

## Religion, Morality, and American Politics\*

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Although historians had long missed the importance of religion in American politics, it has recently become a central topic. My focus will be on the late-nineteenth century, with particular concern for why voting and party affiliation were highly correlated with religious preferences. I will attempt to broaden the standard argument to include not merely denominational preferences but also moral or ethical views.

The ethnocultural model asserts that the deep party loyalty that characterized voters in the nineteenth century was grounded largely — though not exclusively — on religion, or more exactly, the combination of ethnicity and religion.<sup>1</sup> There were three ways in which ethnoreligious factors operated: through group solidarity, religious organization, and modes of moral reasoning.

First, many groups — such as Irish Catholics, northern Methodists, and Swedish Lutherans — formed relatively tight communal identifications, or *Gemeinschaft*. A large portion of routine interaction, such as friendships, business dealings, political conversations, and marriage were typically conducted within the group.<sup>2</sup> In many rural areas, and in some city neighborhoods as well, most or all the inhabitants belonged to the same ethnocultural group. Furthermore, different groups might be rivals or opponents — especially in religious matters. Southern whites and southern blacks, German Catholics and Lutherans, Irish Catholics and Protestants, for example, cordially detested each other, and enhanced their identities by knowledge of their enemies. Immigrant settlements saw the need for mutual solidarity to survive and thrive in the new land. Not surprisingly, such solidarity promoted a common political allegiance. In the competitive marketplace of democratic elections, a united front attracted politicians who would trade favors for votes. The favors might include the recognition of the group in the form of nominations for honorific office, or tangible benefits for a neighborhood, or support for policies that the group particularly favored.

The ethnoreligious environment in which the typical American lived a cen-

\*The original version of this essay was presented at the Eighth Libertarian Scholars Conference, October 1981, in New York City.

tury ago was much more salient than it is today. Certain minority groups today, especially blacks, do resemble nineteenth-century ethnoreligious groups; the intensity of black loyalty to the Democratic party is quite suggestive in this regard. However, Americans today move in such a complex overlap of different groups that religion, in this first sense, is not nearly as important anymore. Historians and political scientists in the first half of the twentieth century, proud of their own cosmopolitan emancipation from the narrow confines of ethnocultural groups, denigrated the desirability of group voting practices. They knew it existed, but saw the particularism of group demands as conflicting with the universalism of good public policy. Intellectuals, especially in the Progressive Era, actively worked for structural reforms that would reduce the importance of both particularistic group voting power and party loyalty. They were quite hostile to ethnocultural factors, and did not study them. The 1960's and 1970's saw a decline in confidence in universalistic Progressive values, and a reaction in celebration of ethnic and racial diversity, which in part accounts for the resurgence of historical interest in our topic.

The second way in which ethnoreligious factors operated was through the explicit mobilization of a religious body, through its ministers, associations, and press, in favor of (or against) definite political goals. The most dramatic case in the nineteenth century involved the Mormons. Less spectacular but more important was the movement within certain bodies in favor of large reforms, especially prohibition of liquor and abolition of slavery. Until recently, cosmopolitan historians avoided analysis of the temperance movement and downplayed the role of religion in antislavery. The central importance of religion is now well established.<sup>3</sup> But it is critical to note that not all religious groups were reformist. All claimed to base their ethics on Christianity, to be sure (excluding the small Jewish groups), but the Christian ethic meant very different things to different bodies. It is the task of a satisfactory historical theory to explain why certain groups were reformist and others not. The ethnocultural model does this and, by linking the reform movements primarily to the Republican party, provides the critical link between religion and voting.

Nearly all the major nineteenth-century denominations — with the important exception of the Southern Baptists — had developed, by 1840 or so, an organizational infrastructure that could be mobilized politically. The ethnocultural model asserts that certain denominations — the pietistic ones — used their structure politically, while others — the liturgical or ritualistic ones — did not. To explain the difference we must explore some old theology and ethics, keeping in mind that certainly theology and perhaps ethics were of much greater salience a century ago than they are today.

