The Liberal Tradition

1. CIVIL LIBERTIES

1. CHARLES JAMES FOX: Speech in the House of Commons, 13 December 1792

But what, Sir, are the doctrines that they desire to set up by this insinuation of gloom and dejection? That Englishmen are not to dare to have any genuine feelings of their own; that they must not rejoice but by rule; that they must not think but by order; that no man shall dare to exercise his faculties in contemplating the objects that surround him, nor give way to the indulgence of his joy or grief in the emotions that they excite, but according to the instructions that he shall receive. That, in observing the events that happen to surrounding and neutral nations, he shall not dare to think whether they are favourable to the principles that contribute to the happiness of man, or the contrary; and that he must take, not merely his opinions, but his sensations, from his majesty’s ministers and their satellites for the time being! Sir, whenever the time shall come that the character and spirits of Englishmen are so subdued; when they shall consent to believe that everything which happens around is indifferent both to their understandings and their hearts; and when they shall be brought to rejoice and grieve just as it shall suit the taste, the caprice, or the ends of ministers, then I pronounce the constitution of this country to be extinct. . . . See to what lengths they carry this system of intellectual oppression! ‘On various pretexts there have been tumults and disorders, but the true design was the destruction of our happy constitution.’ So says the speech; and mark the illustration of the right honourable magistrate: ‘There have been various societies established in the city of London, instituted for the plausible purpose of merely discussing constitutional questions, but which were really designed to propagate seditious doctrines.’ So, then, by this new scheme of tyranny, we are not to judge of the conduct of men by their overt acts, but are to arrogate to ourselves at once the province and the power of the Deity: we are to arraign a man for his secret thoughts, and to punish him because we choose to believe him guilty! ‘You tell me, indeed,’ says one of these municipal inquisitors, ‘that you meet for an honest purpose, but I know better: your plausible pretext shall not impose upon me: I know your seditious design: I will brand you for a traitor by my own proper authority.’ What innocence can be safe against such a power? What inquisitor of Spain, of ancient or of modern tyranny, can hold so lofty a tone? Well and nobly and seasonably has the noble earl said . . . ‘There are speculative people in this country who disapprove of the system of our government, and there must be such men as long as the land is free; for it is of the very essence of freedom for men to differ upon speculative points.’ Is it possible to conceive that it should enter into the imaginations of free men to doubt this truth? The instant that the general sense of the people shall question this truth, and that opinion shall be held dependent on the will of ministers and magistrates, from that moment I date the extinction of our liberties as a people. . . .

Now this, Sir, is the crisis which I think so truly alarming. We are come to the moment when the question is whether we shall give to the king, that is, to the executive government, complete power over our thoughts: whether we are to resign the exercise of our natural faculties to the ministers for the time being, or whether we shall maintain that in England no man is criminal but by the commission of overt acts forbidden by the law. . . .

A noble lord (Fielding), for whom I have a high respect, says he will move for a suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act. I hope not. I have a high respect for the noble lord; but no motive of personal respect shall make me inattentive to my duty. Come from whom it may, I will with my most determined powers oppose so dreadful a measure.

But, it may be asked, what would I propose to do in times of agitation like the present? I will answer openly. If there is a tendency in the dissenters to discontent, because they conceive themselves to be unjustly suspected and cruelly calumniated, what would I do?—I would instantly repeal the Test and Corporation Acts, and take from them, by such a step, all cause of complaint. If there were any persons tinctured with a republican spirit, because they thought that the representative government was more perfect in a republic, I would endeavour to amend the representation of the Commons, and to show that the House of Commons, though not chosen by all, should have no other interest than to prove itself the representative of all. If there were men dissatisfied in Scotland or Ireland, or elsewhere, on account of disabilities and exemptions, of unjust prejudices, and of cruel restrictions, I would repeal the penal statutes, which are a disgrace to our law books. If there were other complaints of grievances, I would redress them where they were really proved; but above all I would constantly, cheerfully, patiently listen. I would make it known that if any man felt, or thought he felt, a grievance, he might come freely to the bar of this House and bring his proofs: and it should be made manifest to all the world that where they did exist they would be redressed; where they did not, that it should be made evident. If I were to issue a proclamation, this should be my proclamation: ‘If any man has a grievance, let him bring it to the bar of the Commons’ House of Parliament with the firm persuasion of having it honestly investigated.’ These are the subsidies that I would grant to government.

Charles James Fox, Speeches during the French Revolution, pp. 6-17.

