Nov. 21, 1945.

22.  Ibid., Nov. 20, 1945.

23.  Ibid., Jan. 2, 1946.

24.  Secret testimony before Roberts Commission, submitted to JCC Jan. 10, 1946.

25.  JCC, Nov. 21, 1945.

26.  Ibid., Jan. 15, 1946.

27.  Ibid., Jan. 5, 1946.

28.  Ibid., Jan. 21, 1946.

NOTES ON CHAPTER VI: BLUEPRINT FOR DEFEAT

  1.  APH, 12.

  2.  JCC, Nov. 15, 1945, Army Exhibit I, p. 5.

  3.  APH, pp. 18, 19, 20.

  4.  JCC, Dec. 6, 1945.

  5.  APH, p. 12.

  6.  APH, p. 13.

  7.  Tr., p. 7905.

  8.  APH, p. 15.

  9.  JCC, Dec. 6, 1945.

10.  APH, p. 39.

11.  JCC, Jan. 24, 1946; APH, p. 38.

12.  JCC, Jan. 24, 1946.

13.  APH, p. 15.

14.  Ibid.

15.  JCC, Feb. 2, 1946.

16.  Tr., p. 7976.

17.  Ibid., p. 8004.

18.  Kimmel, Jan. 15, 1946, p. 65.

19.  Ibid., pp. 66-68.

20.  Ibid., p. 69.

21.  Ibid., p. 71.

22.  JCC, Dec. 3, 1945.

23.  Ibid.

24.  APH, p. 22.

25.  Ibid., p. 23.

26.  Huie, pp. 93-94.

27.  JCC, Ex. 13.

28.  JCC, Feb. 18, 1946. On March 20, 1946, a month after the regular daily hearings of the committee were concluded, the facts on this subject were confused by admission of committee exhibit 172, a War Department memorandum to committee counsel. The representations made in this document were seized by the committee majority in its report (pp. 164-65) in order to advance the argument that lend-lease did not affect the state of the Hawaii defenses. The majority report states:

“In the case of 210 B-17’s and B-24’s, Army heavy bombers adaptable for distant reconnaissance, delivered between Feb. 1 and Nov. 30, 1941, none were shipped under lend-lease and a total of 113 were sold for cash to foreign countries; 12 B-17’s were shipped to Hawaii and 35 to the Philippines.

“With respect to Navy planes, there were no lend-lease transfers of long-range patrol bombers or scout bombers during the same period. Of a total of 835 Navy planes of all types delivered during this period, Feb. 1 to Nov. 30, 582 were delivered to the Navy and 253 to foreign countries (Britain, Canada, Australia, the Netherlands, and Norway) under cash transactions. Of the 582 planes delivered to the Navy, 218 were sent to the Hawaiian area, 146 of the planes being assigned to carriers.

“It appears that of 3,128 Army and Navy planes of various types delivered between Feb. 1 and Nov. 30, 1941, only 177 were shipped under lend-lease to foreign countries and none of these were capable of performing distant reconnaissance. The record is clear, therefore, that the chief of staff and the chief of naval operations did not prejudice our own defenses in approving excessive allocations to foreign governments.”

The minority report (pp. 50-55) arrives at entirely different conclusions:

“It becomes important, therefore, to consider what defensive equipment was essential to protect the Pearl Harbor base, whether such defensive equipment was supplied, and, if not, the reasons for such failure.

“The character of the defensive equipment necessary for the defense of the Pearl Harbor base is not seriously in dispute. The base most essential, being located on an island, approachable from all directions, the first protective equipment necessary was a sufficient number of long-distance patrol planes to permit proper distance reconnaissance covering a 360° perimeter. The evidence indicates that to supply such a reconnaissance program would require approximately 200 patrol planes, with a sufficient supply of spare parts to keep the planes in operation, and a sufficient number of available crews to permit a continuous patrol.

“Base defense also required sufficient fighter planes to meet any attack which might be considered possible. This would require approximately 175 planes.

“The second class of essential defense equipment was a suitable number of antiaircraft batteries with suitable and sufficient ammunition and sufficient experienced crews for ready operation.

“The third class of defense equipment were torpedo nets and baffles. It would be necessary for a considerable portion of the fleet to be in Pearl Harbor at all times, fueling and relaxation of men together with ship repairs requiring the ships in the fleet to have constant recourse to the base at more or less regular intervals. The mobility of the Pearl Harbor base was limited, and ships using the base were in a more or less defenseless situation except for the defense power of their own ship batteries. . . .

“Approximately four-fifths of the damage to the fleet upon the attack was the result of torpedoes fired by torpedo-bombing planes attacking the base at low altitudes. Against such an attack, anti-torpedo baffles and nets would have been of extraordinary value. . . .

“The fourth class of defense equipment for the base lay in the newly discovered device known as radar, which before Dec. 7 had been sufficiently perfected to permit the discovery of approaching planes more than 100 miles away. . . .

“The record discloses that from the time the fleet arrived at Pearl Harbor until the attack on Dec. 7, the high command at Hawaii, both in the Army and the Navy, frequently advised the military authorities at Washington of the particular defense equipment needs at the Pearl Harbor base (Exhibits 53 and 106). Nowhere in the record does any dissent appear as to the reasonableness, or the propriety, of the requests for defense equipment made by the high command in Hawaii. On the contrary, the necessity for such equipment was expressly recognized and the only explanation given for a failure to provide the equipment was that by reason of unavoidable shortages, the requested defense equipment at Hawaii could not be supplied.

