5. Soviet Science
"Planned" science sounds impressive; actually it means prohibited science, where no scientist can follow the leads of his own creative ideas. We have heard a great deal recently about the alleged glories of Soviet science, and about the necessity of the United States catching up with such wonders as sputniks. What is the real record of Soviet science? Professor Baker, analyzing this record, shows that, at the beginnings of the Soviet Union, the old pre-revolutionary scientists continued to do well, largely because science was not yet under government planning. That came with the Second Five-Year Plan, in 1932. The Plan set forth very broad subjects for investigation, but, by the nature of such a plan, many important areas were excluded from the required agenda. "Take almost any branch of non-revolutionary biological science in which outstanding discoveries were made in the outside world during the years of the plan, and you are likely to find that the whole subject was excluded from study."  For example; the study of hormones, and genetics. The Lysenko controversy, the use of the State to eradicate the science of genetics in Soviet Russia, and the compulsory twisting of truth by the Soviet State to fit the ideological myths of its rulers, are well-known, but can hardly be overstressed. It is important to realize
that it is not simply because the Soviet or Nazi leaders were particularly perverse men that they reached out to prevent or cripple science's drive for truth; but because such actions are inherent in the very nature of statism, and central planning. Power, and its promotion, advancement of the ideology of power, become the highest social goal, before which all truth, all integrity must give way.
Government control of science, government planning of science, is bound to result in the politicization of science, the substitute of political goals and political criteria for scientific ones. Even pro-Soviet scientists have admitted that Soviet research is inferior to American, that basic, as contrasted to applied, research, is neglected; that there is too much red tape; that little fundamentally creative work has been done; and that science is unduly governed by political considerations—such as the political views of the scientist propounding any given theory. Scientists are shot for taking the view that happens to be in political disfavor. And, as Baker concludes: "If the selection of scientific personnel is left to the State, the wrong ones are likely to be given important posts, because those who are not themselves scientists will be let astray by… false claims and pretences… (and) scientists may exhibit a servile obedience to their political bosses."  No wonder that in a list, drawn up by seven scientists, of the two dozen most important scientific discoveries made between World Wars I and II, not one came from the U.S.S.R.
In a follow-up to his earlier book, Dr. Baker has recently reaffirmed these conclusions. He further describes the coerced eradication of genetic science in Russia. He also deprecates the much-touted sputniks.  In the first place, if one starts with a given end, and the knowledge of how to get there has already been attained, one can arrive at the end in proportion to the resources one is willing to throw into the undertaking—all this then becomes a purely engineering and economic problem, rather than a scientific research problem, where ends or means are not yet known.  If, for some military or propagandist purpose, it was desirable to make a very deep hole towards the center of the earth, the deepest holes would probably be made by whichever nation decided to devote the largest amount of money to the project. The same principle applies to the sputniks.  And, even so, Baker points out, American satellites have far superior instrumentation, and are therefore much more important scientifically.
6. The Inefficiency of Military Research by Government
We have now seen that general scientific research should be left to the free market, and that conditions of modern technology do not require government control or planning of science. Quite the contrary. What now about military research? We have already said briefly that the end in view is for government to be only a consumer of military research rather than a producer; that government should contract for scientific research rather than conduct its own. Confirmation for this position comes from the important report of the Hoover Commission Task Force Report on Research Activities.  The report was made by scientists who were mainly advisers to the Department of Defense, and hence not sympathetic to the Department.
The Task Force found that 3/5 of the military funds spent by government in 1955 were on operations in private laboratories. All of the Defense Department's basic research was carried on in private laboratories—a clear admission that government laboratories are not good places to conduct vital basic research. Most of this basic research is done in college and university labs, its traditional home. The Task Force comments: "Since there is, in general, an inadequate environment and competence for basic research in its (Dept. of Defense) laboratories, the placing of substantially all of this work in the laboratories of the civilian economy is necessary."  As for applied research, 2/3 was being done in the civilian contract labs, and the Task Force strongly recommended the shift of most of the remaining 1/3 to private civilian hands: "A large portion of the applied research done in the laboratories of the military could be done more effectively in those of the civilian economy". As for actual development of products, as compared to research, the Task Force also advocates a larger role for private operation. Development occurs in several steps. There is (a) establishment of the weapon project. This of course must be decided ultimately by the government staff, but here again, technical studies in connection with establishment are being farmed out to private contractors; (b) testing, which of course must be done by government—the consumer; (c) development and design. This category also absorbs 2/3 of all government R and D funds. 3/4 of development and design work was being done in private contract laboratories, and 1/4 in the government, and yet the Hoover Task Force declared: "Perhaps one-half of the work done in the laboratories of the military can readily be placed in the civilian economy." (Other development activities are development aids to products, and current development, in which there is considerable activity by government.)
