The Growth of Libertarian
Thought in America. by Murray Rothbard
The
Growth of Libertarian
Thought
in Colonial America
Murray
N. Rothbard
[Chapter 33 from Murray N. Rothbard's
Conceived
in Liberty.
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We
have touched several times, especially in dealing with religious
doctrines and institutions, upon the growth of libertarian views in
eighteenth-century America. This extremely significant development was
not a full-blown giant suddenly burst upon the European and American
scenes. J. H. Hexter, in his brilliant Reappraisals
in History, warns us of the
dangerous temptation toward a linear view of history — a view adopted in
different ways by "Whig" and Marxist alike. The linear view assumes a
steady march from past to present; Hexter cites the concept of the
"rising middle classes." Historians, he points out, noted that the
English middle classes were dominant in the nineteenth century, and
virtually nonexistent in the Middle Ages. Hence the linear assumption
of a steady march upward by the middle classes century by century, a
picture which Hexter indicates is far from the truth. But the important
point here is that history often moves not in a smoothly linear trend
but in varying patterns of rises and falls of trends shattered by
contrary trends.
The growth of libertarian
thought in eighteenth-century America was, to be sure, heavily
influenced by a preceding growth in England, the main source of
cultural influence on its colonies. But the pattern was not so simple.
For it must be remembered that parts of America itself had experienced
entirely libertarian institutions in the seventeenth century: for
example, Rhode Island, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania. To a large
extent, this libertarianism had been unarticulated.
In short, the abundance of fertile virgin land in a vast territory
enabled individualism to come to full flower in many areas. But only in
such cases — important to be sure — as those of Roger Williams and Anne
Hutchinson did practicing libertarianism receive theoretical
articulation and groundwork. This does not mean that no theoretical
rationale existed. Indeed, it exploded in a mighty surge during the
height of the Puritan revolution; Roger Williams and his friends among
the libertarian wing of that revolution helped each other develop these
doctrines.
But the significant fact
of the mid-seventeenth century was the defeat of the revolution and the
victory of the counterrevolution. In England this victory can be
pinpointed in Oliver Cromwell's shift rightward and his suppression of
the Levellers — perhaps the finest libertarian movement up to that time.
The steady retreat of Roger Williams from libertarian principles and
enthusiasm can be dated from the disheartening victory of this
Cromwellian counterrevolution. A similar counterrevolution against
liberalism occurred in other parts of Europe: in France with the defeat
of the Holy League in the late sixteenth century and of the popular
Frondeur movements in the seventeenth century; in Holland with the
victory of the Orange party over the Republicans. Civil war and foreign
wars prevented England from turning its attention to its American
colonies until the end of the seventeenth century. When it finally did
so, it used its power to crush libertarian reality where it existed in
America. Thus England imposed a counterrevolution on virtually
libertarian conditions in Pennsylvania and New Jersey, and reversed the
liberal-tending Leislerian revolution, which had had to force its way
against what was in many ways the most reactionary colony of all, New
York. Liberal-tending rebellions in the South (for example, Bacon's
Rebellion in Virginia) were crushed, and reactionary policies
entrenched or deepened. After the vigorous turmoil and turbulence of
the late seventeenth century, when so many parts of America struggled
in various ways toward freedom, a rather bleak uniformity was imposed
on the colonies by England. The first half of the eighteenth century
saw an increasing political stalemate between the contending forces,
now generally consisting of Crown and privileged oligarchy as against
the rest of the population, This period of quiescence was matched in
the mother country, in institutions as well as in thought and opinion.
In the first half of the eighteenth century, England settled down into
a centrist Whig settlement; radical-liberal thought was more or less
underground, expressed in thin trickles by lone independent thinkers.
These liberals kept alive the torch of seventeenth-century Republican
liberalism; when the radical-liberal movement burst forth once again as
a political force in England in the later eighteenth century, it came
not as a completely new phenomenon but as a renaissance of
seventeenth-century radical models.