The pietistic denominations were those dominated by pietistic members, notably the Methodists, Quakers, (New School) Presbyterians, Disciples, Northern Baptists, Congregationalists, English Lutherans, and Scandinavian Lutherans. The liturgical groups were the Roman Catholics, (Old School) Presbyterians, Episcopalians, and German Lutherans. Some denominations were torn between

pietistic and liturgical forces (e.g., the battle between the Low Church and High Church Episcopalians). The Southern Baptists, although numerically quite important, contained both elements and was organized so loosely at the time that they are quite difficult to analyze.

The pietists, although of diverse historical heritages, had converged in the early-nineteenth century toward certain distinct theological and moral principles. Probably their most basic unity was the conviction that religious salvation depended upon a deeply personal internal feeling of the presence of Christ within the soul. The pietists rejected predestination and held instead to Arminianism — the idea that all men can be saved by a direct confrontation with Christ (*not* the church) through a conversion experience. In the first half of the century, the revival was the chief means to conversion. Employing revival techniques with phenomenal success, the pietists succeeded in transforming America from a largely de-Christianized society in 1790 (less than 10% church members) to a largely Christianized society by 1890 (more than 70% church members).<sup>4</sup> After mid-century, the revivals grew less important, as the main task became the retention of children of church members. Hence the importance of Sunday schools, YMCA's, and youth groups like Christian Endeavor. (Foreign mission work also became important.)

“Pietism” is not merely a convenient and suggestive term, it also is rooted in European religious history.<sup>5</sup> (The American pietists usually called themselves “evangelicals.”) The Pietistic movement in Germany in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was a reaction against the liturgicalism of the established Lutheran and Reformed churches. In the early-nineteenth century Pietism took control of the German churches, and many of the dissenters fled to America (hence the origin of the Missouri Synod Lutherans). In Scandinavia Pietism was opposed by the established church, and the dissenters came to America (e.g., the Augustana Swedes and Haugean Danes). Although forms of pietism were important in the English Reformation, the established church was liturgical. Some dissenters fled (Puritans, Pilgrims), and those remaining (Congregationalists, Quakers, etc.) were a small, albeit active minority in England.

The Puritans and Baptists who came to America were Calvinists, not Arminians. In New England the Congregationalists were transformed in a pietistic direction by the First and Second Great Awakenings. The revivals of Charles Finney and Lyman Beecher and the child-nurture teachings of Horace Bushnell transformed the descendants of the Puritans into pietists. (Beecher was a Presbyterian; his denomination split on the issue, while the Calvinists, led by Princeton theologians, moved in a liturgical direction).

The Methodists, a pietistic faction within the Church of England strongly influenced by German Pietism, were superbly organized to exploit the revival technique in America, becoming the largest and most politically active denomination by the time of the Civil War.

The liturgicals, although quite diverse, had a very different theological outlook. Salvation came through strict adherence to the Church, through its sacra-

ments or its creeds. Spontaneous inner religiosity was dangerous unless properly controlled by priests or theologians. For most liturgicals, certain prescribed rituals were essential (e.g., the Mass and baptism by immersion; compare Orthodox Judaism). Likewise most were hierarchical and authoritarian, so that false doctrine and heresy could be crushed. As opposed to the universalistic Arminianism of the pietists, the liturgicals were particularistic. Only certain souls would be saved, and salvation outside the "true faith" was unlikely or impossible. Heresy, pride and insubordination were the cardinal sins for the liturgicals, hence they devoted themselves to theological scholasticism, heresy trials, and the establishment of parochial schools where their youth would be exposed only to the truth.

