In the thread Proving Natural Law, hashem extensively quoted some very important passages from Rothbard's Ethics of Liberty, and very fervently promoted all of Rothbard's contentions. This prompted me to write an extensive post which analyzes Rothbard's arguments and which presents my own theory of ethics, which I characterize as a Humean-Libertarian synthesis. I hope it provides a sensible alternative to those who find themselves intellectually uncomfortable both with moral nihilism and what I call extreme moral rationalism.
Call me Grayson.
You raised some excellent points in your analysis of Rothbard's natural law ethics. You have expressed the fallacy of the "man/men divide" in a clear manner, as you have called it. The fulfillment of an individual does not necessarily imply the fulfillment of a group of individuals, and neither vice versa. I find it surprising that you integrated evolutionary biology with ethics. To my experience, no other libertarian has done that before, other than myself. Evolutionary psychologists have continually warned us of falling into the "naturalistic fallacy." Rothbard's natural law ethics fails because of this.
Life is filled with misinterpretations, misrepresentations, and prodigal folklore.
Anarcho-Mercantilist: You raised some excellent points in your analysis of Rothbard's natural law ethics. You have expressed the fallacy of the "man/men divide" in a clear manner, as you have called it. The fulfillment of an individual does not necessarily imply the fulfillment of a group of individuals, and neither vice versa. I find it surprising that you integrated evolutionary biology with ethics. To my experience, no other libertarian has done that before, other than myself. Evolutionary psychologists have continually warned us of falling into the "naturalistic fallacy." Rothbard's natural law ethics fails because of this.
As far as I understand Aristotle thought the individual needed a group to make flourishing happen. Aristotle thought the State was necessary. I didn't see that in Rothbard's writings though. Maybe I missed it. Plauche in his disseration emphasizes the fulfillment of the individual doesn't need a group. I think while we live in a society and have interpersonal relations the fulfillment of our own flourishing influences others and they influence the individual. A neighborhood full of friends versus criminals is a big difference for the individual.
I haven't yet to read the blog posts of yours Lilburne that lead up to this one. So I'll comment on this later.
The concept of "passions" by Hume is something I don't know about. That's an area I could learn about.
No free market with blind headbutting as thine and mine goes unseen, you know, current events. But if there's an increased implementation of property rights so economics justly happens with this scarcity.. then yes.
Anarcho-Mercantilist:I find it surprising that you integrated evolutionary biology with ethics. To my experience, no other libertarian has done that before, other than myself. Evolutionary psychologists have continually warned us of falling into the "naturalistic fallacy." Rothbard's natural law ethics fails because of this.
Great to meet another libertarian who is a Darwin enthusiast.
wilderness:As far as I understand Aristotle thought the individual needed a group to make flourishing happen. Aristotle thought the State was necessary. I didn't see that in Rothbard's writings though.
Yes, Aristotle was surely no libertarian. I go into that in Aristotle on the State as Association. Rothbard, like many libertarians today, are Aristotelean in their general philosophy, but do not apply that philosophy to more particular questions in the same way that Aristotle did.
wilderness:I think while we live in a society and have interpersonal relations the fulfillment of our own flourishing influences others and they influence the individual. A neighborhood full of friends versus criminals is a big difference for the individual.
Well put.
I loved that article. Nevertheless, I want to make some points:
Lilburne: There is an overwhelming general need in the human species for self-restraint and fellow-feeling if it is to flourish.
There is an overwhelming general need in the human species for self-restraint and fellow-feeling if it is to flourish.
I just can't see why the individual self-restraint of accumulation of wealth can't fit into your definition.
Lilburne: Economic science teaches us that the MOST highly-functional moral feelings are those concerning ownership (both of one's bodily self and of external objects). I believe it is no coincidence that we find in experience and in history that these same moral feelings concerning property are, of all moral feelings, the most timeless and universal. When we take up some unused thing and begin to use it, we automatically think of it as our "ours". We take reflexive affront when our person or our property is aggressed against by others. We feel involuntary outrage when we see the person or property of others aggressed against. And we spontaneously feel guilt when, or at least after, we aggress against the person or property of others. Of course there are exceptions (as with those suffering from Aspberger's), but these facts are true for the overwhelming preponderance of humanity. We don't need to be taught to feel revulsion toward murder, plunder, and enslavement; it has been stamped on our hearts by nature. THAT is what I mean by "natural law": not moral precepts which can be deduced from an understanding of nature, but moral precepts which have arisen out of nature. And chief among these precepts are the property rights implicit in our natural revulsion toward murder, plunder, and enslavement.
