Ideas on Liberty

The Unnoticed Erosion of the Meaning and Value of Liberty

BY ANNE WORTHAM

IN AN ARTICLE on the failure of socialism in the case of subsidized cotton production, Paul Poirot lists the following circumstances that, according to socialist theory, are ideal for an experiment in socialism: a well-developed industrial society; a wealthy people who have known the productivity and abundance of private capitalism and who could afford such costs as a socialistic experiment might involve; a complex exchange economy with many highly skilled and highly productive specialists from whom goods and services might be drawn; persons who would submit willingly to identification and classification as deserving dependents of the society. “Such an experiment surely would be facilitated,” he writes, “if all the people had been more or less conditioned for controls—perhaps having experienced a series of world wars, much international bickering and unrest, a prolonged period of heavy taxation, a huge government debt—yes, and a debauched currency.”1

On these criteria, says Poirot, no country has been a better testing ground for socialism than the United States during the years since the depth of The Great Depression. “When and where else in the world has there been more skilled planning, more effective control, more able and willing participation, and less resistance and interference? We’ve been taught socialism in the schools, read it in the papers, heard it on the radio, seen it on television, and even lived it in our daily affairs.” Surely, he observes, interest groups like cotton growers “have been well-organized and persistent in acknowledging and proclaiming their need. And who on earth has stood and denied it?”2

Another question one might ask is why those who do protest the experiment are denigrated as enemies of liberty? Leonard Read has answered this question in the following observation: “Most Americans are unaware of a decline in individual liberty, and the reason is obvious: the decline rarely takes the form of sudden personal deprivations but, instead, takes the form of unnoticed erosion, and thus, we come, as do the Russians, to regard whatever state we are in as a normal condition.”3

Since liberty has lost its importance, wrote Read, people are not aware that it is in jeopardy. They cannot recognize that the American socialist revolution “is no longer an event of the future to be feared; it is a catastrophe of the past to be remedied—and remembered. In short, the revolution was, that is, the socialist objective has been achieved. Few people seem to appreciate the terrible fact that, already, we are subject to a centralized government of unlimited power.”4

How has this state of affairs come to be? How is it that people who proclaim every 4th of July that theirs is the land of the free—how could these same people be so ignorant of the decline of their freedom? There are many explanations. My answer is that it could not have happened if the American passion for equality had not superseded the imperatives of liberty to the point of rendering them “impractical” in the minds of many people, and if egalitarians had not succeeded in using ideas of liberty to justify statist goals.

Equality is no longer used in reference to man’s nature as a reasoning and self-determining being; it is now the means by which individuals redefine their nature and their relationship to other men and to political authority. It no longer refers to equal political freedom, but is understood by most Americans to mean equality of condition or equality of result. It has acquired such moral and political legitimacy that even in the face of national debt, declining industrial power, and the further erosion of civil liberties, Americans continue to demand it without realizing how much they are sacrificing for a goal that is impossible to achieve. Why do Americans willingly sacrifice their freedom for an ideal that cannot be realized? How did the goal of equality of condition attain such plausibility?

Equality of condition has triumphed over freedom by making itself the end to which freedom is the means. And this has been accomplished by redefining ideas of liberty, transforming them into self-nullifying “anti-concepts”5 that eliminate the difference between freedom and servility and obscure the oppressive effects of equalitarian policies. In order to diminish the meaning of ideas of liberty, egalitarians equate the conception of freedom as absence of constraint with freedom as collective self-determination; they redefine rights to mean “needs,” “interests,” or “privileges;” they set up false dichotomies between inequality and equity, between equality and merit, between people and property. In the face of the philosophical chaos that remains, it is not surprising that many Americans conceive of freedom as (to quote a line from a popular song of the Sixties) “just another word for nothing else to lose.” The arbitrary manipulation of meanings has been so successful that many Americans are hopelessly incapable of recognizing liberty’s eclipse by equality. (And there are many who recognize it with approval.)

A review of the use to which some of the key ideas of liberty are being put will further illuminate the extent of the ideological attack on the legitimacy of individual liberty. This discussion will focus on equality, individual rights, equal opportunity, and equity.

Equality and inequality are two sides of the same coin: human nature. As a species, mankind is universally characterized and distinguished from other species by the capacity to reason. It is with respect to this aspect of human identity that all individuals included in the species are equal. The species is also characterized by a high degree of variety, diversity, and differentiation—that is, inequality—rooted both in the biological and cultural nature of man. Thus, all people are equal in human nature, but not uniform in human attributes. Regardless of biological and cultural heritage, social status, economic position, competence, character and achievement, every person can say, “I am human.” And every person, because of these same attributes, can say: “I am I, unlike any other human before or after me.” Inequality is itself an attribute of the human species. To achieve the equalitarian ideal of a uniform species, or uniform group attributes, would require transcending the very order of nature itself, which in turn would entail violating the nature of man. Therefore, it should be dismissed as a goal. For, in reality, there is no conflict between natural equality of the human species and the social inequality resulting from man’s individuation and differentiation.