The pietists were the aggressive group because of their universalism. Not only could everyone be saved, but they should be. Impediments to salvation in the human environment were morally evil, so it was the duty of every good pietistic Christian to remove them. By the late 1830's the chief evils had been identified as ignorance (hence a crusade for free public schools and, later, compulsory education), intemperance (hence prohibition), and slavery (hence abolitionism). The moral reasoning of the pietist was based upon two deep inner feelings generated by the conversion experience: guilt and achievement. The revivals worked because the preachers successfully infused the listener with a deep sense of guilt over his sins, and anxiety about his terrible fate, and then removed the guilt and anxiety by the joyful experience of conversion to the faith that Christ had reached out and saved a sinner. The modern era is often called an age of anxiety because of the peculiar deep emotional stress faced by individuals. The revivalists identified this anxiety, intensified it, and provided an immediate solution, together with a permanent support network of coreligionists.<sup>7</sup> The achievement of salvation was not just momentary, like some mystical or psychedelic experience; it involved a rebirth, a new life of holiness, continuous self-examination, Bible reading, and the duty to help others to achieve their salvation.

The sense of achievement associated with conversion mandated constant introspection, heightened the sense of anxiety about future individual guilt, and alerted the person to the reality of social evils. It may also have produced a sense of collective guilt for social evil. The sense of achievement carried over into the secular realm, giving a modern, achievement-oriented, future-directed personality to the pietists, while the liturgicals and the unchurched retained traditionalistic, fatalistic personalities. Max Weber came close to this analysis in describing the "Protestant Ethic."<sup>8</sup> For the political historian the critical aspect of pietism is its impact on the public arena. The inner logic of pietism forced it to expand: its "manifest destiny" was to Christianize the entire world, beginning with the country at hand. Much of what the rest of the globe considers distinctively "American" can be traced to this impulse — yet not all; Andrew Jackson and his legions had an equally aggressive policy, but it was directed at foreigners.<sup>9</sup> Some pietist efforts, such as the school crusade, did not encounter articulate, organized or effective opposition; opposition was in the form of passive resistance. The temperance crusade encountered passive resistance at first; only in the mid-

1850's, when the dries began to pass tough laws (e. g., the Maine Law) did serious opposition form, align itself with the Democratic party, and start winning.

The slavery question was much more complex and, as was obvious to all at the time, was a truly dangerous issue. The ideological, philosophical and religious sensibilities of the early-nineteenth century all pointed to the evil of slavery; by the 1840's there was scarcely a literate person in the North (or in Europe) willing to call slavery a good thing; most called it evil. The pietists, or at least their leading edge, went one step further and proclaimed the act of slave ownership itself to be a sin, despite the reasonably clear Biblical sanction for the practice.<sup>10</sup> The Methodist denomination split North and South in 1844 on the question of allowing a bishop to own slaves, and the Baptists split the same year on the matter of missionaries owning slaves.

Southern pietists rejected the lewd Yankee suggestions that slavery was conducive to sexual immorality. Even more troubling was the argument that the ownership of one person by another blocked the progress of individual salvation and self-development. Eventually the Southern pietists decided that slavery was not a sin and was, in fact, tolerable in this evil world, for the self-development of the blacks was more feasible under the tutelage of Christian slavemasters than under pagan conditions in Africa. The historian must stress that as late as the eve of the Civil War pietistic religion did *not* dominate the South. Indeed, Christians there considered themselves a beleaguered minority.<sup>11</sup> The political-cultural dominance of the pietists came after the war, and in part as a result of battlefield revivals.

The moral reasoning and social ethics of the liturgicals was quite different.<sup>12</sup> They were much more particularistic, and the extended kin group or the church congregation was the center of their concern. Group ethical standards were maintained by manifestations of honor and shame, as opposed to achievement and guilt. Excommunication was the most dreaded penalty, while the love and acclaim of the group was the highest earthly reward (the liturgical churches also guaranteed eternal rewards for everyone who followed their codes.) Proper moral behavior was what pleased God — and the liturgicals *knew* what God wanted, for He had codified it through the teachings of their church. Right behavior, and, ultimately, salvation depended upon following the rules exactly. The inner spirit which the pietists listened to, the liturgicals explained, was a dangerous source of trouble, particularly for individualists with a great deal of pride. Traditionalistic child-rearing practices focused on overcoming pride, breaking the defiant will, and making the child submissive to God, that is, obedient to the rules set down by parents and other authorities. Nothing alarmed pietists more than the Catholic dogma that priests could absolve sinners of their guilt through the sacrament of penance. This meant that a hierarchy was superior to the individual conscience. Catholicism itself was not immune to the individualistic American ethos, and Catholic temperance and revival movements flourished briefly. For the most part, however, the Catholics channeled individual energies into church building, and overcame anxiety by the creation of an elaborate structure of new rituals focused