The overall assessment of the Task Force: "a considerable portion of the work now done in installations of the Government should be done in the civilian economy"—especially in applied research, and in development and design. This would be "placing the work where it can be preformed with the greatest effectiveness." And the Task Force expressed concern with the fact that, in recent years, the percentage of R and D work done in the government has been slowly but steadily increasing.
What are the reasons given by the Hoover Task Force for this relative inefficiency of government military scientific research? One reason is the salary problem. We have seen above the "shortage" that comes from not paying the free market price for services. The Task Force found that the pay for civil service scientists in the Defense Department has not been sufficient to meet the competition of the free market, and that there have been too few scientists appointed in the upper levels. Other problems are inherent in military operations in government. The system of military officer-rotation prohibits the emergence of a long-run specialized career for scientific officers. As the Task Forces charges: "the high level of strength of the industrial research and development organization of the nation could not have been attained were the personnel policy for the professional staff the equivalent of that of the military services for their technical officers."
Investigating three of the best Naval laboratories, the Task Force found and unfavorable "atmosphere" of friction among mixed civilian and military personnel, problems due to inadequate civil service pay and promotion policies, and to rapid rotation of upper officers. (And here we may emphasize the recommendation made above about scientists in government: that if the armed forces want good scientists, they should pay market wages, remove undue restrictions, and, further, to change the civil service system to allow more merit payment and less fixed bureaucracy.)
But there is more to governmental inefficiency than those matters. The Hoover Task Force asked the question: why is government poor on all research and development and design, but relatively effective in such work as testing and establishment? Because, answers the Task Force, "The operations of research and development are highly creative and imaginative, they require men with a special type of qualification and a high level of … training. Most of the operations of the establishment, placement, and monitoring of programs, and the tests for evaluation are much less creative and more engineering in their nature."  But even in these latter tasks, the Task Force adds, there is much room for improvement.
The Task Force found the Air Force with the best record in shunting scientific operations to the civilian private economy, and the Army the poorest. But it called for even the Air Force to do more to shift operations into private hands.
7. Atomic Energy
We have so far omitted discussion of atomic energy. Our nuclear age has been held up as the chief argument of those who believe that government control and direction of science is necessary in the modern world—at the very least, in the atomic field. The government –directed team effort involved in making the atomic bomb has been glorified as the model to be imitated by science in the years ahead. But, in analyzing this common view, Jewkes, Sawers, and Stillerman point out, first, that the fundamental atomic discoveries had been made by academic scientists working with simple equipment. One of the greatest of these scientists has commented: "we could not afford elaborate equipment, so we had to think."
Furthermore, virtually the entire early work on atomic energy, up to the end of 1940, was financed by private foundations and universities.  And the development of the bomb was, for peacetime purposes, an extremely wasteful process. The friction on the project between scientists and administrators, the great difficulties of administration, has been pointed out often.  Moreover, Jewkes, Sawers, and Stillerman suggest that government control of research slowed down, rather than speeded up, peacetime atomic development—especially with its excessive secrecy and restrictions. They warn also that latest estimates hold that, even by the year 2000, less than one-half of the total output of electricity will come from atomic energy (the main peacetime use), and that over-optimism about atomic energy has already drained scientists and technologists away from other fields, diminishing the supply of research needed elsewhere. And Professor Bornemann warns that "pressure of exploitation for military purposes has depleted the stock of basic scientific knowledge and in an atmosphere, moreover, which has not been conducive to further discovery in this realm."
