Liberty, Dicta & Force: Why Liberty Brings Out the Best in People and How Government Brings Out the Worst

What is common to the greatest number has the lease care bestowed upon it. Everyone thinks chiefly of his own, hardly at all of the commone interest. — Aristotle (Politics, Book II, ch.3)

Why do people behave the way they do? The answer to this age-old, fundamental question is essential if someone plans to propose a rule to bring about a peaceful and prosperous community. If we understand why people behave the way they do, we can generally predict how they are apt to behave, given the circumstances. “Tragedy of the commons,” or more accurately, “the tragedy of open access,” illustrates how people behave, given the problem of open access to a limited resource.

Ultimately, everyone behaves in ways they consider in their best interest. Selfishness is the immutable driving force of life. The forces of nature that sculpt the structure of our bodies, hearts, and kidneys are the same that sculpt our behavior.1 Our brains evolved to regulate behavior to maximize gene replication. In other words, selfishness underlies the traits that determine the proficiency of gene replication. The genes that produce “good” traits leave more copies. In social animals such as ourselves, genes favoring cooperation (a reciprocal mechanism) emerged as a more adaptive trait than did those favoring aggression.

As discussed in chapter 3, cooperators must have mechanisms that perform specific tasks. Cooperation (reciprocation) cannot evolve if an organism lacks reasoning procedures that can effectively detect cheaters (i.e., those who take conditionally offered benefits without providing the promised return). Such individuals would be open to exploitation, and hence their genes selected out. Consequently, we are genetically programmed to cooperate with reciprocators and not with those who do not reciprocate.

There are two general circumstances in which open access to resources can lead to the tragedy of the commons. One is where nature replenishes resources (natural renewable resources) such as off-shore fisheries, forests, open pastures, and underground water basins. In this instance, the given area of a resource is unowned and has unrestricted access, thereby allowing anyone to exploit the resource at will. The other circumstance is where members of a community produce and replenish resources (human renewable resources) such as goods and services. In this instance, the produced resource is or becomes part of a communal pool for appropriation by the members, irrespective of their individual contribution.

Let’s first examine how people are apt to behave when faced with a tragedy of the commons in which there is open access to a natural, renewable resource. The dilemma arises when you know (as do others) that when there is unrestricted access to a resource, the rational, self-interest choice is to take as much as possible in the here and now because everyone else will be doing the same, but you also know that such rational, individual behavior will not be in your or anyone else’s best interest in the long run because it will completely deplete the resource.

The choice people face in such a situation is sometimes equated to the hypothetical prisoner’s dilemma,2 where the rational choice is to not cooperate (i.e., defect). However, the game-theory model of the prisoner’s dilemma has several limitations that are not present in real-life decision-making. First, in the prisoner’s case, there are only two participants; second, the prisoners cannot talk to each other; third, the rules of the game are inflexible; and fourth, there is only one encounter (episode or game). In the real game of life (on or off the commons), there are multiple participants with ongoing communications, repeated encounters, and the ability to modify strategies (choices) based on results (i.e., trial and error). With these significant differences, people can avoid the tragedy of the commons because everyone involved is selfishly motivated to discover the best strategy to optimize their individual return on investment (time and effort) over the long term.

In her lifelong work, Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom (1933–2012) studied such open-access resources and discovered that, notwithstanding the dilemma encountered in a commons, there is a large body of common sense in the world. She found that people, when left to themselves, would sort out rational ways of surviving and getting along. Although the world’s arable land, forests, fresh water, and fisheries are all finite, it is possible to share them without depleting them and care for them without fighting. Years of fieldwork by Ostrom and others showed her that humans are not trapped and helpless amid diminishing supplies. She looked at forests in Nepal, irrigation systems in Spain, mountain villages in Switzerland and Japan, and fisheries in Maine and Indonesia. She even, as part of her PhD program at the University of California-Los Angeles, studied the water wars and pumping races going on in the 1950s in her own dry backyard.

