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Anti-War Heroes

Tags Media and CultureU.S. HistoryWar and Foreign PolicyCalculation and KnowledgePhilosophy and MethodologyPolitical Theory

02/10/2000Joseph R. Stromberg

I. Introduction: Why Praise Unfamous Men? 

My title raises the question of why we take an interest in individuals of whom few have ever heard. One reason is that the victors write the history--both of domestic politics and foreign policy. Their Court historians seldom dwell on those who opposed intervention and war, if only because such historians are themselves interventionists. The proposition that "war is the health of the state" does not faze these gentlemen, since they are generally statists. They can dismiss critics as narrow nationalists, xenophobes, or sentimental pacifists. To learn very much about the critics, we must do the research ourselves. 

We look at these unsung heroes and their arguments to find facts and judgments missing from the official record.This helps us situate ourselves within a "tradition" of sorts, see who our predecessors are, and perhaps learn from their successes and failures. Such work is thus part of "revisionist" history, broadly speaking. 

There are continuity and discontinuity in the anti-war tradition. Unhappily, no one thought-–two centuries ago--to set up a Sedition Trust like that in Paul Wilson’s novel,1 or even a George Washington's Farewell Address Society, to provide continued intellectual leadership for the cause. 

Reconstructing the line of descent, we find that opposition to war often transcends temporary categories of left and right. We find that individuals shift positions from war to war. Charles Beard, for example, supported Wilson’s crusade, and after assessing that war’s unintended consequences, became a firm opponent of the next big crusade offered to the American people. Some Old Rightists who had opposed entry into World War II signed on for the Cold War, while other Americans who had supported World War II opposed the Cold War. Some, like the New York Times, support all the wars, only abandoning one if it goes badly. Rare are they who oppose all the wars available in their lifetime. 


II. The Task of Revisionist History 

Sometimes the continuities are striking, like the genealogy of ideas on imperialism noted by Professor Ralph Raico, which ran from Cobden and Bright to Hobson to Lenin.2 This sequence, in which sound laissez faire liberal ideas underwent progressively damaging reinterpretation, is exactly paralleled in the history of social thought, a matter with which Dr. Raico has also dealt.3 Knowing these linkages, we are better fitted to criticize faulty theories of empire, doctrines of state omnicompetence, and so forth. 

Dr. Raico "interrogates his sources" about a whole range of historical questions. His treatment of US entry into World War I and his unconventional contribution to Churchill studies, both available in the collection, The Costs of War,4 exemplify the practice of history as such, which, properly done, always revises an existing faulty record. Studying unheralded war critics provides us with useful ideas and material with which to fulfil the promise of a critical, realistic history. 

What ideological continuity we meet with, from one generation of war critics to the next, rests on shared traditions like classical liberalism and republicanism, along with a revulsion to war arising, one might think, from mere common sense. 


III. The ‘Old Republicans’ On Empire 

I begin with a South Carolinian, William Waters Boyce, who served in both the US and Confederate Congresses. In both Houses, Boyce’s chief concern was preserving republican liberty against centralized and arbitrary government. The domestic consequences of imperial foreign policy loomed large in his view of things. 

Speaking in January 1855 of the proposed annexation of Cuba--that hardy perennial--Boyce said, "We are now in the position of Russia, with all her advantages; we are the Russia of the western continent; we have a vast territory; we are compact and invulnerable, defiant of the world in arms. Shall we weaken our position by the acquisition of maritime colonies?" He thought not. To keep Cuba we would need a larger navy and the taxpayers were already burdened enough. Boyce’s reservations apply with even more force to US seizure of the Philippines in 1898. Cuba, at least, was nearby. 

