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The Rise and Fall of the City

November 23, 2005

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     Nearly every urban setting in the world is fraught with conflicts between groups, so much so that political commentators can speak of votes and candidates mostly in terms of the demographic composition and impact of the vote. It is not only in Baghad were people struggle over the levers of Power. Rather, every election turns on the "religious vote," the black vote," the business vote, the women's vote, etc.. This is a sad commentary on the modern city, founded in the middle ages as a place of peace and commerce and which became the very foundation of civilization.

    Why do these conflicts exist and why does the city — the cultural center of commecial civilization characterized by peace and prosperity — attract them? The Marxists say that that urban conflict is rooted in the war between capital and labor, the racialists says its root is in the exploition of one race by another, and feminists view it as a working out of a perpetual struggle over sex. Religion evidentally plays a role as well, as the case of Iraq demonstrates.

    And yet none of these factors speaks to the root cause of urban conflict. For the answer, I offer this reflection from my book Democracy: The God that Failed (now in paperback). It is the state and no other institution or social force that turns peaceful urban civilization into a war-zone:

    Ludwig von Mises explained the evolution of society — of human cooperation under the division of labor — as the combined result of two factors. These are first, the fact of differences among, men (labor) and the inequalities of the geographical distribution of the nature-given factors of production (land); and second, the recognition of the fact that work performed under the division of labor is more productive than work performed in self-sufficient isolation. He writes:

If and as far as labor under the division of labor is more productive than isolated labor, and if and as far as man is able to realize this fact, human action itself tends toward cooperation and association; man becomes a social being not in sacrificing his own concerns for the sake of a mythical Moloch, society, but in aiming at an improvement in his own welfare. Experience teaches that this condition — higher productivity achieved under division of labor — is present because its cause — the inborn inequality of men and the inequality in the geographical distribution of the natural factors of production — is real. Thus we are in a position to comprehend the course of social evolution. 1

    Several points are worth emphasizing here in order to reach a proper understanding of this fundamental insight of Mises's into the nature of society — points which will also help us realize some preliminary conclusions regarding the role of sex and race in social evolution.

    First, it is important to recognize that inequalities with respect to labor or land are a necessary but by no means a sufficient condition for the emergence of human cooperation. If all humans were identical and everyone were equipped with identical natural resources, everyone would produce the same qualities and quantities of goods, and the idea of exchange and cooperation would never enter anyone's mind.

    However, the existence of inequalities is not enough to bring about cooperation. There are also differences in the animal kingdom — most notably the difference of sex (gender) among members of the same animal species as well as the difference between the various species and subspecies (races); yet there is no such thing as cooperation among animals

    To be sure, there are bees and ants who are referred to as "animal societies." But they form societies only in a metaphorical sense.

    2The cooperation between bees and ants is assured purely by biological factors — by innate instincts. They cannot not cooperate as they do, and without some fundamental changes in their biological makeup, the division of labor among them is not in danger of breaking down. In distinct contrast, the cooperation between humans is the outcome of purposeful individual actions, of the conscious aiming at the attainment of individual ends. As a result, the division of labor among men is constantly threatened by the possibility of disintegration.

    Within the animal kingdom, then, the difference between the sexes can only be said to be a factor of attraction — of reproduction and proliferation; whereas the differences of the species and subspecies can be referred to as a factor of repulsion — of separation or even of fatal antagonism, of evasion, struggle, and annihilation.

    Moreover, within the animal kingdom it makes no sense to describe the behavior resulting from sexual attraction as either consensual (love) or nonconsensual (rape); nor does it make any sense to speak of the relationship between the members of different species or subspecies as one of hostility and hatred or of criminal and victim. In the animal kingdom there only exists interaction, which is neither cooperative (social) behavior nor criminal (antisocial) behavior. As Mises writes:

There is interaction — reciprocal influence — between all parts of the universe: between the wolf and the sheep that he devours; between the germ and the man it kills; between the falling stone and the thing upon which it falls. Society on the other hand, always involves men acting in cooperation with other men in order to let all participants attain their own ends.3

    In addition to an inequality of land and labor, a second requirement must be fulfilled if human cooperation is to evolve. Men — at least two of them — must be capable of recognizing the higher productivity of a division of labor based on the mutual recognition of private property (of the exclusive control of every man over his own body and over his physical appropriations and possessions) as compared to either self-sufficient isolation or aggression, depredation, and domination.

