We've had quite a few threads lately that call Natural Rights into question. I stumbled onto this brilliant critique of this skeptical position by Stephan N. Kinsella, which I had read before and forgotten about.
Kinsella: A third rationalist type of rights argument concerns the very nature of rights themselves and shows how any rights-skeptic contradicts himself whenever he denies that rights exist. It is similar to the estoppel approach outlined above, although the discourse under examination need not involve an aggressor. Instead, this argument focuses on rights-skeptics who deny the existence of rights, rather than on actual criminals who object to being punished in particular instances for a given crime. If any right at all exists, it is a right of A to have or do X without B's preventing it; and, therefore, A can legitimately use force against B to enforce the right. A is concerned with the enforceability of his right to X, and this enforceability is all that A requires in order to be secure in his right to X. For a rights-skeptic meaningfully to challenge A's asserted right, the skeptic must challenge the enforceability of the right, instead of merely challenging the existence of the right. Nothing else will do. If the skeptic does not deny that A's proposed enforcement of his purported right is legitimate, then the skeptic has not denied A's right to X, because what it means to have a right is to be able to legitimately enforce it. If the skeptic maintains, then, that A has no right to X, indeed, no rights at all since there are no rights, the skeptic must also maintain that A's enforcement of his purported right to X is not justified. But the problem faced by the skeptic here is that he assumes that enforcement--i.e., the use of force--requires justification. A, however, cares not that the rights-skeptic merely challenges A's use of force against B. The rights-skeptic must do more than express his preference that A not enforce his right against B, for such an expression does not attack the legitimacy of A's enforcing his right against B. The only way for the skeptic meaningfully to challenge A's enforcement action is to acknowlefge that B may use force to prevent A's (illegitimate) enforcement action. And here the rights-skeptic (perversely) undercuts his own position, because by recognizing the legitimacy of B's use of force against A, the rights-skeptic effectively attributes rights to B himself, the right to not have unjustifiable force used against him. In short, for anyone to meaningfully maintain that A has no rights against B on the grounds that no rights exist, he must effectively attribute rights to B so that B may defend himself against A's purportedly unwarranted enforcement action. More common-sensically, this demonstration points out the inconsistency on the part of a rights-skeptic who engages in discourse about the propriety of rights at all. If there are no rights, then there is no such thing as the justifiable or legitimate use of force, but neither is there such a thing as the unjust use of force. But if there is no unjust use of force, what is it, exactly, that a rights-skeptic is concerned about? If individuals delude themselves into thinking that they have natural rights, and, acting on this assumption, go about enforcing these rights as if they are true, the skeptic has no grounds to complain. To the extent the sceptic complains about people enforcing these illusory rights, he begins to attribute rights to those having force used against them. Any rights-skeptic can only shut up, because he contradicts himself the moment he objects to others' acting as if they have rights.
A third rationalist type of rights argument concerns the very nature of rights themselves and shows how any rights-skeptic contradicts himself whenever he denies that rights exist. It is similar to the estoppel approach outlined above, although the discourse under examination need not involve an aggressor. Instead, this argument focuses on rights-skeptics who deny the existence of rights, rather than on actual criminals who object to being punished in particular instances for a given crime.
If any right at all exists, it is a right of A to have or do X without B's preventing it; and, therefore, A can legitimately use force against B to enforce the right. A is concerned with the enforceability of his right to X, and this enforceability is all that A requires in order to be secure in his right to X. For a rights-skeptic meaningfully to challenge A's asserted right, the skeptic must challenge the enforceability of the right, instead of merely challenging the existence of the right. Nothing else will do. If the skeptic does not deny that A's proposed enforcement of his purported right is legitimate, then the skeptic has not denied A's right to X, because what it means to have a right is to be able to legitimately enforce it. If the skeptic maintains, then, that A has no right to X, indeed, no rights at all since there are no rights, the skeptic must also maintain that A's enforcement of his purported right to X is not justified.