2. CHARLES JAMES FOX: Speech in the House of Commons, 13 May 1794

Were the House aware of the extent of this measure? It was no less than giving to the executive authority absolute power over the personal liberty of every individual in the kingdom. It might be said that ministers would not abuse that power. He must own for his part that he did not feel himself very comfortable under that reflection; every man who talked freely; every man who detested, as he did from his heart, this war, might be, and would be, in the hands and at the mercy of ministers. Living under such a government, and being subject to insurrection, comparing the two evils, he confessed he thought the evil they were pretending to remedy was less than the one they were going to inflict by the remedy itself. . . .

To deny to the people the right of discussion because upon some occasions that right had been exercised by indiscreet or bad men, was what he could not subscribe to. The right of popular discussion was a salutary and an essential privilege of the subject. He would not answer long for the conduct of parliament if it were not subject to the jealousy of the people. They all entertained becoming respect for the executive government, that was, for the chief magistrate of the kingdom, but their respect for the king did not supersede the vigilance of parliament. In his opinion, the best security for the due maintenance of the constitution was in the strict and incessant vigilance of the people over parliament itself. Meetings of the people, therefore, for the discussion of public objects were not merely legal, but laudable; and unless it was to be contended that there was some magic in the word ‘convention’ which brought with it disorder, anarchy, and ruin, he could perceive no just ground for demolishing the constitution of England merely because it was intended to hold a meeting for the purpose of obtaining a parliamentary reform.

Ibid. pp. 187 and 199.

3. R. B. SHERIDAN: Speech on the Standing Order for the Exclusion of Strangers, House of Commons, 6 February 1810

His right hon. friend had, by implication, questioned the use of the liberty of the press. Give me, said Mr. Sheridan, but the liberty of the press, and I will give to the minister a venal House of Commons—I will give him the full swing of the patronage of office—I will give him the whole host of ministerial influence—I will give him all the power that place can confer upon him to purchase up submission and overawe resistance; and yet armed with liberty of the press, I will go forth to meet him undismayed; I will attack the mighty fabric he has reared with that mightier engine; I will shake down from its height corruption and bury it beneath the ruins of the abuses it was meant to shelter. . . .

What was it that had caused the downfall of all the nations of Europe? Was it the liberty of the press? No: it was the want of that salutary control upon their governments, that animating source of public spirit and national exertion. If the liberty of the press had existed in France before or since the Revolution—if it had existed in Austria—if in Prussia—if in Spain, Bonaparte would not now find himself in the situation to dictate to Europe.

Cobbet’s Parliamentary Debates, vol. xv, cols. 341-3.

4. EARL GREY: Speech in the House of Lords, 23 November 1819

[The Speech from the Throne at the opening of the session of 1819–20 called for strong measures against the seditious spirit shown in the manufacturing districts. Earl Grey moved an amendment in the Lords, calling for an enquiry into the events of 16 August, in order to maintain ‘that confidence in the public institutions of the country, which constitutes the best safeguard of all law and government.’ The following extracts are from Earl Grey’s speech on 23 November 1819 : his amendment, supported by the Whig peers, was defeated by 159 votes to 34.]

The noble lord who moved the address had, in the course of his speech, warned the House not to let an anxiety for liberty lead to a compromise of the safety of the state. He, for his part, could not separate those things. The safety of the state could only be found in the protection of the liberties of the people. Whatever was destructive of the latter also destroyed the former. . . .

The discontent existing in the country had been insisted on as a ground for the adoption of some measures. . . . But there was another axiom no less true—that there never was an extensive discontent without great misgovernment. . . . When no attention was paid to the calls of the people for relief, when their petitions were rejected and their sufferings aggravated, was it wonderful that at last public discontents should assume a formidable aspect? . . .

Their lordships had some experience in that House two years ago, when restrictive laws were passed and when the Habeas Corpus Act was suspended, of the effect which such measures were likely to produce. The same complaints were then made of the existence of disaffection and discontent, and the same means of resorting to force were suggested. Did these measures produce the effects which were promised? . . .

The effect of these measures was, in his opinion, the cause of a great portion of the discontent which now prevailed. After all the experience which they had had, there was no attempt at conciliation, no concession to the people; nothing was alluded to but a resort to coercion. . . . The natural consequence of such a system, when once begun, was that it could not be stopped: discontents begot the necessity of force; the employment of force increased discontents: these would demand the exercise of new powers, till by degrees they would depart from all the principles of the constitution. . . .

Such was the order of things which prevailed in Ireland previous to the rebellion, and which ended in the destruction of the independent legislature of that country. He knew not whether it was intended to adopt the same measures with regard to this country as had been adopted in Ireland, where the sword had been substituted for persuasion. . . . Could government rest with confidence upon the sword for security? It was impossible that a government of such a nature could exist in England. . . . Without that spirit which the knowledge of the advantages they enjoyed under their constitution infused, all their energies would flag, and all their feelings by which their glory as a nation had been established, would be utterly dissipated.

