Chapter 29

At the NCI (Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 33, pp. 858–60), in mid-1944, he said he had delivered the 13 parts plus part 14 and other new material to (1) Stark, (2) the White House and (3) Knox at the State Department. Then upon his return to the Navy Department at 10:20, he found the “One p.m. Message” had been received.

On February 6, 1946 before the Joint Committee, he testified (ibid., part 8, pp. 3904–08) that he had delivered all 14 parts to (1) McCollum, (2) Wilkinson, (3) Stark, possibly through McCollum and Wilkinson, and (4) directly to Knox, whom he saw personally, at State. He had then returned to the Navy Department where he had encountered the “One p.m. Message.” This account made no mention of delivering the 14 parts to the White House (Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 8, pp. 3904–08).

Kramer testimony February 6, 1946 at the JCC:

Richardson: Now, how early did you go to the office the next morning?

Kramer: My recollection is it was very shortly after 7:30. . . . The normal office hours commenced at 8 o’clock . . . I further wanted to be at the office earlier that morning [December 7] than usual because of the likelihood that I would have to make earlier disseminations that morning than usual [late morning]. . . . I had a specific appointment to be at the State Department by 10 that morning, on instructions from Secretary Knox. I gathered from conversation with Admiral Wilkinson that Admiral Stark would very likely be in Sunday morning, which was not a usual practice. . . . it was an unusual thing for Admiral Stark to be there on Sunday morning [italics added]. On a number of occasions that fall on Sunday morning I had delivered folders to his home and had been received in his study on the second deck, he being in pajamas and dressing gown on one occasion having breakfast. I recollect that because I was offered some coffee. . . .

Richardson: Now you got in your office around 7 o’clock on Sunday morning.

Kramer: Shortly after 7:30, is my best recollection. . . . [M]y recollection is that the fourteenth part was there shortly after I got in that morning, or possibly when I got in that morning. . . . I was on a 24-hour basis, and my translators were also. I had on at least two dozen occasions, during the course of 1941, been called to my office at odd hours of the night, sometimes 2 or 3 in the morning. I had standing instructions with the GY watch officer to call me any time they felt a translator was required. . . . I was the nearest translator to my office, only 5 minutes away in Arlington near Fort Myer. I therefore put myself in the status of being the first one called rather than one of the translators whose homes were in outlying districts. . . .

Richardson: When the delivery was made on Sunday morning then the entire 14-part message was delivered as one message?

Kramer: That is correct, sir. . . . Some details of delivery between 8 and 9 o’clock I have only in the last month or so had my memory refreshed on, in conversations with other officers. The first delivery, to my present best recollection, was made to Commander McCollum, head of the Far Eastern Section, Navy Intelligence. . . . It was probably about 8 o’clock or a few minutes after. . . . Another delivery was made, I believe, about a quarter of 9 to Captain McCollum also, or Commander McCollum then, when I was informed that Admiral Wilkinson had arrived at his office, and I therefore automatically delivered another copy to Admiral Wilkinson. It was about that time, or shortly afterward that another copy was delivered to Admiral Stark’s office. . . . That first delivery to Admiral Stark’s office, I believe, was done by either Admiral Wilkinson or Captain McCollum. . . . My first positive recollection of seeing Admiral Stark is when I was on my way to the State Department to keep my 10 o’clock appointment when I left a copy of some of the other traffic that had come in in Admiral Stark’s outer office. That was probably 9:30 or 9:40. . . . I was at the State Department almost exactly 10 minutes of 10.

Richardson: And to whom did you make delivery actually?

Kramer: Actually to Mr. Knox directly. He came in, as I recollect, about 5 minutes of 10, a few minutes after I got there, and went into the conference room, Mr. Hull’s office. . . . There was a brief discussion between myself, the Army courier, and Mr. Hull’s private secretary in Mr. Hull’s outer office. It lasted probably not more than 3 or 4 minutes, and then I headed back for the Navy Department.

Richardson: What time did you return to the Navy Department?

Kramer: My best recollection is about 10:20. . . . On my arrival there at 10:20, the most striking recollection I have is the first sighting of that message from Tokyo directing the delivery of this note from Tokyo at 1 o’clock p. m., December 7, Washington time. . . . I immediately instructed by chief yeoman to prepare another set of folders so I could make immediate delivery of them.