around Mary and the Eucharist and inculcated through a separate parochial school system and very active local parishes. The High Church Episcopalians, beating back the Low Church challenge, likewise fostered rituals and ceremony, as well as gothic architecture. If inner piety resulted from the performances of rituals, so much the better, but while anxiety would be relieved, the sense of guilt and achievement was neither sought, nor desired, nor likely.

In non-Catholic high church philosophy, especially the "Princeton theology" that controlled about half the Presbyterian denomination, heavy use was made of the concept of conscience as developed by the eighteenth-century Scottish moralists, including Adam Smith. Conscience was real and reflected the will of God, Princeton said, but following Smith, it also noted that the consensus of the community which approved or disapproved specific conduct was superior to the unaided conclusions of the individual conscience. In other words, this ethics was other-directed and based heavily on honor and shame.<sup>13</sup>

For all the liturgicals, morality was a matter for religion, especially the religious group, and not for the state. The question of imposing their own moral codes through civil laws did not arise, for they were sufficiently powerful nowhere in American politics. The "moral majority" approach is not advantageous to moral minorities. On specific ethical questions, the liturgicals did not hold liquor or slavery to be intrinsically immoral. But they did feel it was wrong for the state to impose a moral standard at variance from their own, and they refused to support politicians who proposed to do so.

Going deeper than theological distinctions between pietists and liturgicals were their different modes of moral reasoning. The pietistic ethic was teleological, that is goal-directed. Moral behavior consisted in the search for goodness, for both the individual and the community. Several intellectual trends came together to forge this ethic. The pietistic religious eschatology (or doctrine of last things) was "post-millennial" — that is, they believed that Christ's second coming would take place after a thousand-year millennium of peace and goodness had descended upon earth. It was the duty of the Christian to evangelize and proselytize, so as to achieve this millennium, beginning immediately. (In a related demand the abolitionists called for the immediate ending of slavery.) German idealist philosophy and theology was a second, major contribution to the ethic. The idealists — Kant, Fichte, Hegel, and, especially, Schleiermacher — influenced American thought directly through the Transcendentalist movement (e.g., R. W. Emerson and H. D. Thoreau), and through theological seminaries late in the century.<sup>14</sup> Idealist ethics stressed the full development and expression of the talents latent in the individual personally. This idealism can be seen in the new emphasis on child-rearing (especially in Horace Bushnell), which stressed encouragement and development of the child's potential in sharp contrast to the older Calvinist emphasis on absolute control over sinful will.<sup>15</sup> The idealist philosophy, with its promise of achievement, emboldened the pietists to the confidence that they could indeed change the world. Finally, in a trend closely related to idealism, romanticism, the focus of religious behavior was placed on

feeling. Searching for God within one's own soul, as Schleiermacher, Coleridge and Emerson taught, helped the pietist realize that his or her values were truly godly, and that obstacles to those values were sinful.

The moral reasoning of the liturgicals pointed in quite another direction. Few if any were post-millenarians, hence they lacked confidence that the world could be transformed. Most held that the world was inherently evil and dangerous and that the best true Christians could do was to band together, avoid contact with non-believers, and seek salvation within the true faith. Protestants in the South fit this pattern, and were therefore much more reluctant to support any sort of reform, particularly if it meant close association with the ungodly.<sup>16</sup> The German Lutherans, likewise, had a dark and gloomy view of society about them.