“It was asserted that more equipment had been provided for Hawaii than for any other base, and this is probably correct. The trouble with such an explanation is that Hawaii was the only nonmainland base charged with the defense of a major part of our Pacific fleet, and the equipment supplied to Hawaii was admittedly insufficient. The Philippines received much equipment which might well have gone to Hawaii, because Hawaii could have been defended, whereas no one expected the Philippines to be able to stand a direct Japanese onslaught. Gen. Marshall reported to the President in March, 1941 (Exhibit 59), that ‘Oahu was believed to be the strongest fortress in the world’ and practically invulnerable to attack and that sabotage was considered the first danger and might cause great damage.

“The government made the Atlantic theater the primary theater and the Pacific theater a secondary and a defense theater. We raise no issue as to the propriety of such decision, but we cannot fail to point out that such decision resulted in the failure of the military authorities in Washington to supply the Pearl Harbor base with military defense equipment which everyone agreed was essential and necessary for the defense of the base and the fleet while in the base. As we have said, such a more or less defenseless condition imposed increased peril upon the Pacific fleet, so long as it was based at Pearl Harbor. . . .

“The record discloses that the Army and Navy had available, between Feb. 1 and Dec. 1, 1941, an abundance of long distance patrol planes suitable for reconnaissance purposes. Exhibit 172 shows that the Army received between Feb. 1 and Dec. 1, 1941, approximately 600 long distance bombers capable of flying loaded missions of 1,250 miles or more. Of these 12 went to Hawaii and 35 went to the Philippines. During the same period the Navy received approximately 560 similar long distance bombers, of which approximately 175 were assigned to carriers in the Pacific. During the same period the Army received approximately 5,500 antiaircraft guns, of which 7 went to Hawaii and 100 to the Philippines. If it be true that it was found necessary to send this equipment elsewhere, as we assume, still it would seem that Hawaii instead of having high priority, occupied a subordinate position. . . .

“The fleet itself had been depleted by assignments to the Atlantic theater, and the man supply for plane service had likewise been used as a reservoir from which to supply reserve demands for that theater. . . .

“The lack of material does not appear to be the fault of a failure of appropriations by Congress to the Army and Navy. . . .

“The fatal error of Washington authorities in this matter was to undertake a world campaign and world responsibilities without first making provision for the security of the United States, which was their prime constitutional obligation.”

The record of Congress in providing for the nation’s defense between the advent of President Roosevelt and Pearl Harbor is described by Representative Keefe in his statement of additional views appended to the majority report of the Joint Congressional Committee (pp. 266-U and V):

“The record clearly demonstrates how the Army and Navy get the funds needed for national defense. The Army and Navy are required to submit their respective estimates each year to the Bureau of the Budget. This bureau acting for the President conducts hearings and finally makes recommendations to the President as to the amounts to be recommended to the Congress for appropriation. The Congress is in effect the people of America. The record discloses that in the fiscal years 1934 to 1941, inclusive, the Army and Navy jointly asked for $26,580,145,093. This is the combined total of Army and Navy requests made to the Bureau of the Budget. In the same period the President recommended to the Congress that it appropriate to the combined services $23,818,319,897. The Congress actually made available to the Army and Navy in this period $24,943,987,823. Thus it is apparent that the President himself recommended to the Congress in the fiscal years 1934 to 1941, inclusive, that it appropriate for the Army and Navy $2,761,826,033 less than had been requested by the Army and Navy. The people’s representatives in the Congress gave to the Army and Navy in the form of appropriations and authorizations for expenditure $1,256,667,926 more than the President had recommended in his budget messages to the Congress.

“The mere recital of these undisputed figures should dispose of the contention that ‘the country is as much to blame as any individual in this final situation that developed in Pearl Harbor.’”

Representative Keefe submitted for ready reference a complete statement:

29.  Tr., p. 8005.

30.  JCC, Dec. 6, 1945.

31.  APH, p. 44; JCC, Ex. 5.

32.  JCC, Nov. 15, 1945, Ex. 5, pp. 11-12.

33.  APH, pp. 40-41, 44.

34.  Ibid., p. 44.

35.  BR, p. 34.

36.  Ibid., p. 58.

37.  Ibid., p. 90.

38.  Tr., p. 6230.

39.  BR, p. 60.

40.  Ibid., p. 50. (Adm. Inglis testified Nov. 15, 1945, that the Navy fired 1,685 rounds of 5-inch/.38 caliber anti-aircraft ammunition during the attack, 1,523 rounds of 5-inch/.25 caliber AA, 1,741 rounds of 3-inch/.50 caliber AA, and 275,807 rounds of machine gun ammunition.)