In a mixed economy the ideal of equality of result is offered as an alternative to all inequality, whether just or unjust. It is an absurd notion that cannot work in practice. It can only be pursued at the expense of liberty and result in the further institutionalization of unjust inequality. But its proponents boldly argue that today’s sacrifice of liberty to equality is the only way of achieving liberty at some undetermined time in the future. The ultimate goal of these egalitarians is to negate the principle of individual rights and to legitimate the idea that some men have the right to violate the rights of others.

Why is the negation of individual rights so important to egalitarians? Rights are those conditions of existence that are required for man’s proper survival and moral principles that define the extent of man’s freedom of action in a social context.6 The fundamental nature of rights is that they are exclusive to the individual, not the family, the group, the society, or the nation. They are not permissions, privileges, or conditions granted to men by social institutions, by the law, or by one’s neighbors. Individual rights are not arbitrary constructs created by man, but absolute requirements of man’s nature. It is not in the interest of egalitarians that men hold this conception of rights, for such men will not permit themselves to be ruled by another. In a free society, rights are seen as necessary conditions of individual liberty. In a mixed economy freedom is seen as a characteristic of the social whole, and rights are correspondingly defined as pertaining not to the individual, but to the collective—from the species (“human” rights) to interest groups (“women’s/gay/black/family/patients’/farmers’” rights).

It is only the principle of individual rights that gives meaning to the concept of equality in the social context. As an abstract measurement of man’s political relationship to other men and to political authority, equality means that (1) all men have equal status before the law; and (2) each person should enjoy equal conditions of civil freedom and equal protection of his freedom in order that he may achieve whatever goals his own intelligence, ability, and productivity will allow.

Just as the principle of individual rights gives meaning to political equality, so does it give meaning to the concept of “opportunity.” Opportunities are conditions of human existence that are favorable for the attainment of a goal. They are not self-evident requirements of man’s nature, as rights are, but must be discovered by his mind and brought into existence by his effort. (Even opportunities that we retrospectively identify as “strokes of luck” would be lost opportunities without the effort that gave them substance.) They are not unlimited, as those of one man end where the rights of another begin. In a free society equal opportunity would not be taken to mean that everybody ought to begin at the same starting place. Rather, the ethical-political content of equal opportunity is that since man’s survival depends on self-sustaining and self-generated action, he must be free from interference to peacefully take this action in pursuit of the resources on which his life depends. It is on the basis of the principle of equal opportunity—the equal political freedom to choose one’s actions independently—that toleration and limited government are defended.

In a mixed economy the idea of equal opportunity is used to justify the restriction of the pursuits of men whose social position and productivity places them at an advantage over men of lesser ability. It is used to redefine equal freedom to pursue life chances to mean equal consequences of the pursuit. John Gray summarized the “positive” view of freedom underlying this contemporary liberal conception of equal opportunity as follows:

it is the view that individual freedom in the full sense involves having an opportunity for self-realization . . . The political content of the positive view is that, if certain resources, powers or abilities are needed for self-realization to be effectively achievable, then having these resources must be considered part of freedom itself. It is on this basis that modern revisionary liberals have defended the welfare state as a freedom-enhancing institution: it is alleged to confer needed resources on individuals and thereby to expand their chances of freedom. These revisionary liberals [hold the view] that liberty (positive liberty) involves more than having the legal right to act. It signifies, primarily and centrally, having the resources and opportunities to act so as to make the best of one’s life.7

Equity is another idea of liberty that is used to undermine the legitimacy of individual freedom. As Aristotle wrote, equity is “genuine justice,” based on man’s rational nature. The exercise of justice is the recognition that every person must be judged for what he is. In a free society equity would involve the practice of judging a person’s character and actions exclusively on the basis of the factual evidence available, and of evaluating them by means of an objective moral criterion. Individuals are judged as individuals, not as bearers of the attributes of social categories such as race, sex, and age; neither are they judged as representatives of groups with which they may be affiliated or of “statistical populations.” In a mixed economy equity is used to obliterate the concept of justice and substitute it with the idea of “social justice”—the practice of redistributing income, status and political authority on the basis of collective rights. Equity is employed to suggest that there is no difference between the group and the individual, between a person’s physical attributes and his character; it disregards the difference between the earned or deserved and the unearned or undeserved, between men’s virtues and their vices, between innocence and guilt, between rational self-interest and self-sacrifice. It gives plausibility to paying men for material goods they have not produced, rewarding them for achievements they have not attained, penalizing them for achievements that are theirs; it enables men to sever the connection between the qualities of a person’s character and the admiration and respect extended to or denied him. It is no wonder that in such a society, the prevailing attitude is that life is unfair and justice unattainable.

