PART ONE: THE NATURE OF MONEY
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CHAPTER 3
The Various Kinds of Money
1 Money and Money Substitutes
When an indirect exchange is transacted
with the aid of money, it is not necessary for the money to change hands
physically; a perfectly secure claim to an equivalent sum, payable on demand,
may be transferred instead of the actual coins. In this by itself there is
nothing remarkable or peculiar to money. What is peculiar, and only to be
explained by reference to the special characteristics of money; is the
extraordinary frequency of this way of completing monetary
transactions.
In the first place, money is especially well adapted to
constitute the substance of a generic obligation. Whereas the fungibility of
nearly all other economic goods is more or less circumscribed and is often only
a fiction based on an artificial commercial terminology, that of money is almost
unlimited. Only that of shares and bonds can be compared with it. The sole
factor that could possibly prevent any of these from being completely fungible
is the difficulty of sub-dividing their separate units; and various expedients
have been adopted, which, at least as far as money is concerned, have entirely
robbed this difficulty of all practical significance.
A still more
important circumstance is involved in the nature of the function that money
performs. A claim to money may be transferred over and over again in an
indefinite number of indirect exchanges without the person by whom it is payable
ever being called upon to settle it. This is obviously not true as far as other
economic goods are concerned, for these are always destined for ultimate
consumption.
The special suitability for facilitating indirect exchanges
possessed by absolutely secure and immediately payable claims to money, which we
may briefly refer to as money substitutes, is further increased by their
standing in law and commerce.
Technically, and in some countries legally
as well, the transfer of a banknote scarcely differs from that of a coin. The
similarity of outward appearance is such that those who are engaged in
commercial dealings are usually unable to distinguish between those objects that
actually perform the function of money and those that are merely employed as
substitutes for them. The businessman does not worry about the economic problems
involved in this; he is only concerned with the commercial and legal
characteristics of coins, notes, checks, and the like. To him, the facts that
banknotes are transferable without documentary evidence, that they circulate
like coins in round denominations, that no fight of recovery lies against their
previous holders, that the law recognizes no difference between them and money
as an instrument of debt settlement, seem good enough reason for including them
within the definition of the term money, and for drawing a fundamental
distinction between them and cash deposits, which can be transferred only by a
procedure that is much more complex technically and is also regarded in law as
of a different kind. This is the origin of the popular conception of money by
which everyday life is governed. No doubt it serves the purposes of the bank
official, and it may even be quite useful in the business world at large, but
its introduction into the scientific terminology of economics is most
undesirable.
The controversy about the concept of money is not exactly one
of the most satisfactory chapters in the history of our science. It is chiefly
remarkable for the smother of juristic and commercial technicalities in which it
is enveloped and for the quite undeserved significance that has been attached to
what is after all merely a question of terminology. The solution of the question
has been re garded as an end in itself and it seems to have been completely
forgotten that the real aim should have been simply to facilitate further
investigation. Such a discussion could not fail to be fruitless.
In
attempting to draw a line of division between money and those objects that
outwardly resemble it, we only need to bear in mind the goal of our
investigation. The present discussion aims at tracing the laws that determine
the exchange ratio between money and other economic goods. This and nothing else
is the task of the economic theory of money. Now our terminology must be suited
to our problem. If a particular group of objects is to be singled out from among
all those that fulfill a monetary function in commerce and, under the special
name of money (which is to be reserved to this group alone), sharply contrasted
with the rest (to which this name is denied), then this distinction must be made
in a way that will facilitate the further progress of the
investigation.
It is considerations such as these that have led the
present writer to give the name of money substitutes and not that of money to
those objects that are employed like money in commerce but consist in perfectly
secure and immediately convertible claims to money.
Claims are not
goods;[1] they are means of obtaining disposal over goods. This determines their
whole nature and economic significance. They themselves are not valued directly,
but indirectly; their value is derived from that of the economic goods to which
they refer. Two elements are involved in the valuation of a claim: first, the
value of the goods to whose possession it gives a right; and, second, the
greater or less probability that possession of the goods in question will
actually be obtained. Furthermore, if the claim is to come into force only after
a period of time, then consideration of this circumstance will constitute a
third factor in its valuation. The value on January 1 of a right to receive ten
sacks of coal on December 31 of the same year will be based not directly on the
value of ten sacks of coal, but on the value of ten sacks of coal to be
delivered in a year's time. This sort of calculation is a matter of common
experience, as also is the fact that in reckoning the value of claims their
soundness or security is taken into account.