The eminent economic historian John Nef points out that such inventions useful to war as nitroglycerin and dynamite, did not emerge from war, but from developments in the mining industry. Nef finds that recent world wars have not so much stimulated scientific development, as diverted it into purely military tasks—in fact, have slowed down genuine scientific progress. And while the vast sums of the government speeded up the development of the bomb, "it cannot be claimed that war made the general use of this force for the material benefit of humanity more imminent." And a prominent American engineer has noted that the armed forces, between the wars, were technologically stagnant, and that "little technological progress is possible during a war, except of the 'hothouse' variety, which is forced and superficial, and that whatever gains have been made in military technology have come as a consequence of more general scientific and industrial advances."
Boremann charged further that government monopoly of the atom, and its lack of profit and loss incentives, made atomic power inefficient and over-costly. Government secrecy greatly delayed engineers of the power industry from learning about the modern technology, therefore slowing scientific development.
As we saw earlier, neither is Dr. John R. Baker impressed with such Soviet achievements as the sputnik as a model for science. Engineering development toward a specific given end—in addition to the other evils of government control—also deprives basic research of needed scientific resources. 
That modern nuclear science has not rendered obsolete an individual inventor, the free and undirected spirit (see the views of Jewkes et. al. discussed above) has recently been shown in dramatic form in the case of the "crazy Greek", Nicholas Christofilos, who, as an elevator engineer and supervisor for a truck repair depot, taught himself nuclear physics from the ground up, and originated theories so challenging that atomic experts scoffed and ignored him—until they proved successful. Christofilos, Dr. Edward Teller, and others have all indicated that, in his case, lack of training was a positive advantage in preserving his original bent of mind.
If, then, the advent of atomic energy does not change our basic conclusions: that all civilian research and development be done by the free market, and that as much as military scientific work as possible be channeled into private rather than government operations, what of the space age? How shall we finance our future explorations in space? The answer is simple: insofar as space explorations are a byproduct of needed military work (such as guided missiles) and only insofar, let the space exploration proceed on the same basis as any other military research. But, to the extent that it is not needed by the military, and is simply a romantic penchant for space exploration, then this penchant must take its chances, like everything, in the free market. It may seen exciting to engage in space exploration, but it is also enormously expensive, and wasteful of resources that could go into needed products to advance life on this earth. To the extent that voluntary funds are used in such endeavors, all well and good; but to tax private funds to engage in such ventures would be just another giant government boondoggle.
Turning from the general to the particular, we find that in recent years the Federal government has begun to realize the superior efficiency of private enterprise, even in atomic development. The Hoover Task Force found that the Atomic Energy Commission's nuclear plants were all operated as contract installations, by private industry or by universities. In 1954, the Atomic Energy Commission awarded nearly 18,000 prime contracts to over 5,000 firms, who in turn let more than 375,000 subcontracts. As a result, all the major productive facilities of the atomic energy program have been designed, built, equipped, and operated by private firms. Furthermore, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 significantly relaxed the Federal atomic monopoly, permitting much more private participation in atomic development. As soon as the Act was passed, private industry began moving successfully into the atomic field. Consolidated Edison announced plans for building a 200,000 kilowatt atomic power generating plant at Indian Point, N.Y.—with no help whatever from government except permitting the company to buy atomic fuel. Other companies interested in getting into various phases of an atomic power industry are: electric equipment manufacturers, and companies in other industries (e.g. aircraft, locomotives, machine tools, petroleum, etc.) looking for channels of diversification, and universities, medical and other research organizations, hoping to buy small atomic reactors.
Much, however, remains to be done, and existing restrictions and regulations still keep a large segment of industry from furthering atomic progress. The Atomic Energy Committee of Manufacturing Chemists' Association urge further liberalizing of security and patent regulations. The AEC's powers of licensing and further regulating should be eliminated. The Atomic Energy Commission should confine its activities to military atomic energy; by subsidizing and regulating peaceful atomic energy; by subsidizing and regulating peaceful atomic power, it distorts market allocation of resources and prevents efficient operations. Federal subsidies to atomic power plants burden competing power plants from competing energy sources, and foster uneconomic use of resources.
