Libertarians, if they care to examine the subject, will discover that they have a rich historical tradition in the English and American antislavery movements. The libertarian tradition in antislavery thought may be concisely summed up: In Favorem Libertalis — In Favor of Liberty. No one familiar with this tradition could fail to identify Granville Sharp (1735-1813) as one of its first and greatest expositors and coadjutors.
Historians increasingly recognize the important role that considerations of foreign policy played in shaping the Constitution.’ Leading Federalists, many of whom had had experience abroad negotiating treaties or procuring foreign loans, were acutely sensitive to the demands of power politics and were determined to see the states united under a strong, “energetic” government that could command the respect of all potential enemies.
In his book Principles of Morals and Legislation, the eighteenth-century philosopher and legislator Jeremy Bentham divided all laws into three kinds: (1) laws designed to protect you from harm caused by other people; (2) laws designed to protect you from harm caused by yourself; and (3) laws requiring you to help and assist others. Bentham held that only the first kind of laws were legitimate; and in general libertarians would agree with him.
Professor David Gordon gives his critique of John Hospers’ “Libertarianism and Legal Paternalism” paper published in The Journal of Libertarian Studies.
The major claim in this paper is that there is a distinct ambiguity in the way in which H. L. A. Hart employs the concept of authority in his account of the nature of law. It is a flaw in Hart’s thesis that surprisingly few philosophers of law have detected. Perhaps this is because they share his view that the concept of authority is inherent in the very idea of law. The results of my research suggest that their view might be mistaken.
In an article on Ludwig von Mises,’ Professor R. A. Gonce has performed a remarkable feat: for he has ascribed to a writer who has had nothing but scorn for natural law, a system of economics grounded on such an ethical philosophy -and as a corollary, he has attributed a fusion of the is and the ought to one of the most uncompromising champions of Max Weber’s stern call for Wertfreiheit in the social sciences.
Traffic congestion reaches into all aspects of living: working, shopping, recreation. It insidiously cripples the ability of people to coordinate activities with one another, as it becomes virtually impossible to make exact appointments —a broad interval of time is usually the best that can be planned on.
Those who deny that the provision of protection services could be supplied through either the market or some other nonmonopolistic device must therefore endorse some sort of state. And those within that group who maintain that the provision of such services to everyone within a given territory is the only proper function of government must therefore advocate a minimal, or laissez-faire, state.
Casual observation of the last thirty years or so indicates that the role government plays in the lives of individuals has been increasing. Within the internal structure of government itself there are a number of reasons for this, but perhaps the overriding factor that has given way to this state of affairs is the fact that a large part of the public looks to government as the ultimate “problem-solver.” Political entrepreneurs have been quick to respond.
Long before receiving his Nobel Prize, Friedrich von Hayek was well respected in the academic community. John Maynard Keynes had glowing praise for Hayek’s 1944 The Road to Serfdom. Milton Friedman and Paul Samuelson, antagonists on many issues, agree that Hayek’s 1945 “The Use of Knowledge in Society” was a major contribution to political-economic thought.
