Man, Economy, and State with Power and Market by Murray
N. Rothbard

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Table of Contents
Chapter 1—Fundamentals of Human Action (continued)
6. Factors of Production: The
Law of Returns
We have concluded that the value of each unit of any good is equal to
its marginal utility at any point in time, and that this value is
determined by the relation between the actor’s scale of wants
and
the stock of goods available. We know that there are two types of
goods: consumers’ goods, which directly serve human wants,
and
producers’ goods, which aid in the process of production
eventually to produce consumers’ goods. It is clear that the
utility of a consumers’ good is the end directly served. The
utility of a producers’ good is its contribution in producing
consumers’ goods. With value imputed backward from ends to
consumers’ goods through the various orders of
producers’
goods, the utility of any producers’ good is its contribution
to
its product—the lower-stage producers’
good or the
consumers’ good.
As has been discussed above, the very fact of the necessity of
producing consumers’ goods implies a scarcity of factors of
production. If factors of production at each stage were not
scarce, then there would be unlimited quantities available of factors
of the next lower stage. Similarly, it was concluded that at each stage
of production, the product must be produced by more than one scarce
higher-order factor of production. If only one factor were necessary
for the process, then the process itself would not be necessary, and
consumers’ goods would be available in unlimited
abundance.
Thus, at each stage of production, the produced goods must
have
been produced with the aid of more than one factor. These factors co-operate
in the production process and are termed complementary
factors.
Factors of production are available as units of a homogeneous supply,
just as are consumers’ goods. On what principles will an
actor
evaluate a unit of a factor of production? He will evaluate a
unit
of supply on the basis of the least importantly valued product which he
would have to forgo were he deprived of the unit factor. In other
words, he will evaluate each unit of a factor as equal to the
satisfactions provided by its marginal unit—in this case, the
utility of its marginal product. The marginal product is the
product forgone by a loss of the marginal unit, and its value is
determined either by its
marginal product in the next stage of production, or, if it is a
consumers’ good, by the utility of the end it satisfies.
Thus,
the value assigned to a unit of a factor of production is equal to the value
of its marginal product, or its marginal
productivity.
Since man wishes to satisfy as many of his ends as possible, and in the
shortest possible time (see above), it follows that he will strive for
the maximum product from given units of factors at each stage
of production.
As long as the goods are composed of homogeneous units, their quantity
can be measured in terms of these units, and the actor can know when
they are in greater or lesser supply. Thus, whereas value and utility
cannot be measured or subject to addition, subtraction, etc.,
quantities of homogeneous units of a supply can be measured. A man
knows how many horses or cows he has, and he knows that four horses are
twice the quantity of two horses.
Assume that a product P (which can be a
producers’ good or a consumers’ good) is produced
by three complementary factors, X, Y,
and Z.
These are all higher-order producers’ goods. Since supplies
of
goods are quantitatively definable, and since in nature
quantitative causes lead to quantitatively observable effects, we are
always in a position to say that: a quantities of X,
combined with b quantities of Y,
and c quantities of Z, lead to p
quantities of the product P.
Now let us assume that we hold the quantitative amounts b
and c unchanged. The amounts a
and therefore p are free to vary. The value of a
yielding the maximum p/a, i.e.,
the maximum average return of product to the facto, is called the optimum
amount of X. The law
of returns states that with the quantity of complementary factors held
constant, there always exists some optimum amount of the varying factor.
As the amount of the varying factor decreases or increases from the
optimum, p/a, the average
unit product
declines. The quantitative extent of that decline depends on the
concrete conditions of each case. As the supply of the varying factor
increases, just below this optimum, the average return of product to
the varying factor is increasing; after the optimum it is decreasing.
These may be called states of increasing returns
and decreasing returns to the factor, with the
maximum return at the optimum point.
The law that such an optimum must exist can be proved by contemplating
the implications of the contrary. If there were no optimum, the average
product would increase indefinitely as the quantity of the factor X
increased. (It could not increase indefinitely as the quantity
decreases, since the product will be zero when the
quantity of the factor is zero.) But if p/a
can always be increased merely by increasing a,
this means that any desired quantity of P could be
secured by merely increasing the supply of X. This
would mean that the proportionate supply of factors Y
and Z
can be ever so small; any decrease in their supply can always be
compensated to increase production by increasing the supply of X.
This would signify that factor X is perfectly
substitutable for factors Y and Z
and that the scarcity of the latter factors would not be a matter of
concern to the actor so long as factor X was
available in abundance. But a lack of concern for their scarcity means
that Y and Z would no
longer be scarce factors. Only one scarce factor, X,
would remain. But we have seen that there must be more than one factor
at each stage of production. Accordingly, the very existence of various
factors of production implies that the average return of
product
to each factor must have some maximum, or optimum, value.
In some cases, the optimum amount of a factor may be the only
amount that can effectively co-operate in the production process. Thus,
by a known chemical formula, it may require precisely two
parts of
hydrogen and one part of oxygen to produce one unit of water. If the
supply of oxygen is fixed at one unit, then any supply of hydrogen
under two parts will produce no product at all, and all parts beyond
two of hydrogen will be quite useless. Not only will the combination of
two hydrogen and one oxygen be the optimum combination, but it will be
the only amount of hydrogen that will be at all useful in the
production process.

The relationship between average product and marginal
product
to a varying factor may be seen in the hypothetical example illustrated
in Table 1. Here is a hypothetical picture of the returns to a varying
factor, with other factors fixed. The average unit product increases
until it reaches a peak of eight at five units of X.
This is the optimum point for the varying factor. The marginal
product is the increase in total product provided by the
marginal unit. At any given supply of units of factor X,
a loss of one unit will entail a loss of total product equal to the
marginal product. Thus, if the supply of X
is increased from three units to four units, total product is
increased from 18 to 30 units, and this increase is the
marginal
product of X with a supply of four units.
Similarly, if the
supply is cut from four units to three units, the total product must be
cut from 30 to 18 units, and thus the marginal product is 12.
It is evident that the amount of X
that will yield the optimum of average product is not necessarily the
amount that maximizes the marginal product of the factor. Often the
marginal product reaches its peak before the average product. The
relationship that always holds mathematically between the average and
the marginal product of a factor is that as the
average
product increases (increasing returns), the marginal product is greater
than the average product. Conversely, as the average product
declines (diminishing returns), the marginal product is less
than
the average product.
It follows that when the average product is at a maximum, it equals the
marginal product.
It is clear that, with one varying factor, it is easy for the actor to
set the proportion of factors to yield the optimum return for the
factor. But how can the actor set an optimum combination of factors if
all of them can be varied in their supply? If one combination of
quantities of X, Y, and Z
yields an optimum return for X, and
another combination yields an optimum return for Y,
etc., how is the actor to determine which combination to choose? Since
he cannot quantitatively compare units of X with
units of Y or Z,
how can he determine the optimum proportion of factors? This is a
fundamental problem for human action, and its methods of solution will
be treated in subsequent chapters.
7. Factors of Production:
Convertibility and Valuation
Factors of production are valued in accordance with their anticipated
contribution in the eventual production of consumers’ goods.
Factors, however, differ in the degree of their specifity, i.e., the
variety of consumers’ goods in the production of which they
can
be of service. Certain goods are completely specific—are
useful
in producing only one consumers’ good. Thus, when, in past
ages,
extracts from the mandrake weed were considered useful in healing ills,
the mandrake weed was a completely specific factor of
production—it was useful purely for this purpose. When the
ideas
of people changed, and the mandrake was considered worthless, the weed
lost its value completely. Other producers’ goods may be
relatively nonspecific and capable of being used in a wide variety of
employments. They could never be perfectly
nonspecific—equally
useful in all production of consumers’ goods—for in
that
case they would be general conditions of welfare available in unlimited
abundance for all purposes. There would be no need to economize them.
Scarce factors, however, including the relatively nonspecific ones,
must be employed in their most urgent uses. Just as a supply of
consumers’ goods will go first toward satisfying the most
urgent
wants, then to the next most urgent wants, etc., so a supply of factors
will be allocated by actors first to the most urgent uses in producing
consumers’ goods, then to the next most urgent uses, etc. The
loss of a unit of a supply of a factor will entail the loss of the
least urgent of the presently satisfied uses.
The less specific a factor is, the more convertible
it is from one use to another. The mandrake weed lost its value because
it could not be converted to other uses. Factors such as iron or wood,
however, are convertible into a wide variety of uses. If one type of
consumers’ good falls into disuse, iron output can be shifted
from that to another line of production. On the other hand, once the
iron ore has been transformed into a machine, it becomes less easily
convertible and often completely specific to the product. When
factors lose a large part of their value as a result of a decline in
the value of the consumers’ good, they will, if
possible, be
converted to another use of greater value. If, despite the decline in
the value of the product, there is no better use to which the factor
can be converted, it will stay in that line of product or cease being
used altogether if the consumers’ good no longer has value.
For example, suppose that cigars suddenly lose their value as
consumers’ goods; they are no longer desired. Those cigar
machines which are not usable in any other capacity will
become,
valueless. Tobacco leaves, however, will lose some of their value, but
may be convertible to uses such as cigarette production with little
loss of value. (A loss of all desire for tobacco, however, will result
in a far wider loss in the value of the factors, although part of the
land may be salvaged by shifting from tobacco to the
production of
cotton.)
Suppose, on the other hand, that some time after cigars lose their
value this commodity returns to public favor and regains its former
value. The cigar machines, which had been rendered valueless, now
recoup their great loss in value. On the other hand, the tobacco
leaves, land, etc., which had shifted from cigars to other uses will
reshift into the production of cigars. These factors will gain
in
value, but their gain, as was their previous loss, will be less than
the gain of the completely specific factor. These are examples of a
general law that a change in the value of the product causes
a
greater change in the value of the specific factors than in
that
of the relatively nonspecific factors.
To further illustrate the relation between convertibility and
valuation, let us assume that complementary factors 10X,
5Y, and 8Z produce a supply of 20P.
First, suppose that each of these factors is completely specific and
that none of the supply of the factors can be replaced by other units.
Then, if the supply of one of the factors is lost (say 10X),
the
entire product is lost, and the other factors become valueless. In that
case, the supply of that factor which must be given up or lost equals
in value the value of the entire product—20P,
while the
other factors have a zero value. An example of production with purely
specific factors is a pair of shoes; the prospect of a loss of
one
shoe is valued at the value of the entire pair, while the other shoe
becomes valueless in case of a loss. Thus, jointly,
factors 10X, 5Y, and 8Z
produce a product that is valued, say, as rank 11 on the
actor’s
value scale. Lose the supply of one of the factors, and the other
complementary factors become completely valueless.
Now, let us assume, secondly, that each of the factors is
nonspecific: that 10X can be used in
another line of production that will yield a product, say, ranked 21st
on the value scale; that 5Y in another use will
yield a product ranked 15th on the actor’s value scale; and
that 8Z can be used to yield a product ranked 30th.
In that case, the loss of 10X would mean that
instead of satisfying a want of rank 11, the units of Y
and Z
would be shifted to their next most valuable use, and wants ranked 15th
and 30th would be satisfied instead. We know that the actor
preferred the satisfaction of a want ranked 11th to the
satisfaction of wants ranked 15th and 30th; otherwise the factors would
not have been engaged in producing P in the first
place. But
now the loss of value is far from total, since the other factors can
still yield a return in other uses.
Convertible factors will be allocated among different lines of
production according to the same principles as consumers’
goods
are allocated among the ends they can serve. Each unit of supply will
be allocated to satisfy the most urgent of the not yet
satisfied
wants, i.e., where the value of its marginal product is the highest. A
loss of a unit of the factor will deprive the actor of only the least
important of the presently satisfied uses, i.e., that use in which the
value of the marginal product is the lowest. This choice is analogous
to that involved in previous examples comparing the marginal
utility of one good with the marginal utility of another. This
lowest-ranked marginal product may be considered the value of
the
marginal product of any unit of the factor, with all uses taken into
account. Thus, in the above case, suppose that X
is a convertible factor in a myriad of different uses. If one unit of X
has a marginal product of say, 3P, a marginal
product in another use of 2Q, 5R,
etc., the actor ranks the values of these marginal products of X
on his value scale. Suppose that he ranks them in this order: 4S,
3P, 2Q, 5R. In
that case, suppose he is faced with the loss of one unit of X.
He will give up the use of a unit of X in
production of R, where the marginal
product is ranked lowest. Even if the loss takes place in the
production of P, he will not give up 3P,
but shift a unit of X from the less valuable use R
and give up 5R.
Thus, just as the actor gave up the use of a horse in pleasure riding
and not in wagon-pulling by shifting from the former to the
latter
use, so the actor who (for example) loses a cord of wood intended for
building a house will give up a cord intended for a service less
valuable to him—say, building a sled. Thus, the value of the
marginal product of a unit of a factor will be equal to its
value
in its marginal use, i.e., that use served by the stock of the factor
whose marginal product is ranked lowest on his value scale.
We now can see further why, in cases where products are made with
specific and
convertible factors, the general law holds that the value of
convertible factors changes less than that of specific factors in
response to a change in the value of P or in the
conditions of its production. The value of a unit of a
convertible
factor is set, not by the conditions of its employment in one
type of product, but by the value of its marginal product when all
its uses are taken into consideration. Since a specific factor is
usable in only one line of production, its unit value is set as equal
to the value of the marginal product in that line of
production
alone. Hence, in the process of valuation, the specific factors are far
more responsive to conditions in any given process of
production than are the nonspecific factors.
As with the problem of optimum proportions, the process of value
imputation from consumers’ good to factors raises a great
many
problems which will be discussed in later chapters. Since one product
cannot be measured against other products, and units of different
factors cannot be compared with one another, how can value be imputed
when, as in a modern economy, the structure of production is
very
complex, with myriads of products and with convertible and
inconvertible factors? It will be seen that value imputation is easy
for isolated Crusoe-type actors, but that special conditions are needed
to enable the value-imputing process, as well as the factor-allocating
process, to take place in a complex economy. In particular, the various
units of products and factors (not the values, of
course) must be made commensurable and comparable.
8. Factors of Production: Labor
versus Leisure
Setting aside the problem of allocating production along the most
desired lines and of measuring one product against another, it
is
evident that every man desires to maximize his production of
consumers’ goods per unit of time. He tries to satisfy as
many of
his important ends as possible, and at the earliest possible time. But
in order to increase the production of his
consumers’ goods,
he must relieve the scarcity of the scarce factors of production; he
must increase the available supply of these scarce factors. The
nature-given factors are limited by his environment and
therefore
cannot be increased. This leaves him with the choice of increasing his
supply of capital goods or of increasing his expenditure
of labor.
It might be asserted that another way of increasing his
production
is to improve his technical knowledge of how to produce the desired
goods—to improve his recipes. A recipe, however, can only set
outer limits
on his increases in production; the actual increases can be
accomplished solely by an increase in the supply of productive
factors. Thus, suppose that Robinson Crusoe lands, without equipment,
on a desert island. He may be a competent engineer and have
full
knowledge of the necessary processes involved in constructing
a
mansion for himself. But without the necessary supply of
factors
available, this knowledge could not suffice to construct the mansion.
One method, then, by which man may increase his production per unit of
time is by increasing his expenditure of labor. In the first place,
however, the possibilities for this expansion are strictly
limited—by the number of people in existence at any time and
by
the number of hours in the day. Secondly, it is limited by the ability
of each laborer, and this ability tends to vary. And, finally, there is
a third limitation on the supply of labor: whether or not the work is
directly satisfying in itself, labor always involves the
forgoing
of leisure, a desirable good.
We can conceive of a world in which leisure is not desired and labor is
merely a useful scarce factor to be economized. In such a world, the
total supply of available labor would be equal to the total quantity of
labor that men would be capable of expending. Everyone would
be
eager to work to the maximum of capacity, since increased work would
lead to increased production of desired consumers’
goods.
All time not required for maintaining and preserving the
capacity
to work would be spent in labor.
Such
a situation could conceivably exist, and an economic analysis could be
worked out on that basis. We know from empirical observation,
however, that such a situation is very rare for human action. For
almost all actors, leisure is a consumers’ good,
to be
weighed in the balance against the prospect of acquiring other
consumers’ goods, including possible satisfaction from the
effort
itself. The more a man labors, the less leisure he can enjoy. Increased
labor therefore reduces the available supply of leisure and
the
utility that it affords. Consequently, “people work
only
when they value the return of labor higher than the decrease in
satisfaction brought about by the curtailment of leisure.”
It
is possible that included in this “return” of
satisfaction yielded by labor may be satisfaction in the labor
itself, in the voluntary expenditure of energy on a productive task.
When such satisfactions from labor do not exist, then simply the
expected value of the product yielded by the effort will be weighed
against the disutility involved in giving up
leisure—the
utility of the leisure forgone. Where labor does provide intrinsic
satisfactions, the utility of the product yielded will include the
utility provided by the effort itself. As the quantity of effort
increases, however, the utility of the satisfactions provided
by
labor itself declines, and the utility of the successive units
of
the final product declines as well. Both the marginal utility of the
final product and the marginal utility of labor-satisfaction decline
with an increase in their quantity, because both goods follow the
universal law of marginal utility.
In considering an expenditure of his labor, man not only takes into
account which are the most valuable ends it can serve (as he does with
all other factors), these ends possibly including the satisfaction
derived from productive labor itself, but he also
weighs the prospect of abstaining from the expenditure of labor in
order
to obtain the consumers’ good, leisure. Leisure, like any
other
good, is subject to the law of marginal utility. The first unit of
leisure satisfies a most urgently felt desire; the next unit serves a
less highly valued end; the third unit a still less highly valued end,
etc. The marginal utility of leisure decreases as the supply increases,
and this utility is equal to the value of the end that would have to be
forgone with the loss of the unit of leisure. But in that
case,
the marginal disutility of work (in terms of leisure forgone) increases
with every increase in the amount of labor performed.
In some cases, labor itself may be positively disagreeable, not only
because of the leisure forgone, but also because of specific conditions
attached to the particular labor that the actor finds disagreeable. In
these cases, the marginal disutility of labor includes both
the
disutility due to these conditions and the disutility due to
leisure forgone. The painful aspects of labor, like the forgoing of
leisure, are endured for the sake of the yield of the final product.
The addition of the element of disagreeableness in certain
types
of labor may reinforce and certainly does not counteract the increasing
marginal disutility imposed by the cumulation of leisure forgone as the
time spent in labor increases.
Thus, for each person and type of labor performed, the
balancing
of the marginal utility of the product of prospective units of effort
as against the marginal disutility of effort will include the
satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the work itself, in
addition
to the evaluation of the final product and of the leisure forgone. The
labor itself may provide positive satisfaction, positive pain or
dissatisfaction, or it may be neutral. In cases where the labor itself
provides positive satisfactions, however, these are
intertwined with and cannot be separated from the prospect of
obtaining the final product.
Deprived of the final product, man will consider his labor senseless
and useless, and the labor itself will no longer bring positive
satisfactions. Those activities which are engaged in purely
for their own sake are not labor but are pure play,
consumers’ goods in themselves. Play, as a
consumers’ good,
is subject to the law of marginal utility as are all goods, and the
time spent in play will be balanced against the utility to be
derived from other obtainable goods.
In the expenditure of any hour of labor, therefore, man weighs the
disutility of the labor involved (including the leisure forgone plus
any dissatisfaction stemming from the work itself) against the utility
of the contribution he will make in that hour to the
production of
desired goods (including future goods and any pleasure in the work
itself), i.e., with the value of his marginal product.
In each hour he will expend his effort toward producing that
good whose marginal product is highest on his value scale. If he must
give up an hour of labor, he will give up a unit of that good whose
marginal utility is lowest on his value scale. At each point he will
balance the utility of the product on his value scale against the
disutility of further work. We know that a man’s
marginal
utility of goods provided by effort will decline as his
expenditure of effort increases. On the other hand, with each
new
expenditure of effort, the marginal disutility of the effort
continues to increase. Therefore, a man will expend his labor
as
long as the marginal utility of the return exceeds
the marginal
disutility of the labor effort. A man will stop work when the marginal
disutility of labor is greater than the marginal utility of the
increased goods provided by the effort.
Then, as his consumption of leisure increases, the marginal utility of
leisure will decline, while the marginal utility of the goods forgone
increases, until finally the utility of the marginal products forgone
becomes greater than the marginal utility of leisure, and the actor
will resume labor again.
This analysis of the laws of labor effort has been deduced from the
implications of the action axiom and the assumption of leisure
as
a consumers’ good.
9. The Formation of Capital
With the nature-given elements limited by his environment, and his
labor restricted both by its available supply and its
disutility,
there is only one way by which man can increase his production
of
consumers’ goods per unit of time—by increasing the
quantity of capital goods. Beginning with unaided labor and
nature, he must, to increase his productivity, mix his labor
energy with the elements of nature to form capital goods. These goods
are not immediately serviceable in satisfying his wants, but must be
transformed by further labor into lower-order capital goods, and
finally into the desired consumers’ goods.
In order to illuminate clearly the nature of capital formation and the
position of capital in production, let us start with the hypothetical
example of Robinson Crusoe stranded on a desert island. Robinson, on
landing, we assume, finds himself without the aid of capital goods of
any kind. All that is available is his own labor and the elements given
him by nature. It is obvious that without capital he will be able to
satisfy only a few wants, of which he will choose the most urgent. Let
us say that the only goods available without the aid of capital are
berries and leisure. Say that he finds that he can pick 20
edible
berries an hour, and, on this basis, works 10 hours in berry-picking
and enjoys 14 hours a day of leisure. It is evident that,
without
the aid of capital, the only goods open to him for consumption
are
goods with the shortest period of production.
Leisure is the
one good that is produced almost instantaneously, while berries have a
very short production period. Twenty berries have a production period
of one hour. Goods with longer periods of production are not available
to him unless he acquires capital goods.
There are two ways in which longer processes of production through the
use of capital may increase productivity: (1) they may provide a
greater production of the same good per unit of
time; or (2) they may allow the actor to consume goods that are not
available at all with shorter processes of production.
As an example of the first type of increase in productivity, Robinson
may decide that if he had the use of a long stick, he could shake many
berries off the trees instead of picking them by hand. In that way he
might be able to step up his production to 50 berries an hour. How
might he go about acquiring the stick? Obviously, he must expend labor
in getting the materials, transporting them, shaping them into a stick,
etc. Let us say that 10 hours would be necessary for this task. This
means that to obtain the stick, Crusoe must forgo
10
hours’ production of consumers’ goods. He
must either
sacrifice 10 hours of leisure or 10 hours of berries at 20 per hour
(200 berries), or some combination of the two. He must sacrifice, for
10 hours, the enjoyment of consumers’ goods, and expend his
labor
on producing a capital good—the
stick—which will be of no immediate
use to him. He will be able to begin using the capital good as an
indirect aid to future production only after the 10 hours are up. In
the meantime, he must forgo the satisfaction of his wants. He must restrict
his consumption for 10 hours and transfer his labor
for that period from producing immediately satisfying
consumers’ goods into the production of capital
goods, which
will prove their usefulness only in the future. The
restriction of consumption is called saving,
and the transfer of labor and land to the formation of capital goods is
called investment.
We see now what is involved in the process of capital
formation.
The actor must decide whether or not to restrict his
consumption
and invest in the production of capital goods, by weighing the
following factors: Does the utility yielded by the increased
productivity of the longer process of production outweigh the sacrifice
that I must make of present goods to acquire
consumers’ goods in the future?
We have already seen above the universal fact of time
preference—that
a man will always prefer obtaining a given satisfaction
earlier
than later. Here, the actor must balance his desire to acquire more
satisfactions per unit of time as against the fact that, to
do so, he must give up satisfactions in the present
to increase his production in the future. His time
preference for present over future accounts for his disutility
of waiting,
which must be balanced against the utility that will be eventually
provided by the capital good and the longer process of production. How
he chooses depends on his scale of values. It is possible, for example,
that if he thought the stick would provide him with only 30 berries an
hour and would take 20 hours to make, he would not make the
saving-investment decision. On the other hand, if the stick took five
hours to make and could provide him with 100 berries an hour, he might
make the decision readily.
If he decides to invest 10 hours in adding to his capital goods, there
are many ways in which he might restrict his consumption. As mentioned
above, he can restrict any combination of berries or leisure. Setting
aside leisure for purposes of simplification, he may decide to take a
whole day off at once and produce no berries at all,
completing
the stick in one day. Or, he may decide to pick berries for eight hours
instead of 10, and devote the other two hours a day to making the
stick, in which case the completion of the stick will take five days.
Which method he will choose depends on the nature of his value scale.
In any case, he must restrict his consumption by 10 hours’
worth
of labor—200 berries. The rate of his
restriction will
depend on how urgently he wants the increased production, as compared
with the urgency with which he desires to maintain his present
supply of berries [CONTINUED].
For algebraic
proof, see George J. Stigler, The Theory
of Price (New York: Macmillan & Co., 1946), pp.
44–45.
For further
reading on this subject, see Böhm-Bawerk, Positive
Theory of Capital, pp. 170–88; and Hayek, Counter-Revolution
of Science, pp. 32–33.
This
is the first proposition in this chapter that has not been deduced from
the axiom of action. It is a subsidiary assumption, based on
empirical observation of actual human behavior. It is not
deducible from human action because its contrary is conceivable,
although not generally existing. On the other hand, the assumptions
above of quantitative relations of cause and effect were logically
implicit in the action axiom, since knowledge of definite
cause-and-effect relations is necessary to any decision to act.
Cf. Mises, Human
Action, p. 131.
Leisure
is the amount of time not spent in labor, and play may be
considered as one of the forms that leisure may take in
yielding
satisfaction. On labor and play, cf. Frank A. Fetter, Economic
Principles (New York: The Century Co., 1915), pp.
171–77, 191, 197–206.
Cf. L. Albert
Hahn, Common Sense Economics (New York:
Abelard-Schuman, 1956), pp. 1ff.
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