But the problem faced by the skeptic here is that he assumes that enforcement--i.e., the use of force--requires justification. A, however, cares not that the rights-skeptic merely challenges A's use of force against B. The rights-skeptic must do more than express his preference that A not enforce his right against B, for such an expression does not attack the legitimacy of A's enforcing his right against B. The only way for the skeptic meaningfully to challenge A's enforcement action is to acknowlefge that B may use force to prevent A's (illegitimate) enforcement action. And here the rights-skeptic (perversely) undercuts his own position, because by recognizing the legitimacy of B's use of force against A, the rights-skeptic effectively attributes rights to B himself, the right to not have unjustifiable force used against him. In short, for anyone to meaningfully maintain that A has no rights against B on the grounds that no rights exist, he must effectively attribute rights to B so that B may defend himself against A's purportedly unwarranted enforcement action.
More common-sensically, this demonstration points out the inconsistency on the part of a rights-skeptic who engages in discourse about the propriety of rights at all. If there are no rights, then there is no such thing as the justifiable or legitimate use of force, but neither is there such a thing as the unjust use of force. But if there is no unjust use of force, what is it, exactly, that a rights-skeptic is concerned about? If individuals delude themselves into thinking that they have natural rights, and, acting on this assumption, go about enforcing these rights as if they are true, the skeptic has no grounds to complain. To the extent the sceptic complains about people enforcing these illusory rights, he begins to attribute rights to those having force used against them. Any rights-skeptic can only shut up, because he contradicts himself the moment he objects to others' acting as if they have rights.
And in hilarious footnote 14
Indeed, another way to respond to a rights-skeptic would be to shoot him. If there are no rights, as he maintains, then he cannot object to being shot. So, presumably, any rights-skeptic would change his position and admit there were rights (if only so as to be able to object to being shot), or we would soon have no more rights-skeptics left alive to give us rights-advocates any trouble.
Stephen:Indeed, another way to respond to a rights-skeptic would be to shoot him. If there are no rights, as he maintains, then he cannot object to being shot. So, presumably, any rights-skeptic would change his position and admit there were rights (if only so as to be able to object to being shot), or we would soon have no more rights-skeptics left alive to give us rights-advocates any trouble.
I still don't see why the rights skeptic can't object simply because he doesn't like being shot.
Stephen:f individuals delude themselves into thinking that they have natural rights, and, acting on this assumption, go about enforcing these rights as if they are true, the skeptic has no grounds to complain.
From the rights skeptic position it's not different from a non religious person (which I believe Stephan is) complaining about Christians/ Muslims/ Jews going around and enforcing their religious law on them. It doesn't need to be anything other than personal preference.
"You don't need a weatherman to know which way the wind blows"
Bob Dylan
GilesStratton:I still don't see why the rights skeptic can't object simply because he doesn't like being shot.
There doesn't need to be. Kinsella's argument is, as I understand it that the rights skeptic can't deny rights because even if he does he can't take issue with people enforcing them. But that by no means implies that the rights skeptic has to have any more reason than that it's annoying.
GilesStratton:There doesn't need to be.
GilesStratton:Kinsella's argument is, as I understand it that the rights skeptic can't deny rights because even if he does he can't take issue with people enforcing them. But that by no means implies that the rights skeptic has to have any more reason than that it's annoying.
Intriguingly, should a bad-tempered rights-skeptic shoot a rights-advocate, the advocate's right to life hardly protects him. While the enforcement of punishment against the skeptic depends entirely on the perception of rights and justice among his peers.How inconvenient for Mr. Kinsella's logical puzzle.
How's that? Kinsella never says that rights are some automatic shield.
Brilliant, Knight. You get it. No offense, Giles_Stratton.
Stephan Kinsella [email protected] www.StephanKinsella.com
Stephen, your signoff tag is "Dumb dumb dumb. I feel like a big fish in a small pond that is the world. -- Stephan Kinsella --"
Is that a quote from me? I love it, but don't remember it. Where'd you get that from?
nskinsella:Where'd you get that from?
Here
We've got Hoppeans. Rothbardians. Misesians. Hayekians. Blockeans.
And now, KinselloritesTM
GilesStratton: There doesn't need to be. Kinsella's argument is, as I understand it that the rights skeptic can't deny rights because even if he does he can't take issue with people enforcing them. But that by no means implies that the rights skeptic has to have any more reason than that it's annoying.
