Freedom in One Lesson
27. The Role of Rules
27.
The Role of Rules
“There seems to be considerable confusion about the nature and purpose of rules.” That is how Leonard Read begins “The Role of Rules,” from his 1972 book To Free or Freeze: That Is the Question (Read 1972a), after quoting Epictetus: “The first and most necessary topic in philosophy is the practical application of principles”—that is, we need to apply rules based on valid philosophical principles. He then clarifies the relationship between principles and rules and distinguishes between two different types of rules.
The principle of a thing is a verbal formulation of its nature and its workings; a rule is a homely guide to action deduced from the principle. There are good rules and bad rules precisely as there are true and false principles. A good rule: ‘Do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you.’ A bad rule: ‘The king can do no wrong.’
In other words, good rules are based “on the ground” of real human interactions, while bad rules arise from false principles. In the example above, the first rule derives from the principle that humans have rights that no one else can abrogate (e.g., “all men are created equal before the law”), while the second rule derives from the principle that the ruler has the right to override everyone else’s rights (e.g., “the divine right of kings,” the rejection of which helped pave the path of increasing freedom).
Here, we run up against a knowledge problem. No one can understand the full implication of every principle, so concrete application will always somewhat exceed the ability of an individual. But we often know enough or agree enough about a rule to find its application worthwhile. For instance, deists, believers in a more active God, and nonbelievers may all agree that our shared humanity justifies equal treatment of one another, even if they don’t agree about why this justifies it. “No one knows precisely how to explain gravitation, yet many of us know that it works and we frame countless rules accordingly. . . . To disregard these rules is to court disaster. . . . Most of us are unaware of many . . . principles. . . . Had we no way of abiding by principles except as we understand them, man would perish from the earth.”
No other kind of rule has a greater impact than that which limits the ability of people to impose their wills on others. Rules can protect us from those who, falsely thinking they know more than others, believe they can improve lives through coercion.
Over and over again we witness geniuses in their particular specializations assuming a knowledge of areas in which they have no competence . . . follow him in political economy and become enslaved. Specialization, when coupled with man’s arrogance, leads toward such danger.
What then is our saving grace? Rules! Do not touch a red hot stove or a live wire; do not jump out of a plane without a parachute; do not cheat, lie, steal, kill; do not feather your own nest at the expense of others. I do not have to know that “The volume of a gas varies inversely as the pressure” to avoid a bomb exploding in my face. I only need to know the rule, “Don’t play with bombs.”
For the realm of human actions and interactions, Read makes an important distinction between self-imposed rules for action and rules imposed externally to protect others from antisocial actions.
. . . What is the nature of these rules? There are two divisions—poles apart and each requiring its distinct kind of obedience. Rules in the first category . . . consist in practicing self-discipline; those in the second . . . consist in submitting to external authority.
Take the Golden Rule, which is a maxim in the first category. . . . If one is intelligent enough to see the wisdom of this rule and if he has the strength of character to heed it, he obeys. Otherwise, not! Each individual makes his own decision to obey or not. . . .
The Commandment, “Thou shalt not covet,” is but another of countless ethical and moral rules—a rule that is obeyed or not as the individual chooses. . . . In these matters each decides on the rules to be accepted or rejected and he prospers or fails in life’s purpose according to how intelligently he identifies the rules and obeys them.
Once we recognize our shortcomings in understanding and obeying these ethical and moral rules and guidelines . . . we must conclude that man by nature is imperfect. . . . We will, to some extent, offend the rights of others. Perfect harmony in society is not possible. . . . And pronounced indeed is the disharmony caused by those who have no scruples— no rules of their own!
This poses the necessity for rules of the second kind . . . meant to take effect if and when moral laws are ignored or violated; they are designed to cope with the antisocial as distinguished from the peaceful actions of citizens, that is, with those actions which cause injury to others . . . rules, which if properly drawn and obeyed, would assure a fair field and no favor. In this category of rules, we are expected to obey not necessarily what our conscience suggests but, rather, what an external authority dictates. As distinguished from moral law, this is civil law; it punishes those who trespass against their fellows, but it presupposes that there are men who behave ethically a good part of the time.
He concludes that civil law is necessary because of moral and ethical shortcomings but comes with serious risks.
It is utter folly to believe that there can be a good society without the rule of law—civil law, that is. Yet, this category of rules is loaded with the possibility for evil as well as good results. Civil law can, and often does, lead to total statism— enslavement—or it can, but rarely does, lead to securing individual liberty. Nonetheless, the free society is out of the question in the absence of civil law; to have even the remotest chance of the good society requires that we assume the risk that civil law might go askew. To achieve the best, we must face and overcome grave dangers.
The reality of the need for civil law, combined with the serious dangers that inhere in it, brings us back to a question of rules: which rules would generate the best results for society?
Is there . . . a certain narrow course which, if scrupulously followed, would secure liberty to all? . . .
There is . . . and it can be ours if we are not blind to it. . . .
This high road has as its foundation what many early Americans believed . . . that men’s rights to life, livelihood, and liberty are endowed by the Creator. These rights are part of our very being. . . . Each man participates in an order which confers upon him certain prerogatives which other men should not impair. . . .
This inherent rights principle, affirmed in the Declaration of Independence, has fallen by the wayside so far as comprehension and acceptance are concerned.
What Read calls the high road to the best possible civil society requires rerouting America from its current path and opposing the distortion of the meaning of equality.
There is, however, an easily misunderstood companion idea in the Declaration that may have led many people astray: “. . . that all men are created equal.” This has been seized upon by the Declaration’s detractors to “prove” how nonsensical its writers were. . . . Of course men are not equal in a single personal attribute. This is so obvious that the authors of the Declaration took no pains to say so. They were not writing to fools. What they had in mind was the profound idea that all men are equal before the civil law as they are before God. This relegates civil law to its proper place. Without this concept of equality before the law, justice is out of the question and civil law is out to get you and me.
Read finds civil law necessary because of our failures to live up to what we say we believe is right. But civil law can lead to abuses, and here the rule of universal equality before the law is necessary for our protection. Government, however, makes its own members and favorites far more equal than the rest of us, to paraphrase George Orwell’s Animal Farm. What core lesson about our imperfect reality does Read derive from his analysis ?
It is ridiculous to believe that any set of civil laws can be devised to bring about the good society among a people having no moral and ethical scruples. On the other hand, whenever a first-rate citizenry carelessly permits the civil law to go beyond its principled scope of maintaining the peace of the community, it will deprive them of their liberty and self-responsibility. . . .
Those who aspire to a good society have no manner of realizing their goal except as they (1) understand and obey the basic principles or rules of morality and ethics, and (2) establish and limit the scope of civil law so as to insure liberty and justice for all.