The Foundation for Economic Education The Freeman 1975

The Foundation for Economic Education The Freeman 1976

The Foundation for Economic Education The Freeman 1977

Stephan Kinsella lp-1-20 Mac OS X 10.5.6 Quartz PDFContext

Volume 1, Article 23 (2009)

Metaphysical libertarianism (hereafter ML) is the doctrine that human beings possess free will, that free will is incompatible with determinism, and that determinism is false. Its nomenclatural affinity with political and economic libertarianism (hereafter PEL) is by no means accidental, since, as I am going to argue, the viability of the latter depends on the viability of the former.

     ACCORDING TO BLOCK’S THEORY of “evictionism” (1977, 1978), a fetus can be aborted only if it is not killed as a result (provided that it is a genuine medical possibility). Block claims to derive such a conclusion from the libertarian axiom of non-aggression, which prohibits harming other human beings (even those not [yet] conscious of their humanity), but allows for forcible removal of trespassers from one’s private property (in this case the woman’s womb).

      I am thankful to Walter Block (2010) for his comprehensive and perspicacious engagement with my critical remarks regarding his theory of evictionism (Wisniewski 2010). I also appreciate his kind words about what he sees as the merits and strong points of my argumentation. However, as one could easily surmise from my decision to write this rejoinder, I found his defense of evictionism unconvincing, though certainly informative and thought-provoking. Without further ado, let me now proceed to explaining why.

     Since I remain unconvinced by the arguments used by Walter Block (2010, 2011) to defend the compatibility of his theory of evictionism with libertarianism, I feel obliged to continue our debate. Without further ado, let me proceed to addressing the substantive points he raises in his latest rejoinder to my criticisms (Wisniewski 2010a, 2010b).

Volume 3, Article 7 (2011)

The question to be asked in this paper is the following: is there an objective element of well-being, completely independent of anyone’s desires, interests and preferences? Some authors claim that belief in the existence of such an element figures prominently in our moral practices. For instance, Scanlon (1975, p. 658) writes the following: “it seems clear that the criteria of well-being that we actually employ in naming moral judgments are objective”.

Matt Mortellaro*