The undermining of the meaning and importance of liberty, and its diminishment in practical life began before the creation of the Republic. One of the significant early blows to liberty came during the nation’s revolutionary birth when some members of the Continental Congress insisted that Thomas Jefferson delete from the draft of the Declaration of Independence the passage in which he charged King George III of England with violating the “most sacred rights of life and liberty” of the Negroes who were sold into slavery. While the American revolutionaries declared to the world their independence of a distant monarchy, they neglected to pursue the freedom of bondsmen who found themselves in the New World through no choice of their own.

Are Men Naturally Free?

The creation of history’s first country of individual liberty and the establishment of a political system which stressed the right of each man to the preservation of his own life, the ownership of the fruits of his labor, and the pursuit of his own happiness was the American answer to key questions posed by the Age of Enlightenment: Are men naturally free? If all are free, should they enjoy equal political freedom? This was the issue to which the Declaration of Independence spoke. It was the issue over which the question of slavery was eventually argued. It stirred advocates of women’s suffrage, and moved blacks and whites who protested government-enforced racial segregation and discrimination. And it is the issue yet to be faced in deciding the unresolved fate of American Indians.

The issue of whether a man is the owner of his person and life or the “property” of another human being was settled by the Thirteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Nineteenth Amendments asserted every person’s equal right to freedom and established laws to protect that right. Theoretically, the issue of political equality was resolved and Americans, regardless of sex, race, creed or national origin, could get on with the business of realizing a free and independent existence for themselves.

But the guarantee of political equality has not been sufficient for many Americans. As they see it, the guarantees of equal political freedom and equal protection under the law lack sufficient power to unite so complex a society. A “more perfect union” can only be realized if Americans are united by the establishment of group rights and equality of condition. Americans of this modern liberal persuasion view freedom as a means, as opposed to classical liberalism’s conception of freedom as an end.8 Thus, they believe the aim of equality of condition by means of collective rights should be sought, even if it requires assigning greater political authority to the state than is provided by the Constitution. Indeed, many propose that the Constitution be amended to require the state to carry out these goals.

The sentiment underlying the advocacy of government-imposed social and economic equality has been present in American society since before the amendment of the Bill of Rights to the Constitution. When Alexis de Tocqueville visited America in the 1830s he observed the boisterous egalitarianism of Jacksonian democracy and concluded that perhaps greater than their passion for freedom was the Americans’ search for “complete equality.” Their passion for equality was “ardent, insatiable, incessant, invincible; they call for equality in freedom; and if they cannot obtain that they still call for equality in slavery.” Democracy, he observed, was viewed as “the means for everyone to rise to the level of everyone else.”9

During the two generations between the Civil War and the First World War when American society was being transformed by industrialization and urbanization, the American passion for freedom was overtaken by the passion for equality. The “old” individualism of the American Enlightenment—the philosophy of natural freedom—was rejected and by the beginning of the twentieth century, Americans were being introduced to a new set of ideas to justify their clamor for equality. John Dewey was one of the leading formulators of those ideas, which became known as American pragmatism.

Dewey wrote that Americans must “get away from the conception of the individual as an isolated and independent unit;” they must turn their backs on the “rigid doctrine of natural rights inherent in individuals independent of social organization.”10 The “peculiar idea of personal liberty” must be discarded; the “artificial” autonomy attributed to the individual by Enlightenment thinkers must be rejected for a view of the individual as a “socialized” participant in the social process.11 In viewing the motives of the individual, we should place less emphasis on “calculating self-interest” and regard them more in terms of social responsibility.12 As for the standards by which men are to approach social problems, Dewey argued that we cannot cure social ills with “magnificent generalizations” like freedom and order, individualism and socialism, culture and unity, actuality and tradition, etc. We can resolve social antagonisms only with the trial and error of the experimental method.13 Since thought constructs the objects of knowledge, and since all knowledge is practical, man may “construct” in his mind any social environment he deems practical for “the all-around growth of every member of society.”14 And the test of what is practical is that which proves instrumental.