Ostrom found that people tended to draw up sensible rules for the use of common-pool resources. Neighbors set boundaries and assigned shares, with each person taking turns to use water or graze cows on a certain meadow. They performed common tasks such as clearing canals or cutting timber together at certain times. Monitors watched out for rule breakers, fining or eventually excluding them. The schemes were mutual and reciprocal, and many had worked well for centuries. Best of all, they were not imposed from above. Ostrom put no faith in governments or large conservation schemes paid for with aid money and crawling with concrete-bearing engineers. Caring for the commons has to be a multiple task organized from the ground up and shaped to cultural norms. It has to be discussed face-to-face and based on trust.3

Given the evolutionary biology studies discussed earlier, we should not be surprised to see such cooperative strategies emerge in areas of the commons. We are here because natural selection favored our ancient ancestors whose behavior took advantage of the synergism of cooperation and its lower risk of conflict. The only surprise would be for those in the political world who find the bottom-up emergence of orderly strategies not orchestrated by government to be abnormal. In chapter 8, we will see that the bottom-up emergence of order is indeed the norm in nature — genes cooperate with other genes, cells with other cells, and organisms with other organisms in a symbiotic and yet selfish manner — all without a conductor.

Most instructive in Ostrom’s studies is the creativity of people trying to solve problems complicated by their own propensity to appropriate as much as possible — and how the varied strategies, while devised independently, have certain common characteristics. The variation in strategies was based on the type of resource, its accessibility, and local customs. The common elements that Ostrom found to be essential for a strategy to be successful were:

• The rules and strategies need to be discovered through a dynamic evolutionary process of trial and error.
• The rules must be devised by those using the resource.
• The users of the resource must be responsible for monitoring and enforcing their rules.
• Most important is the presumption against central planning — the plan must avoid immediate recourse to central regulations that will undermine the incentive for resource users themselves to devise rules.4

Governing the Commons5 by Ostrom is a superb testament to the understanding that can be gained when economists observe in close-up detail how people craft arrangements to solve problems in ways often beyond the imagination of textbook theorists. In particular, communities are often able to find stable and effective ways to define the boundaries of a common-pool resource, define the rules for its use, and effectively enforce those rules.6  

In summary, when people are left to their own devices they are most capable of structuring local rules to which every member agrees to adapt his or her behavior according to a strategy that each finds personally advantageous. Government force is incapable of accomplishing that which volition accomplishes naturally.

Let’s now examine how people are apt to behave when the resources produced by members of a community become common-pool resources with open access.

Biologically, we do not behave for the good of the community but rather for the good of ourselves, our kin, according to the degree of relatedness, and others when reciprocity serves our purpose. We cannot behave unselfishly (gene-wise) no matter how much we try or how much we are forced to do so. People will naturally adapt their behavior to optimize their investment of time and effort, given their current circumstances.

A family living independently is well aware that it is solely responsible for its own livelihood. Common sense tells its members that they cannot consume more than they produce. They are naturally motivated to behave prudently to produce and consume accordingly. Cheating is not an option for those living independently.

When joining a community, a family can continue to manage its productive and consumptive behaviors or change them to predatory behavior. The synergistic advantage of living near others will motivate cooperative behavior because reputation and trust are paramount if people want to remain members and gain the benefits of the community. Preying upon your neighbor is a good way to get ostracized from the neighborhood, since cooperation is a reciprocal mechanism.

The tragedy of the commons arises when rules are adopted or enforced that prohibit a person from controlling the distribution of that which he or she produces. Absent the ability to withhold goods from those detected as cheaters, predatory behavior becomes the norm within the community. Common sense tells us that if we are unable to ostracize slackers and free riders, we are less apt to behave cooperatively (i.e., reciprocally) because no one wants to be taken for a sucker. As Charles Stangor notes, “The sucker effect occurs when perceiving that one is contributing more to a task than others, lead[ing] individuals to withhold effort as a means of restoring equity and avoiding being taken advantage of.”7

The tragedy can occur even when the members agree to a communal arrangement. However, the cause of the tragedy (slacking and free riding) will quickly become apparent because we are genetically programmed to detect cheaters. Consequently, the members will be motivated to abandon their communal pooling arrangement and allow each member to control the distribution of that which he or she produces.