Another important way in which the government could encourage peaceful atomic development in a manner consistent with the free market: by freeing it from governmental burdens, to eliminate rate regulation of public utilities (a job for the state governments.) Public utilities are main potential users of atomic energy, but they could hardly do the job of which they are capable with their rates, and methods of operation, fixed by government authority. And the Federal government could properly stimulate space exploration, in a manner consistent with the free market, by permitting any private firms or organizations that might land on other planets, to own the land and other resources which they begin to exploit: in the manner of the Homestead law, although without the law's restrictions on acreage or use of land. Automatic government ownership of any new lands in space acts as an enormous damper on private exploration and development.
There has been much pressure, in recent years, by the firms about to enter the atomic energy industry (specifically the builders of atomic reactors), for Federal subsidies to supplement the third-party liability insurance available from private insurance companies: in cases where accidents at atomic plants injure third parties. This pressure should be firmly resisted. If private enterprise, using its own funds, is unable to pay the full costs of its own insurance, then it should not enter the business. The promotion of atomic energy for peaceful uses is not an absolute goal, as we have seen; it must compete in use of resources with other power plants and with other industries. Any government subsidization of an enterprise, whether through insurance grants or any other method, weakens the private enterprise system and its basic principle that every firm must stand on its own voluntarily-raised resources, and distorts the efficient allocation of resources to serve consumer wants. The other enterprise in this country must pay for their own full insurance costs, and so should the atomic industry. The wise words of the Hoover Task Force on Lending Agencies should be heeded here:
"The risks of ownership are inseparably woven into the concept of private property. When an owner is relieved of his normal risks other than by his own effort and industry, he is beholden to those who assume the risks in his place. This increases the likelihood that he also will be relieved of the other attributes of property ownership—the right, for example, to decide how, when, where, and by whom the property shall be used. In the end he is likely to be relived of the property as well." 
8. Basic Research
The National Science Foundation, in its 1957 study of American research and development, concluded that "our overall effort is ample."  It also concluded, however, that we are deficient in basic research, and that this phase of R & D needs encouragement. It recommends a program of Federal encouragement, ranging from tax exemptions (see below) to Federal aid. We have seen, however, that the great bulk of basic research takes place in private university laboratories, and that the Hoover Task Force has found the government incompetent to perform even military research and development, much less civilian. And we have seen in detail the inefficiencies and the grave dangers of science—and direction is bound to follow subsidy. Also, we have seen how Federal aid to scientific education is self-defeating.
9. What Should Government Do to Encourage Scientific Research and Development?
What, then, should the government do, if anything, to encourage research and development? We have repeatedly outlined the recommended principles of government policy: to avoid interfering positively in the free market or in scientific inquiry, and confine itself to changing the provisions of its won rules and laws that hamper free scientific research. The latter category, however, leaves room for far more government action than one might think.
Some of the recommended policies which flow from these basic principles have already been outlined:
- Pay market wages for scientists used by government or government-contracts.
- Relax civil service red tape, to provide merit payment and promotions.
- Remove undue security regulations and red tape on government-contracted scientific work.
- Remove Atomic Energy Commission regulations and subsidies of the atomic energy industry
- Encourage state governments to shift from truly regressive. "progressive education" in the public schools to solid educations in subject matter, to repeal compulsory attendance, and educationist requirements that restrict the supply of good teachers, and to substitute merit payment for the uniformities of civil service regulation.
- Encourage state governments to repeal rate regulation of the public industry.
But there is another broad category of worthy government action on which we have not touched: tax exemptions. Taxes cripple free energies, productive work and investment. The best way for government to encourage free activity in any area is to remove its own tax burdens on that area. Contrary to common belief, a tax exemption is not simply equivalent to a government subsidy. For a subsidy mulcts taxpayers in order to give a special grant to the favored party. It thereby adds to the ratio of government activity in the economy, distorts productive resources, and multiples the dangers of government control and repression. A tax exemption, or any other type of tax reduction, on the hand, reduces the ratio of government to private action; it frees private energies and allows them to develop unhampered; it reduces the danger of government control and distortion of the economy. It is a step toward the free market and the free society, just as a government subsidy is a step away from the free society.
Another point about tax exemption: it avoids many of the problems entailed by government subsidy in deciding which particular firms and locations should obtain the grant. Should government concentrate its funds on a few large universities or medical schools, for example, or should tax funds be distributed pro-rate to each of the various states, or should they be used to help the poor states catch up the wealthy?  There is no rational way to decide this problem, and thus end aggravating conflicts between different groups in society. These conflicts and problems can be avoided by simply lowering taxes, and allowing free individuals and the free market to decide where and how they will allocate their funds.