    That is, there must be a minimum of intelligence or rationality; and men — at least two of them — must have the sufficient moral strength to act on this insight and be willing to forego immediate gratification for even greater future satisfaction. But for intelligence and conscious will, writes Mises, men would have forever remained deadly foes of one another, irreconcilable rivals in their endeavors to secure a portion of the scarce supply of means of sustenance provided by nature. Each man would have been forced to view all other men as his enemies; his craving for the satisfaction of his own appetites would have brought him into an implacable conflict with all his neighbors. No sympathy could possibly develop under such a state of affairs.4

    There are members of the human species who are capable of understanding the insight but who lack the moral strength to act accordingly. Such persons are either harmless brutes living outside of and separated from human society, or they are criminals. They are persons who knowingly act wrongly and who besides having to be tamed or even physically defeated must also be punished in proportion to the severity of their crime to make them understand the nature of their wrongdoings and hopefully to teach them a lesson for the future. Human cooperation (society) can only prevail and advance as long as man is capable of subduing, taming, appropriating, and cultivating his physical and animalistic surroundings, and as long as he succeeds in suppressing crime, reducing it to a rarity by means of self-defense, property protection, and punishment.5

    As soon as these requirements are fulfilled, however, and as long as man, motivated by the knowledge of the higher physical productivity of a division of labor based on private property, is engaged in mutually beneficial exchanges, the "natural" forces of attraction arising from the differences in the sexes and the "natural" forces of repulsion or enmity arising from the differences between and even within the races, can be transformed into genuinely "social" relations. Sexual attraction can be transformed from copulation to consensual relations, mutual bonds, households, families, love, and affection. [6] (It testifies to the enormous productivity of the family-household that no other institution has proven more durable or capable of producing such emotions) And inter- and intraracial repulsion can be transformed from feelings of enmity or hostility to a preference for cooperating (trading) with one another.

    Human cooperation — division of labor — based on integrated family-households and on separated households, villages, tribes, nations, races, etc., wherein man's natural biological attractions and repulsions for and against one another are transformed into a mutually recognized system of spatial (geographical) allocation (of physical approximation and integration or of separation and segregation, and of direct or of indirect contact, exchange and trade), leads to improved standards of living, a growing population, further extensification and intensification of the division of labor, and increasing diversity and differentiation. [6]

    As a result of this development and an ever more rapid increase of goods and desires which can be acquired and satisfied only indirectly, professional traders, merchants, and trading centers will emerge. Merchants and cities function as the mediators of the indirect exchanges between territorially separated households and communal associations and thus become the sociological and geographical locus and focus of intertribal or interracial association.

    It will be within the class of merchants in which racially, ethnically, or tribally mixed marriages are relatively most common; and since most people, of both reference groups, typically disapprove of such alliances, it will be the wealthier members of the merchant class who can afford such extravagances. However, even the members of the wealthiest merchant families will be highly circumspect in such endeavors. In order not to endanger their own position as a merchant, great care must be taken that every mixed marriage is to be a marriage between "equals."7

    Accordingly, it will be in the big cities as the centers of international trade and commerce, where mixed couples and their offspring typically reside, where members of different ethnicities, tribes, races, even if they do not intermarry, still come into regular direct personal contact with each other (in fact, that they do so is required by the fact that their respective tribesmen back home do not have to deal directly with more or less distasteful strangers), and where the most elaborate and highly developed system of physical and functional integration and segregation will arise.8  It will also be in the big cities where, as the subjective reflection of this complex system of spatio-functional allocation, citizens will develop the most highly refined forms of personal and professional conduct, etiquette, and style. It is the city that breeds civilization and civilized life.

