Cronyism

CHAPTER 13

THE JACKSONIAN REVOLUTION AND THE DEFEAT OF THE NATIONAL REPUBLICANS

The Corrupt Bargain

By 1828, reformers created a new libertarian organization to thwart the American System juggernaut: the Democratic Party. This accomplishment can be attributed to Van Buren, who deliberately tried to return Jefferson’s party to its Old Republican roots. Van Buren first attempted this feat with Crawford in 1824 before supporting the charismatic Jackson after Clay and Adams secretly exchanged favors for the presidency. This nefarious deal—the Corrupt Bargain of 1825— embodied the decade’s pervasive cronyism. The Tennessean defeated Adams in the Revolution of 1828, ushering in a new reform party dedicated to attacking special privileges.

Van Buren had his flaws, but undeniably demonstrated what Murray Rothbard calls “tactical brilliance.” He perceptively understood the indispensable nature of political parties: without an organization favoring limited government, corruption proliferated. He first started in his home state and fought Governor DeWitt Clinton, a new affiliate of National Republicans and Federalists. Nationwide, Van Buren tried to save the Republican Party by reviving the venerable New York–Virginia axis. The Regency formed the nucleus of Crawford’s Radicals, and in 1821 the New Yorker secured a Senate seat and befriended the Old Republican Randolph. The next year, Van Buren made the first of many pilgrimages to Virginia, establishing connections with Roane and Ritchie. Shortly thereafter, he strengthened his strict constructionist voting record.

Van Buren looked ahead to the upcoming presidential election in 1824, currently a dogfight between Crawford, Calhoun, Clay, Adams, and Jackson. The previous three presidents had all formerly served as secretaries of states, making Adams the heir apparent. But Van Buren refused to acquiesce, rallying reformers behind Crawford. In 1823 he sojourned to Ritchie, who swung to Crawford, along with Randolph, Macon, Taylor, Jefferson, and Cooper. Van Buren continued his Virginia pilgrimages, most notably in the spring of 1824, when he met with Jefferson. Van Buren devised a simple strategy: secure victory before the election. The Crawfordite Radicals would accomplish this through the congressional caucus, the old nominating horse of the Republican Party. Aside from its thoroughly Jeffersonian heritage, Van Buren reasoned that the caucus would keep the party together and avoid an overtime House election. If the latter occurred, Van Buren feared that corrupt representatives would trade favors to elevate their preferred choice to the presidency.

Two factors complicated the picture. First, in mid-1823 Crawford suffered a debilitating stroke. Second, later in the year, Van Buren discovered that less than one-fourth of Congress, mainly Crawford supporters, consented to the caucus. The other candidates, in addition to Monroe, resisted because they knew Crawford still possessed the highest chance of winning. Even though supporters nominated Crawford, the fact that other candidates still planned to compete made it an empty nomination. Crawford’s candidacy faded fast.

In the presidential election of 1824, two results quickly emerged. First, Calhoun, previously dropping out of the race, easily achieved his secondary goal and secured the vice presidency. Second, no presidential candidate acquired a majority of the Electoral College. However, Jackson decisively commanded a plurality (99) over Adams (84), Crawford (41), and Clay (37). He also racked up electoral majorities in the most states (11) while Adams (7), Crawford (3), and Clay (3) lagged behind. The same held for the popular vote (143,573), with Adams (120,459), Crawford (48,334), and Clay (47,939) clearly trailing. Jackson was the man to beat.

Some pro-Adams historians increase the New Englander’s turn-out by estimating popular vote totals in states where the legislatures chose electors, particularly New York. They want to show that Adams actually secured the popular vote instead of Jackson, and therefore no corrupt bargain really occurred. This procedure compares apples to oranges. The Jacksonians deliberately chose not to campaign in New York, because the legislature picked the electors. Moreover, as these historians admit, if the state had choosen its electors via popular vote, Clinton would have entered the presidential race and significantly cut down on Adams’ total. Given the election as it actually occurred, the conclusion is inescapable: Jackson received the most votes.

According to the Twelfth Amendment, similar to the 1800 election, the incumbent House voted on the top three candidates, with each state delegation casting one vote for their preferred choice. Whichever candidate won the majority of states—thirteen—would be the next president. This overtime election worried Van Buren, because the chances for corruption markedly increased, though he hoped that Crawford could win as a compromise candidate if gridlock existed between Adams and Jackson supporters.