In the first half of the
eighteenth century, America was more eager to learn from British
liberalism past and contemporary than were the English themselves.
England was, for one thing, the major cultural and ideological
influence in the colonies, and Americans were eager to learn. For
another, America had the heritage of its virtual epoch of libertarian
revolutions in the last half of the seventeenth century; it was a long
time before England was able to clamp down on America. And furthermore,
America was not saddled with the enormous encumbrances on liberty that
faced the English liberals: a pervasive and oppressive feudal land
system — which had broken in America on the rock of vast new land, a
drive for proprietary profit, and an American refusal to pay quitrents;
an established church hierarchy; a large central state apparatus; and a
thoroughly oligarchic polity. Americans suffered from these ailments to
some degree, differing from one colony to the next. And such
institutions as slavery, especially in the plantation South, and
quasi-feudal landholdings in the Hudson Valley, presented great
problems — but not nearly to the extent experienced by Great Britain.
Above all, the rapid breakdown of attempts at imposing a feudal land
system threw open land and areas of American life to a mobility and
opportunity that Europe could not yet experience. The far greater
democracy in the bulk of the American colonies than in England was a
reflection of this breakdown. If liberty was to be achieved in the
Western world, it was clear by the eighteenth century that America
would have to take the lead — to achieve in practice the fruits of a
theory generated in England.
One basic influence on colonial
American thought was the fact that two contrasting traditions emerged
from its Protestant and Puritan heritage. One was the fanatical
theocratic persecuting tradition, which reached its apogee in
Massachusetts Bay and in the Dutch Orange Party. The other was
optimistic, individualist, libertarian, and even deistic, and was
reflected in the Levellers, and in such escapees from Massachusetts as
Anne Hutchinson and Roger Williams, and later in Charles Chauncy and
Jonathan Mayhew.
Apart from ancient writers,
three sources were the most frequently cited and quoted in
eighteenth-century America, especially in the first half of the
century: Algernon Sidney, John Locke, and Trenchard and Gordon of Cato's
Letters. Each made a profound
contribution to the growth and development of libertarian thought in
America.
Algernon Sidney was one of the
leading theorists of the Republican movement in seventeenth-century
England. In particular, the doctrines expounded in his posthumously
published Discourses
Concerning Government were
stamped on men's minds by the circumstances of his martyrdom. Arrested
in the early 1680s, Sidney was killed in late 1683 by the Crown and
thus dramatized the Republican and libertarian cause. Sidney's basic
importance was his stress on the right of revolution. To Sidney,
revolution and freedom were closely linked. Whenever people's liberties
were threatened or invaded, they had the right, nay the duty,
to rebel. Everyone might legitimately slay a tyrant, and there is much
justification for defending the rights of individuals against tyranny.
Revolution to Sidney was not an evil but the people's great weapon for
the overthrow of tyranny and for exercising their rights to popular
government. There was nothing sacred about governments, which on the
contrary should be changed as required. The types of law necessary in a
country were to be discerned by man's reason investigating the
fundamental laws of man's nature. Against the arbitrary whim of the
ruler Sidney championed law as "written Reason" and as defense of life,
liberty, and property: "If there be no other law in a kingdom than the
will of a Prince, there is no such thing as liberty. Property also is
an appendage to liberty; and 'tis as impossible for a man to have a
right to lands or goods, if he has no liberty, and enjoys his life only
at the pleasure of another, as it is to enjoy either when he is
deprived of them."
Although Sidney urged popular
government as against monarchy, he was no believer in the unlimited
rights of Parliament. On the contrary, it was to be subordinated to the
individual rights of the people. Power, he warned, inevitably corrupts
and every institutional power must be guarded against. To Sidney,
government rested on a contract between government and governed. When
government fails to perform its role in the service of the people, it
deserves to be removed. Nor can a people give up their liberties
permanently or be bound to government by the dead hand of the past. In
his Dying Speech,
Sidney proclaimed that "God has left nations the liberty of setting up
such governments as best please themselves." He thanked God that he had
now become a witness to the truth and to the "Old Cause" of liberty
against tyranny in "an age which makes truth pass for treason."