41.  CT, Jan. 11, 1946, 6:2.

42.  JCC, Jan. 26, 1946.

43.  NCI, p. 65.

44.  JCC, Feb. 18, 1946.

45.  They Call It Pacific (Viking, 1943), p. 306.

46.  APH, p. 22.

47.  Kimmel, p. 24.

48.  JCC, Nov. 19, 1945.

49.  Kimmel, p. 24.

50.  NCI, p. 67.

51.  Ibid., p. 74.

52.  Ibid., p. 82.

53.  Ibid., p. 85.

54.  Kimmel, p. 25.

55.  NCI, p. 74.

56.  Tr., pp. 6223-25.

57.  JCC, Dec. 15, 1945.

NOTES ON CHAPTER VII: BACK DOOR TO WAR

  1.  Papers, 1936, p. 206.

  2.  Papers, 1937, pp. 406-11.

  3.  Vital Speeches of the Day, Dec. 15, 1938, p. 147.

  4.  Papers, 1939, p. 3.

  5.  Denied by Roosevelt: Papers, 1939, pp. 114-15.

  6.  Papers, 1939, p. 212.

  7.  Ibid., p. 557.

  8.  Chron., p. 223.

  9.  Papers, 1940, p. 263.

10.  NYT, June 21, 1940, 1:1.

11.  Papers, 1940, pp. 673-74.

12.  Chron., p. 254.

13.  Address to Commons, Aug. 20, 1940.

14.  NYT, Aug. 29, 1940, 1:7.

15.  Chron., p. 255; Papers, 1940, pp. 391-407.

16.  Papers, 1940, pp. 428-31.

17.  Ibid., p. 517.

18.  Ibid., p. 563.

19.  JCC, Nov. 19, 1945.

20.  Papers, 1940, p. 607.

21.  Ibid., pp. 633-44.

22.  Radio address, Feb. 9, 1941.

23.  NYT, Jan. 25, 1941, 1:8.

24.  Chron., p. 273.

25.  CT, June 15, 1946, 2:4.

26.  How War Came, p. 187; Chron., p. 277.

27.  Chron., p. 283; NYT, May 30, 1941, p. 5.

28.  Fed. Reg., Vol. 6, p. 2897; Chron., p. 284.

29.  NYT, June 25, 1941, p. 1.

30.  Chron., p. 288.

31.  How War Came, p. 286.

32.  Chron., p. 293; Peace, pp. 717-20.

33.  World Almanac, 1942, p. 88.

34.  Peace, pp. 737-43.

35.  Ibid., pp. 767-72.

36.  Ibid., pp. 787-88.

37.  Chron., p. 304.

38.  JCC, Jan. 3, 1946.

39.  Ibid., Dec. 31, 1945.

40.  Tr., pp. 6149-50.

41.  JCC, Ex. D-2, Nov. 23, 1945.

42.  JCC, Jan. 3, 1946.

43.  Ibid.

44.  Atlantic, pp. 35-37; Saturday Evening Post (Feb. 26, 1944), p. 16.

45.  JCC, Jan. 3, 1946; Tr., p. 6152.

46.  JCC, Jan. 3, 1946.

47.  Ibid., Dec. 31, 1945.

48.  Ibid., Jan. 3, 1946.

49.  Tr., p. 6150.

50.  Ibid., p. 6151.

51.  Ibid., pp. 6155-56.

52.  Ibid., p. 6286.

53.  JCC, Dec. 6, 1945.

54.  Ibid., Nov. 30, 1945.

55.  Ibid., Nov. 29, 1945.

56.  Ibid., Feb. 12, 1946.

57.  Tr., p. 6287.

58.  JCC, Jan. 29, 1946.

59.  Kimmel, p. 16.

60.  JCC, Dec. 6, 1945.

61.  Kimmel, p. 16.

62.  JCC, Jan. 16, Jan. 18, 1946.

63.  Ibid., Nov. 16, 1945.

64.  Tr., p. 6237.

65.  JCC, Dec. 6, 1945.

66.  CT, Oct. 19, 1944, 1:3.

67.  NYT, Dec. 27, 1941, 1:1.

68.  APH, p. 34.

69.  NCI, p. 62.

70.  Ibid.

71.  Kimmel, p. 15.

72.  AP dispatch in CT, May 9, 1946, 13:4.

73.  John T. Flynn, The Truth about Pearl Harbor, p. 14.

74.  Grew, pp. 402-3.

75.  Intercepts, pp. 200-202.

75a.  Chicago Daily News, Sept. 30, 1946, 5:3, 4.

76.  Ibid., pp. 228-29.

77.  NYT, Dec. 9, 1941, 1:7.

78.  How War Came, p. 315.

79.  NYT, Nov. 30, 1941, 1:5.

80.  Time, Aug. 7, 1939.

81.  Chron., p. 256.

82.  Ibid., p. 289.

83.  NYT, Dec. 2, 1941, p. 6.

84.  For. Rel. II, p. 531.

85.  Peace, p. 696.

86.  For. Rel. I, pp. 517-63.

87.  Peace, p. 422.

88.  Ibid., p. 475.

89.  Grew, p. 295.

90.  For. Rel. II, pp. 211-15.

91.  Ibid., pp. 216-18.

92.  Ibid., pp. 218-19.

93.  Ibid., p. 222.

94.  Ibid., pp. 222-23.

95.  American Metal Market, Vol. LI, No. 215 (Nov. 4, 1944).

96.  For. Rel. II, p. 224.

97.  Ibid., p. 225.

98.  Chron., p. 258.

99.  NYT, Dec. 1, 1940, p. 1.

100.  Peace, pp. 623, 626.

101.  Ibid., pp. 631-37.

102.  NYT, April 26, 1941, p. 7; ibid., Jan. 24, 1941, p. 4.

103.  Peace, pp. 704-5.

104.  NYT, July 26, 1941, p. 5.

105.  Fed. Reg., Vol. 6, p. 3825.

106.  Chron., p. 295.

107.  NYT, July 19, 1941, 2:8; Dec. 21, 1941, 27:3.

108.  Ibid., July 13, 1941, 14:6.

109.  Ibid., June 29, 1941, 9:1.

110.  For. Rel. II, pp. 263-64.

111.  Asia and the Americas, special section, Vol. XLV, No. 12 (December, 1945).

112.  JCC, Jan. 21, 1946.

113.  Ibid., Nov. 24, 1945.

NOTES ON CHAPTER VIII: A, B, C, D’s

  1.  NYT, Dec. 7, 1941, 1:7.

  2.  CT, Dec. 7, 1941, 10:3.

  3.  Ibid.

  4.  JCC, Feb. 12, 1946.

  5.  Ibid., Nov. 19, 1945.

  6.  Ibid., Dec. 10, 1945.

  7.  Ibid., Nov. 19, 1945.

  8.  Tr., pp. 6207-9.

  9.  JCC, Dec. 6, 1945, Ex. 49, B-1.

10.  Ibid., Ex. 50, B-2.

11.  Ibid., Jan. 5, 1946.

12.  In his campaign speech at the Navy Yard at Bremerton, Washington, August 12, 1944, President Roosevelt said, “We were not allowed to fortify Guam nor did we fortify Wake or Midway or Samoa.”