Here are some examples of the many constructive things government can do, via tax exemptions and reductions, to encourage scientific progress in America:
- Tax Credits to business corporations for contributions to colleges and universities for scientific research. This will stimulate basic research in its proper place: in colleges and universities (Also recommended by National Science Foundation)
- Tax Credits to Individuals on income tax for contributions to scientific research in colleges and universities. (Recommended by National Science Foundation)
- Making Tax Deductible, Expenses by Business in training scientists at universities. (Recommended by National Science Foundation)
- Making Tax Deductible, Contributions by Business to individual scientific research.
- Making Educational Expenses (for science or other higher education) Tax Deductible on Parents' income taxes.
- Permitting individual scientists and investors to Average Their Incomes over many years, for Income tax purposes.
- Lowering Corporation Income Tax rates, to permit more investment in research and development.
- Lowering Individual Income Taxes, especially in the Upper Brackets, to permit greater investment of private risk capital in new inventions.
- Permitting Amortization of Equipment at any time pattern the owner wishes, thus allowing rapid amortization of new, innovatory project.
- Lowering, or Repealing, Federal and State Inheritance Taxes, to permit much more private risk capital in new inventions.
- Lower the Capital Gains tax on Individuals—to stimulate research and development of inventions, which can be sold as capital assets for capital gains.
- Lower the Capital Gains tax on Corporations—to permit corporations to try to pile up new inventions in order to increase their assets, and therefore increase the total market value of their securities.
In all of the problems discussed above, the charge has been that free market activity was deficient in some form of scientific research of development. In the question of automation, the charge is really the reverse: that technological improvement might become so great as to threaten dire consequences, particularly unemployment.
Now the spectre of "technological unemployment" has been with us at least since the early days of the Industrial Revolution, when benighted workers smashed machines which came to create jobs for them and raise their standards of living immeasurably above the subsistence level. Despite all manner of refutation it recurs continually, the latest manifestation being the fashionable view that the current chronic unemployment during a recovery is caused by "too much" increase in productivity (when it is really caused by excessive union wage rates). It is about time that this absurdity notion of technological unemployment be laid to rest once and for all. Who was displaced by the steam shovel? How many millions of ditch diggers are now out of work because of it? Where are the billions of unemployed that are supposed to have been caused by the replacement of the human pack animal by the wagon and the truck? Where are they, if the doctrine of technological unemployment is correct? Where are the millions of unemployed resulting from the Industrial Revolution—when the truth is the other way round, that thousands of beggars had nothing to do until the Industrial Revolution rescued them!
Actually, a technological improvement in an industry has the following result: if the demand for the product is elastic (and approximately half of the products have an elastic demand), then the lower prices, and lower costs, of the product will stimulate increased demand and increased production, expanding employment in the industry. If the demand is inelastic, then the improvement will cause less resources to be devoted to the industry, and lower employment; but since prices have declined, the consumers take the funds that they had formerly spent on this industry and spend them elsewhere, thus generating more employment in the other industries. One of the "other industries" that will be expanded will be the industry of making the new machines or new products. Thus: there is no technological unemployment remaining. Automation will have the same effect as any technological improvement, expanding employment in some industries, contracting them in others—but leaving no residue of technological unemployment.
Discussing the problem of technological unemployment, the Earl of Halsbury writes that he knows of no instance where technological progress has caused prolonged unemployment, or, indeed, where technological regression has caused unemployment!
More specifically on automation, it is expected to increase the demand for skilled workers in industry, and decrease demand for the unskilled, who can shift (thus continuing recent pro-automation trends) into the service trades, which cannot be automated. Halsbury estimated that practically no unemployment, even temporarily, need be involved in such shifting, since there is a 2% "natural" turnover in industry per annum, due to retirement of old and recruiting of young workers, and that the redeployment of labor caused by automation will not be nearly as heavy as this rate. The retirement-recruitment process will therefore be a good buffer against even temporary unemployment. Argyle adds that there is even greater room for mobility, for in addition to this process, about 10% of workers leave per annum for other reasons and that these too will buffer against forced unemployment.