Claims to money are, of
course, no exception. Those which are payable on demand, if there is no doubt
about their soundness and no expense connected with their settlement, are valued
just as highly as cash and tendered and accepted in the same way as money. [2]
Only claims of this sort—that is, claims that are payable on demand, absolutely
safe as far as human foresight goes, and perfectly liquid in the legal sense—are
for business purposes exact substitutes for the money to which they refer. Other
claims, of course, such as notes issued by banks of doubtful credit or bills
that are not yet mature, also enter into financial transactions and may just as
well be employed as general media of exchange. This, according to our
terminology, means that they are money. But then they are valued independently;
they are reckoned equivalent neither to the sums of money to which they refer
nor even to the worth of the rights that they embody. What the further special
factors are that help to determine their exchange value, we shall discover in
the course of our argument.
Of course it would be in no way incorrect if
we attempted to include in our concept of money those absolutely secure and
immediately convertible claims to money that we have preferred to call money
substitutes. But what must be entirely condemned is the widespread practice of
giving the name of money to certain classes of money substitutes, usually
banknotes, token money, and the like, and contrasting them sharply with the
remaining kinds, such as cash deposits. [3] This is to make a distinction without
any adequate difference; for banknotes, say, and cash deposits differ only in
mere externals, important perhaps from the business and legal points of view,
but quite insignificant from the point of view of economics.
On the other
hand, arguments of considerable weight may be urged in favor of including all
money substitutes without exception in the single concept of money. It may be
pointed out, for instance, that the significance of perfectly secure and liquid
claims to money is quite different from that of claims to other economic goods;
that whereas a claim on a commodity must sooner or later be liquidated, this is
not necessarily true of claims to money. Such claims may pass from hand to hand
for indefinite periods and so take the place of money without any attempt being
made to liquidate them. It may be pointed out that those who require money will
be quite satisfied with such claims as these, and that those who wish to spend
money will find that these claims answer their purpose just as well; and that
consequently the supply of money substitutes must be reckoned in with that of
money, and the demand for them with the demand for money. It may further be
pointed out that whereas it is impossible to satisfy an increase in the demand,
say, for bread by issuing more breadtickets without adding to the actual supply
of bread itself, it is perfectly possible to satisfy an increased demand for
money by just such a process as this. It may be argued, in brief, that money
substitutes have certain peculiarities of which account is best taken by
including them in the concept of money.
Without wishing to question the
weight of such arguments as these, we shall on grounds of convenience prefer to
adopt the narrower formulation of the concept of money, supplementing it with a
separate concept of money substitutes. Whether this is the most advisable course
to pursue, whether perhaps some other procedure might not lead to a better
understanding of our subject matter, must be left to the judgment of the reader
To the author it appears that the way chosen is the only way in which the
difficult problems of the theory of money can be solved.
2 The Peculiarities of Money Substitutes
Economic discussion about money must be
based solely on economic considerations and may take legal distinctions into
account only insofar as they are significant from the economic point of view
also. Such discussion consequently must proceed from a concept of money based,
not on legal definitions and discriminations, but on the economic nature of
things. It follows that our decision not to regard drafts and other claims to
money as constituting money itself must not be interpreted merely in accordance
with the narrow juristic concept of a claim to money. Besides strictly legal
claims to money, we must also take into account such relationships as are not
claims in the juristic sense, but are nevertheless treated as such in commercial
practice because some concern or other deals with them as if they actually did
constitute claims against itself. [4]
There can be no doubt that the German
token coins minted in accordance with the Coinage Act of July 9, 1873, did not
in law constitute claims to money. Perhaps there are some superficial critics
who would be inclined to classify these coins actually as money because they
consisted of stamped silver or nickel or copper discs that had every appearance
of being money. But despite this, from the point of view of economics these
token coins merely constituted drafts on the national Treasury. The second
paragraph of section nine of the Coinage Act (in its form of June 1, 1909)
obliged the Bundesrat to specify those centers that would pay out gold coins on
demand in return for not less than 200 marks' worth of silver coins or fifty
marks' worth of nickel and copper coins. Certain branches of the Reichsbank were
entrusted with this function. Another section of the Coinage Act (sec. 8)
provided that the Reich would always be in a position actually to maintain this
convertibility. According to this section, the total value of the silver coins
minted was never to exceed twenty marks per head of the population, nor that of
the nickel and copper coins two and one-half marks per head. In the opinion of
the legislature, these sums represented the demand for small coins, and there
was consequently no danger that the total issue of token coinage would exceed
the public demand for it. Admittedly, there was no statutory recognition of any
right to conversion on the part of holders of token coins, and the limitation of
legal tender (sec. 9, par 1) was only an inadequate substitute for this.