Pre-millennialism played an important role beginning in the middle-nineteenth century.<sup>17</sup> Believers felt that Christ's Second Coming would come any hour. Some sects (the Seventh Day Adventists, Nazarenes, Holiness sects, and Jehovah's Witnesses) were organized around this belief, and withdrew completely from social or political activity. A large group of pietists became converted to pre-millennialism in the late-nineteenth century through the revival activities of Dwight Moody, Billy Sunday, and the "dispensationalist" preachers. They emphasized the literal interpretation of the Bible and, adopting Princeton's Presbyterian theology, emerged as the "fundamentalist" movement in the early-twentieth century. The fundamentalists rejected social activism, and, apart from the Scopes episode in the 1920's, avoided politics. However, reborn fundamentalist Christians suddenly emerged as a political force in the 1970's under the aegis of the "Moral Majority" and kindred groups. (The Ku Klux Klan movement of the 1920's was certainly political, but it was rooted more in mainline pietistic groups than in the fundamentalist movement.)

The moral reasoning of the liturgicals, in contrast to the teleology of the pietists, was rule-oriented, or "deontological." Moral conduct consisted not in pursuit of some good, but rather in close adherence to specific rules of conduct. The rules reflected God's will, and were authoritatively articulated through The Church. The Catholics were the most explicitly deontological, but the Protestant liturgicals were also affected. Indeed, before the impact of idealism became felt, all the colleges in eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century America strongly emphasized courses in morality, with textbooks based on the rule-oriented Scottish "common sense" school of philosophy (John Locke, Shaftsbury, Thomas Reid, Adam Smith).<sup>18</sup> In secular terms, deontological ethics was expressed in a devotion to the letter of the law, especially to the Constitution. The contrasting modes of moral reasoning were expressed directly in politics. Andrew Jackson and his allies, building on the strict Constitutionalism of the Jeffersonians and the "Old Republicans," created a Democratic party committed to a structure of rules in which individuals would be free to act as they chose. Early libertarians like William Leggett were staunch Democrats, and held that, once the proper rules — usually of a *laissez faire* type — were laid out, individuals would create their own little best worlds as they saw fit.<sup>19</sup> Down to the New Deal, Democrats were

committed to strict Constitutionalism. In reaction against Franklin Roosevelt's loose interpretation and efforts to pack the Supreme Court, many traditional Democrats, typified by Al Smith, broke away.

The Whigs, by contrast, were a teleological party. They had visions of a good society and believed it was the duty of the government to help build it. Their major concern was with economic modernization, and, in view of the underdeveloped economy, it was government's task to establish a national bank, encourage industry through protective tariffs, and provide money for such internal improvements as roads, canals, railroads and port facilities. The Whigs also promoted moral reforms, notably in the arena of public schools and asylums.<sup>20</sup>

The Republican party continued the teleological search for a good society, and, in its early days, added the fervor of post-millennialists. The Civil War would not only crush disunion, it would forever eliminate the evil of slavery, and, in the process, enable the party to push for rapid economic modernization. As Lincoln's Gettysburg Address shows, the Republicans had a deep vision of a great society in the new world that would be a beacon to the old world as well. The old rules hardly mattered, as constitutional quibbles fell away in the face of marching armies.<sup>21</sup>

The approach to political history through the analysis of modes of moral reasoning permits a broadening of the ethnocultural model. The religious alignments of the nineteenth century can be predicted on the basis of theology and, especially, ethics. The fraction of Americans who were not connected with churches — from one-third to one-fourth of the electorate in the second half of the century — may have aligned themselves according to their ethical principles. As for those hedonistic individuals who did not have ethical standards reaching beyond their kinfolk, little can be said, although there is some evidence they were inclined to be Democrats. The distinction between teleological-Republican and deontological-Democratic can also incorporate libertarians and free-thinkers. Indeed, it is possible to generalize further, by identifying teleological ethics and pietism with a "modern" personality, and deontological ethics and liturgicalism with traditionalism. This explains why traditionistic immigrant groups, like European peasants and southern blacks who crowded into northern cities in the 1900's and 1950's automatically aligned themselves with the traditionalistic party, the Democrats.