A liberal Republican and friend
of Sir Henry Vane (the Massachusetts champion of Anne Hutchinson),
Sidney had been unhappy with Cromwell's turn to tyranny and had spent
the Republican years in retirement. He was then forced to spend the
bulk of the Restoration years in exile, until his execution. Sidney's
great classical model was Brutus and his stirring motto Manus
haec inimica tyrranis ("This
hand to tyrants ever sworn the foe," in the translation of John Quincy
Adams).
Algernon Sidney's widening
impact on America during the eighteenth century influenced the great
liberal Massachusetts Congregational ministers Andrew Eliot and
Jonathan Mayhew. Eliot testified that this "martyr to civil liberty"
first taught him just principles of government. Indeed, the defense of
revolution by the martyred Sidney was far more inspiring to Americans
than the defense by the timorous John Locke. Sidney's historical honor
roll consisted of those who had helped their countrymen get rid of
tyrants. Injustice, to Sidney, made a government illegal. "Swords were
given to men that none be slaves but such as knew not how to use them,"
and "the law that forbids injuries were of no use if no penalty might
be inflicted on those who will not obey it." Concluded Sidney: "Let the
danger be never so great, there is a possibility of safety whilst men
have life, hands, arms, and courage to use them, but the people must
certainly perish, who tamely suffer themselves to be oppressed ... by
the injustice, cruelty, and malice of an ill magistrate...."[1]
If liberty found its martyr in
Algernon Sidney, it found its elaborated systematic defense in the Essay
Concerning Civil Government of
the noted philosopher John Locke. The Essay,
we now know, was written in the early 1680s at about the same time as
Sidney's Discourses;
it was therefore written when Locke too was a revolutionary plotter
against Stuart rule, and not,
as had been assumed, as a conservative ex
post facto rationale for the
Glorious Revolution of 1688.[2]
There were two strains in
Locke's Essay:
the individualist and libertarian, and the conservative and
majoritarian, and examples of caution and inconsistency are easy to
find. But the individualist view is the core of the philosophic
argument, while the majoritarian and statist strain appears more in the
later, applied portions of the theory. We know, furthermore, that Locke
was an extraordinarily secretive and timorous writer on political
affairs, even for an age when criticism could and did lead to exile and
death. Hence, it is not unreasonable to assume that the conservative
strain in Locke was a camouflage for the radically libertarian core of
his position; certainly it was not difficult to concentrate on that
core and make it the groundwork of a libertarian creed. And Locke's Essay
was particularly worthwhile in that it soared above the usual narrowly
parochial concern of the day for time and place: from English liberty,
ancient privileges, and the common law, to a universal abstract
political philosophy grounded on the nature of man.
Locke began his analysis with
the "state of nature" — not as an historical hypothesis but as a logical
construct — a world without government, to penetrate to the proper
foundation of the state. In the state of nature, each man as a natural
fact has complete ownership or property over his own person. These
persons confront unused natural resources or "land," and they are able
to maintain and advance themselves by "mixing their labor with the
land." Through this mixing, the hitherto unowned and unused natural
resources become
the property of the individual mixer. The individual thereby acquires a
property right not only in his own person but also in the land that he
has brought into use and transformed by his labor.[3]
The individual, then, may keep this property, exchange it for the
property of others, or bequeath it to his heirs.[4]He
has the "natural right" to the property and to defend it against
invasion by others. The moral justification for government, to Locke,
was to defend these rights of property. Should government fail to serve
this function, and itself become destructive of property rights, the
people then have the right to revolt against such government and to
replace it with one that will defend their rights.[5]
Thus, Locke, by the use of reason in investigating the laws of man's nature,
adumbrated the doctrine of the natural rights of the individual to
person and property, rights that are anterior to government and that
government is duty-bound to defend, on pain of a justified overthrow.
