
The Mises Institute monthly, free with membership
January 1998
Volume 16, Number 1
Capitalism and the Tao
by William Marina
China is undergoing one of the great economic transformations
in human
history. It has moved from communism toward what it calls "market
socialism" at breakneck pace, and enjoyed
double-digit economic growth as a result.
As an inevitable consequence, the grip of central state power
has begun to
relax. Even such draconian policies as the one-child-per-family
rule are loosening in
practice if not yet in law.
Sino-American relations are poised to enter a new era of
cooperation and
trade--if the U.S.
warhawks don't get in the way. Commentators such as A.M.
Rosenthal of the New York
Times call attention to the persecution of Christians in
China, and no doubt there is
truth here. But he wants to use this as justification for a new
round of interventionism
and China bashing.
Others think the U.S. should cut off trade relations as a way
of
pressuring the regime toward a greater recognition of human
rights. Some others decry
China's "interference" in American politics, as if the
U.S. hasn't had something to say about Chinese politics in the
past. Others still
believe American policymakers "lost"
China in the 1940s, and want to enlist Cold War tactics to get it
back.
Much of the confusion stems from the tendency to think of
China as an
inherently collectivist society, just as some mistakenly regard
Russia as inherently
authoritarian. This is far from the case.
In Economic Thought before Adam Smith, Murray Rothbard
noted the
three essential schools of Chinese thought: Taoism, Confucianism,
and Legalism, all
established from the 6th to the 4th century B.C. These worldviews
focus respectively on
the individual, the family, and the state. Chinese history has
been an ongoing,
interacting tension around the points of that triad.
Confucianism stresses patriarchy and family relationships. It
has not been
friendly to market ideas, but, in its original form, it did not
extol the state as the "father figure." Confucius even put the
military
state outside the social structure, writing that "A man does not
use good iron for nails, nor good men for soldiers."
Even closer to individualist thinking is Taoism, formed by Lao
Tzu, a
contemporary of Confucius. He taught that individual happiness is
the basis of a good
society. He saw the state, with its "laws and regulations more
numerous than the hairs of an ox," as the persistent oppressor of
the individual, "more
to be feared than fierce tigers." He was an opponent of taxation
and war, and his students and the tradition
that followed him were consistently libertarian.Natural law ideas
are inherent in both the
Taoist and Confucian worldviews, and the Confucian idea of
sagacious judges building up a
series of precedents to draw upon is nothing if not the basic
concept of Anglo-American "common law."
In contrast, the Legalism of Chin Shih Wang Ti, the first
great Emperor
who unified China more than two millennia ago, has much in common
with Mao's
conception of Marxism and Western ideas of Positive Law. But even
using mass murder and
totalitarian control, the Great Unifier was no more successful
than the Communists at
building a Chinese religion around statism.
The statism of the Legalism tradition has always been tempered
by Taoist
individualism and the Confucian emphasis on the family. Together,
Taoism and Confucianism
form a strong cultural resistance to imperial state ambitions.
With the resurgence of the
market economy in China, the Tao, especially, appears to have
more than nine lives.
Chinese history has also been what the Chinese call "the
eternal struggle between the
Imperial Dragon and the Local Snakes." Americans ought to relate.
Our own history has been a similar struggle
between advocates of republican decentralization, based on
natural rights concepts not
unlike those of the Taoists and Confucians, and the positive-law
statism of proponents of
centralization and empire. The great strength of the market
economy, of course, is that it
is inextricably interwoven with decentralization.
In the last 150 years, Western relations with China have
backed the
Imperial Dragon, big governments always preferring to deal with
other big governments.
This had tragic consequences for people and trade relations on
both sides. In the U.S.,
the federal government has expanded at the expense of
individuals, families, localities,
and states; similarly in China, the "Imperial Dragon" has grown
at the expense of the "Local Snakes."
Yet the individualist tradition owes much to China. In the
early modern
period, the West was fascinated by the wealth and creativity of
China. It was China's
political theorists who first saw the loss of the "mandate of
Heaven" as a justification for
political change. This is surely a step beyond the notion of the
"divine right" of kings favored by some
Western conservatives.
H.G. Creel and other Sinologists have observed that Thomas
Jefferson's good ideas on education bear a striking resemblance
to those of
Confucius, probably acquired from French thinkers much enamored
of China. And as European
bureaucratization increased early in the nineteenth century
bolstered by the ideas of
Positivism, it was Alexis de Tocqueville who referred to its rise
in France as "le system chinois."In the 1940s, Chiang
K'ai-shek's hyper-inflationist government, despite help at
various times from
the U.S.S.R., Germany, Japan, and the U.S., had lost legitimacy
among large numbers of the
Chinese people. In 1944 the Communists, meeting in Yenan
concluded that, given
Stalin's hatred toward them and help for their enemies, the best
hope was to look
toward the U.S.
U.S. policymakers rejected that overture, and the U.S.
intervention in
Korea and Vietnam brought relations with China to a low point.
Ironically, it was the
great "China Basher," Richard Nixon, who initiated a
rapprochement with the Communist regime.
Faced with the overwhelming reality that socialism meant
bankruptcy and
barbarism "and
impressed by the free-market successes of the Asian tigers"
reformers in the Chinese
government began market reforms in 1979. These reforms have made
remarkable advances
despite such tragedies as Tiananmen Square.
With the Cold War over, some restless Americans urge a "get
tough" policy with China. Such
pressures are counterproductive when applied to individuals and
even more so to a country
with China's cultural tradition.
Instead, we need to be supportive of that Taoist individualism
that is
thousands of years old, not just dating from the market reforms
of 1979.
The important step toward the establishment of freedom and
human rights--and the two are not separate--is to build up the
rule of law.
Traditional Chinese concepts of law are actually closer to those
in the West than many
realize.
One aim of the "Cultural Revolution" in the decade after 1966
was to destroy the law schools, libraries, and
faculties where the Chinese were attempting to adapt their system
to Western ideas of law.
The more creative faculty and students were sent to work on farms
or clean toilets, or put
in prison or worse.
Since 1979 the Chinese have mounted a massive effort to
recapture that
lost ground. But law schools and legal traditions are not built
overnight. We need to
support those making such efforts, however, not aid their enemies
by China bashing.
The Tao, with its emphasis on individualism, non-aggression,
and voluntary
exchange, was the progenitor of modern libertarianism and
Austrian economics. It is basic
to the rise of the market economy and the decline of socialism in
China. Following those
principles means working at the level of people to people, and
business to business,
getting involved with government at the local and provincial
levels, if at all, and
stopping the bashing and warmongering.
------------
William Marina teaches history at Florida-Atlantic University
FURTHER READING: Joseph Needham, Science and
Civilization in
China: History of Scientific Thought (Cambridge
University Press, 1956); Murray
N. Rothbard Economic Thought Before Adam Smith (Edward
Elgar, 1995); Jonathan
Spence, The Search for Modern China (W.W. Norton,
1990).
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