Representative Keefe, in his statement of additional views attached to the majority report of the Joint Congressional Committee (pp. 266-V and W), states:

“Another subject that has been bandied about the country for a number of years relates to what has been frequently referred to as the failure or refusal of Congress to fortify the island of Guam. The contention has been made that Congress refused to appropriate money to fortify the island of Guam and that as a result of such failure the entire war in the Pacific in its initial stages was lost to the Japanese.

“The fact is that no proposal was ever submitted to the Congress involving the fortification of Guam. The Navy did request an appropriation of five million dollars for the purpose of dredging the harbor at Guam (Stark testimony, Tr., pp. 6546-47). The first request of the Navy was rejected by the Congress. Thereafter, the appropriation requested by the Navy was passed with only one vote against it. The dredging operation was being carried on when war broke out with Japan.

“It is interesting to note that ‘Rainbow No. 5,’ which is the Joint Chiefs of Staff world-wide war plan, placed the island of Guam in Category ‘F’ (Tr., p. 6535). The following questions and answers tell the story:

Mr. KEEFE. Now, I would like to ask a question which bothered me with respect to your Rainbow No. 5, which places the island of Guam in what is called Category F.

Adm. STARK. I have the category here.

Mr. KEEFE. Now will you state for the record what Category F means?

Adm. STARK. Yes, sir. We have that, I am sure. This is out of Joint Action, Army and Navy, and refers to degrees of preparation, and they are put in categories of defense, A, B, C, D, E, and F.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, take Guam to start with. That is in F. Now give us what Category F means.

Adm. STARK. Category F: “Positions beyond the continental limits of the United States which may be subject to either minor or major attack for the purpose of occupation but which cannot be provided with adequate defense forces. Under this category the employment of existing local forces and local facilities will be confined principally to the demolition of those things it is desirable to prevent falling into the hands of the enemy.”

Mr. KEEFE. Then, so far as Guam was concerned, at the time this basic war plan was devised it was the considered opinion of both the Army and Navy that it could not be defended and it therefore was placed in Category F that required those on the island, through demolition or otherwise, to destroy anything of value to the enemy and to permit it to be taken?

Adm. STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And to surrender?

Adm. STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That is right, is it not?

Adm. STARK. That is correct, yes, sir (Tr., p. 6537).

Mr. KEEFE. Now, at the time of the attack on Guam and the capture of Guam by the Japs were improvements on the harbor being made at that time or had they been completed?

Adm. STARK. They had not been completed. Of course, I recall very clearly the legislation with regard to that. I do not know just what their status was at this moment. I had obtained from Congress the appropriation, I believe it was $6,000,000, for certain improvements to the harbor. You recall the first year I lost it by six votes, and the following year it went through almost unanimously, only one vote being opposed to it. Just how far we had gotten along with that I do not recall at the moment.

Mr. KEEFE. With those improvements completed, Guam would still be in Category F, would it not?

Adm. STARK. In the same category, Category F. The improvements were not such as improved the defense of Guam but very little.

Mr. KEEFE. Even with the improvements that were requested and contemplated the Island of Guam, in the opinion of the Joint Army and Navy Board, could not be successfully defended due to the power that Japan had in the mandated islands surrounding it, is that right?

Adm. STARK. That is correct (Tr., p. 6547).

“These simple facts as disclosed to the public for the first time in these hearings should effectively dispose of the contention that ‘Congress refused to fortify the Island of Guam, and hence the United States suffered tremendous loss in the initial stages of the war with Japan.’”

13.  p. 245.

14.  JCC, Ex. 49, B-1, p. i.

15.  Tr., pp. 5573-74.

16.  JCC, Feb. 12, 1946.

17.  Of these agreements the majority report of the Joint Congressional Committee (pp. 168-71) remarks:

“A great deal of inquiry was made during the course of proceedings to determine whether the government of the United States had entered into an agreement with Great Britain and the Netherlands committing this nation to war upon Japan in the event British or Dutch possessions were attacked by the Japanese. It is clear from evidence before the committee that no agreement was entered into in this regard. The President and his Cabinet, while momentarily expecting an attack by Japan, recognized and observed the constitutional mandate that this government could only be committed to war by a declaration of the Congress.

“Recognizing the inevitable consequences of the tripartite pact, representatives of the War and Navy departments participated during 1941 in a series of staff conversations with military and naval experts of Great Britain, Canada, and the Netherlands. The first of these, meetings, initiated by the chief of naval operations and limited to American and British representatives, was held in Washington from Jan. 29 to March 27, 1941. The official report of the conversations, referred to as ‘ABC-1,’ points out specifically that the discussions were held with a view ‘to determine the best methods by which the armed forces of the United States and British Commonwealth, with its present allies, could defeat Germany and the powers allied with her, should the United States be compelled to resort to war.’ The report states clearly that the plans to accomplish this purpose, as embodied in the report, were subject to confirmation by the highest military authorities in the United States and Great Britain and by the governments of both countries as well. This was in accord with the joint statement of the position the American representatives would take, made by the chief of naval operations and the chief of staff on January 27 at the outset of the conversations.

“‘ABC-1’ was approved by the chief of naval operations and the Secretary of the Navy and by the chief of staff and the Secretary of War, thereafter being submitted to the President on June 2, 1941. On June 7 the President returned ‘ABC-1’ without formal approval, pointing out that since the plan had not been finally approved by the British government, he would not approve it at that time but that in case of war the report should be returned to him for approval.