The larger question raised by Cuban annexation was empire. Boyce put it thus: "We may extend our dominion over the whole continent, our navies may ride triumphant on every sea, our name may be the terror of Kings, our decrees the destinies of nations, but be assured it will be at the price of our free institutions. I know not how it may be with others, but for my own part, I would not pay this price for all the power and all the glory that ever clustered around all the banners and all the eagles emblazoned in the pantheon of history."5

Boyce sketched out a vision for America: "Let us turn from the line of vulgar conquerors to the fathers of the Republic; let us learn from them, that the truest patriotism is the preservation of our institutions, the truest wisdom is moderation. In short, let our history be not the history of our imagination, but the history of our common sense. By this course we may not vaunt so many statues, so many triumphal arches, so many trophies of victory, and boundless dominion, but we shall have what is more glorious than these, we shall have our institutions preserved; we shall have the conquests of peace; the mighty march of civilization; Christianity working out, unimpeded, her Divine mission; these will be our statues; these our triumphal arches; these the trophies of our victories; and they will be such as no nation before us have ever had."6

Boyce’s second--Confederate--Congressional career found him a staunch critic of Jefferson Davis and other centralists in Richmond.7 With Vice President Alexander H. Stephens, Linton Stephens, Governor Joe Brown of Georgia, and Governor Zebulon Vance of North Carolina, Boyce was part of a Confederate opposition whose position, at times, approached "revolutionary defeatism." They thought it better--come to that--to lose the war than to lose republican liberties to a new despotism in Richmond. 

The postwar works of Jefferson Davis, Albert Taylor Bledsoe, former Confederate Vice President Alexander H. Stephens, and others raised the question of empire in the 18th-century sense. American republican thinkers used the term "empire" to refer to large, consolidated states wielding irresponsible power. This understanding ran all through the ratification debates of 1787. This is how Stephens, probably the last great American republican theorist, saw things: "there is no difference between Consolidation and Empire; no difference between Centralism and Imperialism. The consummation of either must necessarily end in the overthrow of Liberty and the establishment of Despotism. To speak of any Rights as belonging to the States, without the innate and inalienable Sovereign power to maintain them, is but to deal in the shadow of language without the substance. Nominal Rights without Securities are but Mockeries!"8 This is sound republican doctrine. 


IV. Critics of the Splendid Little War and Insular Imperialism 

The Spanish-American War of 1898 raised fundamental issues for classical liberals and republicans. A few Southerners drew the parallel between the suppression of Philippine independence and their own struggle three decades earlier. Senator James H. Berry of Arkansas said that if "the doctrine that ‘all just powers of government are derived from the consent of the governed’ was true in 1861, it is true in 1898." Senator Edward W. Carmack of Tennessee held that if American rule in the Philippines was "not ten thousand times better" than carpetbag rule in the South, "may the Lord God have mercy upon the Philippine Islands."9 Tom Watson, the rough-and-tumble Georgia "Jeffersonian" populist, stated: "Republics cannot go into the conquering business and remain republics. Militarism leads to military domination, military despotism."10 

It took a bloody counter-insurgency war to make good US claims to the Philippines. Reports of atrocities committed during the "Philippine Insurrection" brought into being the American Anti-Imperialist League, based in Boston. Ideologically, the antis were classical liberals who believed in free-markets and constitutional republicanism. They opposed using government to secure foreign markets and espoused the right of all peoples to self-government. 

Lenin called them "the last of the Mohicans of bourgeois democracy"--a title they certainly earned. Many had taken part in the antislavery campaign and other 19th-century liberal causes. Prominent members included George S. Boutwell, former Treasury Secretary, industrialist Andrew Carnegie, textile manufacturer Edward F. Atkinson, former Ohio Senator Carl Schurz, author Mark Twain, and philosopher William James. The upper class character of the League may have prevented it from building a mass-based anti-imperialist movement. 

In Our New Departure (1901), Moorfield Storey expressed the views of the antis: "The citizen of Porto Rico today has no American citizenship, no constitutional rights, no representation in the legislature which imposes the important taxes that he pays, no voice in the selection of his executive or judicial officers, no effective voice in his own legislature. He is governed by a foreign nation under law which he had no part whatever in framing, and the Republican party offers the island no hope either of independence or of statehood. This is government without the consent of the governed. This is what is meant by ‘imperialism.’" 