Locke is clear that aggression
and invasion of another's right can establish no just title to property
or rule, and that this holds for great heads of states as well as for
petty criminals: "The injury and the crime is equal, whether committed
by the wearer of a crown or some petty villain. The title of the
offender and the number of his followers make no difference unless it
be to aggravate it. The only difference is, great robbers punish little
ones to keep them in their obedience, but the great ones are rewarded
with laurels and triumphs, because they are too big for the weak hands
of justice in this world, and have the power in their own possession
which should punish offenders." As to the legislature,
- The reason why men enter
into society is the preservation of their property; and the end why
they choose and authorize a legislature is that there may be laws made,
and rules set, as guards and fences to the properties of all the
members of the society ... whenever the legislators endeavor to take
away and destroy the property of the people, or to reduce them to
slavery under arbitrary power, they put themselves into a state of war
with the people, who are thereupon absolved from any farther obedience,
and are left to the common refuge which God hath provided for all men
against force and violence.
Locke's reply to the critics of
his theory of revolution was trenchant: Those who oppose the right to
revolution as turbulent and destructive "may as well say, upon the same
ground, that honest men may not oppose robbers or pirates, because this
may occasion disorder or bloodshed, If any mischief come in such cases,
it is not to be charged upon him who defends his own right, but on him
who invades his neighbor's."
To the objection that his
theory allowed for frequent revolution, Locke countered that "such
revolutions happen not upon every little mismanagement in public
affairs. Great mistakes in the ruling part, many wrong and inconvenient
laws, and all the slips of human frailty will be borne by the people
without mutiny or murmur. But if a long train of abuses,
prevarications, and artifices, all tending the same way, make the
design visible to the people ... tis not to be wondered that they
should then rouse themselves ... "
The third great influence on
America, and perhaps the most widely cited source in the colonies, was
the works of John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, especially their Cato's
Letters, We have already noted
the influence of the letters on the freedom of the press, as well as
the strong influence of Trenchard and Gordon's contemporaneous Independent
Whig series, both written in the
early 1720s. Trenchard and Gordon were part of a small group of
Englishmen who during the eighteenth century kept alive the torch of
liberal Republican principles. This group was variously called "Common-
wealthmen" "Real Whigs," or "true Whigs."
The great significance of Cato's
Letters is that in them the
wealthy John Trenchard and his young protégé
Thomas Gordon greatly radicalized the impact of Locke's libertarian
creed. They did so by applying Lockean principles to the concrete
nature and problems of government, in a series of powerfully argued and
hard-hitting essays that were often cited and reprinted and widely read
throughout the American colonies. Cato's
Letters did more than merely
restate Lockean doctrine. From the position that the people have the
right to revolt against a government destructive of liberty, "Cato"
proceeded to argue with great force that government is always and
everywhere the potential or actual aggressor against the rights and
liberties of the people. Liberty, the source of all the fruits of
civilization and human happiness, is ever liable to suffer the
aggressions and encroachments of government, of power, the source from
which war, tyranny, and impoverishment ever flow. Power always stands
ready to conspire against liberty, and the only salvation is for the
public to keep government within strictly limited bounds, and to be
ever watchful, vigilant, and hostile to the inevitable tendencies of
government power to encroach upon liberty.
Expounding Lockean doctrine,
"Cato" puts it thus:
- All men are born free;
Liberty is a gift which they receive from God himself; nor can they
alienate the same by consent, though possibly they may forfeit it by
crimes....The right of the magistrate arises only from the right of
private men to defend themselves, to repel injuries, and to punish
those who commit them: that right being conveyed by the society to
their public representative, he can execute the same no further than
the benefit and security of that society requires he should. When be
exceeds his commission, his acts are as extrajudicial as are those of
any private officer usurping an unlawful authority; that is, they are
void; and every man is answerable for the wrong which he does. A power
to do good can never become a warrant for doing evil.