Economic science teaches us that the MOST highly-functional moral feelings are those concerning ownership (both of one's bodily self and of external objects). I believe it is no coincidence that we find in experience and in history that these same moral feelings concerning property are, of all moral feelings, the most timeless and universal. When we take up some unused thing and begin to use it, we automatically think of it as our "ours". We take reflexive affront when our person or our property is aggressed against by others. We feel involuntary outrage when we see the person or property of others aggressed against. And we spontaneously feel guilt when, or at least after, we aggress against the person or property of others. Of course there are exceptions (as with those suffering from Aspberger's), but these facts are true for the overwhelming preponderance of humanity. We don't need to be taught to feel revulsion toward murder, plunder, and enslavement; it has been stamped on our hearts by nature. THAT is what I mean by "natural law": not moral precepts which can be deduced from an understanding of nature, but moral precepts which have arisen out of nature. And chief among these precepts are the property rights implicit in our natural revulsion toward murder, plunder, and enslavement.
Also, I just can't see why the "new socialist man" of Marx (who thought it was possible to change human nature) won't hijack our moral code and change those moral precepts.
Lilburne: AM: I find it surprising that you integrated evolutionary biology with ethics. To my experience, no other libertarian has done that before, other than myself. Evolutionary psychologists have continually warned us of falling into the "naturalistic fallacy." Rothbard's natural law ethics fails because of this. Great to meet another libertarian who is a Darwin enthusiast.
AM: I find it surprising that you integrated evolutionary biology with ethics. To my experience, no other libertarian has done that before, other than myself. Evolutionary psychologists have continually warned us of falling into the "naturalistic fallacy." Rothbard's natural law ethics fails because of this.
February 17 - 1600 - Giordano Bruno is burnt alive by the catholic church. Aquinas : "much more reason is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted of heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put to death."
ivanfoofoo:I loved that article.
Wonderful! Thanks.
ivanfoofoo:I just can't see why the individual self-restraint of accumulation of wealth can't fit into your definition.
Definition of what exactly? General need? Flourishing?
ivanfoofoo:Also, I just can't see why the "new socialist man" of Marx (who thought it was possible to change human nature) won't hijack our moral code and change those moral precepts.
Changes in intrinsic human nature happen gradually over millennia. And socialism has a hard time even lasting a few decades. Outside of genetic engineering, we need not fear ever becoming "the new socialist man".
Lilburne: Definition of what exactly? General need? Flourishing?
Individual self-restraint of accumulation of wealth could also enter the definition of "general need"
Lilburne: Changes in intrinsic human nature happen gradually over millennia. And socialism has a hard time even lasting a few decades. Outside of genetic engineering, we need not fear ever becoming "the new socialist man".
So then you're assuming that the human morality, which lies in natural facts, can be highjacked?
Lilburne: Anarcho-Mercantilist:I find it surprising that you integrated evolutionary biology with ethics. To my experience, no other libertarian has done that before, other than myself. Evolutionary psychologists have continually warned us of falling into the "naturalistic fallacy." Rothbard's natural law ethics fails because of this. Great to meet another libertarian who is a Darwin enthusiast.
WARNING: This signature violates Rule 5. Stay classy!
I disagree with this article (though I liked your Krugman one). The more I hear Roderick Long speak of eudaimonia, the more I am influenced by such a concept. I believe there is an objective end goal that we pursuit as a vast always prevelant life goal. That minor goals are just the constituent means to obtaining this end goal and we employ reason as to ascertain which goals will bring us closer to this ultimate goal.
Roderick Long: "Economics and its Ethical Assumptions": Now according to this tradition, why do they say that we have just one ultimate end? Why not say that we have lots, that there are lots of things we want: ice cream, fame, not being killed? We've got all these different things, but why suppose that they're all constituents of some big super-end? Well, I think part of the reason they think this is: what happens when you make trade-offs? Suppose there are two ultimate ends you have: ice cream and fame. Those are two ultimate ends you have, and they come in degrees. (That's why I didn't use not being killed, because that's less a matter of degree.) So you want more ice cream, and you want more fame. And sometimes those go together, like winning an ice-cream-eating contest. But still there are lots of cases where these goals might conflict, and so you have to do trade-offs, and decide between them. If you're deciding between them, that's an action. Actions have to have a means-end structure, right? So if you're trying to decide how to trade off between ice cream and fame, then doing that must be a means to some end. Well, what is the end? It can't be the end of maximizing the ice cream, because you haven't decided whether that's what you're going to do. It can't be the end of maximizing fame, because you haven't decided that. It can't be the end of getting the maximization of both, because it's a trade-off — that's impossible. Instead, you're trying to maximize something of which these two are parts, some general, overall satisfaction — that's what you're trying to maximize. You might wonder whether "maximize" is even the right word, but anyway you're trying to promote some good that includes both of these intrinsic good; these are intrinsic parts of your overall good. And it's that sort of thing that leads the eudaimonists to think that whenever you're acting, you're always promoting some ultimate good of yours, some ultimate end or aim.