    To maintain law and order within a big city, with its intricate pattern of physical and functional integration and separation, a great variety of jurisdictions, judges, arbitrators and enforcement agencies in addition to self-defense and private protection will come into existence. There will be what one might call governance in the city, but there will be no government (state).9

For instance, Fernand Braudel has given the following description of the complex pattern of spatial separation and functional integration and the corresponding multiplicity of separate and competing jurisdictions developed in the great trading centers such as Antioch during the heyday of the Islamic civilization from the eighth to the twelfth century: At the city center was the Great Mosque for the weekly sermon…. Nearby was the bazaar, i.e., the merchants' quarter with its streets and shops (the souk) and its caravanserais or warehouses, as well as the public baths … Artisans were grouped concentrically, starting from the Great Mosque: first, the makers and sellers of perfumes and incense, then the shops selling fabrics and rugs, the jewelers and food stores, and finally the humblest trades… curriers, cobblers, blacksmiths, potters, saddlers, dyers. Their shops marked the edges of the town…. In principle, each of these trades had its location fixed for all time. Similarly, the maghzen or Prince's quarter was in principle located on the outskirts of the city, well away from riots or popular revolts. Next to it, and under its protection, was the mellah or Jewish quarter. The mosaic was completed by a very great variety of residential districts, divided by race and religion: there were forty-five in Antioch alone. "The town was a cluster of different quarters, all living in fear of massacre." So Western colonists nowhere began racial segregation — although they nowhere suppressed it. (Braudel, A History of Civilizations [New York: Penguin Books, l995], p. 66)

    For a government to arise it is necessary that one of these judges or arbitrators succeed in establishing himself as a monopolist. That is, he must be able to insist that no citizen can choose anyone but him as the judge or arbitrator of last resort, and he must successfully suppress any other judge or arbitrator from trying to assume the same role (thereby competing against him).

    More interesting than the question of what a government is, however, are the following: How is it possible that one judge can acquire a judiciary monopoly, given that other judges will naturally oppose any such attempt; and what specifically makes it possible, and what does it imply, to establish a monopoly of law and order in a big city, i.e., over a territory with ethnically, tribally, or racially mixed populations?

    First, almost by definition it follows that with the establishment of a city government interracial, tribal, ethnic, and clannish-familial tensions will increase because the monopolist, whoever he is, must be of one ethnic background rather than another; hence, his being the monopolist will be considered by the citizens of other ethnic backgrounds as an insulting setback, i.e., as an act of arbitrary discrimination against the people of another race, tribe, or clan. The delicate balance of peaceful interracial, interethnic, and interfamilial cooperation, achieved through an intricate system of spatial and functional integration and separation, will be upset.

    Second, this insight leads directly to the answer as to how a single judge can possibly outmaneuver all others. In brief, to overcome the resistance by competing judges, an aspiring monopolist must shore up added support in public opinion. In an ethnically mixed milieu this typically means playing the "race card." The prospective monopolist must raise the racial, tribal, or clannish consciousness among citizens of his own race, tribe, clan, etc., and promise, in return for their support, to be more than an impartial judge in matters relating to one's own race, tribe, or clan (that is, exactly what citizens of other ethnic backgrounds are afraid of, i.e., of being treated with less than impartiality).10

    At this stage in this sociological reconstruction let us, without further explanation, briefly introduce a few additional steps required to arrive at a realistic contemporary scenario regarding race, sex, society, and state. Naturally, a monopolist will try to maintain his position and possibly even turn it into a hereditary title (i.e., become a king). However, accomplishing this within an ethnically or tribally mixed city is a far more difficult task than within a homogeneous rural community. Instead, in big cities governments are far more likely to take on the form of a democratic republic — with "open entry" into the position of supreme ruler, competing political parties, and popular elections.11  In the course of the political centralization process12  — the territorial expansion of one government at the expense of another — this big city model of government will become essentially its only form: that of a democratic state exercising a judicial monopoly over a territory with racially or ethnically diverse populations.

    While the judicial monopoly of governments nowadays typically extends far beyond a single city and in some cases over almost an entire continent, the consequences for the relations between the races and sexes and spatial approximation and segregation of government (monopoly) can still be best observed in the great cities and their decline from centers of civilization to centers of degeneration and decay.

    With a central government extending over cities and the countryside, countries, inlanders, and foreigners are created. This has no immediate effect on the countryside, where there are no foreigners (members of different ethnicities, races, etc.). But in the great trading centers, where there are mixed populations, the legal distinction between inlander and foreigner (rather than ethnically or racially distinct private property owners) will almost invariably lead to some form of forced exclusion and a reduced level of interethnic cooperation.