“Shortly after the staff conversations in Washington military and naval representatives of the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands conferred in April of 1941 at Singapore in order to draft a plan for the conduct of operations in the Far East based on ‘ABC-1.’ In the instructions sent the commander-in-chief of our Asiatic fleet prior to the Singapore conversations it was emphatically pointed out that the results of such conversations were likewise subject to ratification by the governments concerned and were to involve no political commitment by the United States. The report of the conversations, referred to as ‘ADB,’ explicitly recognized that no political commitments were implied. Nevertheless, the chief of naval operations and the chief of staff withheld their approval feeling that some of the statements in the report had political implications. One of the proposals of the Singapore conference, however, was subsequently incorporated as a recommendation in the joint memoranda of Nov. 5 and 27 which the chief of staff and the chief of naval operations submitted to the President; i. e., that military counter-action should be undertaken in the event Japan attacked or directly threatened the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies, or if the Japanese moved forces into Thailand west of 100° east or south of 10° north, Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands. . . .

“From all of the evidence, as earlier indicated, there is no basis for the conclusion that an agreement had been effected committing the United States to war against Japan in the event of an attack by her upon the British or the Dutch. It is indisputable that the President and his Cabinet contemplated presenting the problem to the Congress should our position in the Far East become intolerable. Further, the reports of the 1941 staff conversations contain clear disclaimers of any political commitments and the voluminous records relating to these conversations will be searched in vain for any suggestion that an agreement binding the United States to go to war was made. Additionally, all the witnesses who were questioned on the point—including the ranking military and naval leaders of the country at the time—testified that in these meetings the constitutional prerogative of the Congress to declare war was scrupulously respected. The preliminary planning done at these conferences manifested commendable foresight and indeed our military leaders would have been inexcusably negligent had they not participated in these conversations in the face of the clear pattern of conquest mapped out by the Axis. This planning saved precious time and lives once Japan struck.

“While no binding agreement existed, it would appear from the record that the Japanese were inclined to the belief that the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands would act in concert. . . .”

The reader may compare this easy dismissal of the effect of the agreements with the findings of the minority (pp. 12-14):

“There is additional evidence for the conclusion that in January, 1941, President Roosevelt then became convinced that the war was a global war and that his decisions as chief executive and commander-in-chief must thenceforward be made with reference to that conviction. This evidence is as follows: Beginning in January, 1941, representatives of the American armed forces and representatives of British and Dutch armed forces on the suggestion of the United States started a series of conversations in respect of cooperation against Japan in the Far East. Out of these subsequent conversations were developed American-British-Dutch war plans for combined operations against Japan if Japanese armed forces started hostile actions against British, Dutch, or American possessions in the Far East. President Roosevelt approved these plans, ‘except officially,’ as Adm. Stark testified.

“The President’s commitment to Great Britain was foreshadowed by understandings previously reached between American; British, and Dutch military authorities. In a memorandum to the President dated Nov. 27, 1941 (Ex. 17), Gen. Marshall and Adm. Stark stated:

“‘After consultation with each other, United States, British, and Dutch military authorities in the Far East agreed that joint military counteraction against Japan should be undertaken only in case Japan attacks or directly threatens the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies, or should the Japanese move forces into Thailand west of 100° East or south of the 10° North, Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands.’

“The agreement referred to by Adm. Stark and Gen. Marshall, was reached at conferences in Singapore in April, 1941, between United States, British, and Dutch military authorities in the Far East. . . .

“While the President did not approve written agreements on these understandings he and the high authorities in Washington acted with the British and Dutch just as if a binding pact had been made. Likewise the Japanese acted upon the same belief that the United States, Britain, and Netherlands East Indies were working together. There is ample evidence in the record to this effect. (Ex. I, p. 205—Tokyo to Berlin dispatch: Id. p. 227, Washington to Tokyo dispatch.)

“Subsequent American diplomatic negotiations with Japan were based upon the principle of cooperation with Great Britain, the Dutch Netherlands, China, and Australia. No separate over-all plan for the simple defense of American possessions against Japan was developed by the armed forces of the United States between January, 1941, and Dec. 7, 1941, with a view to safeguarding American interests separately. After the Japanese attack on Dec. 7, American, British, Dutch, and Australian operations in the Pacific theater were conducted on the cooperative principle which had governed the military and naval conversations and planning between January and December, 1941. . . .”

18.  Kimmel, p. 9.

19.  Ibid.; JCC, Ex. 44 E.

20.  Kimmel, p. 10.

21.  JCC, Dec. 5, 1945.

22.  Tr., p. 8555.

23.  Ibid., p. 8557.

24.  Kimmel, p. 41.

25.  JCC, Dec. 31, 1945.

26.  Tr., p. 6321.

27.  JCC, Dec. 10, 1945.

28.  Tr., p. 6291.

29.  Ibid., pp. 6312-14; JCC, Dec. 20, 1945.

30.  Tr., p. 6315.

31.  JCC, Feb. 20, 1946.

32.  Tr., p. 6198.

33.  Ibid., p. 6204.

34.  Intercepts, p. 111.

35.  Ibid., p. 227.

36.  Ibid., p. 173.

37.  Ibid., p. 192.

38.  Ibid., p. 238.

39.  Address to Commons, NYT, Jan. 28, 1942, 1:4.

40.  Radio address, NYT, Feb. 16, 1942, 1:3.

41.  AP dispatch from London, June 21, 1944, in CT, same date, 1:2.

NOTES ON CHAPTER IX: MEETING AT SEA

  1.  JCC, April 9, 1946.

  2.  Welles’s “Memorandum of Conversation,” upon which this account of the Atlantic conference is based, was introduced before the JCC as Exhibits 22-B, 22-C, and 22-D on Nov. 23, 1945.

  3.  How War Came, p. 10.

  4.  The minority report of the Joint Congressional Committee (pp. 14-15) emphasizes a subsidiary agreement reached at the Atlantic conference:

“The danger of war with Japan formed a principal theme of discussion between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill at the Atlantic conference in August, 1941, and agreements or understandings reached by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill at that conference were based on a common program for dealing with Japan and close cooperation between the United States and Great Britain in diplomatic, military, and naval affairs in respect of the Far East as well as the Atlantic. Their chief understandings as thus far disclosed by official records were three in number:

“(1) Common diplomatic actions warning Japan against taking any further steps in dominating neighboring countries by force or threat of force.