Now according to this tradition, why do they say that we have just one ultimate end? Why not say that we have lots, that there are lots of things we want: ice cream, fame, not being killed? We've got all these different things, but why suppose that they're all constituents of some big super-end? Well, I think part of the reason they think this is: what happens when you make trade-offs? Suppose there are two ultimate ends you have: ice cream and fame. Those are two ultimate ends you have, and they come in degrees. (That's why I didn't use not being killed, because that's less a matter of degree.) So you want more ice cream, and you want more fame. And sometimes those go together, like winning an ice-cream-eating contest. But still there are lots of cases where these goals might conflict, and so you have to do trade-offs, and decide between them.
If you're deciding between them, that's an action. Actions have to have a means-end structure, right? So if you're trying to decide how to trade off between ice cream and fame, then doing that must be a means to some end. Well, what is the end? It can't be the end of maximizing the ice cream, because you haven't decided whether that's what you're going to do. It can't be the end of maximizing fame, because you haven't decided that. It can't be the end of getting the maximization of both, because it's a trade-off — that's impossible. Instead, you're trying to maximize something of which these two are parts, some general, overall satisfaction — that's what you're trying to maximize. You might wonder whether "maximize" is even the right word, but anyway you're trying to promote some good that includes both of these intrinsic good; these are intrinsic parts of your overall good. And it's that sort of thing that leads the eudaimonists to think that whenever you're acting, you're always promoting some ultimate good of yours, some ultimate end or aim.
'the American is the most unphilosophical of beings. The rationalization of conduct in general is most repugnant to him; he prefers to emotionalize it.' - Albert J Nock
Lilburne,
What's the difference in your opinion between eudaimonia (pursuit of happiness) and "passions"? I really am not seeing any significant distinctions being made. I see eudaimonia swallowing up "passions" and providing a more expansive explanatory power.
Rothbard: Ends can also be apprehended by reason as either objectively good or bad for man" "[T]here is therefore room for the concept of right reason, reason directing man's acts to the attainment of the objective good for man." Moral conduct is therefore conduct in accord with right reason: "If it is said that moral conduct is rational conduct, what is meant is that it is conduct in accordance with right reason, reason apprehending the objective good for man and dictating the means to its attainment." "For the ends themselves are selected by the use of reason; and right reason dictates to man his proper ends as well as the means for their attainment."
Isn't this about how well an individuals epistemology is, meaning, if right reason gets to an end, then that right reason matches that end. Are you saying that since "passions" come first, then reason is only a means in the middle between the telos of passions (thus passions are the end as well)? This seems to be more of an origin or cause and effect type statements. It's somebody trying to find what came first and then if you can, then that is the telos of human nature. Yes in development passions may come first before reason and way before certain kinds of knowledge, but isn't reason playing a part in this process in developing habits or foresight to therefore guide passions better, thus, I don't see passions flying a solo mission here. You stated that maturation helps a child be a man in one of your blog posts. I see reason finding and being ends all the time. But a particular reason or passion is not the ultimate end since I think there's more to life than what we are currently living and thus life and eudaimonia and reason and passions are a journey. These are all open-ended.
But this all comes back to eudaimonia for me. And yet for me a way to explain eudaimonia is by value. It's also known as happiness, well-being, quality, or flourishing. And any telos is for me starting with value (quality), meaning, do I value this or that. Does it have the quality I'm looking for, if so, then it holds value. It is good (moral). I experiment and find out. Through a certain upbringing I don't need to ask all the questions and start all over in finding out what people figured out and passed down to us thousands of years ago. So I validate certain values and with further learning I may discard (find no value) some things.
Maybe I throw in my own perspective so heavily at times, but I don't see how Rothbard was trying to state ultimate ends of "common" man. Could you point out where he says this and we could elaborate?
The fulfillment of an individual happens when the individual is not bogged down in fighting justice (against other people) constantly and thus the individual can enjoy more quality endeavors. I don't see how you counter this.
Anarchist Cain: Suppose there are two ultimate ends you have: ice cream and fame. Those are two ultimate ends you have, and they come in degrees. (That's why I didn't use not being killed, because that's less a matter of degree.) So you want more ice cream, and you want more fame. And sometimes those go together, like winning an ice-cream-eating contest. But still there are lots of cases where these goals might conflict, and so you have to do trade-offs, and decide between them. If you're deciding between them, that's an action. Actions have to have a means-end structure, right? So if you're trying to decide how to trade off between ice cream and fame, then doing that must be a means to some end. Well, what is the end? It can't be the end of maximizing the ice cream, because you haven't decided whether that's what you're going to do. It can't be the end of maximizing fame, because you haven't decided that. It can't be the end of getting the maximization of both, because it's a trade-off — that's impossible. Instead, you're trying to maximize something of which these two are parts, some general, overall satisfaction — that's what you're trying to maximize.