    Moreover, with a central state in place, the physical segregation and separation of city and countryside will be systematically reduced. In order to exercise its judicial monopoly, the central government must be able to access every inlander's private property, and to do so it must take control of all existing roads and even expand the existing system of roadways. Different households and villages are thus brought into closer contact than they might have preferred, and the physical distance and separation of city and countryside will be significantly diminished. Thus, internally, forced integration will be promoted.

    Naturally, this tendency toward forced integration due to the monopolization of roads and streets will be most pronounced in the cities. This tendency will be further stimulated if, as is typical, the government takes its seat in a city. A popularly elected government cannot help using its judicial monopoly to engage in redistributive policies in favor of its ethnic or racial constituency, which will invariably attract even more of its own tribe's members, and with changes in the government more members of even more and different tribes will be drawn from the countryside to the capital city to receive either government jobs or handouts. As a result, not only will the capital become relatively "oversized" (as other cities shrink). At the same time, due to the monopolization of "public" streets — whereon everyone may proceed wherever he wants — all forms of ethnic, tribal, or racial tensions and animosities will be stimulated.

    Moreover, while interracial, tribal, and ethnic marriages were formerly rare and restricted to the upper strata of the merchant class, with the arrival of bureaucrats from various racial, tribal, and ethnic backgrounds in the capital city, the frequency of interethnic marriage will increase, and the focus of interethnic sex — even without marriage — will increasingly shift from the upper class of merchants to the lower classes — even to the lowest class of welfare recipients. Government welfare support will naturally lead to an increase in the birthrate of welfare recipients relative to the birthrate of other members, in particular of members of the upper class of their tribe or race.

    As a result of this overproportional growth of low and even underclass people and an increasing number of ethnically, tribally, racially mixed offspring especially in the lower and lowest social strata, the character of democratic (popular) government will gradually change as well. Rather than the "race card" being essentially the only instrument of politics, politics becomes increasingly "class politics." The government rulers can and will no longer rely exclusively on their ethnic, tribal, or racial appeal and support, but increasingly they must try to find support across tribal or racial lines by appealing to the universal (not tribe or race specific) feeling of envy and egalitarianism, i.e., to social class (the untouchables or the slaves versus the masters, the workers versus the capitalists, the poor versus the rich, etc.). 13,14

    The increasing admixture of egalitarian class politics to the preexisting tribal policies leads to even more — racial and social — tension and hostility and to an even greater proliferation of the low and under-class population. In addition to certain ethnic or tribal groups being driven out of the cities as a result of tribal policies, increasingly also members of the upper classes of all ethnic or tribal groups will leave the city for the suburbs (only to be followed — by means of public (government) transportation — by those very people whose behaviors they had tried to escape).15

a changed concept of the nature of law…. The beginning of legislation paralleled the abolition of patrician rule. Legislation initially took the form of charismatic statutes by the aesymnetes [governors possessing supreme power for a limited time]. But soon the new creation of permanent laws was accepted. In fact new legislation by the ecclesia became so usual as to produce a state of continuous flux. Soon a purely secular administration of justice applied to the laws or, in Rome, to the instructions of the magistrate. The creation of laws reached such a fluid state that eventually in Athens the question was directed yearly to the people whether existing laws should be maintained or amended. Thus it became an accepted premise that the law is artificially created and that it should be based upon the approval of those to whom it will apply. (pp.170 — 71)

      Likewise, in the medieval city states of Europe the "establishment of rule by the popolo had similar consequences…. It, too, ground out enormous editions of city laws and codified the common law and court rules (trial law) producing a surplus of statutes of all kinds and an excess of officials" (p. 172). Hand in hand with the changed concept of law goes a different political conduct.

      The political justice of the popolo system with its system of official espionage, its preference for anonymous accusations, accelerated inquisitorial procedures against magnates, and simplified proof (by "notoriety") was the democratic counterpart of the Venetian trials of the [aristocratic — patrician] Council of Ten. Objectively the popolo system was identified by: the exclusion of all members of families with a knightly style of life from office; obligating the notables by pledges of good conduct; placing the notables' family under bail for all members; the establishment of a special criminal law for the political offenses of the magnates, especially insulting the honor of a member of the populace; the prohibition of a noble's acquiring property bordering on that of a member of the populace without the latter's agreement…. Since noble families could be expressly accepted as part of the populace, [however,] even the offices of the popolo were nearly always occupied by noblemen. (pp. 160-61)

  With the upper class and the merchants leaving in larger numbers, however, one of the last remaining civilizing forces will be weakened, and what is left behind in the cities will represent an increasingly negative selection of the population: of government bureaucrats who work but no longer live there, and of the lowlifes and the social outcasts of all tribes and races who live there yet who increasingly do not work but survive on welfare. (Just think of Washington, DC.)