“(2) Occupation of the Azores by the armed forces of the United States with protective assistance by British armed forces in guarding against a possible Nazi thrust from the mainland.

“(3) Cooperation between the United States and Great Britain in ‘the policing of the world’ during a transition period following the close of the war. . . .

“It is scarcely thinkable that in his discussions with Prime Minister Churchill at the Atlantic conference in August, 1941, President Roosevelt would have assumed that the United States was to cooperate with Great Britain in ‘the policing of the world’ for a transition period after the war unless he was then certain that at some stage in the development of the war the United States would become involved in it.”

  5.  Peace, p. 714.

  6.  JCC, Nov. 24, 1945.

  7.  Ibid., Dec. 15, 1945.

  8.  Radio address, NYT, Aug. 25, 1941, 1:8.

  9.  NYT, Nov. 11, 1941, 1:1.

10.  Grew, p. 478.

11.  Tr., pp. 6298-6303.

12.  The majority report of the Joint Congressional Committee (pp. 304-5) debates this question inconclusively:

“The evidence before the committee does not show whether or not the British government took ‘parallel action’ to the warning given Japan by President Roosevelt. Undersecretary Welles testified before the committee that he took it for granted that the British government took such parallel action and that the records of the State Department would probably show that (Tr., p. 1279), but Secretary Hull testified, and the State Department has advised the committee, that its files contain no record of any such action (Tr., p. 14, 306; 4480). Furthermore, as late as Nov. 30 (Washington time), Prime Minister Churchill sent a message to the President saying that ‘one important method remains unused in averting war between Japan and our two countries, namely a plain declaration, secret or public as may be thought best, that any further act of aggression by Japan will lead immediately to the gravest consequences. . . . We would, of course, make a similar declaration or share in a joint declaration’ (Ex. 24); and the evidence further shows that on Dec. 7 the Prime Minister submitted to President Roosevelt a draft of a proposed warning to Japan (Tr., pp. 13738-40). On the other hand, on Aug. 25, 1941, in an address reporting to Parliament on the Atlantic conference, the Prime Minister said:

“‘But Europe is not the only continent to be tormented and devastated by aggression. For five long years the Japanese military factions, seeking to emulate the style of Hitler and Mussolini, taking all their posturing as if it were a new European revelation, have been invading and harrying the 500,000,000 inhabitants of China. Japanese armies have been wandering about that vast land in futile excursions, carrying with them carnage, ruin and corruption, and calling it “the Chinese incident.” Now they stretch a grasping hand into the southern seas of China. They snatch Indo-China from the wretched Vichy French. They menace by their movements Siam, menace Singapore, the British link with Australasia, and menace the Philippine Islands under the protection of the United States.

“‘It is certain that this has got to stop. Every effort will be made to secure a peaceful settlement. The United States are laboring with infinite patience to arrive at a fair and amicable settlement which will give Japan the utmost reassurance for her legitimate interests. We earnestly hope these negotiations will succeed. But this I must say: That if these hopes should fail we shall, of course, range ourselves unhesitatingly at the side of the United States (Tr., 1355-56; 4480-4481).’

“While Secretary Hull testified that he knew of no parallel action taken by the British other than this address (Tr., 14306), which was broadcast by radio, Undersecretary Welles testified that in his opinion this address did not constitute ‘parallel action’ of the kind proposed by Mr. Churchill to the President, and that in Mr. Welles’s judgment such action would necessarily have had to have been in the form of an exchange of diplomatic notes (Tr., 1356).”

Again (p. 302) the majority report says:

“The evidence before the committee is conflicting as to whether or not Prime Minister Churchill promised President Roosevelt that the British government would take action parallel to that to be taken by the United States government.

“The only contemporaneous records of the Atlantic conference before the committee are three memoranda prepared by Undersecretary Welles (Ex. 22-B, 22-C, 22-D). Those memoranda show that the procedure outlined by President Roosevelt differed substantially from that envisaged in Prime Minister Churchill’s proposal. As there described by Mr. Welles, the President’s procedure did not call for parallel action by either the British or Dutch governments, or for keeping Russia informed, as Mr. Churchill had proposed. Nor, as in the case of Mr. Churchill’s proposal, was the precise phraseology of the warning to Japan prescribed, it being left entirely up to the President. Mr. Welles testified that the promise given by the President to Mr. Churchill ‘was limited to the fact that a warning would be given’ (Tr., p. 142), and that the only agreement reached between the President and the Prime Minister was ‘that the President made the promise to Mr. Churchill that the government of the United States, in its own words and in its own way, would issue a warning to the Japanese government of the character which actually was made by the President on Aug. 17’ (Tr., p. 1428).

“While it is true that Mr. Welles testified that the promise made by President Roosevelt was to ‘take parallel action with the British government in warning the Japanese government’ (Tr., p. 1235-6) and that he ‘took it for granted Mr. Churchill must have made that statement’ (i. e., promised to make a parallel warning) to the President (Tr., 1446), it is also true that when asked directly whether the President had told him that Mr. Churchill had promised to make a parallel warning, Mr. Welles said, ‘The President in his conversation with me, so far as I remember, did not make that specific statement’ (Tr., p. 1446). Moreover, as previously noted, the Welles’ memoranda neither state nor indicate that any such promise was made by Mr. Churchill (Ex. 22-B, 22-C, 22-D), and there is no evidence before the committee showing that action parallel to the President’s warning to Japan was ever taken by the British government. On the other hand, both ‘Peace and War’ (Ex. 28, p. 129) and ‘Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan 1931-1941’ (Ex. 29, vol. II, p. 345) refer to an ‘agreement’ to take parallel action made by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, though, of course, neither of these purports to be a contemporaneous account of the Atlantic conference. Likewise, in his testimony before the committee, Secretary Hull referred to such an ‘agreement,’ though again Secretary Hull did not attend the Atlantic conference (Tr., p. 1116).”