John Dewey provided just the philosophy that muckrakers and populists in the Progressive movement needed.15 If he was the “guru” of the movement, Theodore Roosevelt, the first president of the twentieth century, was its publicity man.16 Roosevelt’s doctrine, which was alternately called a “Square Deal” and the “new nationalism,” held that “social justice” could be attained only through strengthening the power of the federal government so that the executive could be the “steward of public welfare.” The judiciary must not disrupt this stewardship; contrary to its traditional position, it must “be interested primarily in human welfare rather than property.” Indeed, this must be the position of the American nation. Men thinking primarily of property rights and personal profits “must now give way to the advocate of human welfare, who rightly maintains that every man hold his property subject to the general right of the community to regulate its use to whatever degree the public welfare may require it.”17

This doctrine influenced not only the two presidents immediately following Roosevelt, but also every president from Franklin Roosevelt to Ronald Reagan. The cumulative effect of their varying implementation of this policy of statism is that America is now a society in which the quest for political equality has been abandoned for the quest for equality of condition. Individual rights have been sacrificed to group rights. The “public good” has replaced individual self-interest. The tyranny of “affirmative action” has usurped the standards of excellence and merit. Individual initiative has become ensnared in the trap of “social responsibility.” The noble ideal of individual liberty has been transformed into a revolt against the very self-responsibility and risk-taking that liberty entails. And the politics of victimization is the order of the day.18

In a society based on individual rights, political freedom, and capitalism, there is no conflict between inequality, equity, and merit. Inequality resulting from people’s varying application of their abilities to the problems of living is not synonymous with systemic injustice, unfairness, or institutional discrimination. One man’s gain is not another’s loss; one social class or group does not improve its life chances at the expense of the life chances of other classes or groups.19 No one is exempt from the risks and responsibilities of exchange and competition in the open, unregulated market of goods, services, and ideas. The consequence of this expression of freedom is the unequal but wide-ranging and equitable distribution of knowledge, wealth, consumption, and authority.

In a free society laws and institutions reflect people’s recognition of the fact that it is neither just nor unjust that men are born with differing natural abilities into different social positions. Therefore those possessing great natural capacity and who are at a more favorable starting point in society are not made to atone for what is not an injustice and not of their making. Neither are there attempts to eliminate these differences, or put them to work for the greatest number, or for the worst off. In a free society laws and judicial and political institutions are limited to ensuring that such differences among citizens are allowed free expression that does not infringe on the rights of others.

The American society is no longer organized primarily according to private capitalism; rather, it is organized according to the mixture of freedom and controls of welfare state capitalism. In this system private groups (e.g., labor, education, business) that have governmental power without governmental responsibility compete for exemption from open competition.20 In this system there exists the concurrence of just inequality on the one hand and unjust exploitative inequality on the other.21 Social mobility in America is dictated by a system of legalized constraints that benefit some at the expense of others.

This zero-sum system of privileges and penalties prevails not because it is either the best ethical or practical arrangement. Rather, it exists because, at bottom, most Americans believe that security and certainty are corollaries of freedom, that they have a right to these conditions of life, and that it is the duty of the government to provide them. This belief—that freedom requires state paternalism—reflects a profound ignorance of the theoretical and practical meaning of freedom. But it is the prevailing idea of the American political culture.

Dr. Wortham is a visiting scholar at the Hoover Institution in Stanford, California.

22. Paul Poirot, “Socialism at Its Best,” Essays on Liberty, Vol. V (September 1958), The Foundation for Economic Education.

23. Ibid.

24. Leonard E. Read, How to Advance Liberty (Irvington-on-Hudson, NY: The Foundation for Economic Education, 1965).

25. Ibid.

26. Ayn Rand identifies “anti-concept” as an “artificial, unnecessary, and (rationally) unusable term, designed to replace and obliterate some legitimate concepts . . . without public discussion; and, as a means to that end, to make public discussion unintelligible, and to induce the same disintegration in the mind of any man who accepts them, rendering him incapable of clear thinking or rational judgment.” See: Ayn Rand, Capitalism: the Unknown Ideal (New York: The New American Library, 1966), pp. 176–177.

27. Ibid., pp. 288–289.

28. John Gray, Liberalism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), p. 69.

29. Ibid., p. 72.

30. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (ed. Richard D. Heffner) (New York: New American Library, 1963).

31. John Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action (New York: Capricorn, 1963). Quoted in Leonard Peikoff, The Ominous Parallels (New York: Stein and Day, 1982).

32. Ibid.

33. John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (1920) (Boston: Beacon Press), pp. 194–195.

34. John Dewey, Freedom and Culture (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1939), p. 33.

35. Dewey, op. cit.

36. Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. (New York: Vintage Books, 1955).

37. Bragdon, Henry W. and Samuel P. McCutchen, History of a Free People (New York: Macmillan), 1967, p. 510.

38. Ibid., p. 514

39. See my discussion of the politics of victimization in The Other Side of Racism (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1981). See also John Murray Cuddihy’s discussion of groups competing for status as “top underdog” in his The Ordeal of Civility (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1974), p. 122.