Liberty
"Cato" defined as "the power which every man has over his own actions,
and his right to enjoy the fruit of his labour, art, and industry, as
far as by it he hurts not the society, or any members of it, by taking
from any member, or by hindering him from enjoying what he himself
enjoys. The fruits of a man's honest industry are the just rewards of
it, ascertained to him by natural and eternal equity, as is his title
to use them in the manner which he thinks fit: And thus, with the above
limitations, every man is sole lord and arbiter of his own private
actions and property."
From liberty all other
blessings flow:
- Indeed liberty is the
divine source of all human happiness. To possess, in security, the
effects of our industry, is the most powerful and reasonable incitement
to be industrious: And to be able to provide for our children, and to
leave them all that we have, is the best motive to beget them. But
where property is precarious, labour will languish. The privileges of
thinking, saying, and doing what we please, and of growing as rich as
we can, without any other restriction, than that by all this we hurt
not the public, nor one another, are the glorious privileges of
liberty; and its effects, to live in freedom, plenty, and safety.
Moreover, "Cato" made clear
that the rights and liberties he was enunciating were individual and
not those of the majority. The despotism of the majority can be as bad
as the tyranny of one or a few:
- It is a mistaken notion in
government, that the interest of the majority is only to be consulted,
since in society every man has a right to everyman's assistance in the
enjoyment and defense of his private property; otherwise the greater
number may sell the lesser, and divide their estates amongst
themselves; and so, instead of a society, where all peaceable men are
protected, become a conspiracy of the many against a minority. With as
much equity may one man wantonly dispose of all, and violence may be
sanctified by mere Power.
But in this idyll of liberty
there is always and ever the threat of the encroachments and
aggressions of power, of government:
- Only the checks put upon
magistrates make nations free; and only the want of such checks makes
them slaves. They are free, where their magistrates are confined within
certain bounds set them by the people ... And they are slaves, where
the magistrates choose their own rules, and follow their lust and
humours; than which a more dreadful curse can befall no people ... and
therefore most nations in the world are undone, and those nations only
who bridle their governors do not wear chains.
Once acquiring power, rulers
will try their best to keep and extend it:
- We know, by infinite
examples and experience, that men possessed of Power, rather than part
with it, will do any thing, even the worst and the blackest, to keep
it; and scarce ever any man upon earth went out of it as long as he
could carry everything his own way in it .... This seems certain, that
the good of the world, or of their people, was not one of their motives
either for continuing in Power, or for quitting it.
- It is the nature of Power to
be ever encroaching, and converting every extraordinary power, granted
at particular times, and upon particular occasions, into an ordinary
power, to be used at all times, and when there is no occasion; nor does
it ever part willingly with any advantage.
If liberty for "Cato" is the
source of human happiness, the tyranny of power is the source of vast
human misery:
- Tyrants ... reduce mankind
to the condition of brutes, and make that Reason, which God gave them,
useless to them: They deprive them even of the blessings of nature,
starve them in the midst of plenty, and frustrate the natural bounty of
the earth to men; so that Nature smiles in vain where tyranny frowns:
The very hands of men, given them by Nature for their support, are
turned by tyrants into the instruments of their misery, by being
employed in vile drudgeries or destructive wars, to gratify the lust
and vanity of their execrable lords ....
- Tyrants ... are supported by
general ruin; they live by the destruction of mankind; and as fraud and
villainy, and every species of violence and cruelty, are the props of
their throne; so they measure their own happiness, and security, and
strength, by the misery and weakness of their people.... That wealth,
which dispersed amongst their subjects, and circulated in trade and
commerce, would employ, increase, and enrich them ... is barbarously
robbed from the people, and engrossed by these their oppressors ...