Indeed, corruption did occur, thanks to a devastated Clay, whom the overtime rules eliminated from the race. Clay’s consolation prize was that as Speaker he exerted enormous power in deciding who received the honor, which meant he could wrangle a personal reward. In particular, he coveted the secretary of state position that proved such a reliable stepping stone. Clay arranged a sit-down with Adams, whom he immensely favored over Jackson and Crawford. In early 1825, Clay magnanimously asked Adams “to satisfy him with regard to some principles of great public importance [the American System], but without any personal considerations for himself.” Of course: two politicians who had no problem pilfering the public would now look out only for the nation’s welfare. The public interest always reigns supreme! Both knew the deal: Clay would elevate Adams to the presidency while the latter appointed the Speaker to be his secretary of state, who would then become the president eight years down the road. This deal was the third corrupt bargain that rocked the nation. Adams was all the worse for it, because during the campaign, the candidates pledged they would make no secret deals, and the New Englander, along with Jackson, stated that he did not actually want the job.

Adams and Clay quickly enlisted six state delegations—Kentucky, Ohio, Louisiana, Illinois, Missouri, and Maryland—necessary for victory. Jackson won the majority of the electoral votes in these states (Louisiana, Illinois, and Maryland) or finished second behind Clay in the popular vote (Kentucky, Ohio, and Missouri). In other words, the state delegations should have voted for Jackson and given him the majority necessary for victory. But this was not to be.

Clay’s home state was the easiest. Although the state legislature instructed its delegation to vote for Jackson, the Speaker ordered the congressmen to vote for Adams even though the official figures showed he did not win a single vote in Kentucky. Clay then corrupted Ohio. He introduced a bill extending the National Road into Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Missouri. Shortly thereafter, Ohio declared for Adams. Thanks to Congressman Henry Gurley, a Clay supporter friendly to Adams, Clay also enlisted Louisiana.

Now Adams conjured up his magic. In Illinois, Daniel Cook served as the sole representative. Unfortunately for Jackson, Cook was friends with Adams. After some cajoling and reported bribery, he declared his vote for the New Englander. Although the furious Illinois public denied Cook’s reelection bid in 1826, Adams granted his old chum a diplomatic post in Cuba. Missouri also sent only one representative, John Scott. Adams made Scott two promises: he would appoint Scott’s requested publishers to print Missouri’s laws and keep his brother as an Arkansas judge, even though said brother had illegally killed a colleague in a duel.

The Federalist Webster, who saw an opening in the emerging Adams-Clay alliance, also performed valuable work. He obtained assurances from Adams that Federalists would be eligible for patronage. Webster then used this pledge to convince the Maryland delegates to swing behind Adams. Crucially, Webster also solidified New York, which threatened to drop Adams down to twelve states. Although the state legislature voted for Adams, Van Buren managed to split the congressional delegation in the hopes of winning it for Crawford. It deadlocked, with one undecided Federalistist Stephen Van Rensselaer. If Van Rensselaer voted for Adams, the delegation would follow and give the New Englander his thirteen states. Thanks to Webster’s remarks about Federalist patronage, it did.

In February, the House elected Adams president on the first ballot. Webster and Randolph, tasked with counting the votes, expressed diametrically opposed reactions. While Webster crowed, Randolph bitterly remarked: “it was impossible to win the game, gentlemen, the cards were stacked.”Jackson, of course, fumed: “The Judas of the West has closed the contract, and received the thirty pieces of silver. His end will be the same.”

Thus, Adams corruptly secured the six states necessary to win the presidency. The plurality of the people and the Electoral College chose Jackson, which put him in the strongest position to win. But without a majority of the Electoral College, the decision went to the House, where Adams and Clay thwarted the people’s will. This demonstrated to the public the entrenched cronyism in Congress, signaling the need for serious reform.

The Revolution of 1828

To Van Buren, the corrupt bargain was caused by Republicans abandoning the congressional caucus. Realizing that the party was beyond repair, he created a new organization in its place. After developing this crucial political network, the Jacksonian Democrats triumphed, forever throwing the National Republicans out of power in what can be called “The Revolution of 1828.” Van Buren’s initial groundwork was one of the most notable accomplishments in the history of reform.