Nevertheless, it is a matter of general knowledge that the token coins were in
fact cashed without any demur at the branches of the Reichsbank specified by the
Chancellor.
Exactly the same sort of significance was enjoyed by the Reich
Treasury notes, of which not more than 120 million marks' worth were allowed to
be in circulation. These also (sec. 5 of the act of April 30, 1874) were always
cashed for gold by the Reichsbank on behalf of the Treasury. It is beside the
point that the Treasury notes were not legal tender in private transactions
while everybody was obliged to accept silver coins in amounts up to twenty marks
and nickel and copper coins in amounts up to one mark; for, although they were
not legally bound to accept them in settlement of debts, people in fact accepted
them readily.
Another example is afforded by the German thaler of the
period from the introduction of the gold standard until the withdrawal of the
thaler from circulation on October 1, 1907. During the whole of this period the
thaler was undoubtedly legal tender. But if we seek to go behind this expression,
whose juristic derivation makes it useless for our present purpose, and ask if
the thaler was money during this period, the answer must be that it was not. It
is true that it was employed in commerce as a medium of exchange; but it could
be used in this way solely because it was a claim to something that really was
money, that is, to the common medium of exchange. For although neither the
Reichsbank nor the Reich nor its separate constituent kingdoms and duchies nor
anybody else was obliged to cash them, the Reichsbank, acting on behalf of the
government, always took pains to ensure that no more thalers were in circulation
than were demanded by the public. It achieved this result by refusing to press
thalers on its customers when paying out. This, together with the circumstance
that thalers were legal tender both to the bank and to the Reich, was sufficient
to turn them in effect into drafts that could always be converted into money,
with the result that they circulated at home as perfectly satisfactory
substitutes for money. It was repeatedly suggested to the directors of the
Reichsbank that they should cash their own notes not in gold but in thalers
(which would have been well within the letter of the law) and pay out gold only
at a premium, with the object of hindering the export of it. But the bank
steadily refused to adopt this or any proposal of a similar nature.
The
exact nature of the token coinage in other countries has not always been so easy
to understand as that of Germany, whose banking and currency system was
fashioned under the influence of such men as Bamberger, Michaelis, and Soetbeer.
In some legislation, the theoretical basis of modern token-coinage policy may
not be so easy to discover or to demonstrate as in the examples already dealt
with. Nevertheless, all such policy has ultimately the same intent. The
universal legal peculiarity of token coinage is the limitation of its power of
payment to a specified maximum sum; and as a rule this provision is supplemented
by legislative restriction of the amount that may be minted.
There is no
such thing as an economic concept of token coinage. All that economics can
distinguish is a particular subgroup within the group of claims to money that
are employed as substitutes for money, the members of this subgroup being
intended for use in transactions where the amounts involved are small. The fact
that the issue and circulation of token coins are subjected to special legal
rules and regulations is to be explained by the special nature of the purpose
that they serve. The general recognition of the right of the holder of a
banknote to receive money in exchange for it while the conversion of token coins
is in many countries left to administrative discretion is a result of the
different lines of development that notes and token coinage have followed
respectively. Token coins have arisen from the need for facilitating the
exchange of small quantities of goods of little value. The historical details of
their development have not yet been brought to light and, almost without
exception, all that has been written on the subject is of purely numismatical or
metrological importance. [5] Nevertheless, one thing can safely be asserted:
token coinage is always the result of attempts to remedy deficiencies in the
existing monetary system. It is those technical difficulties, that hinder the
subdivision of the monetary unit into small coins, that have led, after all
sorts of unsuccessful attempts, to the solution of the problem that we adopt
nowadays. In many countries, while this development has been going on, a kind of
fiat money[6] has sometimes been used in small transactions, with the very
inconvenient consequence of having two independent kinds of money performing
side by side the function of a common medium of exchange. To avoid the
inconveniences of such a situation the small coins were brought into a fixed
legal ratio with those used in larger transactions and the necessary precautions
were taken to prevent the quantity of small coins from exceeding the
requirements of commerce. The most important means to this end has always been
the restriction of the quantity minted to that which seems likely to be needed
for making small payments, whether this is fixed by law or strictly adhered to
without such compulsion. Along with this has gone the limitation of legal tender
in private dealings to a certain relatively small amount. The danger that these
regulations would prove inadequate has never seemed very great, and consequently
legislative provision for conversion of the token coins has been either entirely
neglected or left incomplete by omission of a clear statement of the holder's
right to change them for money. But everywhere nowadays those token coins that
are rejected from circulation are accepted without demur by the state, or some
other body such as the central bank, and thus their nature as claims to money is
established. Where this policy has been discontinued for a time and the attempt
made by suspending effectual conversion of the token coins to force more of them
into circulation than was required, they have become credit money, or even
commodity money. Then they have no longer been regarded as claims to money,
payable on demand, and therefore equivalent to money, but have been valued
independently.