With respect to the Philippines, he wrote: "To impose our sway upon them against their will, to conquer a nation of Asiatics by fire and sword, was the abandonment of every principle for which this country had stood. It was 'criminal aggression.' The American people were not consulted regarding this momentous change of national policy, nor was Congress, nor were the people of the Philippines. 'It was one man, and that man the President,' who insisted upon taking the Philippine Islands against the will of their people, and who, to do it, departed from all the traditions of our country." 

Further: "The President alone assumed 'that absolute authority over the Philippines' which Secretary Long praised him for refusing."11 McKinley made war on an existing, popular Filipino government before the matter had come before Congress and before effective American sovereignty extended beyond Manila Bay. I would add that this was the most extensive use of so-called executive "war powers" since Abraham Lincoln’s. 

(I mention - with passing reference to current flag controversies - that, during the Philippine war, Mark Twain suggested adoption of new flag with black stripes replacing the white ones and the skull and crossbones replacing the stars.) 


V. Critics of the 'War to End War' 

The intended and unintended consequences of American participation in World War I called forth an array of critics, although most were forced into silence by the federal reign of terror which prevailed from April 1917 to the end of the war. Critics worth mentioning include writers Albert Jay Nock, Henry L. Mencken, and Randolph Bourne, and politicians such as Robert LaFollette, R.F. Pettigrew, and Tom Watson. 

Bourne had been in tune with "progressive" thinking, with social engineering as the solution to America’s problems. Repelled by American intellectuals’ eager embrace of "war technique"--from US entry onward--he penned a notable essay, "The War and the Intellectuals," the publication of which, in June 1917, led to a break with his mentor John Dewey. Bourne wrote that the intellectuals, having signed on for the war, now imagined it was "they who effectively willed it." Armed with a new sense of power and deeply involved in matters of state, they forgot their criticism, in 1914, of a war manifesto signed by ninety-three German professors, just as they forgot that "the real enemy is war rather than imperial Germany." 

The intellectuals’ defection (from peace) reflected an "English colonial" mentality. With a war on, "everyone [is] forced into line" and their "new certitude becomes idealized." This was a certitude not shared by those actually fighting in Europe, who had given up "every reason for their being there except that nobody knew how to get them away."12 There are things with which to disagree in Bourne’s essay, but we can forgive a lot to someone who could say that "war is the health of the state." 


VI. Old Right Critics of World War II and the Cold War 

The "Old Right" arose as a loose coalition of anti-New Dealers, committed generally to classical liberalism and republicanism. Through the American First Committee they fought vainly to prevent US involvement in another global bloodbath. As the world picked through the rubble of that war, some Old Rightists continued resisting interventionism well into the Cold War. 

Frank Chodorov: Georgist Libertarian 

Frank Chodorov was a libertarian's libertarian. A son of Russian immigrants, he had many businesses and jobs, but was best known as a promoter of libertarian ideas. The writings of Henry George were an important influence on Chodorov and the libertarian essayist Albert Jay Nock was a mentor to him. Like other libertarian and conservative "Old Right" critics of the New Deal, Chodorov was strongly committed to nonintervention. As World War II took form, he wrote antiwar editorials in the old Freeman, until he was removed as editor in 1942. He founded his own broad-sheet, analysis in 1944. There, he could write what he thought. Analysis merged with Felix Morley and Frank Hanighen’s Human Events in 1951. In 1954-1955, Chodorov edited the new Freeman, published by FEE, where he served as an isolationist’s isolationist. 

