1.

THE ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY* (1943)

The achievement of political security is the basic quest of every peace-loving human group. It is even more basic than the quest for material welfare, since in an insecure world the latter is merely a passing phase. It has become clear to many thinkers and statesmen for some time past that political security cannot be attained and preserved through its own devices by one nation alone. Out of that realization developed the conception of collective security.

2.

PROSPERITY VERSUS PEACE: THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF A NEW ECONOMY FALLACY (1947)*

A new economic fallacy came of age in the course of the last prewar decade and threatens to play havoc with the future peace of the world. This fallacy consists in saying that a country’s national prosperity depends, essentially, upon a centralized planning of its economic life. Those who propound this point of view usually confuse full employment with prosperity and state the problem in terms of the former rather than of the latter objective.

3

AN ECONOMIST’S VIEWS ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION* (1950)

It is difficult not to be impressed by the fact that the quest for world organization carried out since the end of World War I was accompanied by a continuous growth of restrictions placed by governments of the various countries upon the economic intercourse between their residents and those of other countries. In consequence, the breakup of the world economy has been going pari passu with a growing concern over international cooperation in the political field.

4

NOTES ON THE HAVANA TRADE CHARTER (1948)*

The signing in Havana on March 24th 1948 of the Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment brought to a close three years of negotiating and drafting successive texts of the Charter for an International Trade Organization. The results of that long and painstaking effort are now before us and will become, undoubtedly, the object of very careful scrutiny throughout the world, in chancelleries, universities, business organizations, etc.

5

HOW IHE U.S. LOST THE ITO CONFERENCES (1949)*

It is not my present purpose to engage in a detailed discussion of the Havana Charter, nor to give reasons why I believe, as I do, that it is a harmful document which should not be ratified by Congress. What I purpose to examine is another aspect of the problem: the course of action that resulted in American delegates’ signing a document which denies rather than confirms the basic objectives of American economic policy.

6

ECONOMIC NATIONALISM AS AN OBSTACLE TO FREE WORLD UNITY (1952)*

I

It is one of the jobs of historians, when they look back upon past events, decades or centuries after they have taken place, to ascertain when the destinies of countries and nations have taken fundamental turns, for better or for worse, in the course of their history, what the causes of these turns were — and their consequences, whether they could have been avoided or reversed, in brief, whether nations through their leaders and their public opinion have acted wisely or otherwise in the face of ex

7

U.S. FOREIGN ECONOMY POLICY (1958)*

I

Unless the U.S. wishes to give its export surplus away indefinitely, it should aim either to expand its private overseas investment, or to expand its imports, or both. As will presently be shown, there is much scope for the further growth of U.S. investment, given a favorable international environment, but it is not in itself a substitute for the expansion of U.S. imports: no country has ever been prepared to reinvest all of its foreign earnings on past investments, and add on top of it a new export of capital.

Fifth Edition

Murray N. Rothbard

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