Governor William Bradford’s account of the Pilgrims of Plymouth exemplifies the tragedy when a communal system is adopted for the production and distribution of goods and services. When each Pilgrim had access to an equal share of the stores produced from the land used in common for growing crops without regard to their personal contribution, the community experienced a dwindling quantity of stores produced. Facing another year of famine, the communal system was abandoned and replaced with a system that allowed each family to work its own allocated plot and retain or trade whatever it produced. In 1623 — the first year following the change — the community experienced its most abundant harvest, which was and still is celebrated as Thanksgiving.

The diary kept by Governor Bradford is a testament to how people behave given the adoption of rules that run counter to their natural selfish inclinations, particularly where each person must share the product of his or her labor equally among all the community members. Not only did the communal system produce little in resources, it engendered strife and discontent between the members of the small community, even though they all shared a common and strict Christian faith. From the diary of William Bradford, circa 1623:

Whille no supply was heard of, neither knew they when they might expecte any. So they begane to thinke how they might raise as much torne [corn] as they could, and obtaine a beter crope then they had done, that they might not still thus languish in miserie. At length, after much debate of things, the Govr (with the advise of the cheefest amongest them) gave way that they should set corve [crops from labor] every man for his owne perticuler, and in that regard trust to them selves; in all other things to goe on in the generall way as before. And so assigned to every family a parcell of land, according to the proportion of their number for that end, only for present use (but made no devission for inheritance), and ranged all boys and youth under some familie. This had very good success; for it made all hands very industrious, so as much more torne was planted then other waise would have bene by any means the Govr or any other could use, and saved him a great deall of trouble, and gave farr better contente. The women now wente willingly into the feild, and tooke their litle-ons with them to set torne, which before would aledg weaknes, and inabilitie; whom to have compelled would have bene thought great tiranie and oppression.

The experience that was had in this commone course and condition, tried sundrie years, and that amongst godly and sober men, may well evince the vanitie of that conceite of Platos and other ancients, applauded by some of later times; — that the taking away of propertie, and brining in communitie into a comone wealth, would make them happy and florishing; as if they were wiser then God. For this comunitie (so farr as it was) was found to breed much confusion and discontent, and retard much imployment that would have been to their benefite and comforte. For the yong-men that were most able and fitte for labour and servise did repine that they should spend their time and streingth to worke for other mens wives and children, with out any recompence. The strong, or man of parts, had no more in devission of victails and cloaths, then he that was weake and not able to doe a quarter the other could; this was thought injuestice. The aged and graver men to be ranked and equalised in labours, and victails, cloaths, etc., with the meaner and yonger sorte, thought it some indignite and disrespect unto them. And for mens wives to be commanded to doe servise for other men, as dresing their meate, washing their cloaths, etc., they deemd it a kind of slaverie, neither could many husbands well brooke it. Upon the poynte all being to have alike, and all to doe alike, they thought them selves in the like condition, and ove as good as another; and so, if it did not cut of those relations that God hath set amongest men, yet it did at least much diminish and take of the mutuall respects that should be preserved amongst them. And would have bene worse if they had been men of another condition. Let pone objecte this is mens corruption, and nothing to the course it selfe. I answer, seeing all men have this corruption in them, God in his wisdome saw another course fiter for them.8

A summarized reading of Bradford’s diary:

Because we had not heard of the arrival of any supplies or if any were on the way, we had to think about how we might raise as much corn as possible to obtain a better crop and avoid languishing in misery. After a long debate the Governor (with the advice of the chiefest amongst them) decided to set the crops for each man in particular to own and work. So, every family was assigned a parcel of land according to the family size. This arrangement had very good success; for it made all hands very industrious, so that much more corn was planted than would have been planted otherwise. The women now went willingly to the field and took their little ones with them to help plant corn, whereas before they would allege weakness and inabilities and complain about being oppressed.