Obviously, "it's annoying" is not a good reason in argumentation, since anyone could simply verbally decree any other proposition to be "annoying." GilesStratton/universalizability FAIL.
Sphairon:How inconvenient for Mr. Kinsella's logical puzzle.
Knight_of_BAAWA:How's that? Kinsella never says that rights are some automatic shield.
Right, but it is still only a logical puzzle.
liberty student: We've got Hoppeans. Rothbardians. Misesians. Hayekians. Blockeans. And now, KinselloritesTM
My dad always told me "Kinsella" meant, in Ireland, "king of the island." But my google-fu indicates it means "unclean head." Woe unto ye, Dirty-Headers!
AE is all about chains of logical reasoning...
In regards to the use of force as to where the justice lies and to who has rights is relative upon the individual or the situation: YOU (the individual) are the right, the justification, and the morality to the extant the individual is capabal or allows himslef to be. Force is just or unjust so long as one lets it be so. This, of course, does not take theological arguments into consideration.
This should read a negative rights-skeptic, and I think this would help clarify the opposition much better. If one is insistint on ignoring consequentialist arguments, perhaps a more teleological "virtue ethics" would probably be a better way to go about the morality business. Rights seem to be one of those curious things that started with the Reformation and are now one of the many things that essentially evolved to Protestant Secularism.
Very interesting points Dr. Kinsella. I believe Wilderness and I have been stating a proto form of this argument on the boards here. If morality [ the code of conduct for humanity, ie. natural rights ] is utterly subjective then what will naturally evolve is merely a world of pseudo 'might makes right'. Say I greet people by punching them in the face. An odd quirk but I walk up to person B and greet them in my face punching manner. If morality is completely subjective then what I just did to them is perhaps wrong to them but right for me. Why must I stop punching people in the face if it pleases me? It quickly becomes a constant battle of me either gaining the ability to punch person B in the face or person B using some form of offensive or defensive coercion against me. The winner of this 'duel' is the individual who has the greater amount or ability of coercion. Thus a form of 'might makes right' assumes.
'Men do not change, they unmask themselves' - Germaine de Stael
nskinsella:Obviously, "it's annoying" is not a good reason in argumentation, since anyone could simply verbally decree any other proposition to be "annoying."
For the rights skeptic this is true, just as certain types of music may be annoying according to their subjective evaluation so might your coercion. In fact, from the perspective of the rights skeptic that's the only valid reason there is disliking certain things. Since rights skepticism should be the initial position and because the burden of proof is on you, I don't think the argument establishes what you want it to.
In fact, it doesn't get you there. You're assuming various forms of property ownership etc. are legitimate from the go.
GilesStratton:In fact, it doesn't get you there. You're assuming various forms of property ownership etc. are legitimate from the go.
Which forms?
Laughing Man:If morality [ the code of conduct for humanity, ie. natural rights ] is utterly subjective then what will naturally evolve is merely a world of pseudo 'might makes right'.
Stephan is using the same sort of argumentation Hoppe does. Performative contradiction.
Your argument is based on a sort of aesthetics.
GilesStratton:For the rights skeptic this is true, just as certain types of music may be annoying according to their subjective evaluation so might your coercion. In fact, from the perspective of the rights skeptic that's the only valid reason there is disliking certain things.
GilesStratton:Since rights skepticism should be the initial position
thanks for the mention LM. I've argued like this here too. I used the inverse of the footnoted Kinsella, and you and I (and others) have used the "might makes right" outcome in various forms when NR is rejected which is piss-poor cause NR is discoverable, logical, and is cognizant of what is beautiful and good.
good article
The problem with Kinsella's argument, as I see it, is that it trades on a conflation of multiple meanings of "rights" and ignores a multitude of possible (albeit ultimately wrong) positions between libertarian rights (universal and absolute prohibition of aggression) and "no libertarian rights = no such thing as an unjust use of force." The claims he makes do not automatically follow from the denial of libertarian rights. It'll take more to show those other positions are wrong than the "neat-and-tidy" arguments Kinsella presents here.