     When one would think that matters could not possibly become worse, they do. After the race and the class cards have been played and done their devastating work, the government turns to the sex and gender card, and "racial justice" and "social justice" are complemented by "gender justice."16  The establishment of a government — a judicial monopoly — not only implies that formerly separated jurisdictions (as within ethnically or racially segregated districts, for instance) are forcibly integrated; it implies at the same time that formerly fully integrated jurisdictions (as within households and families) will be forcibly broken down or even dissolved.

    Rather than regarding intra-family or -household matters (including subjects such as abortion, for instance) as no one else's business to be judged and arbitrated within the family by the head of the household or family members,17  once a judicial monopoly has been established, its agents — the government — also become and will naturally strive to expand their role as judge and arbitrator of last resort in all family matters. To gain popular support for its role the government (besides playing one tribe, race, or social class against another) will likewise promote divisiveness within the family: between the sexes — husbands and wives — and the generations — parents and children.18  Once again, this will be particularly noticeable in the big cities.

    Every form of government welfare — the compulsory wealth or income transfer from "haves" to "have nots" lowers the value of a person's membership in an extended family-household system as a social system of mutual cooperation and help and assistance. Marriage loses value. For parents the value and importance of a "good" upbringing (education) of their own children is reduced. Correspondingly, for children less value will be attached and less respect paid to their own parents. Owing to the high concentration of welfare recipients, in the big cities family disintegration is already well advanced. In appealing to gender and generation (age) as a source of political support and promoting and enacting sex (gender) and family legislation, invariably the authority of heads of families and households and the "natural" intergenerational hierarchy within families is weakened and the value of a multi-generational family as the basic unit of human society diminished.

    Indeed, as should be clear, as soon as the government's law and legislation supersedes family law and legislation (including interfamily arrangements in conjunction with marriages, joint-family offspring, inheritance, etc.), the value and importance of the institution of a family can only be systematically eroded. For what is a family if it cannot even find and provide for its own internal law and order! At the same time, as should be clear as well but has not been sufficiently noted, from the point of view of the government's rulers, their ability to interfere in internal family matters must be regarded as the ultimate prize and the pinnacle of their own power.

    To exploit tribal or racial resentments or class envy to one's personal advantage is one thing. It is quite another accomplishment to use the quarrels arising within families to break up the entire — generally harmonious — system of autonomous families: to uproot individuals from their families to isolate and atomize them, thereby increasing the state's power over them. Accordingly, as the government's family policy is implemented, divorce, singledom, single parenting, and illegitimacy, incidents of parent-, spouse-, and child-neglect or -abuse, and the variety and frequency of "nontraditional" lifestyles increase as well.19

    Parallel to this development will be a gradual but steady surge in crime and criminal behavior. Under monopolistic auspices, law will invariably be transformed into legislation. As a result of an unending process of income and wealth redistribution in the name of racial, social, and gender justice, the very idea of justice as universal and immutable principles of conduct and cooperation will be eroded and ultimately destroyed. Rather than being conceived of as something preexisting (and to be discovered), law is increasingly considered as government made law (legislation).

    Accordingly, not only will legal uncertainty increase, but in reaction the social rate of time preference will rise (i.e., people in general will become more present-oriented and have an increasingly shorter planning horizon). Moral relativism will also be promoted. For if there is no such thing as an ultimate right, then there is also no such thing as an absolute wrong. Indeed, what is right today may be wrong tomorrow, and vice versa.