Suppose there are two ultimate ends you have: ice cream and fame. Those are two ultimate ends you have, and they come in degrees. (That's why I didn't use not being killed, because that's less a matter of degree.) So you want more ice cream, and you want more fame. And sometimes those go together, like winning an ice-cream-eating contest. But still there are lots of cases where these goals might conflict, and so you have to do trade-offs, and decide between them.
If you're deciding between them, that's an action. Actions have to have a means-end structure, right? So if you're trying to decide how to trade off between ice cream and fame, then doing that must be a means to some end. Well, what is the end? It can't be the end of maximizing the ice cream, because you haven't decided whether that's what you're going to do. It can't be the end of maximizing fame, because you haven't decided that. It can't be the end of getting the maximization of both, because it's a trade-off — that's impossible. Instead, you're trying to maximize something of which these two are parts, some general, overall satisfaction — that's what you're trying to maximize.
AC, thanks for the wonderfully intriguing quote. I've only read a few things by Long, but each one has been brilliant.
Let's consider a concrete hypothetical case of Long's ice cream/fame example. Let's say a man, we'll call him Quintus, is at a karaoke bar and grill with some friends and the place is packed. He takes a number for a turn at singing. Then, just as his number comes up, the waiter brings a giant banana split to your table. His friends are bunch of pigs, so he knows that if he goes up and sings, the banana split will be gone by the time he gets back. But if he doesn't take his turn now, he will miss his chance to sing. Now, he LOVES banana splits, but he also loves performing (he's quite a good singer). So he is torn between his desire for ice cream and his desire for performing. Ice cream and fame are, strictly speaking, not his ends but means. The physical ice cream is a means to the goal of the delicious taste sensation that occurs when he is eating it. And the act of performing is a means to the goal of the exhilarating sensation he gets while performing. And let's say he ultimately chooses to go ahead and sing, and let his gluttonous friends consume the split.
Now a eudaemonist would say the goals of taste sensation and "stage exhilaration" are not ultimate ends, but intermediary means to a single end. A Tolkien geek would say their ethical doctrine is, "one end to rule them all, and one end to bind them" (which is not to say that I myself am a Tolkien geek, just that that is what one would say. The eudaemonist would argue this must be true, because Quintus chose between the two goals, choosing implies a criterion, and a criterion implies a "higher" goal. The eudaemonist calls this higher goal "overall well-being" or (of course) eudaemonia.
This would seem to run counter to my contention that goals such as taste sensation and stage exhilaration are truly ends, and are therefore creatures of the passions. And this leads to the following questions.
First of all, I insist that such goals are not products of reason. An affirmative answer to 3 does not follow from affirmative answers to 1 and 2. To say that we choose between the goals of flavor and exhilaration is not to say we choose to have those goals in the first place. The statement, "I choose to desire X" makes no sense. One chooses to act upon desire, but not to feel the desire in the first place. So let us grant for a moment that goals like flavor and exhilaration are not ends, but penultimate goals which are but means to the ultimate goal of eudaemonia. I contend then that such penultimate goals, along with eudeamonia itself, must be creatures of the passions, because to the notion of choosing to have an urge makes no sense.
I have more to say on this, but I've got to take a break to achieve my penultimate goal of enjoying an In N Out burger in order to promote my eudaemonia.
Lilburne:Now a eudaemonist would say the goals of taste sensation and "stage exhilaration" are not ultimate ends, but intermediary means to a single end
Constituent means
Lilburne:First of all, I insist that such goals are not products of reason. An affirmative answer to 3 does not follow from affirmative answers to 1 and 2. To say that we choose between the goals of flavor and exhilaration is not to say we choose to have those goals in the first place. The statement, "I choose to desire X" makes no sense. One chooses to act upon desire, but not to feel the desire in the first place.
Why are they not products of reason? One must utilize logic in order to ascertain whither flavor or fame will bring them close to their ultimate end goal. There must be a third 'party' that rationalizes whither the love of food is stronger then the love of fame and vice versa. When confronted with two urges both as strong as the other, something must utilize which is the better, therefore when present with flavor or fame one must utilize logic to choose an urge.
Lilburne:I have more to say on this, but I've got to take a break to achieve my penultimate goal of enjoying an In N Out burger in order to promote my eudaemonia.