Yours in liberty,Geoffrey Allan Plauché, Ph.D.Adjunct Instructor, Buena Vista UniversityWebmaster, LibertarianStandard.comFounder / Executive Editor, Prometheusreview.com
Geoffrey Allan Plauche:and ignores a multitude of possible (albeit ultimately wrong) positions between libertarian rights (universal and absolute prohibition of aggression) and "no libertarian rights = no such thing as an unjust use of force."
its possibly not helpful to chide someone for not taking time and effort to counter possible counterarguments, whilst admitting that the counterarguments to be countered are ultimately wrong....
Where there is no property there is no justice; a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid
Fools! not to see that what they madly desire would be a calamity to them as no hands but their own could bring
I think he was providing an argument between the two positions, but it undoubtedly didn't construct libertarian rights (rights being principles). It was an argument, but not an analysis. Is that what you tried to say here? Because a person can easily make the point it wasn't an article to develop an analysis of all sides. Merely a straight forward argument/case.
Kinsella starts with the notion of legitimacy (presumably, "objective" rightness or wrongness), then instead of sticking with that word he for some reason switches to justifiable and just/unjust. Now we can only assume he still means objective rightness/wrongness when he says just/unjust. But this clarification does not jive well with his challenge:
Kinsella:But if there is no unjust use of force, what is it, exactly, that a rights-skeptic is concerned about?
Plugging in from above, the reader can scarcely be faulted for interpreting this as, "But if there is no objectively wrong use of force, what is it, exactly, that a rights-skeptic is concerned about?" This is no challenge for anyone who does not accept the notion of objective ethics. Kinsella implicitly assumes objective rightness and wrongness are coherent concepts, when that is precisely the underlying issue.
He again assumes objective rightness and wrongness with his usage of the word object (verb):
Kinsella:If there are no rights, as he maintains, then he cannot object to being shot.
Since when did objecting require the implicit assumption of objective (a priori) right and wrong? For Kinsella's purposes, "object" has to mean something other than merely demanding not to be shot and/or providing reasons why pulling the trigger would have consequences the shooter would probably not desire. For Kinsella's purposes only objections appealing to objective moral truths count as objections, but anyone who rejects the notion of objective moral truth would reject this narrow definition.
In short, Kinsella's critique presupposes the existence of objective or a priori moral truth, which is itself the hardest-to-swallow aspect of natural rights theories. If he wishes to defend natural rights, he would do better to try to defend - or even just clearly define - the underlying concept of objective or a priori ethics he takes as given here.
What factors determine whether a society will be anarchic or statist? Help advance my work: 13fX6FXUxLCNzLDtmHoh7SqSKciD6PETud
nirgrahamUK:its possibly not helpful to chide someone for not taking time and effort to counter possible counterarguments, whilst admitting that the counterarguments to be countered are ultimately wrong....
Yeah, but GAP has a point. Kinsella's argumentation works, as long as some basic premises are already in place. This style of argumentation doesn't prove objective rights, it only proves rights, when both parties agree that some sort of rights exist.
liberty student:Yeah, but GAP has a point. Kinsella's argumentation works, as long as some basic premises are already in place. This style of argumentation doesn't prove objective rights, it only proves rights, when both parties agree that some sort of rights exist.
imo, the root agreement is even more primitive than that both parties agree that some sort of rights exist.
it is that both parties agree that there is an issue to be decided and that this can be done through rational argumentation.
Even if not, unless the parties are consistent in their uncaring about initiating force, i.e. they do not care if others aggress against them, there will be special pleading.
Isn't that something taken simply? I think so. I don't even see the nit-picking otherwise. It's the whole point on why humans are rational in the first place. They have the potential to realize each other and understand. Where I used to work (justice field) it was extremely common for new staff members to think they could try to talk with a resident/criminal that became upset. They tried to be all nicey-nicey, talk to them, and believed that if we only were nice enough to them that they would listen and be good. New staff members always had to have more experienced staff members with them because they could easily get hurt. After working there for awhile everybody - all people without exception - realized you can't simply talk to somebody that is trying to throw punches at you and think talking in a nice calm voice will stop somebody that is illogical and beastly/animalistic. Talk yes. Talk calmly yes. Be nice yes. They all obviously help. But with somebody being illogical be very prepared to defend yourself cause people of that sort easily become usurped by their self-inflicted nolition passions and so being on guard that a fist coming to the face can happen real quick, out of blue.
i don't see anything you said that would disagree with this. I gave practical real-time experiences on what happens when that rational argumentation is avoided.
yeah cause somebody has to win the fist fight for whatever reason - even if it is a vacating of reason. the more beastly one may win to prove the more beastly are winners.