Even before Adams’ first address to Congress in December 1825, the Tennessee legislature nominated Jackson for president. Van Buren realized he could forge his libertarian party around the charismatic Jackson: “If Gen Jackson & his friends will put his election on old party grounds . . . our success when achieved will be worth something.” It was a perfect partnership. As Robert Remini explains, “both were committed to a states’ rights philosophy and both tended to a laissez-faire notion of economic theory.” Van Buren built up his Old Republican credentials in the 1820s, and Jackson maintained Old Republican connections that went back to his tenure as a senator in the late 1790s. Although Jackson based his 1824 campaign largely on personality, the House debacle convinced the Tennessean of the need for serious reform. Over the next several years, he outlined a “reform retrenchment and economy” program. In particular, Jackson wanted amendments to enforce strict constructionism and weaken special-interest deals in Congress; the elimination of the national debt and the Second Bank of the United States; and stringent vetoes on government spending and bureaucratic decision-making. Congressman James K. Polk and Senator Thomas Benton, among Jackson’s earliest supporters, wholeheartedly agreed.

In 1826, Jackson and Van Buren acquired their first ally: Vice President Calhoun, who recognized that the National Republicans had anointed Adams and Clay for the next sixteen years. Van Buren suggested to Calhoun that they bring Ritchie and his Richmond Enquirer on board to convince Radicals that Jackson adhered to Old Republican principles. However, Calhoun remained hostile to Ritchie, because the Virginian still appropriately considered the South Carolinian a staunch nationalist. But Van Buren pressed Calhoun until he relented. Soon Ritchie, Randolph, and Barbour joined the Jacksonians.

In January 1827, Van Buren wrote a famous letter to Ritchie outlining his grand strategy. He desired to produce a “substantial reorganization of the old Republican Party,” substituting “principle for personal preference as one of the leading points in the contest.” Van Buren recognized that “political combinations between the inhabitants of the different states are unavoidable & the most natural & beneficial to the country is that between the planters of the South [Virginia] and the plain Republicans of the North [New York].” Contrary to modern perception, Van Buren did not try to create a pro-slavery party. Instead, he wanted to recreate the divisions between the Hamiltonian Federalists and the Jeffersonian Republicans. The new Democratic Party, according to Van Buren, must champion laissez-faire and the Spirit of 1798 against the National Republicans’ American System. The old battle between liberty and power emerged once more.

Meanwhile, Clay prepared for the upcoming rematch, engaging in political malfeasance and rallying the troops. First, the secretary of state dispensed federal printing contracts to favorable newspapers, particularly the National Intelligencer, while eschewing unreliable periodicals, such as Amos Kendall’s Kentucky Argus. Second, he used the congressional franking privilege (free postal services) to subsidize campaign costs. Third, Clay enlisted Webster as the campaign’s unofficial treasurer because of his connections with the Boston Associates. Fourth, he hit the campaign trail, preaching the American System. Or, in the words of an Adams administration newspaper, “The real question, the only question of policy and principle, that is at issue between the supporters of Mr. Adams and those of Gen. Jackson, is this: ‘Shall the American System be adopted as a great leading national measure or not?”

Unfortunately for Clay, Jackson and Van Buren’s coalition grew stronger by the day. In the spring of 1827, Van Buren enlisted Crawford. Later in the year, Kendall and Francis Preston Blair of Kentucky, former Clay supporters, joined Van Buren after realizing that “states rights, the Bank, [and] the power of the Judiciary . . . became the criterion to distinguish the parties.” Finally, Van Buren created a central committee to gather these leading politicos and then fight corruption with corruption, using the franking privilege and acquiring state-level printing contracts for Jacksonian newspapers.

Over 1828, Jackson gained momentum. A favorable sign occurred in the 1826 elections, when Adams lost control of Congress, the first time ever for a sitting president. The presidential election only confirmed the bad omen. Jackson amassed 647,292 votes to Adams’ 507,730, 178 Electoral College votes to the incumbent’s eighty-three. Adams carried New England while the Tennessean commanded the Mid-Atlantic, the South, and the West. New York split in favor of Jackson because of the politicking of Van Buren (who successfully secured the governorship). In the legislature, Democrats comfortably controlled the House and narrowly the Senate. Clearly, the people had chosen the Jacksonians, ushering in a new era.