I have never been to one of these but in California, in & out burger always has a line of people. I blame Hume
Lilburne: Now a eudaemonist would say the goals of taste sensation and "stage exhilaration" are not ultimate ends, but intermediary means to a single end. A Tolkien geek would say their ethical doctrine is, "one end to rule them all, and one end to bind them" (which is not to say that I myself am a Tolkien geek, just that that is what one would say. The eudaemonist would argue this must be true, because Quintus chose between the two goals, choosing implies a criterion, and a criterion implies a "higher" goal. The eudaemonist calls this higher goal "overall well-being" or (of course) eudaemonia. This would seem to run counter to my contention that goals such as taste sensation and stage exhilaration are truly ends, and are therefore creatures of the passions. The eudaemonist would say whichever you choose the end is happiness. You say the end result is passions. Thinking in manners of telos. I see no difference. Lilburne: And this leads to the following questions. If such goals are means, and we use choose between them, does not choice imply deliberation? And does not deliberation imply reason? Are such goals, then, products of reason? First of all, I insist that such goals are not products of reason. An affirmative answer to 3 does not follow from affirmative answers to 1 and 2. To say that we choose between the goals of flavor and exhilaration is not to say we choose to have those goals in the first place. The statement, "I choose to desire X" makes no sense. One chooses to act upon desire, but not to feel the desire in the first place. So let us grant for a moment that goals like flavor and exhilaration are not ends, but penultimate goals which are but means to the ultimate goal of eudaemonia. I contend then that such penultimate goals, along with eudeamonia itself, must be creatures of the passions, because to the notion of choosing to have an urge makes no sense. Happiness need not only by choosing to have an urge. Eudeamonia is pleasant, such as your passions here. I see no difference other than eudeamonia can also include pleasant reasoning. I understand passions doesn't exclude reason either, but you are making a distinction between the two, passion and reason. Eudeamonia can be achieved by both. Thus they are distinct still, but also both reason and passions are fulfilling happiness (desire) in and of themselves in both reason and urges. I don't know enough about Hume, so, I'm not making any final conclusions here. I'm going along with the discussion on what I do know about eudeamonia. So further discussion on this would help me think this through. No free market with blind headbutting as thine and mine goes unseen, you know, current events. But if there's an increased implementation of property rights so economics justly happens with this scarcity.. then yes. | Post Points: 20
This would seem to run counter to my contention that goals such as taste sensation and stage exhilaration are truly ends, and are therefore creatures of the passions.
The eudaemonist would say whichever you choose the end is happiness. You say the end result is passions. Thinking in manners of telos. I see no difference.
Lilburne: And this leads to the following questions. If such goals are means, and we use choose between them, does not choice imply deliberation? And does not deliberation imply reason? Are such goals, then, products of reason? First of all, I insist that such goals are not products of reason. An affirmative answer to 3 does not follow from affirmative answers to 1 and 2. To say that we choose between the goals of flavor and exhilaration is not to say we choose to have those goals in the first place. The statement, "I choose to desire X" makes no sense. One chooses to act upon desire, but not to feel the desire in the first place. So let us grant for a moment that goals like flavor and exhilaration are not ends, but penultimate goals which are but means to the ultimate goal of eudaemonia. I contend then that such penultimate goals, along with eudeamonia itself, must be creatures of the passions, because to the notion of choosing to have an urge makes no sense.
And this leads to the following questions.
Happiness need not only by choosing to have an urge. Eudeamonia is pleasant, such as your passions here. I see no difference other than eudeamonia can also include pleasant reasoning. I understand passions doesn't exclude reason either, but you are making a distinction between the two, passion and reason. Eudeamonia can be achieved by both. Thus they are distinct still, but also both reason and passions are fulfilling happiness (desire) in and of themselves in both reason and urges. I don't know enough about Hume, so, I'm not making any final conclusions here. I'm going along with the discussion on what I do know about eudeamonia. So further discussion on this would help me think this through.
Anarchist Cain:Roderick Long: "Economics and its Ethical Assumptions"
Do you have anything you can link to on this subject AC???
It sounds like the ocean, smells like fresh mountain air, and tastes like the union of peanut butter and chocolate. ~Liberty Student
@lilburne,virtue ethics seems to be more optimistic than the humean theory based on my understanding from what I have read.The reason being that, in the tradition of virtue ethics (from what I gather, which might not be right), recognising what is virtuous, and training yourself to be virtuous is itself a virtue, it is an ethics with a core of. and a hope of self-improvement,
i.e someone with natural anger and rage, can assess it and over time actually hope to curb that 'passion' by the application of reason extended over time, i.e. habit. whereas, I would think supposing that the passions are ultimately whimsical and uninfluencable and unrationalisable makes them seem like a point of undue 'indeterminancy', a point of 'arbitrary non-agent relative will' which strikes me as pessimistic, although I may well have overstated the case.
Where there is no property there is no justice; a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid
Fools! not to see that what they madly desire would be a calamity to them as no hands but their own could bring
Harry Felker: Anarchist Cain:Roderick Long: "Economics and its Ethical Assumptions" Do you have anything you can link to on this subject AC???
http://mises.org/story/2103
Morty: Harry Felker: Anarchist Cain:Roderick Long: "Economics and its Ethical Assumptions" Do you have anything you can link to on this subject AC??? http://mises.org/story/2103
Thanks Morty
Anarchist Cain:Why are they not products of reason? One must utilize logic in order to ascertain whither flavor or fame will bring them close to their ultimate end goal.
