FDR Remonstrates Against Increased Japanese Troops in Indochina

Secretary of State Hull was laid up with a cold,[1] so Undersecretary of State Welles called the two Japanese ambassadors to the State Department on December 2, and presented them with a statement by President Roosevelt: “[C]ontinuing Japanese troop movements to southern Indochina,” reported during the past several days, represent “a very rapid and material increase in the forces of all kinds stationed by Japan in Indochina.” As FDR understood the Japanese agreement with the French Vichy government, t

U.S. War[1] Plans Published

On December 4, 1941, a front-page story in the Washington Times Herald and its parent newspaper, the Chicago Tribune, sent shockwaves throughout the nation:

F.D.R’s WAR PLANS

GOAL IS 10 MILLION ARMED MEN:

HALF TO FIGHT IN AEF

PROPOSED LAND DRIVE BY JULY 1, 1943, TO SMASH NAZIS

Tokyo: “Utterly Impossible for Japan to Accept” U.S. Terms

Page One of The New York Times reported on December 5 that Tokyo “was struck as by a bombshell . . . with the revelation of the substance of the Japanese-American negotiations.” Japan’s government-controlled news agency, Domei, had announced, “It is utterly impossible for Japan to accept the stipulations of the American document” presented to the two Japanese ambassadors on November 26 by Secretary of State Hull.

Collecting “Intelligence” and Determining Policy

With the perspective of hindsight, it is easy to spot the significant clues that should have given warning that the Japanese might attack Pearl Harbor. Out of fairness to the participants in the drama that was unfolding in 1941, however, we should keep in mind the situation as it appeared to them. A mass of information was coming into Washington in many forms from all over the world.

First 13 Parts of Japan’s Reply to U.S. Note of November 26

U.S. officials assumed the Japanese government had not been bluffing when it wired its ambassadors in Washington setting a deadline after which “things [were] automatically going to happen” if they could not reach agreement in their negotiations with the United States by November 29.

New York Times December 7, 1941 Reports: Navy Secretary Knox Says: U.S. Navy “Superior to Any”

While the authorities in Washington had been deeply concerned for months behind the scenes with the significance of the Japanese intercepts being decoded daily by U.S. Army and Navy cryptographers, they were also sensitive to public opinion. Especially so, since the leak on December 4 of the government’s secret war plans.

“Intelligence” Supplied Hawaiian Commanders was Limited

Unlike the top administration and military officials in Washington, the armed forces in Hawaii did not have a “Purple” machine or access to MAGIC. The Hawaiian commanders did not even know of their existence. They knew Washington had information not available to them and had to rely on Washington to be kept informed.

The Reaction to the Attack in Washington

As news of the attack on Pearl Harbor spread around the world, reports soon followed of other Japanese actions—all over the Pacific. They struck Singapore in southeast Asia, where the British had a big naval base. They struck Khota Baru on the British Malayan peninsula and the British base in Hong Kong. They attacked U.S.-operated Clark Field in the Philippines. And they struck the U.S. islands of Guam and Wake. All this within seven hours and three minutes of the attack on Pearl Harbor.

How Much Damage Had the Japanese Inflicted on Pearl Harbor?

The people in this country were panic-stricken. Why had Japan attacked the U.S. Fleet while negotiations with the U.S. were still ongoing? How much damage had been inflicted? Would the Japanese land in Hawaii? Would they attack the west coast of the United States? Would they attack Panama?