Giles:.I still don't see why the rights skeptic can't object simply because he doesn't like being shot.
nirgrahamuk:imo, the root agreement is even more primitive than that both parties agree that some sort of rights exist. it is that both parties agree that there is an issue to be decided and that this can be done through rational argumentation.
wilderness:i don't see anything you said that would disagree with this.
what is a good example of a point of contention that could form the topic of discussion, the point to be decided, in a rational argument between a rights believer and a rights-sceptic ?
nirgrahamUK: wilderness: I'm all ears. dont hold your breath ;-) but i think it shows that my statement about rational argument was not trivial....
wilderness: I'm all ears.
but i think it shows that my statement about rational argument was not trivial....
not trival at all. it was simple. i like simple. I think wisdom is simple. Like A=A. simple. my son is three now and he completely understands more and more how to resolve issues by talking with us about it or walking away to calm down. sure he has his outbursts still, but he's maturing and discovering it's better to come clean and quickly resolve these issues or else he won't be playing with his toys for a while. Can't take away the toys!
Excellent. You and Baawa.
liberty student: Yeah, but GAP has a point. Kinsella's argumentation works, as long as some basic premises are already in place. This style of argumentation doesn't prove objective rights, it only proves rights, when both parties agree that some sort of rights exist.
Which is enough. How could more be expeced of an argument? Should it appeal even to a criminal determined to harm you? Even the best argument conceivable is not self-executable.
Knight_of_BAAWA:So what? I could dislike your disliking. Now what do you do?
Whatever my subjective preferences dictate, what sort of a question is that?
Knight_of_BAAWA: GilesStratton:Since rights skepticism should be the initial positionJustify that
Are you actually denying that the burden of proof is one the one claiming rights exist.
Geoffrey Allan Plauche: The problem with Kinsella's argument, as I see it, is that it trades on a conflation of multiple meanings of "rights" and ignores a multitude of possible (albeit ultimately wrong) positions between libertarian rights (universal and absolute prohibition of aggression) and "no libertarian rights = no such thing as an unjust use of force." The claims he makes do not automatically follow from the denial of libertarian rights. It'll take more to show those other positions are wrong than the "neat-and-tidy" arguments Kinsella presents here.
I know the philosophers don't like neat and tidy arguments, for it would put them out of business.
My argument was in a suvey article where I summarized various related approaches. In the first part, I summarized Hoppe's argumentation ethics, my own estoppel argument, and a closely related argument about how rights-skepticism is self-refuting. I think this was basically my own argument, but only presented in summary form (which is enough, since it is pretty simple, no offense philosophers). BTW Aristotelean-Randian-Austrian Larry Sechrest liked all 3, as he explained here.
nskinsella:Which is enough. How could more be expeced of an argument?
I agree. I'm actually on your side.
nskinsella:Should it appeal even to a criminal determined to harm you?
No, obviously it should not, although the NR advocates struggle with subjectivity. It's simply EVIL if it doesn't conform to libertarian canon. Which is fine if we're in a cult, but not very satisfying if we're trying to reconcile ethics and epistemology.
nskinsella:Even the best argument conceivable is not self-executable.
@all, pay attention ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^.
liberty student: nskinsella:Which is enough. How could more be expeced of an argument? I agree. I'm actually on your side. nskinsella:Should it appeal even to a criminal determined to harm you? No, obviously it should not, although the NR advocates struggle with subjectivity. It's simply EVIL if it doesn't conform to libertarian canon. Which is fine if we're in a cult, but not very satisfying if we're trying to reconcile ethics and epistemology. nskinsella:Even the best argument conceivable is not self-executable. @all, pay attention ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^.
LS. That's a no-brainier. No struggle from subjectivity from me. I've said many times here before. The object/subject paradigm is simply a trap for those that get caught up trying to fit themselves into such categories. Your acting as if you now figuring something out means everybody is now just figuring it out. No. You just figured it out - I think. But this isn't anything new.
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