- Alas! Power encroaches daily
upon Liberty, with a success too evident; and the balance between them
is almost lost. Tyranny has engrossed almost the whole earth, and
striking at mankind root and branch, makes the world a slaughterhouse;
and will certainly go on to destroy, till it is either destroyed
itself, or, which is most likely, has left nothing else to destroy.
The corruption and lust for
power in human nature are the cause of the aggressive nature of power,
and therefore require eternal vigilance against power's encroachments:
- There has been always such a
constant and certain fund of corruption and malignity in human nature,
that it has been rate to find that man, whose views and happiness did
not center in the gratification of his appetites, and worst appetites,
his luxury, his pride, his avarice, and lust of power and who
considered any public trust reposed in him, with any other view, than
as the means to satiate such unruly and dangerous desires! And this has
been most eminently true of Great Men, and those who aspired to
dominion. They were first made great for the sake of the public, and
afterwards at its expense. And if they had been content to have been
moderate traitors, mankind would have been still moderately happy; but
their ambition and treason observing no degrees, there was no degree of
vileness and misery which the poor people did not feel.
- The appetites therefore of
men, especially of Great Men, are carefully to be observed and stayed,
or else they will never stay themselves. The experience of every age
convinces us, that we must not judge of men by what they ought to do,
but by what they will do; and all history affords but few instances of
men trusted with great power without abusing it, when with security
they could.
"Cato" assured his readers that there was no danger that the public
might exercise its right of revolution against tyrannical government
too frequently or imprudently; due to settled habits, as well as the
propaganda and power of government, the danger is quite the reverse:
- It is foolish to say, that
this doctrine can be mischievous to society, at least in any proportion
to the wild ruin and fatal calamities which must befall, and do befall
the world, when the contrary doctrine is maintained: For, all bodies of
men subsisting upon their own substance, or upon the profits of their
trade and industry, find their account so much in ease and peace, and
have justly such terrible apprehensions of civil disorders, which
destroy everything that they enjoy; that they always bear a thousand
injuries before they return one, and stand under the burdens as long as
they can bear them ....
- What with the force of
education, and the reverence which people are taught, and have been
always used to pay to princes; what with the perpetual harangues of
flatterers, the gaudy pageantry and outside of Power, and its gilded
ensigns, always glittering in their eyes; what with the execution of
the laws in the sole power of the prince; what with all the regular
magistrates, pompous guards and standing troops, with the fortified
towns, the artillery, and all the magazines of war, at his disposal;
besides large revenues, and multitudes of followers and dependents, to
support and abet all that he does: Obedience to authority is so well
secured, that it is wild to imagine, that any number of men, formidable
enough to disturb a settled State, can unite together and hope to
overturn it, till the public grievances are so enormous, the oppression
so great, and the disaffection so universal, that there can be no
question remaining, whether their calamities to be real or imaginary,
and whether the magistrate has protected or endeavoured to destroy his
people.[6]
The American colonists eagerly
imbibed from Trenchard and Gordon, not only the Lockean doctrine of
individual liberty and of the right of revolution against government in
what Professor Bernard Bailyn has justly called a "superbly readable"
form; but also, and even more important, the dichotomy between liberty
and power, and the ever-constant threat to the crucial liberties of the
people by the eternal incursions and encroachment of governmental
tyranny. Even more concretely, Trenchard and Gordon were not afraid to
point to the corruption and the increasing power of government and its
bureaucracy in the relatively free England of their day. It was a
warning that the American colonists were eagerly to take to heart. [7]
Libertarian English views were
also brought to America with a dramatic burst by the great liberal
Massachusetts minister, Jonathan Mayhew. We have seen how this deist
and Unitarian studied Locke at Harvard and was later to laud the
influence upon him of Locke and Algernon Sidney. In early 1750, Mayhew
delivered his most celebrated political sermon, significantly as a
centennial celebration of the execution of Charles 1: A
Discourse Concerning Unlimited Submission and Non-Resistance to the
Higher Powers.