Kramer: On my arrival there [back at the Navy Department] at 10:20, the most striking recollection I have is the first sighting of that message from Tokyo directing the delivery of this note from Tokyo at 1:00 p.m., December 7, Washington time . . . I immediately instructed my chief yeoman to prepare another set of folders so I could make immediate delivery of them. . . . Just as I was about to leave the office, a plain language Japanese message was sent in to my office by the GY watch officer that carried, I believe the so-called hidden word message. . . . I recognized it as such from an external indicator, namely the word “Stop” at the end, and recognized the first word as being one of the code words referring to England. In scanning the rest of the message, as I recollect, the sixth or seventh word had another code word, which, incidentally, were all proper names. The word was “Hattori” which, although I recognized [it] as a code word, I did not immediately recall the meaning of, and hastily referred to the list of such code words . . . interpreted as “relations between Japan and (blank) country,” to be inserted, was not in accordance with expectations. I dictated to my chief yeoman the sense of that message.

At the NCI, Kramer said that he had returned to the Navy Department after his first delivery on the morning of December 7. There he had discovered the “One p.m. Message” along with several others. Within ten or fifteen minutes he was at Admiral Stark’s office. From there he had gone to the White House and then [italics added] to State, where Knox and Stimson were meeting with Hull. Kramer said he had not seen Knox personally, but he had “made a point of verbally inviting the attention of Mr. Knox” through a State Department Foreign Service Officer who regularly handled this material for Mr. Hull “the implications of the times.” 1300 Washington time was 7:30 at Pearl Harbor and a few hours before sunrise at Kota Bharu, where the Japanese appeared to be heading.

Kramer told the JCC (part 8, pp. 3910–12) that he had delivered the “One p.m. Message” to (1) the State Department where he had “most emphatically not” spoken with Knox, (2) the White House, and then (3) back to the Navy Department.

Ibid., part 9, p. 3909. Kramer testimony:

Kramer: I stopped off at Admiral Stark’s office [Stark was in his office; it was between 10:30 and 10:35]. . . . The office door was closed. . . . Word was sent in . . . that I had something for him. My impressions earlier have been that it was his Flag Secretary, then Commander Wellborn. That has only quite recently been corrected on that score since I am informed that Wellborn was not there that morning at all. My recollections were fully refreshed in a conversation only in the last few days with Captain McCollum to the effect that he was the one who came to the door. I distinctly recollect that now. I further recollect pointing out to Captain McCollum the tie-up of the time, 1:00 Washington, with the scheme that had been developing for the past week or so in the Southwest Pacific with reference to Malaya and the Kra Peninsula. Captain McCollum reacted instantaneously to my pointing that out. His reactions, I believe, were identical with mine. I do not believe our conversation lasted more than 10 seconds or so, and then I headed for the State Department.

Ibid., part 8, p. 3910:

[Arriving at State at about 10:45, Kramer made delivery to] one of the private secretaries of Mr. Hull. . . . Before that folder was taken in to Mr. Hull there was a brief conversation of the identical nature that I had had with Captain McCollum at Admiral Stark’s door, pointing out the tie-up of the time 1:00 Washington, with the situation in the Southwest Pacific.

Richardson: One o’clock Washington meant dawn in Hawaii, did it not?

Kramer: It was 7:30 in Hawaii, yes, sir.

Richardson: And was that fact pointed out in your conversation with McCollum, and at the State Department?

Kramer: It was mentioned in passing, yes, sir.

Questioned by Richardson, Kramer said: “The primary point of that [the 1:00 delivery time] was the conviction, at least in my mind, that the Japanese intended to carry out their plans against Kota Bharu, with the intention and purpose of forcing the hand of the Thai Premier, Pibul, who had been maintaining, for some time past, the position that his country was neutral, that any foreign nation that invaded his quarters would be considered an enemy, and that the moment such an invasion took place he would call on the other party for assistance. By ‘other party’ I refer to Japan or to Britain.”

Ibid., part 9, pp. 4110, 4116. Excerpts of Kramer’s 1944 memorandum reprinted. Kramer explained the significance of the “One p.m. Message” for Knox’s benefit, as he often had explained other Japanese intercepts to the Navy personnel authorized to see them:

The implications were so obvious in the light of what we know, that it was not necessary to state that invasion of British territory was undoubtedly scheduled for 1300 (EDT), and that at least a complete break with the U.S. was scheduled simultaneously. . . . I recollect conversation only for Mr. Knox’ benefit regarding the implications of the 1300 hour. I distinctly remember that the tie-up of these times would be apparent to experienced naval officers, but that a civilian (Mr. Knox) might overlook it. Hence the pains I took to point it out at the State Department. I repeated this point at least half a dozen times that morning to others, chiefly subordinates, I think, but including one of Mr. Hull’s secretaries who handled this material for him, to one or two of my office workers, and I believe also to Colonel Bratton [the Army courier] in Mr. Hull’s outer office, probably to Commander Wellborn, and Admiral’s flag secretary, possibly to McCollum, and probably to you [Safford] too.”