Let's suppose there is a real popular PDA. This PDA is only popular because they subvert their investigations that may be detrimental to their reputation to someone else for a price. This person is not associated with the PDA, but a random citizen.
Using Rothbard's equal punishment for PDAs that break property rights, in an investigation to find evidence that would deem someone guilty, but find no corresponding evidence, would other PDA's object to this practice, because it is not effecting the PDA that is breaking the law. Lawsuits would not involve the PDA but the person who did the investigation. Thus it would amount to the PDA not being sued and having higher profits and cheaper services.
Is this a bad idea on part of the PDA to do outsourcing of PI's because it may put them in a blackmail, or would have to pay the investigator after he is released from prison for his services of not blackening the hands of the PDA?
Anyway, how would this sort of practice be prevented? would other PDA's sue for fraud, or would it be more of a smear campaign of the accused PDA to get their customer to leave their services?
Would this type of practice be "illegal" in the full sense of an anarcho-capitalist free market legal code.
Democracy is nothing more than replacing bullets with ballots
If Pro is the opposite of Con. What is the opposite of Progress?
I'm not sure exactly what you're suggesting.
Suppose a PDA gets a criminal complaint. They say "This case is hard! We'll outsource it to X." There is nothing inherently wrong with that.
If X mishandles the case, then the original PDA is still responsible for X's decision, if they choose to enforce it.
If the PDA or X are intentionally mishandling cases to benefit their customers, then they'll be shut down by market competition.
In the present, if the State mishandles a case, then people have no recourse. For example, suppose policemen are accused of inappropriately shooting someone. A judge rules them not guilty. The victim has no further recourse. If a PDA did that, then they would rapidly lose all their customers.
If a policeman engages in misconduct, then both the policeman and the PDA are responsible for making restitution to the victims. If there's a single rogue policeman, then the PDA probably could survive. If it happened too much, then the PDA would lost custoemrs.
"Libel" is not a crime in an anarchist society. You have the right to say "Y is dishonest" and Y has the right to say your accusation is wrong. In the present, libel is sometimes a problem because of the mainstream media monopoly.
Misconduct is only profitable if the PDA has a monopoly. In other words, such misconduct is only possible if there's a State.
I have my own blog at FSK's Guide to Reality. Let me know if you like it.
fsk: If a policeman engages in misconduct, then both the policeman and the PDA are responsible for making restitution to the victims. If there's a single rogue policeman, then the PDA probably could survive. If it happened too much, then the PDA would lost custoemrs.
I meant if the person is not associated with the PDA, but does illegal searches or, as your example, shoots someone by mistake, the blame and fault are with the hired hand, not the PDA. So blame will not fall on the PDA, thus distorting market forces. Except it would probably be cheaper to take a chance then pay massive amounts of hush money.
But if the hush money works, how would one assume that X is working for a PDA and not just a robber. The PDA could offer a risk that X will have to pay back to the victim. It is not going to help the PDA 's customers, but keep a shield from the market forces. I'm sure that the PDA has more money for people to sue for, rather then a street criminal. It is kind of a risk assessment between taking a chance of being sued for millions of dollars, or paying off a criminal to take the blame with a smaller amount than a victim would ask for in restitution. My point is that for a company to do good, it must have a good reputation in the market. If it is always giving victims restitution, people aren't going to think well of that PDA. I'm sure some desperate company would try this, but that is a redundant because the market made them desperate in the first place.
And suppose X signed a contract to do a robbery or search, would the PDA bring that to a market court and say " This man violated his contract by not stealing something, so I want punishment for this liar ". Would they enforce the contract, or intent of robbery, or both?
Let's deal with a concrete example. PDA #1 has customer A. PDA #2 has customer B. PDA #1 hires X to steal from or assassinate B. At this point, when PDA #2 does the investigation, it might uncover the link between X and PDA #1. In that case, PDA #1 would be essentially forced out of business. They would lose their customers *AND* the punitive damages would be huge. Whoever from PDA #1 that hired X would now have a huge outstanding claim against them. At this point, any employees at PDA #1 who weren't involved with the crime would leave for another employer.
Suppose the link between X and PDA #1 is not discovered. In that case, it is treated like any other crime. X would not just owe compensatory damages, but punitive damages like any other convicted criminal.
Suppose X is not caught at all. In that case, PDA #2 isn't doing a very good job.
The bottom line is that punitive damages are always high enough to make dishonest behavior unprofitable. If you're flagrantly dishonest or negligent, the punitive damage award should be huge.
A contract to do something that's obviously a crime isn't enforceable.
It is important to realize that these PDAs are going to be full of individually responsible individuals. Any person who is responsible for such a misdeed, no matter their affiliation, is liable to pay reparations. The PDA is only a convenient way to refer to a few people at the same time, but it is not responsible for anything. Only individuals are responsible.
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