40. This is not to say that a free and open society would be without conflicts of interest. In such a society those with less will want to acquire more, and those with more will want to keep what they have while obtaining more. There is no necessary conflict of interest in this, but since men are neither morally perfect nor omniscient, there is always the possibility that people will attempt to achieve gains by imposing their will on others through direct or indirect coercion. But in a free society men could not rely with impunity on physical or legislative coercion to realize their desires. Disparate interests may also come into conflict by virtue of noncoercive practices such as lying, deception, breach of promise, etc. But unless those acts involve the exchange of material values or the obstruction of justice, they are beyond the scope of the law to resolve. (Although consensus is not a necessary condition of a free society, nonviolent coexistence is.)

41. Ayn Rand, Philosophy: Who Needs It (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1982), p. 205.

42. By “just inequalities” I do not mean, as John Rawls does, inequalities in wealth, power, and authority that are justified to the extent that they work to the advantage of the worst off rather than those who are talented and socially advantaged. Inequalities in wealth, power, and authority are justified only to the extent that they are not the consequence of the use of force or fraud.

• 1. Paul Poirot, “Socialism at Its Best,” Essays on Liberty, Vol. V (September 1958), The Foundation for Economic Education.
• 2. Ibid.
• 3. Leonard E. Read, How to Advance Liberty (Irvington-on-Hudson, NY: The Foundation for Economic Education, 1965).
• 4. Ibid.
• 5. Ayn Rand identifies “anti-concept” as an “artificial, unnecessary, and (rationally) unusable term, designed to replace and obliterate some legitimate concepts . . . without public discussion; and, as a means to that end, to make public discussion unintelligible, and to induce the same disintegration in the mind of any man who accepts them, rendering him incapable of clear thinking or rational judgment.” See: Ayn Rand, Capitalism: the Unknown Ideal (New York: The New American Library, 1966), pp. 176–177.
• 6. Ibid., pp. 288–289.
• 7. John Gray, Liberalism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), p. 69.
• 8. Ibid., p. 72.
• 9. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (ed. Richard D. Heffner) (New York: New American Library, 1963).
• 10. John Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action (New York: Capricorn, 1963). Quoted in Leonard Peikoff, The Ominous Parallels (New York: Stein and Day, 1982).
• 11. Ibid.
• 12. John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (1920) (Boston: Beacon Press), pp. 194–195.
• 13. John Dewey, Freedom and Culture (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1939), p. 33.
• 14. Dewey, op. cit.
• 15. Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. (New York: Vintage Books, 1955).
• 16. Bragdon, Henry W. and Samuel P. McCutchen, History of a Free People (New York: Macmillan), 1967, p. 510.
• 17. Ibid., p. 514
• 18. See my discussion of the politics of victimization in The Other Side of Racism (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1981). See also John Murray Cuddihy’s discussion of groups competing for status as “top underdog” in his The Ordeal of Civility (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1974), p. 122.
• 19. This is not to say that a free and open society would be without conflicts of interest. In such a society those with less will want to acquire more, and those with more will want to keep what they have while obtaining more. There is no necessary conflict of interest in this, but since men are neither morally perfect nor omniscient, there is always the possibility that people will attempt to achieve gains by imposing their will on others through direct or indirect coercion. But in a free society men could not rely with impunity on physical or legislative coercion to realize their desires. Disparate interests may also come into conflict by virtue of noncoercive practices such as lying, deception, breach of promise, etc. But unless those acts involve the exchange of material values or the obstruction of justice, they are beyond the scope of the law to resolve. (Although consensus is not a necessary condition of a free society, nonviolent coexistence is.)
• 20. Ayn Rand, Philosophy: Who Needs It (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1982), p. 205.
• 21. By “just inequalities” I do not mean, as John Rawls does, inequalities in wealth, power, and authority that are justified to the extent that they work to the advantage of the worst off rather than those who are talented and socially advantaged. Inequalities in wealth, power, and authority are justified only to the extent that they are not the consequence of the use of force or fraud.
• 22IN AN ARTICLE on the failure of socialism in the case of subsidized cotton production, Paul Poirot lists the following circumstances that, according to socialist theory, are ideal for an experiment in socialism: a well-developed industrial society; a wealthy people who have known the productivity and abundance of private capitalism and who could afford such costs as a socialistic experiment might involve; a complex exchange economy with many highly skilled and highly productive specialists from whom goods and services might be drawn; persons who would submit willingly to identification and classification as deserving dependents of the society. “Such an experiment surely would be facilitated,” he writes, “if all the people had been more or less conditioned for controls—perhaps having experienced a series of world wars, much international bickering and unrest, a prolonged period of heavy taxation, a huge government debt—yes, and a debauched currency.”