The banknote has followed quite a different line of
development. It has always been regarded as a claim, even from the juristic
point of view. The fact has never been lost sight of that if its value was to be
kept equal to that of money, steps would have to be taken to ensure its
permanent convertibility into money. That a cessation of cash payments would
alter the economic character of banknotes could hardly escape notice; in the
case of the quantitatively less important coins used in small transactions it
could more easily be forgotten. Furthermore, the smaller quantitative importance
of token coins means that it is possible to maintain their permanent
convertibility without establishing special funds for the purpose. The absence
of such special funds may also have helped to disguise the real nature of token
coinage. [7]
Consideration of the monetary system of Austria-Hungary is
particularly instructive. The currency reform that was inaugurated in 1892 was
never formally completed, and until the disruption of the Hapsburg monarchy the
standard remained legally what is usually called a paper standard, since the
Austro-Hungarian Bank was not obliged to redeem its own notes, which were legal
tender to any amount. Nevertheless, from 1900 to 1914 Austria-Hungary really
possessed a gold standard or gold-exchange standard, for the bank did in fact
readily provide gold for commercial requirements. Although according to the
letter of the law it was not obliged to cash its notes, it offered bills of
exchange and other claims payable abroad in gold (checks, notes, and the like),
at a price below the upper theoretical gold point. Under such conditions, those
who wanted gold for export naturally preferred to buy claims of this sort, which
enabled them to achieve their purpose more cheaply than by the actual export of
gold.
For internal commerce as well, in which the use of gold was
exceptional since the population had many years before gone over to banknotes
and token coins,[8] the bank cashed its notes for gold without being legally
bound to do so. And this policy was pursued, not accidentally or occasionally or
without full recognition of its significance, but deliberately and
systematically, with the object of permitting Austria and Hungary to enjoy the
economic advantages of the gold standard. Both the Austrian and the Hungarian
governments, to whose initiative this policy of the bank was due, cooperated as
far as they were able. But in the first place it was the bank itself which had
to ensure, by following an appropriate discount policy, that it would always be
in a position to carry out with promptitude its voluntary undertaking to redeem
its notes. The measures that it took with this purpose in view did not differ
fundamentally in any way from those adopted by the banks-of-issue in other
gold-standard countries. [9] Thus the notes of the Austro-Hungarian Bank were in
fact nothing but money substitutes. The money of the country, as of other
European countries, was gold.
3 Commodity Money, Credit Money, and Fiat Money
The economic theory of money is generally expressed in a terminology
that is not economic but juristic. This terminology has been built up by
writers, statesmen, merchants, judges, and others whose chief interests have
been in the legal characteristics of the different kinds of money and their
substitutes. It is useful for dealing with those aspects of the monetary system
that are of importance from the legal point of view; but for purposes of
economic investigation it is practically valueless. Sufficient attention has
scarcely been devoted to this shortcoming, despite the fact that confusion of
the respective provinces of the sciences of law and economics has nowhere been
so frequent and so fraught with mischievous consequences as in this very sphere
of monetary theory. It is a mistake to deal with economic problems according to
legal criteria. The juristic phraseology, like the results of juristic research
into monetary problems, must be regarded by economics as one of the objects of
its investigations. It is not the task of economics to criticize it, although it
is entitled to exploit it for its own purposes. There is nothing to be said
against using juristic technical terms in economic argument where this leads to
no undesirable consequences. But for its own special purposes, economics must
construct its own special terminology.
There are two sorts of thing that
may be used as money: on the one hand, physical commodities as such, like the
metal gold or the metal silver; and, on the other hand, objects that do not
differ technologically from other objects that are not money, the factor that
decides whether they are money being not a physical but a legal characteristic.