Many of the semi-skilled, and even the unskilled, workers will be upgraded from routine, assembly-line type jobs into better paying, more skilled and varied work. It is largely the routine work that will be eliminated. In many instances, automation will not even decrease the workers in the specific jobs affected. Thus, Halsbury estimates that computerized accountancy, which will permit cheaper and more economic calculation of payrolls, and faster inventory and stock control, will also open up and partially solve a range of new problems, which firms couldn't even have thought of tackling before: such as "production scheduling". As a result, he predicts that as many accountants will need to be employed a generation hence as now, except that they will need more skills than they require now.
Automation will be largely applicable, and certainly only economically applicable, in the mass production industries, such as manufacturing, electrical goods, office machinery. It will be feasible for small-scale firms (the new "numerical control) as well as large in these areas. There will still be plenty of room, however, for homemade goods, crafts, services of persons, etc. And Woollard warns against wild overestimation of what automation in manufacturing will amount to:
"if by the term 'automatic factory' one is tempted to think of a plant in which the materials are loaded at the beginning of the week, then everyone goes home to play golf expecting to come in on Saturday morning to find the work loading itself on trucks for dispatch, the automatic factory is just a pipe-dream. I doubt very much whether we shall ever see anything of the sort."
In addition, such industries as transportation and retailing do not seem to be adapted to automation. And Spencer estimates that office automation, while requiring considerable retraining and upgrading of office staff, will not lead to any overall reduction in clerical labor. Office needs for labor have been steadily increasing, due to increased complexity of industry, and the effect of computers will be to stop or slow down this growth, rather than actually unemploy any large number of clerical staff; it will reduce considerably the druggery of present clerical work.
Rational optimism about the employment effects of automation has been well expressed by H.R. Nicholas, one of Britain's most prominent trade union leaders. Nicholas points out that automation creates employment, that our present-day technology has been a boon, rather than a handicap, to employment. Nicholas points out that the numbers employed in our presently most automated industries, such as petroleum, have expanded rather than contracted, because of the prosperity of the industry. There has been more work for tankers, railroads, trucks, etc. to move oil, for shipyards to build these tankers, for managerial, sales, maintenance help in the industry: none of whom will be displaced by automation.
One point about automation that should not be overlooked: "it will greatly improve the safety of industrial work, many of the unsafe jobs (such as handling atomic, fissionable materials) being automatically accomplished."
Let us, therefore, put aside the old Luddite (machine-wrecking) bogey of technological unemployment, and hail modern developments of automation for what it is and will be: a superb method of greatly increasing the standards of living and the leisure hours, of all of us. We can therefore, hail the Douglas Subcommittee when it reported as follows:
"One highly gratifying thing which appeared throughout the hearings was the evidence that all elements in the American economy accept and welcome progress, change, and increasing productivity. This flexibility of mind and temperament has been a conspicuous characteristic of American industry for generations in well-known contrast to that of many other countries. Not a single witness raised a voice in opposition to automation and advancing technology. This was true of the representatives of organized labor as well as of those who spoke from the side of management… Labor, of course, recognizes that automatic machinery lessons the drudgery for the individual worker and contributes greatly to the welfare and standard of living of all."
Epilogue: The Values of Technology
There is a wing of opinion, here and abroad, that is positively opposed to modern technology and all it stands for, believing that mode and technology brutalizes man, enslaves and "depersonalizes" him, ruins his culture, etc.
Fortunately, this view is overwhelmingly rejected by the bulk of our nation, and therefore there is no need to enter into extended refutation here. But is might be a propos to cite the views of this subject of two social philosophers with very different views on other matter:
Thus, Professor Ernest Nagel, of the Department of Philosophy, of Columbia University:
"it is by no means evident that a life of deep satisfaction and dedication to the values of a liberal civilization is enjoyed by a smaller fraction of American society than of other types of culture, whether present or past. Critics of American mass culture tend to forget that only comparatively small elite groups in the great civilizations of the past were privileged to share in the high achievements of those cultures … In our own society, on the other hand, modern science and technology have made available to unprecedented numbers the major resources of the great literatures and the arts of the past and present, never accessible before in such variety even to the societies… The evidence seems to me overwhelming that the growth of scientific intelligence has helped to bring about not only improvements in the material circumstances of life, but also an enhancement in its quality."