13.  JCC, Nov. 24, 1945.

14.  Ibid., Nov. 27, 1945.

15.  Intercepts, p. 197. (In this message Nomura used the phrase “on the 17th of this month,” but evidently was referring to the warning of Aug. 17. Neither the account in For. Rel. II (pp. 740-43) or in Intercepts (pp. 141-43) of the conversation of the Japanese emissaries and Roosevelt on Nov. 17 shows the President to have voiced any additional warning.)

16.  For. Rel. II, p. 139.

17.  Ibid., p. 143.

18.  JCC, Nov. 28, 1945.

19.  Ibid., Dec. 21, 1945.

20.  For. Rel. II, pp. 525-26.

NOTES ON CHAPTER X: THE LAST OF THE JAPANESE MODERATES

  1.  Grew, p. 446.

  2.  Ibid., p. 359.

  3.  Ibid., p. 361.

  4.  Ibid., p. 362.

  5.  Ibid., p. 363.

  6.  JCC, Nov. 27, 1945.

  7.  Grew, p. 369.

  8.  Ibid., p. 365.

  9.  For. Rel. II, pp. 388-89.

10.  Ibid., p. 391.

11.  Ibid., p. 331.

12.  Ibid., pp. 398-402.

13.  Ibid., p. 407.

14.  Ibid., pp. 420-22.

15.  Ibid., pp. 428-34.

16.  Ibid., p. 440-41.

17.  Ibid., p. 447.

18.  Ibid., pp. 454-55.

19.  Ibid., pp. 486-92.

20.  Ibid., p. 485.

21.  Ibid., p. 509.

22.  NYT, July 17, 1941, 1:5; July 19, 1:4.

23.  For. Rel. II, p. 496.

24.  Ibid., p. 267.

25.  Grew, p. 334.

26.  Peace, pp. 569-72.

27.  JCC, Nov. 27, 1945.

28.  Tr., pp. 6339-40.

29.  Ibid., pp. 6341-42.

30.  Ibid.

31.  Peace, p. 88.

32.  Tr., p. 6353.

33.  Ibid., pp. 6344-53.

34.  For. Rel. II, pp. 516-20.

35.  Ibid., p. 525.

36.  Ibid., pp. 533-34.

37.  Ibid., p. 526.

38.  Ibid., p. 529.

39.  Ibid., pp. 534-35.

40.  Ibid., p. 549-50.

41.  Ibid., pp. 552-53.

42.  Ibid., pp. 554-55.

43.  Ibid., p. 402.

44.  Ibid., p. 550.

45.  Ibid., p. 553.

46.  Ibid., p. 565.

47.  Ibid., p. 568.

48.  Ibid., pp. 572-73.

49.  Ibid., p. 571.

50.  Ibid., p. 576.

51.  Ibid., pp. 576-77.

52.  Ibid., p. 592.

53.  Ibid., p. 588.

54.  AP dispatch from Tokyo Dec. 19, 1945, in CT, Dec. 20, 1945.

55.  For. Rel. II, p. 628.

56.  Intercepts, pp. 33-36.

57.  Peace, p. 754.

58.  For. Rel. II, pp. 645-50.

59.  Grew, p. 444.

60.  For. Rel. II, pp. 352-54.

61.  Ibid., p. 662.

62.  Grew, p. 456.

63.  For. Rel. II, p. 692.

64.  Grew, p. 481-82.

65.  How War Came, p. 287.

66.  AP dispatch from Tokyo, Dec. 16, 1945, in CT Dec. 17, 5:3.

NOTES ON CHAPTER XI: DIPLOMACY FOR D-DAY

  1.  The ambitious designs of the Japanese militarists were described in the majority report of the Joint Congressional Committee (pp. 295-6) as follows:

“On June 22, 1941, Germany had invaded Russia. The German attack upon Russia had precipitated a series of events in Japan which were to have far-reaching effects upon Japanese-American relations. It had quickened the appetites of those in the Japanese government who believed that then, or never, Japan’s destiny was in her own hands. Intensive consideration had immediately been given in Tokyo to the question whether Japan should not attack Russia at once (Ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 16). Foreign Minister Matsuoka in particular had urged this course. According to the memoirs of Prince Fumimaro Konoye, the Japanese Premier at the time, the attention of the government became so centered upon this question that the American counter-proposal of June 21, which by that time had been received in Tokyo from the Japanese ambassador in Washington, became completely side-tracked until after an Imperial Conference with Emperor Hirohito on July 2 (Japan time) (Ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, pp. 16, 18). At that conference the question of war with Russia had been temporarily shelved in favor of ‘an advance into the southern regions,’ and it had been decided that, first of all, the plans ‘which have been laid with reference to French Indo-China and Thai will be prosecuted, with a view to consolidating our position in the southern territories’ (Ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 70; cf. Ex. 1, pp. 1-2). It is now known that at the Imperial Conference on July 2 (Japan time) it was also decided that, in case the diplomatic negotiations with the United States should break down, ‘preparations for a war with England and America will also be carried forward;’ that all plans, including the plan to use Japan’s military strength to settle the Soviet question if the German-Russian war should develop to Japan’s advantage, were to be carried out—

“‘in such a way as to place no serious obstacles in the path of our basic military preparations for a war with England and America’;
and that—

“‘In case all diplomatic means fail to prevent the entrance of America into the European war, we will proceed in harmony with our obligations under the tripartite pact. However, with reference to the time and method of employing our armed forces we will take independent action’ (Ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 71).