A piece of paper that is specially characterized as money by the imprint of some
authority is in no way different, technologically considered, from another piece
of paper that has received a similar imprint from an unauthorized person, just
as a genuine five-franc piece does not differ technologically from a "genuine
replica." The only difference lies in the law that regulates the manufacture of
such coins and makes it impossible without authority. (In order to avoid every
possible misunderstanding, let it be expressly stated that all that the law can
do is to regulate the issue of the coins and that it is beyond the power of the
state to ensure in addition that they actually shall become money; that is, that
they actually shall be employed as a common medium of exchange. All that the
state can do by means of its official stamp is to single out certain pieces of
metal or paper from all the other things of the same kind so that they can be
subjected to a process of valuation independent of that of the rest. Thus it
permits those objects possessing the special legal qualification to be used as a
common medium of exchange while the other commodities of the same sort remain
mere commodities. It can also take various steps with the object of encouraging
the actual employment of the qualified commodities as common media of exchange.
But these commodities can never become money just because the state commands it;
money can be created only by the usage of those who take part in commercial
transactions.)
We may give the name commodity money to that sort of money
that is at the same time a commercial commodity; and the name fiat money to
money that comprises things with a special legal qualification. A third category
may be called credit money, this being that sort of money which constitutes a
claim against any physical or legal person. But these claims must not be both
payable on demand and absolutely secure; if they were, there could be no
difference between their value and that of the sum of money to which they
referred, and they could not be subjected to an independent process of val
uation on the part of those who dealt with them. In some way or other the
maturity of these claims must be postponed to some future time. It can hardly be
contested that fiat money in the strict sense of the word is theoretically
conceivable. The theory of value proves the possibility of its existence.
Whether fiat money has ever actually existed is, of course, another question,
and one that cannot offhand be answered affirmatively. It can hardly be doubted
that most of those kinds of money that are not commodity money must be
classified as credit money. But only detailed historical investigation could
clear this matter up.
Our terminology should prove more useful than that
which is generally employed. It should express more clearly the peculiarities of
the processes by which the different types of money are valued. It is certainly
more correct than the usual distinction between metallic money and paper money.
Metallic money comprises not only standard money but also token coins and such
coins as the German thaler of the period 1873-1907; and paper money, as a rule,
comprises not merely such fiat money and credit money as happen to be made of
paper, but also convertible notes issued by banks or the state. This terminology
is derived from popular usage. Previously, when more often than nowadays
"metallic" money really was money and not a money substitute, perhaps the
nomenclature was a little less inappropriate than it is now. Furthermore, it
corresponded—perhaps still corresponds—to the naive and confused popular
conception of value that sees in the precious metals something "intrinsically"
valuable and in paper credit money something necessarily anomalous.
Scientifically, this terminology is perfectly useless and a source of endless
misunderstanding and misrepresentation. The greatest mistake that can be made in
economic investigation is to fix attention on mere appearances, and so to fail
to perceive the fundamental difference between things whose externals alone are
similar, or to discriminate between fundamentally similar things whose externals
alone are different.
Admittedly, for the numismatist and the technologist
and the historian of art there is very little difference between the five-franc
piece before and after the cessation of free coinage of silver, while the
Austrian silver gulden even of the period 1879 to 1892 appears to be
fundamentally different from the paper gulden. But it is regrettable that such
superficial distinctions as this should still play a part in economic
discussion.
Our threefold classification is not a matter of mere
terminological gymnastics; the theoretical discussion of the rest of this book
should demonstrate the utility of the concepts that it involves.
The
decisive characteristic of commodity money is the employment for monetary
purposes of a commodity in the technological sense. For the present
investigation, it is a matter of complete indifference what particular commodity
this is; the important thing is that it is the commodity in question that
constitutes the money, and that the money is merely this commodity. The case of
fiat money is quite different. Here the deciding factor is the stamp, and it is
not the material bearing the stamp that constitutes the money, but the stamp
itself. The nature of the material that bears the stamp is a matter of quite
minor importance. Credit money, finally, is a claim falling due in the future
that is used as a general medium of exchange.