Again, using reason to choose between two desires is not the same thing as reason generating those desires in the first place.
Anarchist Cain:There must be a third 'party' that rationalizes whither the love of food is stronger then the love of fame and vice versa.
I'm not sure if "rationalize" is the right word here. Reason, to me, is a capacity for inference. And inference is concluding that one thing either deductively or inductively follows from another. But what kind of inference is it when somebody decides between two urges? When deliberating, one may use reason to determine questions of fact concerning the two options. But then, once the facts have been considered, and the actual choice is to be made, what kind of inference is involved? What is the premise from which "therefore I choose X" is concluded? It seems that, once it comes down to actually deciding on an action, the man chooses impelled by whichever is the stronger urge.
Let's take the karaoke bar and grill example. Quintus deliberates over the options of the banana split and performing. He considers exactly what sensations he would undergo with each of the choices: how the banana split would taste and how it would feel to be on stage. These questions about anticipated future states of sensation are questions of fact. And he uses his reason to inductively determine them. He anticipates that the banana split will taste a certain way, because other banana splits have tasted a certain way before, for example. But when it comes down to the decision itself, no matter how many facts he has collected in his deliberation, what really matters is how he values those facts. It's not an issue of inference, like "singing yields 10 "utils" while ice cream only yields 8, 10>8, therefore singing is objectively best". The set of facts, enlarged by deliberation, associated with the two options elicits two sets of urges. The stronger urge will impel the acting man to decide for its associated option. This decision cannot be characterized as an inference.
Anarchist Cain:I have never been to one of these but in California, in & out burger always has a line of people. I blame Hume
I'm sure Hume would have loved In & Out.: he was not a thin man. But I think St. Thomas Aquinas had him beat in the philosophical fatty department.
wilderness:The eudaemonist would say whichever you choose the end is happiness.
At least according to Long's quote, it doesn't seem that they would identify the chosen option with happiness, but instead the chosen option would be considered a constituent means (thanks for that term, Anarchist Cain) for happiness.
wilderness:I understand passions doesn't exclude reason either, but you are making a distinction between the two, passion and reason.
To me, the passions are that part of the psyche which generates urges, while reason is that part which conducts inference.
I work at In N Out :)
“Elections are Futures Markets in Stolen Property.” - H. L. Mencken
Lilburne: wilderness:The eudaemonist would say whichever you choose the end is happiness. At least according to Long's quote, it doesn't seem that they would identify the chosen option with happiness, but instead the chosen option would be considered a constituent means (thanks for that term, Anarchist Cain) for happiness.
Wait. Are you saying here that since it is not 'identified' it is not reasoned? I had trouble comparing what I said with what you said here.
Lilburne: wilderness:I understand passions doesn't exclude reason either, but you are making a distinction between the two, passion and reason. To me, the passions are that part of the psyche which generates urges, while reason is that part which conducts inference.
Here's a quote of Aristotle:
"We must take as a sign of states of character the pleasure or pain that ensues on acts; for the man who abstains from bodily pleasures and delights in this very fact is temperate, while the man who is annoyed at it is self-indulgent, and he who stands his ground against things that are terrible and delights in this or at least is not pained is brave, while the man who is pained is a coward. For moral excellence is concerned with pleasures and pains; it is on account of the pleasure that we do bad things, and on account of the pain that we abstain from noble ones. Hence we ought to have been brought up in a particular way from our very youth, as Plato says, so as both to delight in and to be pained by the things that we ought; for this is the right education.
Again, if the virtues are concerned with actions and passions, and every passion and every action is accompanied by pleasure and pain, for this reason also virtue will be concerned with pleasures and pains...
That virtue, then, is concerned with pleasures and pains, and that by the acts from which it arises it is both increased and, if they are done differently, destroyed, and that the acts from which it arose are those in which it actualizes itself..."
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And this is in the same collection of books that Aristotle explained the telos of an individual is eudaemonia. So what I see here is by virtue the passions, the urges, can by reason become acted upon in a noble and/or brave way. it takes a cultivation of the urges by reason to rise above low level passions. I'm not stating the passions you are speaking about are low level, but since you place them outside of intellectual cultivation I'm having difficulty with understanding how right reasoning would not only infer but become the end. Thus right reasoning would enjoy the end, take part in the end, if as stated it is right reasoning. Thus reasoning that is in accord with fulfilling happiness. Though reason has a late start in development (a child has less reasoning and somebody that is not interested in education more than a child quite possibly but less than somebody who is more curious), I don't see how reason still wouldn't take part in the end. This is the point of eudaemonia. It is not only of the pleasure and pain undeveloped, but also a fulfillment of pleasure in the intellect. By choices and actions reason further cultivates and refines the passions and thus an individual enjoys a good intellect as well as a good heart.