• 23On these criteria, says Poirot, no country has been a better testing ground for socialism than the United States during the years since the depth of The Great Depression. “When and where else in the world has there been more skilled planning, more effective control, more able and willing participation, and less resistance and interference? We’ve been taught socialism in the schools, read it in the papers, heard it on the radio, seen it on television, and even lived it in our daily affairs.” Surely, he observes, interest groups like cotton growers “have been well-organized and persistent in acknowledging and proclaiming their need. And who on earth has stood and denied it?”
• 24Another question one might ask is why those who do protest the experiment are denigrated as enemies of liberty? Leonard Read has answered this question in the following observation: “Most Americans are unaware of a decline in individual liberty, and the reason is obvious: the decline rarely takes the form of sudden personal deprivations but, instead, takes the form of unnoticed erosion, and thus, we come, as do the Russians, to regard whatever state we are in as a normal condition.”
• 25Since liberty has lost its importance, wrote Read, people are not aware that it is in jeopardy. They cannot recognize that the American socialist revolution “is no longer an event of the future to be feared; it is a catastrophe of the past to be remedied—and remembered. In short, the revolution was, that is, the socialist objective has been achieved. Few people seem to appreciate the terrible fact that, already, we are subject to a centralized government of unlimited power.”
• 26Equality of condition has triumphed over freedom by making itself the end to which freedom is the means. And this has been accomplished by redefining ideas of liberty, transforming them into self-nullifying “anti-concepts” that eliminate the difference between freedom and servility and obscure the oppressive effects of equalitarian policies. In order to diminish the meaning of ideas of liberty, egalitarians equate the conception of freedom as absence of constraint with freedom as collective self-determination; they redefine rights to mean “needs,” “interests,” or “privileges;” they set up false dichotomies between inequality and equity, between equality and merit, between people and property. In the face of the philosophical chaos that remains, it is not surprising that many Americans conceive of freedom as (to quote a line from a popular song of the Sixties) “just another word for nothing else to lose.” The arbitrary manipulation of meanings has been so successful that many Americans are hopelessly incapable of recognizing liberty’s eclipse by equality. (And there are many who recognize it with approval.)
• 27Why is the negation of individual rights so important to egalitarians? Rights are those conditions of existence that are required for man’s proper survival and moral principles that define the extent of man’s freedom of action in a social context. The fundamental nature of rights is that they are exclusive to the individual, not the family, the group, the society, or the nation. They are not permissions, privileges, or conditions granted to men by social institutions, by the law, or by one’s neighbors. Individual rights are not arbitrary constructs created by man, but absolute requirements of man’s nature. It is not in the interest of egalitarians that men hold this conception of rights, for such men will not permit themselves to be ruled by another. In a free society, rights are seen as necessary conditions of individual liberty. In a mixed economy freedom is seen as a characteristic of the social whole, and rights are correspondingly defined as pertaining not to the individual, but to the collective—from the species (“human” rights) to interest groups (“women’s/gay/black/family/patients’/farmers’” rights).
• 28it is the view that individual freedom in the full sense involves having an opportunity for self-realization . . . The political content of the positive view is that, if certain resources, powers or abilities are needed for self-realization to be effectively achievable, then having these resources must be considered part of freedom itself. It is on this basis that modern revisionary liberals have defended the welfare state as a freedom-enhancing institution: it is alleged to confer needed resources on individuals and thereby to expand their chances of freedom. These revisionary liberals [hold the view] that liberty (positive liberty) involves more than having the legal right to act. It signifies, primarily and centrally, having the resources and opportunities to act so as to make the best of one’s life.
• 29But the guarantee of political equality has not been sufficient for many Americans. As they see it, the guarantees of equal political freedom and equal protection under the law lack sufficient power to unite so complex a society. A “more perfect union” can only be realized if Americans are united by the establishment of group rights and equality of condition. Americans of this modern liberal persuasion view freedom as a means, as opposed to classical liberalism’s conception of freedom as an end. Thus, they believe the aim of equality of condition by means of collective rights should be sought, even if it requires assigning greater political authority to the state than is provided by the Constitution. Indeed, many propose that the Constitution be amended to require the state to carry out these goals.
• 30The sentiment underlying the advocacy of government-imposed social and economic equality has been present in American society since before the amendment of the Bill of Rights to the Constitution. When Alexis de Tocqueville visited America in the 1830s he observed the boisterous egalitarianism of Jacksonian democracy and concluded that perhaps greater than their passion for freedom was the Americans’ search for “complete equality.” Their passion for equality was “ardent, insatiable, incessant, invincible; they call for equality in freedom; and if they cannot obtain that they still call for equality in slavery.” Democracy, he observed, was viewed as “the means for everyone to rise to the level of everyone else.”