In the twentieth century the connections between religion and politics weakened greatly. Pietists in mainline denominations dropped their post-millennial dreams, and concentrated on building happier lives for themselves and their families. Ministers assumed a pastoral rather than prophetic role, attempting primarily to provide psychological uplift and comfort to their parishioners. The minor sects and the fundamentalists, while maintaining a revivalist style, became liturgical in the sense of emphasis on rituals (the revival itself), and on theological orthodoxy. In recent years major groups like the Missouri Synod and the Southern Baptists have poured their energies into defining a rigid orthodoxy based on the infallibility of the Bible. The new evangelicals have been proselytizing vigorous-



ly, but have avoided politics save where they feel the laws of the land have been altered to incorporate false rules of morality.<sup>23</sup> Hence the "Moral Majority" type of movement can be seen as a negative effort to block or reverse constitutional changes (ERA, pornography, abortion), rather than as a positive movement to build a good society through government action. The Catholic Church, notably in the era of Pope John XXIII, has modernized itself by eliminating traditional rituals and beliefs. The conflict between Papal resistance to birth control and actual practice reveals that most Catholics reject rigid deontological ethics in favor of idealistic norms of personal fulfillment. While radical Catholics in Latin America have adopted post-millennial social goals — "liberation theology" — the parallel movement among American Catholics remains quite weak except on college campuses.<sup>24</sup>

The major theological innovation in this century, as far as politics is concerned, was the rise of the Social Gospel among mainline northern pietists and, to a lesser extent, among Catholics.<sup>25</sup> The origins can be traced to the German theologian Albrecht Ritschl, who rejected the inner search for salvation in favor of a communal search, and to the American Baptist-socialist Walter Rauschenbusch. The national leadership of major Protestant bodies adopted the principles of the Social Gospel early in the twentieth century (at a time when southern Methodists, Baptists and Presbyterians who did not agree with the new theology, had denominations separate from their northern counterparts). The Federal Council of Churches (now the National Council), together with denominational commissions, vigorously promulgated the idea that the Kingdom of God can be built on earth by destroying social evils (militarism, poverty, the sins of capitalism, racism). Collective guilt on the part of those who foster or tolerate such evils is a main theme of the present-day Social Gospel. However, the great majority of the members of the mainline denominations have resisted this new theology, opening a wide chasm between the leadership and the rank-and-file. One result of this tension has been a sharp decline in membership in the liberal churches.<sup>26</sup>

The clerical leadership has had more influence as a direct lobby on government. Early in the century, the Progressive wing of the G.O.P., led by Theodore Roosevelt, accepted the Social Gospel as a guide to government policy. Eventually the conservatives drove out this wing of the G.O.P., but it continues to flourish among liberal Democrats. Theology perhaps plays less a role than the fact that traditionalists form the core of the Democratic party. Inspired by Franklin Roosevelt, the liberal democrats made their highest goal the protection of traditional groups who are most marginal to the modern economy — the poor, blacks, recent immigrants, and employed women. The Republicans, by stressing the central importance of strengthening the modern aspects of the economy with pro-business, low tax, low spending policies, retain a teleological goal for government, albeit quite different in content from the liberals.<sup>27</sup> The libertarian movement, in contrast to both major parties, stresses a deontological, rights- and rules-oriented, *laissez faire* system within which individuals, but not society as a whole, can shape their goals.<sup>28</sup>

The religious polarities that shaped American politics in the nineteenth century have largely faded. True, the process whereby youth "inherit" parental politics as well as parental religion still produces a correlation between religion and politics. Catholics report Democratic affiliation more often than Protestants, but the actual voting differentials have almost disappeared.<sup>29</sup> However, one of the deep forces of religion, the ethical sense or mode of moral reasoning, still operates to distinguish teleological from deontological approaches to political judgment. In the teleological camp we find both conservative Republicans and liberal democrats — seeking different goals for society, to be sure, but both committed to creating a good society. In the deontological camp we find fundamentalist and evangelical groups, whose pre-millenarian beliefs block the search for social goals, but who oppose the constitutional imposition of rules they find unacceptable, and also the libertarians who demand a reformulation of the rules of society in order to maximize individual options.<sup>30</sup>