Chodorov had opposed US entry into World War II. Having had no illusions about the great crusade with Uncle Joe, he saw little reason to enlist in its sequel, the cold war. In early 1947, Congress debated the Truman Doctrine--US aid to any government anywhere, that claimed to be menaced by communism--and, specifically, aid to Greece and Turkey. Chodorov foresaw "a Byzantine Empire of the West," if Truman's policy prevailed. He warned that "poking into the business of Europe" would directly impact American liberty: Already a hunt for Reds was on, and when "the situation require[s] it the definition of 'Red' will include every person who raises his voice against the going order." In the end, "when our imperialism comes to grips with the empire of the commissars, ...our liberties will vanish into-- communism."13 Of course the Greek-Turkish Aid Bill passed. 

In "Misguided Patriotism" (March 1951), we find Chodorov criticized the "mesalliance" between business and government, saying: "To put it bluntly: Communism will not be imported from Moscow; it will come out of Wall Street and Main Street."14

In the August 1954 Freeman Chodorov sparred with young William F. Buckley, Jr., paladin of the interventionist new right. Buckley wrote that "to beat the Soviet Union we must… imitate the Soviet Union" – with conscription, higher taxes, and bureaucracy. He dismissed fears that such a program would make American life "indistinguishable from life in the Soviet Union, save possibly for an enduring folkway or two." 

Chodorov replied that communism was an idea, immune to killing by military means. We could only kill "natives" who happened to believe in that unworkable idea--if, for example, we should ever be so foolish as to "send an army into Indochina." No, we should stand firm for private property and freedom "and let all natives live."15 Looking back from 2000 AD, one can say that Washington did its best to make American life rather "indistinguishable from life in the Soviet Union" and now wishes to deny us even the "enduring folkway or two." 

As the battle for the soul of the right wing continued, Chodorov noted that we now suffered increased public debt, high taxes, the "involuntary servitude" of peacetime conscription, and "a bureaucracy that compares favorably with in size with that of the Nazi regime." In cold or hot war, "the State acquires power...and because of its insatiable lust for power [it] is incapable of giving up any of it. The State never abdicates." Overseas, our rough-and-ready Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, was practicing "a new kind of imperialism" based on bribery and manipulation to make France to join the European Defense Community.16

William S. Schlamm, an immigrant ex-leftist argued the cold warrior's case in the November 1954 Freeman. He asked how we "could avoid being overrun by a communist world monopoly of military power," especially once the communists added "the gigantic industrial powerhouse of western Europe to the manpower and natural resources of Asia?" The "unarmed US"--his ungrounded assumption--could never prevail. He would rather "pay with the recoverable loss of some of my liberties for a chance to avoid, for centuries, the total loss of freedom."17 

That’s grand, but it seems clear that had communists overrun western Europe and run that "power-house" on Stalinist guidelines, they would have shortly reduced their threat to manageable proportions; but word of the debate on the socialist calculation problem apparently never reached Schlamm. As for "recoverable loss" of freedoms, may we see the list of ones recovered? 

In reply, Chodorov went over the ground methodically. Those who thought war inevitable were calling for conscription. Thus, they knew that Americans would never volunteer "to fight… Russia on foreign soil." Conscription for World Wars I and II raised "the pertinent question: if Americans did not want these wars should they have been compelled to fight them?" (Here the right-wing extremist sounds rather "democratic.") Those who would compel Americans to fight Russia had a "dictator complex." 

Creating an American leviathan in the name of stopping another one was a stacked deck. Either way, we got leviathan. In truth, withdrawing into our own hemisphere would be advantageous by forcing the Soviets to lengthen their supply lines – if they really were bent on attack.. As for Europe: "it would be hard on the Europeans if they fell into Soviet hands; but not any worse than if we precipitated a war in which their homes became the battlefield."18 Quite a few saved-by-being-destroyed villages later, we can see Chodorov’s point. As things played out, however, an interventionist new right stampeded its followers into another great crusade, at the final end of which the citizenry would get their liberties back, no questions asked. It would be rude to ask, even though the supposed reason for putting freedom into escrow succumbed to bureau-sclerosis and rational-calculation problems ten years ago. 

