WE MIGHT BELIEVE THAT there are no conceivable conditions under which the state is legitimate. Alternatively, we might believe that there are such conditions, but deny that they actually obtain. The difference between these two forms of anarchism is important. The classical formulation of libertarianism would seem to entail the first form. Section I of this article argues that this fact alone would constitute a serious objection against its plausibility.

     In “Why Libertarians Should Reject Positive Rights,”1 Joshua Katz offers a critical response to the argument I develop in “Libertarianism and the Possibility of the Legitimate State.” Although Katz raises some interesting points regarding the limits of a particular line of argumentation that can be found in that art

Introduction

     In “Why Libertarians Should Believe in Positive Rights” (presented at the Austrian Scholars Conference 2006)1 Nico Maloberti offers a reformulation of libertarianism that does not preclude the possibility, in principle, of a legitimate state.

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“Para mí, los estados, son producto de las fantasías de los hombres. ¿Cómo explicar de otro modo que al sur de una línea la tierra cambie de nombre?”

—Jorge Luis Borges (1978)1

Introduction

     Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (1942) is a classic in the history of economic and political thought. It is probably the best known of Joseph Schumpeter’s contributions to political economy. The book earned its well-deserved fame not only for its well known thesis of the demise of capitalism, but also for its warning that socialism would probably be its successor.

I

     Libertarians believe that all individuals are entitled to live as they choose, free from interference by other persons or by the state. They also believe that in the absence of such interference, whether by government or other agents of the state intent on designing or planning for society as a whole, order will nonetheless prevail. Given the freedom to contract and exchange, markets will coordinate the production and distribution of goods—and indeed do so better than any other institution can.

Hardy Bouillon and Hartmut Kliemt, Eds.
Ashgate, 2007, 212 pages

 

I am a lead pencil — the ordinary wooden pencil familiar to all boys and girls and adults who can read and write.

Writing is both my vocation and my avocation; that’s all I do.

Introduction

     This aim of this article is to defend the usage that Hans-Hermann Hoppe (1989; 2006) makes of performative contradiction for justifying the self-ownership axiom. “Any person who would try to dispute the property right in his own body would become caught up in a contradiction, as arguing in this way and claiming his argument to be true, would already implicitly accept precisely this norm as being valid” (Hoppe 2006, 133).

Introduction

     In an article entitled “Rothbard as a Philosopher” (Feser 2006) Edward Feser harshly criticises the philosophical abilities of Murray Rothbard.