## NOTES

1. See Paul Kleppner, *The Cross of Culture: A Social Analysis of Midwestern Politics, 1850–1900* (New York: Free Press, 1970); Richard Jensen, *The Winning of the Midwest: Social and Political Conflict, 1888–1896* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971); and, especially, Kleppner, *The Third Electoral System, 1853–1892: Parties, Voters and Political Cultures* (Chapel Hill, N. C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1979).
2. Jay P. Dolan, *The Immigrant Church: New York's Irish and German Catholics, 1815–1865* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975); and Andrew M. Greeley, *The American Catholic: A Social Portrait* (New York: Basic Books, 1977), chap. 11. For an ethnic approach to political history that minimizes the role of religion, theology, and ethics, see Robert Kelley, *The Cultural Patterns in American Politics: The First Century* (New York: Knopf, 1979).
3. Sidney E. Ahlstrom, *A Religious History of the American People* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972) is the best and most convenient guide to the theological and structural history — but not the social history. For that, see Martin E. Marty, *A Righteous Empire* (New York: Harper, 1970); and James Hennessey, *American Catholics: A History of the Roman Catholic Community in the United States* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981.)
4. Kleppner, *Third Electoral System*, pp. 203–207.
5. Kenneth Scott Latourette, *Christianity in a Revolutionary Age*, vols. 1 and 2 (New York: Harper, 1958, 1959), provides encyclopedic coverage of European religious history.
6. The literature is vast; a good starting point is John L. Thomas, "Romantic Reform in America, 1815–1865," *American Quarterly* 17 (1965): 65–81; also Norman H. Clark, *Deliver Us From Evil: An Interpretation of American Prohibition* (New York: Norton, 1976).
7. Fascinating insight into the conversion process comes from the hymns, which played a central role. See Sandra S. Sizer, *Gospel Hymns and Social Religion: The Rhetoric of Nineteenth-Century Revivalism* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978).
8. See my *Illinois: A Bicentennial History* (New York: Norton, 1978).
9. A brilliant treatment, complete with discussion of the teleological thrust of the Whigs, is Major L. Wilson, *Space, Time and Freedom: The Quest for Nationality and the Irrepressible Conflict, 1815–1861* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1974); and his essay, "The Concept of Time and the Political Dialogue in the United States, 1828–1848," *American Quarterly* 19 (1967): 619–44. See also Daniel Walker Howe, *The Political Culture of the American Whigs* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979).
10. For a narrative history, see Louis Filler, *The Crusade Against Slavery: 1830–1860* (New York: Harper, 1960). For recent interpretations, see Ronald G. Walters, *The Antislavery Appeal: American Abolitionism after 1830* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976); and Lewis