• 31Dewey wrote that Americans must “get away from the conception of the individual as an isolated and independent unit;” they must turn their backs on the “rigid doctrine of natural rights inherent in individuals independent of social organization.” The “peculiar idea of personal liberty” must be discarded; the “artificial” autonomy attributed to the individual by Enlightenment thinkers must be rejected for a view of the individual as a “socialized” participant in the social process. In viewing the motives of the individual, we should place less emphasis on “calculating self-interest” and regard them more in terms of social responsibility. As for the standards by which men are to approach social problems, Dewey argued that we cannot cure social ills with “magnificent generalizations” like freedom and order, individualism and socialism, culture and unity, actuality and tradition, etc. We can resolve social antagonisms only with the trial and error of the experimental method. Since thought constructs the objects of knowledge, and since all knowledge is practical, man may “construct” in his mind any social environment he deems practical for “the all-around growth of every member of society.” And the test of what is practical is that which proves instrumental.
• 32Dewey wrote that Americans must “get away from the conception of the individual as an isolated and independent unit;” they must turn their backs on the “rigid doctrine of natural rights inherent in individuals independent of social organization.” The “peculiar idea of personal liberty” must be discarded; the “artificial” autonomy attributed to the individual by Enlightenment thinkers must be rejected for a view of the individual as a “socialized” participant in the social process. In viewing the motives of the individual, we should place less emphasis on “calculating self-interest” and regard them more in terms of social responsibility. As for the standards by which men are to approach social problems, Dewey argued that we cannot cure social ills with “magnificent generalizations” like freedom and order, individualism and socialism, culture and unity, actuality and tradition, etc. We can resolve social antagonisms only with the trial and error of the experimental method. Since thought constructs the objects of knowledge, and since all knowledge is practical, man may “construct” in his mind any social environment he deems practical for “the all-around growth of every member of society.” And the test of what is practical is that which proves instrumental.
• 33Dewey wrote that Americans must “get away from the conception of the individual as an isolated and independent unit;” they must turn their backs on the “rigid doctrine of natural rights inherent in individuals independent of social organization.” The “peculiar idea of personal liberty” must be discarded; the “artificial” autonomy attributed to the individual by Enlightenment thinkers must be rejected for a view of the individual as a “socialized” participant in the social process. In viewing the motives of the individual, we should place less emphasis on “calculating self-interest” and regard them more in terms of social responsibility. As for the standards by which men are to approach social problems, Dewey argued that we cannot cure social ills with “magnificent generalizations” like freedom and order, individualism and socialism, culture and unity, actuality and tradition, etc. We can resolve social antagonisms only with the trial and error of the experimental method. Since thought constructs the objects of knowledge, and since all knowledge is practical, man may “construct” in his mind any social environment he deems practical for “the all-around growth of every member of society.” And the test of what is practical is that which proves instrumental.
• 34Dewey wrote that Americans must “get away from the conception of the individual as an isolated and independent unit;” they must turn their backs on the “rigid doctrine of natural rights inherent in individuals independent of social organization.” The “peculiar idea of personal liberty” must be discarded; the “artificial” autonomy attributed to the individual by Enlightenment thinkers must be rejected for a view of the individual as a “socialized” participant in the social process. In viewing the motives of the individual, we should place less emphasis on “calculating self-interest” and regard them more in terms of social responsibility. As for the standards by which men are to approach social problems, Dewey argued that we cannot cure social ills with “magnificent generalizations” like freedom and order, individualism and socialism, culture and unity, actuality and tradition, etc. We can resolve social antagonisms only with the trial and error of the experimental method. Since thought constructs the objects of knowledge, and since all knowledge is practical, man may “construct” in his mind any social environment he deems practical for “the all-around growth of every member of society.” And the test of what is practical is that which proves instrumental.
• 35Dewey wrote that Americans must “get away from the conception of the individual as an isolated and independent unit;” they must turn their backs on the “rigid doctrine of natural rights inherent in individuals independent of social organization.” The “peculiar idea of personal liberty” must be discarded; the “artificial” autonomy attributed to the individual by Enlightenment thinkers must be rejected for a view of the individual as a “socialized” participant in the social process. In viewing the motives of the individual, we should place less emphasis on “calculating self-interest” and regard them more in terms of social responsibility. As for the standards by which men are to approach social problems, Dewey argued that we cannot cure social ills with “magnificent generalizations” like freedom and order, individualism and socialism, culture and unity, actuality and tradition, etc. We can resolve social antagonisms only with the trial and error of the experimental method. Since thought constructs the objects of knowledge, and since all knowledge is practical, man may “construct” in his mind any social environment he deems practical for “the all-around growth of every member of society.” And the test of what is practical is that which proves instrumental.