This sermon, which has been
called the "warning gun of the [American] Revolution," was the first
expression in eighteenth-century America of the sacred right of
resistance to tyrannical government. Reason, said Mayhew, dictates the
usefulness of obedience to government for social protection; but when
government becomes oppressive, when it robs and ruins the public, then
"they immediately cease to be the ordinance and ministers of God, and
no more deserve that glorious character than common pirates and
highwaymen. Rulers," continued Mayhew, "have no authority from God to
do mischief, and citizens have the right to disobey 'unlawful'
authority," and "in cases of very great and general oppression ... to
vindicate their natural and legal rights, to break the yoke of tyranny,
and free themselves and posterity from inglorious servitude and ruin."
Following Locke and "Cato," Mayhew pointed out that there was little
danger of revolution for trivial causes, for "mankind in general have a
disposition to be ... submissive and passive and tame under
government...."
Mayhew also stressed every
man's right and duty of "private judgment," basing this in turn on the
nature of man: his capacity for reason and freedom of will to choose
his course of action. And as criteria for choice, the individual had
available to him knowledge of truth and rightness rooted eternally in
the "nature of things."
The 1744 pamphlet of the
Reverend Elisha Williams of Massachusetts, The
Essential Rights and Liberties ...,
was also frankly Lockean throughout. Writes Williams:
- As reason tells us, all are
born thus naturally equal, i.e. with an equal right to their persons;
so also with an equal right to their preservation ... and every man
having a property in his own person, the Labour of his body and the
work of his hands are properly his own, to which no one has right but
himself; it will therefore follow that when he removes anything out of
the state that nature has provided and left it in, he has his labour
with it, and joined something to it that is his own, and thereby makes
it his property .... Thus every man having a natural right to [or being
proprietor of] his own person and his own actions and Tabour, which we
call property; it certainly follows, that no man can have a right to
the person or property of another. And if every man has a right to his
person and property; he has also a right to defend them ... and so has
a right of punishing all insults upon his person and property.
Consequently, a law violating
natural and constitutional rights is no true law and requires no
obedience. The natural right of private judgment was also upheld by the
Reverend William Rand of Massachusetts in 1757, and by the Reverend
Joseph Fish of Connecticut three years later.
During this period, many of the
New Light ministers, under pressure of establishment persecution in
several colonies, began to move towards a libertarian position. Elisha
Williams was a New Light. The Reverend Samuel Davies, leader of the
Southern New Side Presbyterians, declared in 1751 that people had a
"legal as well as natural right to follow their own judgment," and to
gauge governmental authority against the great principles of natural
justice. Davies' focus, of course, was on religious aspects of liberty.
Princeton, the training ground of the New Lights, soon developed as a
libertarian center. Davies, president of Princeton from 1759 to 1761,
lauded the English Puritan Revolution and exhorted his listeners to
fight if need be for their liberties. His predecessor, the Reverend
Aaron Burr, was noted as a "great friend to liberty, both civil and
religious," in state and church.
"Separates" — New Lights in
Massachusetts and Connecticut who insisted on clear — cut separation from
the state establishment — petitioned extensively for religious liberty
and exemption from church taxes, even though the petitions were almost
always spurned by the government. Daniel Hovey, of Mansfield, was
imprisoned in 1747 for refusing to pay the church tax, and petitioned
for relief on the ground that liberty of conscience was "the un-
alienable right of every rational creature." The Separates of
Canterbury went beyond this to include the right of liberty and
property. In their petition of 1749, they asserted that God's law
strictly limited the functions of government to "defense of everyone in
the free enjoyment and improve- ment of life, liberty, and property
from the force, violence and fraud of others; their different opinions
in ecclesiastical affairs notwithstanding." The Canterbury Separates
also insisted on the natural right of parishioners to dissent and to
separate from them — a
welcome consistency for that or indeed for any era. Another leading
libertarian petition came in 1743-44 from Exeter, Massachusetts. The
petition asked: "Is not liberty equally every man's right ... ?" The
Exeter Separates asserted the right of private judgment, the right to
separate, and the right to be free of taxes for a religious
establishment. And though it was rejected, they petitioned again eleven
years later.