    Rising time preferences combined with moral relativism, then, provides the perfect breeding ground for criminals and crimes — a tendency especially evident in the big cities. It is here that the dissolution of families is most advanced, that the greatest concentration of welfare recipients exists, that the process of genetic pauperization has progressed furthest, and that tribal and racial tensions as the outcome of forced integration are most virulent. Rather than centers of civilization, cities have become centers of social disintegration, corruption, brutishness, and crime.20

    To be sure, history is ultimately determined by ideas, and ideas can, at least in principle, change almost instantly. But in order for ideas to change it is not sufficient for people to see that something is wrong. At least a significant number must also be intelligent enough to recognize what it is that is wrong. That is, they must understand the basic principles upon which society — human cooperation — rests: the very principles explained here. And they must have sufficient will power to act according to this insight.

    The state — a judicial monopoly — must be recognized as the source of de-civilization: states do not create law and order; they destroy it. Families and households must be recognized as the source of civilization. It is essential that the heads of families and households reassert their ultimate authority as judge in all internal family affairs. Households must be declared extraterritorial territory, like foreign embassies. Free association and spatial exclusion must be recognized as not bad but good things that facilitate peaceful cooperation between different ethnic and racial groups. Welfare must be recognized as a matter exclusively of families and voluntary charity and state welfare as nothing but the subsidization of irresponsibility.

Hans-Hermann Hoppe ( Hoppe@Mises.com) is professor of economics at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. This essay is based on a chapter of Democracy: The God That Failed.

21 See on this Edward C. Banfield, "Present-Orientedness and Crime," in Assessing the Criminal, Randy E. Barnett and John Hagel, eds. (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1977); David Walters, "Crime in the Welfare State," in Criminal Justice?: The Legal System vs. Individual Responsibility, Robert J. Bidinotto, ed. (Irvington-on-Hudson, N.Y.: Foundation for Economic Education, 1994); also James Q. Wilson, Thinking About Crime (New York: Vintage Books, 1985).

23 See on this Seymour W. Itzkoff, <em>The Decline of Intelligence in America</em> (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994); idem, The Road to Equality: Evolution and Social Reality (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1992).