The experience we had was contrary to the conceit of Plato and other ancients that the taking away of property and bringing into the community a common wealth would make them happy and flourishing; as if they were wiser than God. For the community was found to breed much confusion and discontent, and retard much employment that would have been to their benefit and comfort. The young men who were more able and fit for labor and service complained that they should spend time and strength working for the other men’s wives and children without compensation. The strong men thought it an injustice that they would receive the same share of food and clothes that those who were weaker and only able to do a quarter of the work received. The older and graver men found that the equal ranking in labor, food, and clothes with that of the meaner and younger ones to be indignant and disrespectful. For men’s wives to be commanded to do service for other men such as dressing their meat and washing their clothes, etc., they deemed to be a kind of slavery and their husbands could not tolerate it. The point of all having to be alike and do alike they thought of themselves in the like condition and only as good as another. It took away the mutual respect that should be preserved amongst them.

Rules that ignore the biological nature of behavior simply invite tragedy. The disastrous consequences that follow the adoption of rules counter to man’s biological nature may be unintended, but are nevertheless predictable. There are annals of tragic, unintended consequences that should give anyone pause before issuing a rule designed to improve social welfare. Simply going about adopting and enforcing one rule after another, hoping one will actually produce good consequences, without bothering to understand the immutable selfish nature of human behavior, is characteristic of the inhumane world of politics and government.

The tragedy of communal access to human resources is exemplified in a political democracy, where free riders have equal say about the distribution of resources as do those who produce them. The growing number of those on the dole in the United States reached sixty-seven million, or 20 percent of the population, in 2012 — an annual welfare distribution of $2.5 trillion.9 Should anyone with even a modicum of common sense be surprised to see such figures?

The empirical evidence surrounding open access to natural resources demonstrates the creative ability of people when left to their own devices to harmoniously solve their social problems and the disruptive effect of external people trying to solve social problems for them with top-down dicta and force. The tragedy that sensible people are able to avoid when left alone is the very tragedy governments perpetuate.

• 1Robert Sapolsky, Biology and Human Behavior: The Neurological Origins of Individuality, 2nd ed (The Teaching Company).
• 2The prisoner’s dilemma is a game-theoretic model that posits two prisoners accused of a joint crime who are each given two choices: squeal (defect, “D”) on your partner or deny his participation in the crime (cooperate, “C”). The jail sentence each will receive depends on the choices made by both prisoners. They cannot talk to each other. The possible combined choices are CC, CD, DC, and DD. Based on the assigned level of punishment for each outcome, the rational choice for both prisoners is to defect (squeal), yet they would have each received a lesser sentence if they had instead both cooperated (denied the other’s participation).
• 3“Elinor Ostrom,” Economist, June 30, 2012, http://www.economist.com/node/21557717.
• 4Ibid.; see remarks by Ostrom, 26–34.
• 5Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
• 6Elinor Ostrom, with comments by Christina Chang, Mark Pennington and Vlad Tarko, The Future of the Commons, November 1, 2012 Institute of Economic Affairs. See comment by Mark Pennington, p. 14.
• 7Charles Stangor, Social Groups in Action and Interaction (New York: Routledge, 2015).
• 8Paul Solman, “Communism, Capitalism and the Third Thanksgiving,” PBS, November 22, 2012.
• 9Post Staff Report, “On the Dole: A Fifth of All Americans,” New York Post, February 13, 2013. https://nypost.com/2012/02/13/on-the-dole-a-fifth-of-all-americans. William Beach and Patrick Tyrrell, “The 2012 Index of Dependence on Government,” Heritage Foundation February 8, 2012.