4 The Commodity Money of the Past and of the Present
Even when the differentiation of commodity money,
credit money, and fiat money is accepted as correct in principle and only its
utility disputed, the statement that the freely mintable currency of the present
day and the metallic money of previous centuries are examples of commodity money
is totally rejected by many authorities and by still more of the public at
large. It is true that as a rule nobody denies that the older forms of money
were commodity money. It is further generally admitted that in earlier times
coins circulated by weight and not by tale. Nevertheless, it is asserted, money
changed its nature long ago. The money of Germany and England in 1914, it is
said, was not gold, but the mark and the pound. Money nowadays consists of
"specified units with a definite significance in terms of value, that is
assigned to them by law" (Knapp). "By 'the standard' we mean the units of value
(florins, francs, marks, etc.) that have been adopted as measures of value, and
by 'money' we mean the tokens (coins and notes) that represent the units that
function as a measure of value. The controversy as to whether silver or gold or
both together should function as a standard and as currency is an idle one,
because neither silver nor gold ever has performed these functions or ever could
have done so" (Hammer). [10]
Before we proceed to test the truth of these
remarkable assertions, let us make one brief observation on their
genesis—although it would really be more correct to say renascence than to say
genesis, since the doctrines involved exhibit a very close relationship with the
oldest and most primitive theories of money. Just as these were, so the
nominalistic monetary theories of the present day are, characterized by their
inability to contribute a single word toward the solution of the chief problem
of monetary theory—one might in fact simply call it the problem of monetary
theory—namely that of explaining the exchange ratios between money and other
economic goods. For their authors, the economic problem of value and prices
simply does not exist. They have never thought it necessary to consider how
market ratios are established or what they signify. Their attention is
accidentally drawn to the fact that a German thaler (since 1873), or an Austrian
silver florin (since 1879), is essentially different from a quantity of silver
of the same weight and fineness that has not been stamped at the government
mint. They notice a similar state of affairs with regard to "paper money." They
do not understand this, and endeavor to find an answer to the riddle. But at
this point, just because of their lack of acquaintance with the theory of value
and prices, their inquiry takes a peculiarly unlucky turn. They do not inquire
how the exchange ratios between money and other economic goods are established.
This obviously seems to them quite a self-evident matter. They formulate their
problem in another way: How does it come about that three twenty-mark pieces are
equivalent to twenty thalers despite the fact that the silver contained in the
thalers has a lower market value than the gold contained in the marks? And their
answer runs: Because the value of money is determined by the state, by statute,
by the legal system. Thus, ignoring the most important facts of monetary
history, they weave an artificial network of fallacies; a theoretical
construction that collapses immediately the question is put: What exactly are we
to understand by a unit of value? But such impertinent questions can only occur
to those who are acquainted with at least the elements of the theory of prices.
Others are able to content themselves with references to the "nominality" of the
unit of value. No wonder, then, that these theories should have achieved such
popularity with the man in the street, especially since their kinship with
inflationism was bound to commend them strongly to all "cheap-money"
enthusiasts.
It may be stated as an assured result of investigation into
monetary history that at all times and among all peoples the principal coins
have been tendered and accepted, not by tale without consideration of their
quantity and quality, but only as pieces of metal of specific degrees of weight
and fineness. Where coins have been accepted by tale, this has always been in
the definite belief that the stamp showed them to be of the usual fineness of
their kind and of the correct weight. Where there were no grounds for this
assumption, weighing and testing were resorted to again.
Fiscal
considerations have led to the promulgation of a theory that attributes to the
minting authority the right to regulate the purchasing power of the coinage as
it thinks fit. For just as long as the minting of coins has been a government
function, governments have tried to fix the weight and content of the coins as
they wished. Philip VI of France expressly claimed the right "to mint such money
and give it such currency and at such rate as we desire and seems good to us"[11]
and all medieval rulers thought and did as he in this matter. Obliging jurists
supported them by attempts to discover a philosophical basis for the divine
right of kings to debase the coinage and to prove that the true value of the
coins was that assigned to them by the ruler of the country.
Nevertheless,
in defiance of all official regulations and prohibitions and fixing of prices
and threats of punishment, commercial practice has always insisted that what has
to be considered in valuing coins is not their face value but their value as
metal. The value of a coin has always been determined, not by the image and
superscription it bears nor by the proclamation of the mint and market
authorities, but by its metal content. Not every kind of money has been accepted
at sight, but only those kinds with a good reputation for weight and fineness.