• 36John Dewey provided just the philosophy that muckrakers and populists in the Progressive movement needed. If he was the “guru” of the movement, Theodore Roosevelt, the first president of the twentieth century, was its publicity man. Roosevelt’s doctrine, which was alternately called a “Square Deal” and the “new nationalism,” held that “social justice” could be attained only through strengthening the power of the federal government so that the executive could be the “steward of public welfare.” The judiciary must not disrupt this stewardship; contrary to its traditional position, it must “be interested primarily in human welfare rather than property.” Indeed, this must be the position of the American nation. Men thinking primarily of property rights and personal profits “must now give way to the advocate of human welfare, who rightly maintains that every man hold his property subject to the general right of the community to regulate its use to whatever degree the public welfare may require it.”
• 37John Dewey provided just the philosophy that muckrakers and populists in the Progressive movement needed. If he was the “guru” of the movement, Theodore Roosevelt, the first president of the twentieth century, was its publicity man. Roosevelt’s doctrine, which was alternately called a “Square Deal” and the “new nationalism,” held that “social justice” could be attained only through strengthening the power of the federal government so that the executive could be the “steward of public welfare.” The judiciary must not disrupt this stewardship; contrary to its traditional position, it must “be interested primarily in human welfare rather than property.” Indeed, this must be the position of the American nation. Men thinking primarily of property rights and personal profits “must now give way to the advocate of human welfare, who rightly maintains that every man hold his property subject to the general right of the community to regulate its use to whatever degree the public welfare may require it.”
• 38John Dewey provided just the philosophy that muckrakers and populists in the Progressive movement needed. If he was the “guru” of the movement, Theodore Roosevelt, the first president of the twentieth century, was its publicity man. Roosevelt’s doctrine, which was alternately called a “Square Deal” and the “new nationalism,” held that “social justice” could be attained only through strengthening the power of the federal government so that the executive could be the “steward of public welfare.” The judiciary must not disrupt this stewardship; contrary to its traditional position, it must “be interested primarily in human welfare rather than property.” Indeed, this must be the position of the American nation. Men thinking primarily of property rights and personal profits “must now give way to the advocate of human welfare, who rightly maintains that every man hold his property subject to the general right of the community to regulate its use to whatever degree the public welfare may require it.”
• 39This doctrine influenced not only the two presidents immediately following Roosevelt, but also every president from Franklin Roosevelt to Ronald Reagan. The cumulative effect of their varying implementation of this policy of statism is that America is now a society in which the quest for political equality has been abandoned for the quest for equality of condition. Individual rights have been sacrificed to group rights. The “public good” has replaced individual self-interest. The tyranny of “affirmative action” has usurped the standards of excellence and merit. Individual initiative has become ensnared in the trap of “social responsibility.” The noble ideal of individual liberty has been transformed into a revolt against the very self-responsibility and risk-taking that liberty entails. And the politics of victimization is the order of the day.
• 40In a society based on individual rights, political freedom, and capitalism, there is no conflict between inequality, equity, and merit. Inequality resulting from people’s varying application of their abilities to the problems of living is not synonymous with systemic injustice, unfairness, or institutional discrimination. One man’s gain is not another’s loss; one social class or group does not improve its life chances at the expense of the life chances of other classes or groups. No one is exempt from the risks and responsibilities of exchange and competition in the open, unregulated market of goods, services, and ideas. The consequence of this expression of freedom is the unequal but wide-ranging and equitable distribution of knowledge, wealth, consumption, and authority.
• 41The American society is no longer organized primarily according to private capitalism; rather, it is organized according to the mixture of freedom and controls of welfare state capitalism. In this system private groups (e.g., labor, education, business) that have governmental power without governmental responsibility compete for exemption from open competition. In this system there exists the concurrence of just inequality on the one hand and unjust exploitative inequality on the other. Social mobility in America is dictated by a system of legalized constraints that benefit some at the expense of others.
• 42The American society is no longer organized primarily according to private capitalism; rather, it is organized according to the mixture of freedom and controls of welfare state capitalism. In this system private groups (e.g., labor, education, business) that have governmental power without governmental responsibility compete for exemption from open competition. In this system there exists the concurrence of just inequality on the one hand and unjust exploitative inequality on the other. Social mobility in America is dictated by a system of legalized constraints that benefit some at the expense of others.