And here Father Bernard W. Dempsey, of the Institute of Social Order:
"There are those who see in the mechanization of modern industry an inevitable and devastating anti-personal force…. First of all, man has been condemned to earn his bread in the sweat of his brow; and yet past ages have more sweat and less bread than typical American industrial workers experience… Finally, the industrial discipline can also be challenging, interesting and inspiring, especially when an able mechanic is furnished good tools and materials to work with. We must not forget that the farmer is weather-paced, season-paced and animal-paced with a tyranny that is at least as exacting as the industrial discipline… In the day of serfs in Western Europe the horse was the symbol of nobility and knighthood. Many American workers in the course of a day control more horse power than there was on the whole field of Agincourt."
 Baker, op.cit., pp. 66ff.
 Baker, op.cit., pp. 75-76.
 John R. Baker, Science and the Sputniks (London: Society for Freedom in Science, December 1958.) Also see Dr. Conway Zirkle, Death of a Science in Russia (Philadelphia, 1949).
 Baker, Science and the Sputniks, op.cit., p.1
 Baker, Science and the Sputniks, op.cit., p.1
 Subcommittee of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of Government, Research Activities in the Department of Defense and Defense-Related Agencies (Wash. D.C.: April, 1955).
 Research Activities, op.cit., p.36.
 Research Activities, op,cit., p. 38
 Research Activities, op.cit., p.44.
 Research Activities, op.cit., p.48.
 Jewkes, et.al., p. 76
 See Arthur H. Compton, Atomic Quest, p. 28.
 Compton, op.cit., p.113.
 Bornemann, loc. Cit., p.196. Also see Department of State, Pub. #2702, The International Control of Atomic Energy (Wash. D.C.:Chemists' Association, Impact of Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy on the Chemical Industry (Wash. D.C>: Feb. 1956).
 John U. Nef, War and Human Progress (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950), pp. 375-77, 448.
 See Baker, Science and the Sputniks, op.cit.
 William Trombley, “Triumph is Space for a 'Crazy Greek'”, Life (March 30, 1959), pp. 31-34.
 See Freank S. Meyer, “Principles and Heresies” National Review (November 8, 1958), p.307.
 See Council for Technological Advancement, Industrial Participation in Atomic Energy Development (October 18, 1954).
 Impact of Peaceful Uses…., op.cit.,p.10.
 Thus see Paul F. Genachte, Moving Ahead With the Atom (New York: Chase Manhattan Bank, January 1957), p.12)
 Task Force Report, Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, Lending Agencies (Wash. D.C.: February, 1955), p.9
 Basic Research, op.cit.
 Thus, see Medical Research: A Mid Century Survey, op.cit., Vol.I, p.145.
 This, indeed , is the effect of any change in the economy, whether of consumer wants, of natural resources, of climate, or technology: employment in some firms and industries will be expanded, and in others will be contracted.
 The Earl of Halsbury, “Introduction”, in E.M. Hugh-Jones, ed., The Push-Button World (University of Oklahoma Press, 1956).
 Michael Argyle, “Social Aspects of Automation”, in Hugh-Jones op.cit., p. 113.
 Frank G. Woollard, “Automation in Engineering Production”, in Hugh-Jones, op.cit., p.38.
 W.R. Spencer, “Administrative Applications of Automation”, in Hugh-Jones, op.cit., p.107.
 H.R. Nicholas, “The Trade Union Approach to Automation”, in Hugh-Jones, op.cit.
 See Automation and Technological Change, Report of the Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization to the Joint Committee of the Economic Report (Washington, D.C.: 1955), p.6.
 Automation and Technological Change, op.cit., pp.4-5.
 Thus, see Ralph Ross and Ernest Van den Haag, The Fabric of Society, and Introduction to the Social Sciences (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Cox, 1957)
 Ernest Nagel, “The Place of Science in a Liberal Education”, Daedalus, (Winter, 1959), pp.66-67.
 Bernard W. Dempsey, S.J., “The Worker As Person”, Review of Social Economy (March, 1954), pp.19-20.