“The following report of the Imperial Conference on July 2 (Japan time) had been cabled by the Japanese foreign minister to the Japanese ambassadors in the United States, Germany, Italy, and Russia, the same day:

“‘(National Secret)

“‘At the conference held in the presence of the Emperor on July 2 “The Principal Points in the Imperial Policy for Coping with the Changing Situation” were decided. This Policy consists of the following two parts. The first part “The Policy” and the second part “The Principal Points.” (I am wiring merely the gist of the matter.) Inasmuch as this has to do with national defense secrets, keep the information only to yourself. Please also transmit the content to both the naval and military attaches, together with this precaution.

“‘The Policy.

“‘1. Imperial Japan shall adhere to the policy of contributing to world peace by establishing the Great East Asia Sphere of Co-prosperity, regardless of how the world situation may change.

“‘2. The Imperial Government shall continue its endeavor to dispose of the China incident, and shall take measures with a view to advancing southward in order to establish firmly a basis for her self-existence and self-protection.

“‘The Principal Points.

“‘For the purpose of bringing the CHIANG Régime to submission, increasing pressure shall be added from various points in the south, and by means of both propaganda and fighting plans for the taking over of concessions shall be carried out. Diplomatic negotiations shall be continued, and various other plans shall be speeded with regard to the vital points in the south. Concomitantly, preparations for southward advance shall be re-enforced and the policy already decided upon with reference to French Indo-China and Thailand shall be executed. As regards the Russo-German war, although the spirit of the Three-Power Axis shall be maintained, every preparation shall be made at the present and the situation shall be dealt with in our own way. In the meantime, diplomatic negotiations shall be carried on with extreme care. Although every means available shall be resorted to in order to prevent the United States from joining the war, if need be, Japan shall act in accordance with the Three-Power Pact and shall decide when and how force will be employed (Ex. 1, pp. 1-2).’

“It is worthy of note that this intercepted Japanese message, which was translated and available in Washington on July 8 (Washington time), did not mention the decisions at the Imperial Conference respecting the United States.

“Commencing immediately after the Imperial Conference, Japan had proceeded with military preparations on a vast scale, calling up from one to two million reservists and conscripts, recalling Japanese merchant vessels operating in the Atlantic Ocean, imposing restrictions upon travel in Japan, and carrying out strict censorship of mail and communications.”

Although Ambassador Nomura described the occupation of Indo-China as necessary to safeguard Japan’s food supplies and to frustrate foreign powers bent upon encircling Japan, a diplomatic message of July 14, 1941, from Canton to Tokyo (Ex. 1, p. 2) stated:

“Subsequent information from the military officials to the Attachés is as follows:

“1. The recent general mobilization order expressed the irrevocable resolution of Japan to put an end to Anglo-American assistance in thwarting her natural expansion and her indomitable intention to carry this out, if possible, with the backing of the Axis but, if necessary, alone. Formalities, such as dining the expeditionary forces and saying farewell to them, have been dispensed with. That is because we did not wish to arouse greatly the feelings of the Japanese populace and because we wished to face this new war with a calm and cool attitude.

“2. The immediate object of our occupation of French Indo-China will be to achieve our purposes there. Secondly, its purpose is, when the international situation is suitable, to launch therefrom a rapid attack. This venture we will carry out in spite of any difficulties which may arise. We will endeavor to the last to occupy French Indo-China peacefully but, if resistance is offered, we will crush it by force, occupy the country and set up martial law. After the occupation of French Indo-China, next on our schedule is the sending of an ultimatum to the Netherlands Indies. In the seizing of Singapore the Navy will play the principal part. As for the Army, in seizing Singapore it will need only one division and in seizing the Netherlands Indies, only two . . .”

  2.  Grew, p. 460.

  3.  For. Rel. II, p. 697.

  4.  AP dispatch from Tokyo Dec. 18, 1945, in CT Dec. 19.

  5.  For. Rel. II, pp. 703-4.

  6.  Ibid., p. 704.

  7.  Ibid., p. 679.

  8.  AP dispatch from Tokyo Sept. 6, 1945, in CT Sept. 7; AP dispatch from Tokyo Sept. 20, 1945, in CT Sept. 21, 3:3.

  9.  Grew, p. 470.

10.  Paul V. Horn, “Effects of Allied Economic Blockade on Japan,” The Conference Board Economic Record, III: 22 (Nov. 25, 1941), 509-12.

11.  For. Rel. II, p. 705.

12.  Ibid., p. 706.

13.  Ibid., pp. 709-10.

14.  Ibid., p. 716.

15.  Ibid., pp. 710-14.

16.  Ibid., p. 710.

17.  Ibid., p. 718.

18.  Ibid., p. 720.

19.  Ibid., pp. 731-34.

20.  Ibid., pp. 736-37.

21.  Ibid., pp. 740-43.

22.  Ibid., p. 745.

23.  Ibid., p. 746.

24.  Ibid.

25.  Ibid., p. 747.

26.  Ibid., pp. 759-61.

27.  Ibid., p. 789.

28.  Ibid., p. 757.

29.  Ibid., p. 756.

30.  Ibid., pp. 754-55.

31.  Ibid., p. 760.

32.  Ibid., pp. 763-64.

33.  JCC, Nov. 23, 1945.

34.  Grew, p. 483.

35.  Ibid., p. 486.

36.  For. Rel. II, pp. 148-49.

37.  Ibid., pp. 377-78.

38.  JCC, Nov. 23, 1945.

39.  Stimson, p. 47.

40.  JCC, Nov. 23 1945.

41.  Ibid.

42.  Ibid.

43.  Ibid., Nov. 24, 1945.

44.  APH, p. 51.

45.  The terms of this proposed agreement were: