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The Crash

June 22, 1999

National Post, Canada
Tuesday, June 22, 1999

Has Alan Greenspan finally signalled the end of the party? We think so. A paradigmatic shift has
occurred in the Fed chairman's thinking, a watershed in monetary policy-making.

Before we dissect his carefully crafted June 17 testimony to the Joint Economic Committee, we
should note that Wall Street does not share our opinion. In fact, bond and stock markets rallied
with gusto, relieved that a modest quarter-point tightening was all that was going to be. This was
inferred from his statement that "when we can be pre-emptive, we should be, because modest
pre-emptive actions can obviate the need to more drastic actions at a later date." Even on their
interpretation, however, one ought to pay attention to the calculated use of the plural actions. Will it be a number of quarter-point actions?

That Mr. Greenspan is gravely concerned with stock market and real estate speculation is
undeniable. His speech is littered with such references. Why should he care about asset price
inflation when prices and costs remain so well behaved? The answer is that the Fed has singled
out home and equity speculation as prosperity's main source of potential destabilization. His
truncated logic runs as follows: The pool of available job seekers is dwindling as "labour
productivity has not grown fast enough to accommodate the increased demand for labour induced
by the exceptional strength in demand for goods and services." This, in turn, has been produced
by "an inclination of households and firms to increase their spending on goods and services
beyond the gains in their income from production." In other words, consumers have been running
down their savings.

How did this happen? The answer is that the "propensity to spend" has been "spurred by the rise
in equity and home prices . . ." We have come full circle: Rising stock and home prices have
spurred people to go on a spending binge, which, in turn, is straining an already tight labour
market. This will lead, eventually, to "significant increases in wages, in excess of productivity
growth." No wonder the Fed has been uncomfortable with the proper "weight to place on asset

But if Mr. Greenspan brings the party to an end, in the interest of reducing this "propensity to
spend," won't that bring about a depression? Not to worry, he reassures us: "Even if this period of
rapid expansion of capital gains comes to an end, shortly, there remains a substantial amount in
the pipeline to support outsized increases in consumption for many months into the future."
Adding immediately that "of course, a dramatic contraction in equity prices would greatly reduce
this backlog of extra spending," he may be signalling that a mere correction may not do the job,
and that something a bit more dramatic may be required to reduce the extra or excessive spending.

After dealing, rather ambiguously and inconclusively, with the concept of bubbles ("a large
number of analysts have judged the level of equity prices to be excessive," and "bubbles
generally are perceptible only after the fact") he consoles us for what is about to happen: ". . .
while bubbles that burst are scarcely benign, the consequences need not be catastrophic for the
economy." Neither the bursting of the Japanese bubble a decade ago nor the 1929 Crash led to
depressions; rather, it was the "ensuing failures of policy," or so he thinks.

Rather belatedly, Mr. Greenspan is here preparing us for what will happen anyway -- or, more
likely, for what he is about to bring about: a stock market crash. Hopefully, it will be handled
properly, perhaps in the same manner as the Fed dealt with the aftermath of the 1987 crash --
providing enough liquidity to forestall widespread systemic failures. He must have had
something like that in mind when he added that "certainly, the crash of 1987 left little lasting
imprint on the American economy." A few lines later, he confirms this idea: "Should volatile
asset prices [read: collapsing stock prices] cause problems, policy is best positioned to address
the consequences when the economy is working from a base of stable product prices." In other
words, if inflation is still benign at the time of the coming crash, the Fed will be able to contain
the damage by easing money once again.

Significantly, he ended his testimony with the following words: "It is the job of policy-makers to
mitigate the fallout when it occurs, and hopefully, ease the transition to the next expansion." Why
would he close his remarks by referring to a fallout, unless that was a foregone conclusion? In
other words, will he persist in tightening -- one quarter at a time -- until he eliminates the source
of the naughty propensity to spend?

We referred earlier to Mr. Greenspan's truncated logic. Indeed, he should know better than to
characterize asset price inflation as the destabilizing element. Asset price inflation is not an
endogenous phenomenon. Rather, it is the result of years of excessively easy money, itself the
consequence of a monetary policy that has lost contact with the true demand for money. Fiat
money has been managed by a well-meaning -- but misguided nonetheless -- team of technocrats,
not gratuitously called central bankers. They have fixed the "price" of money much as the former
centralized economies fixed the price of shoes or bread -- in complete disregard to the laws of
economics. Little wonder, then, that they have manufactured too much money.

The numbers bear it out: The growth of the broad monetary aggregates has been accelerating ever
since the Mexican crisis, hitting recently the fastest pace since the very early '80s, a time of
serious inflation. Our own favourite, M1, after due weight is given to rising money velocity, has
been flashing red for well over two years. The Fed's adjusted monetary base -- the one variable
totally under its control -- has been exploding upward, at 9% year-over-year and at 14% in the
most recent two months, all but proving that the price of money has been fixed too low.

It is not just asset price inflation that threatens the stability of the economy. More fundamentally,
it is a fiat money system that has, predictably, lost its way. One, two or even three hikes in fed
funds will do little to remedy the situation, though they will certainly begin to unwind the
speculative excesses of the past decade. When it is all over, let us hope we will all concur that
money is too important to be left in the hands of central bankers.

* * * * *

Albert D. Friedberg is director-general partner of Friedberg Mercantile Group, a Toronto-
based investment manager and dealer.

Read Greenspan's Monetary policy and the economic outlook .

Also see Friedberg Home Page.

For more on the Austrian Cycle theory, see The Austrian Theory of the Trade Cycle and Other Essays and the Austrian Study Guide section on the Business Cycle.

Albert D. Friedberg will be speaking at the Mises Institute's conference Austrians and Financial Markets.

Note: The views expressed on Mises.org are not necessarily those of the Mises Institute.

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