In loan contracts, repayment in specific kinds of money has been stipulated for,
and in the case of a change in the coinage, fulfillment in terms of metal
required. [12] In spite of all fiscal influences, the opinion gradually gained
general acceptance, even among the jurists, that it was the metal value—the
bonitas intrinseca as they called it—that was to be considered when repaying
money debts. [13]
Debasement of the coinage was unable to force commercial
practice to attribute to the new and lighter coins the same purchasing power as
the old and heavier coins. [14] The value of the coinage fell in proportion to the
diminution of its weight and quality. Even price regulations took into account
the diminished purchasing power of money due to its debasement. Thus the
Schöffen or assessors of Schweidnitz in Silesia used to have the newly minted
pfennigs submitted to them, assess their value, and then in consultation with
the city council and elders fix the prices of commodities accordingly. There has
been handed down to us from thirteenth-century Vienna a forma institutionis que
fit per civium arbitrium annuatim tempore quo denarii renovantur pro rerum
venalium qualibet emptione in which the prices of commodities and services are
regulated in connection with the introduction of a new coinage in the years 1460
to 1474. Similar measures were taken on similar occasions in other
cities. [15]
Wherever disorganization of the coinage had advanced so far
that the presence of a stamp on a piece of metal was no longer any help in
determining its actual content, commerce ceased entirely to rely on the official
monetary system and created its own system of measuring the precious metals. In
large transactions, ingots and trade tokens were used. Thus, the German
merchants visiting the fair at Geneva took ingots of refined gold with them and
made their purchases with these, employing the weights used at the Paris market,
instead of using money. This was the origin of the Markenskudo or scutus
marcharum, which was nothing but the merchants' usual term for 3.765 grams of
refined gold. At the beginning of the fifteenth century, when the Geneva trade
was gradually being transferred to Lyons, the gold mark had become such a
customary unit of account among the merchants that bills of exchange expressed
in terms of it were carried to and from the market. The old Venetian lire di
grossi had a similar origin. [16] In the giro banks that sprang up in all big
commercial centers at the beginning of the modern era we see a further attempt
to free the monetary system from the authorities' abuse of the privilege of
minting. The clearinghouse business of these banks was based either on coins of
a specific fineness or on ingots. This bank money was commodity money in its
most perfect form.
The nominalists assert that the monetary unit, in
modern countries at any rate, is not a concrete commodity unit that can be
defined in suitable technical terms, but a nominal quantity of value about which
nothing can be said except that it is created by law. Without touching upon the
vague and nebulous nature of this phraseology, which will not sustain a moment's
criticism from the point of view of the theory of value, let us simply ask:
What, then, were the mark, the franc, and the pound before 1914? Obviously, they
were nothing but certain weights of gold. Is it not mere quibbling to assert
that Germany had not a gold standard but a mark standard? According to the
letter of the law, Germany was on a gold standard, and the mark was simply the
unit of account, the designation of 1/2790 kg. of refined gold. This is in no
way affected by the fact that nobody was bound in private dealings to accept
gold ingots or foreign gold coins, for the whole aim and intent of state
intervention in the monetary sphere is simply to release individuals from the
necessity of testing the weight and fineness of the gold they receive, a task
which can only be undertaken by experts and which involves very elaborate
precautionary measures. The narrowness of the limits within which the weight and
fineness of the coins are legally allowed to vary at the time of minting, and
the establishment of a further limit to the permissible loss by wear of those in
circulation, are much better means of securing the integrity of the coinage than
the use of scales and nitric acid on the part of all who have commercial
dealings. Again, the right of free coinage, one of the basic principles of
modern monetary law, is a protection in the opposite direction against the
emergence of a difference in value between the coined and uncoined metal. In
large-scale international trade, where differences that are negligible as far as
single coins are concerned have a cumulative importance, coins are valued, not
according to their number, but according to their weight; that is, they are
treated not as coins but as pieces of metal. It is easy to see why this does not
occur in domestic trade. Large payments within a country never involve the
actual transfer of the amounts of money concerned, but merely the assignment of
claims, which ultimately refer to the stock of precious metal of the central
bank.
The role played by ingots in the gold reserves of the banks is a
proof that the monetary standard consists in the precious metal, and not in the
proclamation of the authorities.
Even for present-day coins, so far as
they are not money substitutes, credit money, or fiat money, the statement is
true that they are nothing but ingots whose weight and fineness are officially
guaranteed. [17] The money of those modern countries where metal coins with no
mint restrictions are used is commodity money just as much as that of ancient
and medieval nations.
[1] See Böhm-Bawerk, Rechte und
Verhältnisse (Innsbruck, 1881), pp. 120 ff.
[2] Wagner, Beiträge zur Lehre
von den Banken (Leipzig, 1857), pp. 34 ff.
[3] For instance, Helfferich, Das
Geld, 6th ed. (Leipzig, 1923), pp. 267 ff.; English trans., Money
(London, 1927), pp. 284 ff.