While England was the great
fountainhead of intellectual influence in eighteenth-century America,
France also was important, even in the first half of the century, more
so than has been generally believed. By far the most widely read French
writer in the colonies was the great French liberal and deist, Francois
Voltaire. Despite the enormous prejudice in America against Roman
Catholicism and against France, Voltaire was able to make his way as a
representative of deist and optimist thought, and especially as an
avowed disciple of John Locke. For liberalism in eighteenth-century
France was a heritage of seventeenth-century liberalism in England, and
especially of John Locke. The young Voltaire spent three years of exile
in England, in the late 1720s, and there became a firm advocate of
religious liberty and of freedom of speech and press, and of Locke as
their philosophical groundwork. Voltaire's libertarian views were
therefore English by inspiration and in content.
Voltaire conveyed this
liberalism to France with his Philosophical
Letters on the English,
published in English in 1733 and then in French in 1734. In the Letters
he spread the Lockean message to the Continent. He also praised the
Quakers for their condemnation of war. His English exile also
influenced Voltaire to write modern European history. His popular History
of Charles XII was published so
that people would "be cured of the folly of conquest."
It is the curious belief of
many writers that whereas English liberalism was moderate, pragmatic,
and cautious, French liberalism was destructive, absolutist, and
revolutionary. The truth is almost the reverse. Liberalism emerged as a
coherent doctrine and as a full and powerful force in
seventeenth-century England, and a thoroughgoing revolutionary force at
that. French liberalism in the following century was frankly taken from
England, albeit at a time when English liberal thought had been all but
stifled by the Whig "settlement." But French liberals despaired of the
odds of fomenting revolution against the might of French feudalism and
royal absolutism, which were far more rigidly fastened upon France than
upon England. The eighteenth-century French liberals therefore remained
content with the futile cause of urging liberty upon the royal power as
a free gift to the people. A vain hope. When in history has a ruling
elite voluntarily surrendered its power and rule as a free gift,
unpressured by severe and persistent opposition from below?
[1]
The dying words of another contemporaneous martyr of the Stuarts, the
Cromwellian Colonel Richard Rumbold, also served as inspiration to such
revolutionary Americans as Thomas Jefferson: "I am sure there was no
man born . . . with a saddle on his back, neither any booted and
spurred to ride him."
[2]
See the Peter Lasiett edition of John Locke, Two
Treatises of Government
(Cambridge: At the University Press, 1960).
[3]
Locke adopted the curious, theologically oriented view that the
original unused land was given to mankind in common and was then taken
out of this common stock by individual labor. Actually, in fact,
original land being unused was therefore unowned
by anyone, individual or communal. It should be mentioned that,
contrary to some historians, Locke's "labor theory of property" has no
relation to the "labor theory of value" of Karl Marx and other
socialist authors.
[4]
Macpherson has shown that Locke's state of nature includes a free
market for exchange of property, including monetary exchanges, all of
which is logically anterior to government (C. B. Macpherson, The
Political Theory of Possessive Individualism
[Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962], pp. 208 ff.).
[5]
It is a misconception to accuse Locke of setting "property rights"
above "human rights." For the two were conjoined: property rights
included the right of the individual's property in his own person.
[6]
John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, Cato's
Letters, in D. L. Jacobson, ed.,
The English Libertarian Heritage (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co.,
1965), pp. 108-9, 114-15, 118-19, 127-29, 133-34, 193-94, 196, 256-57.
[7]
On Cato's Letters
and their great influence in America, see Bernard Bailyn, The
Origins of American Politics
(New York: Random House, 1969), pp. 35-44, 54; and Bailyn, The
Ideological Origins of the American Revolution
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, Belknap Press, 1967), pp. 35-37,
43-45, and passim.