  • 1. Ludwig von Mises, Human Action: A Treatise on Economics, Scholar's Edition (Auburn, Ala.: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1998), p.160.9
  • 2. See on this Jonathan Bennett, Rationality: An Essay Toward an Analysis (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964).
  • 3. Mises, Human Action, p. 169.
  • 4. Ibid., p. 144.
  • 5. Rarely has the importance of cognition and rationality for the emergence and maintenance of society been more strongly emphasized than by Mises. He explains that one may admit that in primitive man the propensity for killing and destroying and the disposition for cruelty were innate. We may also assume that under the conditions of earlier ages the inclination for aggression and murder was favorable to the preservation of life. Man was once a brutal beast…. But one must not forget that he was physically a weak animal;he would not have been a match for the big beasts of prey if he had not been equipped with a peculiar weapon, reason. The fact that man is a reasonable being, that he therefore does not yield without inhibitions to every impulse, but arranges his conduct according to reasonable deliberation, must not be called unnatural from a zoological point of view. Rational conduct means that man, in face of the fact that he cannot satisfy all his impulses, desires, and appetites, foregoes the satisfaction of those which he considers less urgent. In order not to endanger the working of social cooperation, man is forced to abstain from satisfying those desires whose satisfaction would hinder establishment of societal institutions. There is no doubt that such a renunciation is painful. However, man has made his choice. He has renounced the satisfaction of some desires incompatible with social life and has given priority to the satisfaction of those desires which can be realized only or in a more plentiful way under a system of the division of labor… . This decision is not irrevocable and final. The choice of the fathers does not impair the sons' freedom to choose. They can reverse the resolution. Every day they can proceed to the transvaluation of values and prefer barbarism to civilization, or, as some authors say, the soul to the intellect, myths to reason, and violence to peace. But they must choose. It is impossible to have things incompatible with one another. (Human Action, pp. 171 — 72) See on this also Joseph T. Salerno, "Ludwig von Mises as Social Rationalist," Review of Austrian Economics 4 (1990).
  • 7. See Murray N. Rothbard, "Freedom, Inequality, Primitivism, and the Division of Labor," in idem, Egalitarianism as a Revolt Against Nature and Other Essays (Auburn, Ala.: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2000).
  • 8. See Wilhelm Mühlmann, Rassen, Ethnien, Kulturen. Moderne Ethnologie (Neuwied: Luchterhand, 1964), pp. 93 — 97. In general, apart from the upper strata of the class of merchants, peaceful racial or ethnic mixing is typically restricted to members of the social upper-class, i.e., to nobles and aristocrats. Thus, the racially or ethnically least pure families are characteristically the leading royal dynasties.
  • 9.
  • 10. See Otto Brunner, Sozialgeschichte Europas im Mittelalter (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1984), chap. 8; Henri Pirenne, Medieval Cities (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1969); Charles Tilly and Wim P. Blockmans, eds., Cities and the Rise of States in Europe, 1000 — 1800 (Boulder, Cob.: Westview Press, 1994); Boudewijn Bouckaert, "Between the Market and the State: The World of Medieval Cities," in Values and the Social Order, Vol.3, Voluntary versus Coercive Orders, Gerard Radnitzky, ed. (Aldershot, U.K.: Avebury, 1997). Incidentally, the much-maligned Jewish Ghettoes, which were characteristic of European cities throughout the Middle Ages, were not indicative of an inferior legal status accorded to Jews or of anti-Jewish discrimination. To the contrary, the Ghetto was a place where Jews enjoyed complete self-government and where rabbinical law applied. See on this Guido Kisch, The Jews in Medieval Germany (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942); also Erik Von Kuehrielt-Leddihn, "Hebrews and Christians," Rothbard — Rockwell Report 9, no. 4 (April, 1998).
  • 11. For a sociological treatment of the first (predemocratic) stage in the development of city states, characterized by aristocratic — patrician government founded on and riven by families (clans) and family conflicts, see Max Weber, The City (New York: Free Press, 1958), chap. 3. See also note 16 below.
  • 12. This statement regarding the characteristically democratic — republican — rather than monarchical — form of government in large commercial cities should not be misinterpreted as a simple empirical-historical proposition. Indeed, historically the formation of governments predates the development of large commercial centers. Most governments had been monarchical or princely governments, and when large commercial cities first arose the power of kings and princes typically also extended initially to these newly developing urban areas. Instead, the above statement should be interpreted as a sociological proposition concerning the unlikeliness of the endogenous origin of royal or princely rule over large commercial centers with ethnically mixed populations, i.e., as an answer to an essentially hypothetical and counterfactual question. See on this Max Weber, Soziologie, Weltgeschichtliche Analysen, Politik (Stuttgart: Kroener, 1964), pp. 41 — 42, who notes that kings and nobles, even if they resided in cities, were nonetheless decidedly not city-kings and city-nobles. The centers of their power rested outside of cities, in the countryside, and the grip that they held on the great commercial centers was only tenuous. Hence, the first experiments with democratic — republican forms of government occurred characteristically in cities which broke off and gained independence from their predominantly monarchical and rural surroundings.
  • 13. On the eliminative competition and inherent tendency of states toward centralization and territorial expansion — ultimately to the point of the establishment of a world government — see Democracy: The God That Failed, chapters 5, 11, and 12.
  • 14. See on this Helmut Schoeck, Envy: A Theory of Social Behavior (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1970); Rothbard, Egalitarianism as a Revolt Against Nature and Other Essays; and esp. "Freedom, Inequality Primitivism, and the Division of Labor," in ibid.
  • 15. For a sociological treatment of this second — democratic or "plebeian" — stage in the development of city government, based on and riven by classes and "class conflicts" (rather than clans and family conflicts, as during the preceding development stage of patrician government), see Max Weber, The City, chap. 4. In contrast to patrician city government, plebeian government, Weber observes importantly, is characterized by
  • 16. See on this tendency Edward Banfield, The Unheavenly City Revisited (Boston:Little, Brown, 1974).
  • 17. See on this Murray N. Rothbard, "The Great Women's Lib Issue: Setting it Straight," in Egalitarianism as a Revolt Against Nature and Other Essays; Michael Levin, Feminism and Liberty (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1987).
  • 18. See Robert Nisbet, Prejudices: A Philosophical Dictionary (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982), pp. 1-8, 110-17.
  • 19. See on this Murray N. Rothbard, "Kid Lib," in Egalitarianism as a Revolt Against Nature and Other Essays.
  • 20. See on this Allan C. Carlson, "What Has Government Done to Our Families?" Essays in Political Economy (Auburn, Ala.: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1991); Bryce J. Christensen, "The Family vs. the State," Essays in Political Economy (Auburn, Ala.: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1992).

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