Parliamentary Debates, vol. xli, pp. 7-19.

5. LORD JOHN RUSSELL: An Essay on the History of the English Government and Constitution from the Reign of Henry VII to the Present Time (1821)

There is another circumstance with respect to public opinion, which is of more importance than any. It is, that opinion has become much more sensitive, and men are more disposed to go to extremes than they were before. Since the beginning of the present reign, a popular party has appeared, which professes itself dissatisfied with the measure of liberty secured to us at the Revolution. Others have followed them, who, generally perhaps without any serious intention, have found pleasure in trying how far violence of language would be permitted. There has naturally arisen in the opposite quarter of the heavens, another party, who cling to ease and quiet, and would fain see political discussion silenced altogether. In times of great ferment, the dissensions of these parties become highly dangerous to all regular and sober freedom. Thus, at the beginning of the French Revolution, Mr. Burke having got a hold of the public mind, raised a spirit of the most bitter persecution against all who did not approve of the policy of the war. The extreme nervousness of the nation made it unsafe to indulge any honest differences in politics. The minister, by instituting trials for treason, gave in to and promoted the popular fury; and had it not been for Mr. Erskine’s eloquence, it is impossible to say whether the lives of Mr. Fox and all the chief of his party might not have been sacrificed to the rage and fear of the alarmists. The demagogues of the day, on the other hand, lose no opportunity of exciting the people, in times of distress, to acts of outrage and rebellion. The quiet and well-disposed, and indeed all persons of property, naturally take the alarm. The panic is increased by miserable wretches, who imitate the language of demagogues, in order to inspire terror into the community, and strengthen the ministers of the day. The evil of violent language and blasphemous publications, however, admits of an easy remedy. We have laws sufficiently strong against sedition and tumult; it is only necessary to put them in force. Instead of this, two other methods have been taken; both, in my mind, injudicious, and one extremely dangerous. The first is the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act. Now this is a very proper precaution, when a conspiracy is carried on by a few principal leaders whose imprisonment puts an end to the plot. But it is no remedy at all, when the evil consists in the discontent of some thousands of unemployed manufacturers. . . . The other remedy consists in new laws, restraining the right of speaking and writing. Acts of this kind interpose obstacles to public meetings and public newspapers, and serve to discountenance, for a time, by the authority of Parliament, the abuses of liberty which have prevailed. But it is manifest, that it is impossible to prevent sedition and blasphemy, unless all freedom of speech and the liberty of the press be extinguished. It is impossible to provide beforehand, by Act of Parliament, that all speeches and writings shall keep within the bounds of loyalty and moderation. Therefore, the restraining laws are, except for the moment, inefficient. They are also pernicious; for they admit a principle, which, if pushed to its full extent, authorises a censorship of the press. They are, therefore, in direct opposition to the maxims of the Revolution, which allowed any man to do freely, that which in itself was harmless. . . .

It would seem, that we have now gone as far as it is possible to go safely upon the system of restraint. If blasphemy and sedition again alarm the timid, they must be suppressed by the ordinary laws: otherwise we must either admit a censorship, or surrender the present mode of trial by jury.

It is to be hoped, that, rather than adopt either of these tyranical expedients, England would impeach the minister, who gave such atrocious advice to his sovereign.

Lord John Russell, Essay . . . (1821), pp. 287-91.

6. LORD JOHN RUSSELL: Speech in the House of Commons, 26 February 1828

[Lord John Russell was proposing a motion for the repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts. It was carried by 237 to 193.]

I now come to the great principle involved in the numerous petitions before the House; petitions signed by the noble body of Dissenters, by Roman Catholics, and by many members of the established Church. That principle is, that every man ought to be allowed to form his religious opinions by the impressions on his own mind, and that, when so formed, he should be at liberty to worship God according to the dictates of his conscience, without being subjected to any penalty or disqualification whatever; that every restraint or restriction imposed on any man on account of his religious creed is in the nature of persecution and is at once an offence to God and an injury to man. This is the just and noble principle on which the Dissenters claim the repeal of the Test Act.

. . . It may be asked, if I remove these securities, what other tests would I propose? My answer is, that I am opposed to religious tests of every kind. . . . I would wish to see applied to persons taking seats in parliament, and all the offices of government or corporations, a simple provision, that they should be called upon only to swear allegiance to the king.

Parliamentary Debates, N.S. xviii, pp. 678-9.