Do you see where I'm having difficulty ridding my view on how passions and eudaemonia are similar, except, the latter is more expansive in scope. You're excluding passions from reason yet you say individuals reason so this is not my difficulty. Eudaemonia is experienced as the passions and as reason. So it's more inclusional. This is how I see this. The more virtuous somebody is the more eudaemonia will be included not just in the passions, but in reason, in character (human acting), and influential in the bonding of society too.
Proof for natural rights is provided by Rassmusen in Groundwork for Rights. His argument is that life is an end in itself. This is because any action that does not promote your life is a logically contradictory action, since you need life in order to act. He then proceeds to argue that natural law is the groundwork you need to use in order to promote your own life.
Mises Community Natural Rights Discussion Group
First of all, I reject the "means-end dichotomy." The "means-end dichotomy" is merely an axiom. However, this axiom is psychologically unsound. Consequentially, I reject Aristotelian ethics.
Could anyone provide an argument for the "means-end dichotomy" in the first place?
http://mises.org/pdf/humanaction/pdf/Ha_04.pdf ?
its 4 and a half big font pages.
nirgrahamUK: http://mises.org/pdf/humanaction/pdf/Ha_04.pdf ? its 4 and a half big font pages.
I responded to you in Semantics of Abstract Ideas and Rejecting the Means-End Dichotomy.
Anarcho-Mercantilist: nirgrahamUK: http://mises.org/pdf/humanaction/pdf/Ha_04.pdf ? its 4 and a half big font pages. I responded to you in Semantics of Abstract Ideas and Rejecting the Means-End Dichotomy.
I offered a response on your blog on Rejecting the Means-End Dichotomy.
i ignored cardinality, we can do that another time.
bump... cause I wouldn't mind trying to understand this...
wilderness: Lilburne: wilderness:The eudaemonist would say whichever you choose the end is happiness. At least according to Long's quote, it doesn't seem that they would identify the chosen option with happiness, but instead the chosen option would be considered a constituent means (thanks for that term, Anarchist Cain) for happiness. Wait. Are you saying here that since it is not 'identified' it is not reasoned? I had trouble comparing what I said with what you said here. Lilburne:
Lilburne:
No, by "identify" I meant "equate". In other words, the eudaemonist wouldn't equate the chosen option with happiness, but instead the chosen option would be considered a means for happiness.
wilderness:So what I see here is by virtue the passions, the urges, can by reason become acted upon in a noble and/or brave way. it takes a cultivation of the urges by reason to rise above low level passions.
In any given moment we are impelled by our urges. We can try to cultivate our psyche such that in the future we will have certain urges. But even that cultivation is an action which is impelled by an urge.
Let's say Quintus had a history of ice cream gluttony. He wants to become less gluttonous, because that would make him feel better about himself as a person. The fact that his urge to improve himself is considered good and worthy does not make it any more "intellectual" (of the intellect) than his urge for ice cream. Let's say he sees a banana split, but he abstains from it. This is not a victory of the intellect. This is a victory of the urge for self-improvement over the urge for ice cream. You might say the urge for self-improvement arises from high-level passions, but it is passion nonetheless.
wilderness: Wait. Are you saying here that since it is not 'identified' it is not reasoned? I had trouble comparing what I said with what you said here.
Lilburne: No, by "identify" I meant "equate". In other words, the eudaemonist wouldn't equate the chosen option with happiness, but instead the chosen option would be considered a means for happiness.
Are you taking a linear position? I think that's the concept I was trying to explain, but finally found the words. I take a more particular approach, meaning, particulars such as reason can telos happiness. So can passions. Now if we are talking about the whole person, then each of these particulars of the person are telosing (?) happiness, thus, as a whole the person is telosing happiness.
Lilburne: wilderness:So what I see here is by virtue the passions, the urges, can by reason become acted upon in a noble and/or brave way. it takes a cultivation of the urges by reason to rise above low level passions. In any given moment we are impelled by our urges. We can try to cultivate our psyche such that in the future we will have certain urges. But even that cultivation is an action which is impelled by an urge.
I agree with this. To focus on human action or reason would side-step the other moral virtues or values in general that a person can enjoy. I don't know if my position is unordinary, which I've explained above.
Lilburne: Let's say Quintus had a history of ice cream gluttony. He wants to become less gluttonous, because that would make him feel better about himself as a person. The fact that his urge to improve himself is considered good and worthy does not make it any more "intellectual" (of the intellect) than his urge for ice cream. Let's say he sees a banana split, but he abstains from it. This is not a victory of the intellect. This is a victory of the urge for self-improvement over the urge for ice cream. You might say the urge for self-improvement arises from high-level passions, but it is passion nonetheless.