The Revolution of 1828 ended the Era of Corruption. Thanks to Van Buren, the power-hungry Adams-Clay-Webster triumvirate could not continue their program of central banking, protective tariffs, transportation subsidies, western nationalization, and South American imperialism. Remini properly argues the election embodied

what Kendall had called “the principles for which we are all contending.” . . . They contended that . . . corruption abounds where power goes unchecked [and] demanded an administration that would restrict government power. . . . Jackson’s election would not only expel a corrupt administration from office but create a new party based on mass support dedicated to the restoration of the constitutional safeguards of liberty.

Now, Jackson, Van Buren, and their libertarians needed to figure out how to avoid the pitfalls of Jefferson’s Republican Party and successfully remove special privileges.

______________

Murray N. Rothbard, “Principle in Politics,” Inquiry (September 1983): 35.

Donald Cole, Martin Van Buren and the American Political System (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 115, 125; Donald Ratcliffe, The One-Party Presidential Contest (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2015), pp. 32–33, 81–82, 149–55; Robert Remini, Martin Van Buren and the Making of the Democratic Party (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), pp. 7–29, 35–49, 59–63, 119; Norman Risjord, The Old Republicans (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), pp. 230–31, 252–53.

Ratcliffe, One-Party Presidential Contest, appendix.

Donald Ratcliffe, “Popular Preferences in the Presidential Election of 1824,” Journal of the Early Republic (Spring 2014): 45–77.

Ibid., pp. 72–73.

Robert Remini, Henry Clay (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1991), p. 258.

Ratcliffe, One-Party Presidential Contest, pp. 149–50; Remini, Henry Clay, pp. 235–58; Remini, Making of the Democratic Party, pp. 85–89; Robert Remini, Andrew Jackson, vol. 2 (New York: History Book Club, 1998), pp. 86–89; William Watkins, Crossroads for Liberty (Oakland, CA: The Independent Institute, 2016), pp. 251–52; Henry Watson, Liberty and Power (New York: The Noonday Press, 1990), pp. 81–83.

David Johnson, John Randolph of Roanoke (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2012), p. 203.

Watson, Liberty and Power, 82. See also Johnson, John Randolph, p. 203; Shaw Liver-more, The Twilight of Federalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962), pp. 172–82; Ratcliffe, One-Party Presidential Contest, p. 246, appendix; Remini, Henry Clay, pp. 259–65; Remini, Making of the Democratic Party, pp. 89–92; Remini, Andrew Jackson, 2, pp. 89–99.

Robert Remini, The Election of Andrew Jackson (New York: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1963), p. 39.

Remini, Andrew Jackson, 2, p. 194.

William Belko, Philip Pendleton Barbour in Jacksonian America (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2016), p. 140.

Donald Cole, Vindicating Andrew Jackson (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2009), p. 50; Ratcliffe, One-Party Presidential Contest, p. 267; Remini, Andrew Jackson, 2, pp. 76, 129; Risjord, The Old Republicans, p. 262; Charles Sellers, James K. Polk, Jacksonian (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 105–06.

Remini, Making of the Democratic Party, pp. 130–131.

Remini, Making of the Democratic Party, p. 131.

Belko, Philip Pendleton Barbour, p. 131; Cole, Vindicating Andrew Jackson, pp. 46–50, 71–76; Remini, Making of the Democratic Party, pp. 124–32; Risjord, The Old Republicans, pp. 262–63; Sean Wilentz, The Rise of American Democracy (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005), pp. 295–96, 307.

Daniel Feller, The Jacksonian Promise (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), p. 74.

Richard Ellis, The Union at Risk (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 14.

Donald Cole, A Jackson Man (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2004), pp. 95–97; Cole, Vindicating Andrew Jackson, pp. 59–71, 76, 183–86, 193–94; Ellis, Union at Risk, pp. 14–15; Historical Statistics of the United States, Historical Statistics of the United States, vol. 5, ed. Richard Sutch and Susan Carter (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 200; Remini, Election of Andrew Jackson, pp. 84–85, 126–31.

Remini, Andrew Jackson, 2, p. 129.