[4] See Laughlin, The Principles of
Money (London, 1903), pp. 516 ff.
[5] See Kalkmann, Englands
Übergang zur Goldwährung im 18. Jahrhundert (Strassburg, 1895),
pp. 64 ff.; Schmoller, "Über die Ausbildung einer richtigen
Scheidemünzpolitik vom 14. bis zum 19. Jahrhundert," Jahrbuch fur
Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reich 24 (1900):
1247-74; Helfferich, Studien über Geld und Bankwessen
(Berlin, 1900), pp. 1-37.
[6] On the concepts of commodity money,
credit money, and fiat money, see sec. 3 of this chap.
[7] On the nature of token coinage, see
Say, Cours complet d'économie politique pratique, 3d ed. (Paris, 1852),
vol, 1, p. 408; and Wagner, Theoretische Sozialökonomik (Leipzig, 1909),
Part II pp. 504 ff. Very instructive discussions are to be found in the
memoranda and debates that preceded the Belgian Token Coinage Act of 1860.
In the memorandum of Pirmez, the nature of modern convertible token coins is
characterized as follows: "With this property (of convertibility) the coins
are no longer merely coins; they become claims, promises to pay. The holder
no longer has a mere property right to the coin itself [jus in re]; he has a
claim against the state to the amount of the nominal value of the coin
[jus ad rem], a right which he can exercise at any moment by demanding its
conversion. Token coins cease to be money and become a credit instrument
[une institution de crédit], banknotes inscribed on pieces of metal ..."
(see Loi décretant la fabrication d'une monnaie d'appoint ...
précédee des notes sur la monnaie de billon en Belgique ainsi que la
discussion de la loi à la Chambre des Représentants
[Brussels, 1860], p. 50).
[8] The silver gulden in Austria-Hungary
held the same position as the silver thaler in Germany from 1873 to 1907.
It was legal tender, but economically a claim to money, since the
bank-of-issue in fact always cashed it on demand.
[9] See my articles "Das Problem
gesetzlicher Aufnahme der Barzahlungen in Österreich-Ungarn," Jahrbuch
für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reich 33
(1909): 985-1037; "Zum Problem gesetzlicher Aufnahme der Barzahlungen in
Österreich-Ungarn," ibid. 34 (1910): 1877-84; "The Foreign Exchange Policy of
the Austro-Hungarian Bank," Economic Journal 19 (1909): 202-11; "Das vierte
Privilegium der Österreichisch-Ungarischen Bank," Zeitschrift für
Volkswirtschaft, Sozialpolitik und Verwaltung 21 (1922): 611-24.
[10] See esp. Hammer, Die
Hauptprinzipien des Geld-und Währungswesens und die Lösung der
Valutafrage (Vienna, 1891), pp. 7 ff.; Gesell, Die Anpassung des Geldes
und seiner Verwaltung an die Bedürfnisse des modernen Verkehres
(Buenos Aires, 1897), pp. 21 ff.; Knapp, Staatliche Theorie des Geldes,
3d ed. (Munich, 1921), pp. 20 ff.
[11] See Luschin, Allgemeine
Münzkunde und Geldgeschichte des Mittelalters und der neureren Zeit
(Munich, 1904), P. 215; Babelon, La théorie féodale de la
monnaie (Extrait des mémoires de l'Académie des Inscriptions et
Belles-Lettres, vol. 38, Part I [Paris, 1908], p. 35).
[12] For important references, see
Babelon, op. cit., p. 35.
[13] See Seidler, "Die Schwankungen
des Geldwertes und die juristische Lehre von dem Inhalt der Geldschulden,"
Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik (1894), 3d. Series, vol. 7, p.
688.
[14] For earlier conditions in Russia,
see Gelesnoff, Grundzüge der Volkswirtschaftslehre, trans. into German by
Altschul (Leipzig, 1918), p. 357.
[15] See Luschin, op. cit., pp. 221 f.
[16] Ibid., p. 155; Endemann, Studien
in der romanisch-kanonistischen Wirtschafts-und Rechtslehre bis gegen Ende
des 17. Jahrhunderts (Berlin, 1874), vol. 1, pp. 180 ff.
[17] Chevalier, Cours d'économie
politique, III., La monnaie (Paris, 1850), pp. 21 ff; Goldschmidt,
Handbuch des Handelsrechts (Erlangen, 1868), vol. 1, Part II, pp. 1073 ff.
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