I agree and I don't see how this side-steps pursuit of happiness. Aristotle himself listed many virtues and goods and not all of these are intellectual. Quoted from Plauche dissertation:
"A good place to start would be with goods and virtues identified by Aristotle. In Rhetoric 1362b0-28 Aristotle lists a number of goods and some of the virtues that he also discusses in the Nicomachean Ethics. Rasmussen and Den Uyl summarize the list of goods as 1) intellectual ability (including speech), 2) intellectual pursuits, 3) health (including action, pleasure and life), 4) friendship, 5) honor, 6) wealth, 7) beauty, 8) justice, and 9) artistic pursuits...
Of the moral virtues (and their corresponding vices of excess and deficiency), Aristotle discusses 1) courage (the mean between rashness and cowardice); 2) temperance (licentiousness and insensibility); 3) generosity or liberality (prodigality and illiberality/meanness), a minor virtue regarding getting and spending; 4) magnificence (vulgarity and pettiness/extreme stinginess), a major virtue regarding getting and spending;" etc...
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To not become gluttonous (vice) is to pursue health (virtue), and these are the telos of happiness in the virtuous sense.
I don't know where this goes against the grain of an "eudaemonist". Again, I definitely admit I have not inquired into all the works on this topic, so, I don't know who's position I'm directly coming from or if I'm picking and choosing in a way that I've preconceived to be my original position and thus I'm picking up what fits my worldview along the way and discarding what is not. But from these works I'm not an expert on, but I'm also not vaguely familiar I'm wondering whom Hume is arguing against. Maybe there were or still are "eudaemonists" that over rationalize and narrow the concept of happiness to intellect alone, but this was not something "courage", for one, or health needs rationalized in the act. Unless there are principles that a cognizant person, thus a person fully or more fully aware of their own actions would act upon such principles when they do something.
1) For example, a person on a diet would refrain from eating the banana split due to the rationalized principles of the diet.
2) But somebody that has the urge to eat it, then chooses not to, the reason for such is a means that refrains the urge of a more desired end, thus, a more desired urge is met, which is not to eat the sundae.
Thus somebody in 1 is following a pre-ordained rationalized principle. It was something rationalized before the act. Somebody in 2 is more involved in the moment of an urge that wasn't rationalized first. Yet there is a third way:
3) The telos of happiness that can be rationalized before or after the event is going along with the urge to refrain and thus reasoned as following a diet or even reasoned to simply following the urged refraining. Thus happiness in fulfilling this urge. Also another telos of happiness happens if reason happens, the reasoning it was a refrain or following a diet. And thus the intellect is happy as well to figure this out. The conclusions of rationality fit the event, thus, the epistemology matches the event. Happiness all around.
I'm the third way here. Whether my way in understanding this follows in step with others, I'm not an expert on what others think, so, I don't know.
So do you see why I don't see the difference between a passions, reasoned, and thus teleological happiness position?
Here's Aristotle saying what you are saying about deliberation (rationalizing) being a means. Keep in mind the book I'm taking this from (Aristotle's) states the end is happiness (he defines happiness in various ways that include baseline desires and intellectual desires, as well as, social desires, etc...). I perceive any of these desires originating in the individual and as I commented previously society influences these desires too (an individual in a neighborhood of criminals would be influenced and would be influencing those around him or her differently than a neighborhood of non-criminals). So an eudaemonia position seems to be mirroring yours in a way. I'm trying to see the distinctions, so, let me know if there are any. Taken from book 3; chapter 5; Nicomachean Ethics:
"The end, then, being what we wish for, the means what we deliberate about and choose, actions concerning means must be according to choice and voluntary. Now the exercise of the virtues is concerned with means. Therefore virtue also is in our own power, and so too vice. For where it is in our power to act it is also in our power not to act, and vice versa; so that, if to act, where this is noble, is in our power, not to act, which will be base, will also be in our power, and if not to act, where this is noble, is in our power, to act, which will be base, will also be in our power. Now if it is in our power to do noble or base acts, and likewise in our power not to do them, and this was what being good or bad meant, then it is in our power to be virtuous or vicious."
Anarcho-Mercantilist: First of all, I reject the "means-end dichotomy." The "means-end dichotomy" is merely an axiom. However, this axiom is psychologically unsound. Consequentially, I reject Aristotelian ethics.
See Mises and Rothbard on the difference between psychology and praxeology.
Yours in liberty,Geoffrey Allan Plauché, Ph.D.Adjunct InstructorBuena Vista University
"Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?"(Who watches the watchmen?)-Juvenal, Satires VI.347
See http://mises.org/Community/forums/t/10229.aspx for a critique of constitutive means.
We need less reading and more thinking. -Amorey Gethin What factors determine the feasibility of anarchy?
AJ: See http://mises.org/Community/forums/t/10229.aspx for a critique of constitutive means.
Already found it. I think the critique fails.
I've responded there.
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