- Perry and Michael Fellman, eds., *Antislavery Reconsidered* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1979).
11. Donald G. Mathews, *Religion in the Old South* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), chaps. 4 and 6; Ann Loveland, *Southern Evangelicals and the Social Order: 1800–1860* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1980).
  12. No history of morality exists. Highly suggestive is Ernst Troeltsch, *The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches* (1911; New York: Harper, 1931); also see Karl Barth, *Protestant Thought in the Nineteenth Century: Its Background and History* (Valley Forge, Penna.: Judson, 1973). On southern morality, see Betram Wyatt-Brown, *Southern Honor: Ethics and Behavior in the Old South* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982). On college teaching, see Wilson Smith, *Professors and Public Ethics: Studies of Northern Moral Philosophers Before the Civil War* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1956); and D. G. Meyer, *The Instructed Conscience: The Shaping of the American National Ethic* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1972). On religious ethics, see the books by Dolan, Greeley, Marty, Walters, Mathews and Loveland cited above. For a fascinating Freudian approach, see James Gilligan, "Beyond Morality: Psychoanalytic Reflections on Shame, Guilt and Love," in Thomas Likona, ed., *Moral Development and Behavior* (New York: Harper, 1976), pp. 144–58.
  13. Meyer, *Instructed Conscience*; also Guy W. Stroh, *American Ethical Thought* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979).
  14. See Claude Welch, *Protestant Thought in the Nineteenth Century* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972).
  15. See, for example, Lloyd deMause, ed., *The History of Childhood* (New York: Harper, 1974); and Dickson J. Bruce, *Violence and Culture in the Antebellum South* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979), chap. 2.
  16. See Bruce, *Violence and Culture*; and Loveland, *Southern Evangelicals*.
  17. Ernest R. Sandeen, *The Roots of Fundamentalism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970); and for a somewhat different emphasis, George M. Marsden, *Fundamentalism and American Culture: The Shaping of Twentieth-Century Evangelicalism, 1870–1925* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980).
  18. Meyer, *Instructed Conscience*. On ethnoreligious differences in rule orientations, see Greeley, *American Catholic*, pp. 196–98; for denominational differences, see David Schuller *et al.*, eds., *Ministry in America* (New York: Harper, 1980).
  19. Marvin Meyers, *The Jacksonian Persuasion: Politics and Belief* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957), esp. chap. 2 on Jackson and chap. 9 on Leggett.
  20. See the items in note 9, and also Lee Benson, *The Concept of Jacksonian Democracy: New York as a Test Case* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961).
  21. Leonard P. Curry, *Blueprint for Modern America: Nonmilitary Legislation of the First Civil War Congress* (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1968); Morton Keller, *Affairs of State: Public Life in Late Nineteenth Century America* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), chap. 4.
  22. Benson, *Jacksonian Democracy*; Bruce Laurie, *Working People of Philadelphia: 1800–1850* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1980), chap. 3, esp. p. 66; Jensen, *Winning of the Midwest*, p. 311; Melvyn Hammarberg, *The Indiana Voter: The Historical Dynamics of Party Allegiance During the 1870's* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), pp. 113–14.
  23. See Richard Quebedeaux, *The Worldly Evangelists* (New York: Harper, 1978), esp. p. 87; and Harold Lindsell, *The Bible in Balance* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 1979), chaps. 3, 4, and 6.
  24. Greeley, *American Catholic*; Greeley *et al.*, *Catholic Schools in a Declining Church* (Kansas City: Sheed and Ward, 1976); and Edward Wakin and Joseph Scheuer, *The De-Romanization of the American Catholic Church* (New York: Harper, 1970).
  25. Charles H. Hopkins, *The Rise of the Social Gospel in American Protestantism, 1865–1915* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940); and Kenneth Cauthen, *The Impact of American Religious Liberalism* (New York: Harper, 1962).
  26. Jeffrey K. Hadden (*The Gathering Storm in the Churches* [Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1969]) spotted the trend; Schuller *et al.*, (*Ministry in America*) confirms it.
  27. Theodore J. Lowi, *The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States* (New York: Norton, 1979); Otis L. Graham, *Toward a Planned Society: From Roosevelt to Nixon* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976).

28. Murray Rothbard, *For a New Liberty: The Libertarian Manifesto* (New York: Macmillan, 1978); Friedrich Hayek, *The Constitution of Liberty* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960); and Gottfried Dietze, "Hayek on the Rule of Law," in Fritz Machlup, ed., *Essays on Hayek* (New York: New York University Press, 1976), pp. 107-46; and, especially, Hayek, *The Mirage of Social Justice* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), vol. 2 of his *Law, Legislation and Liberty*.
29. Norman H. Nie *et al.*, *The Changing American Voter* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), pp. 229-32, 258-60; Greeley, *American Catholic*, chap. 5; and David Knoke, *Change and Continuity in America Politics: The Social Basis of Political Parties* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976).
30. See J. Roland Pennock, *Democratic Political Theory* (Princeton: University Press, 1979), chap. 5; and Richard E. Flatham, *The Practice of Political Authority: Authority and the Authorities* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).