In 1962, Chodorov summed up his philosophy: "Isolationism is not a political policy, it is a natural attitude of a people." Left to themselves, people "do not feel any call to impose their own customs and values on strangers." But "interventionism is a conceit of the political leader," who otherwise finds too little for himself to do in a self-regulating civil society. Past interventions had made not a better world but "a monstrous bureaucracy with a vested interest in intervention" and a nation dedicated to "interference in the affairs of every country in the world." 

Decrying the various imperial follies of Macedonia, Rome, revolutionary France, Great Britain, and Nazi Germany, Chodorov hoped Americans would "return to that isolationism which for over a hundred years prospered the nation and gained for us the respect and admiration of the world."19 Samuel B. Pettengill: Cleveland Democrat 

Samuel B. Pettengill, Democratic Congressman from Indiana, 1930-1938, was another kind of Old Right stalwart, a Cleveland Democrat. He was a vocal critic of the New Deal and published a detailed attack on its economic policies and "planning" in 1940. He was clear about the parallels with mercantilism and fascist corporatism, writing that "the second or third New Deal is fundamentally fascist." All such systems of central economic regimentation--fascist, Nazi, Soviet--were antithetical to the American form of government. 

The New Dealers were happy to experiment with all of them. He noted the Nazi regime’s insistence on breaking down the constituent states of the German Reich and compared this to centralizing trends at home. He wrote: "that we are moving toward some form of National Socialism and away from our form of government seems hard not to believe."20

In an address given in October 1949, Pettengill denounced the New Deal-Fair Deal program, now using the term "socialism" to describe it. His central theme was the twin evils of high taxation and monetary inflation, which would render people dependent. Inflation was also an engine for eroding genuine federalism: "The federal government has a printing press; the states do not. This easy money route promotes the extension of federal power and subtracts from state and local self-government."21

Now, all this might have some bearing on war and peace. Pettengill took on foreign policy in the October 1954 Freeman.22 After crusading for democracy in one war and the Atlantic Charter in another, where, he asked, "is freedom from fear, of the A-bomb and H-bomb, or freedom from conscription for our youth?" Our leaders blindly destroyed the balance of power in Europe and Asia and now wanted "to rearm our recent foes as our noble allies against our recent noble ally." This did not seem like a success. Giving out a premature judgment on the Wise Men, Pettengill wrote, "[a]fter forty years of demonstrated failure it is difficult to understand why these pontifical gentlemen should be listened to." 

The authorities had conducted an unconstitutional war in Korea and were waging "a psychological war" against the people and in favor of intervention, by "propaganda blown big by the radio, the screen, and TV." Secretary Marshall had called for an end to debate on foreign affairs in October 1950, Pettengill notes, just "when we were being told that we probably faced twenty to forty more years or more of the same." 

One could not prove that staying out of the world wars would have made the world better off: "It is enough to ask whether the world could be worse off today if we had stayed at home and adhered to the teachings of Washington, Jefferson and Monroe." 

Referring to our cozy relationship with Marshall Tito, Pettengill says, "With no valid plan for peace except naked power politics, we join up with every gangster with a bodyguard." Taking what the uninformed might think a "left-wing" view, he adds that through the entangling NATO alliance, we had become "the unhappy supporters of European colonialism in Africa and Asia against a new tide of nationalism sweeping over the colored races as it swept over our shores in 1776." Sounding a lot like William Appleman Williams, he says: "Interventionism and one-worldism have put us on the wrong side of history." 

People came to America to escape "crushing taxes, the 'goosestep,' one-man government, military conscription, 'a soldier on the back of every peasant'" and not to recreate those same evils here. Pettengill thought it "utterly fantastic" to believe that "Russia can conquer America on the North American Continent"--but then he was not privy to all that "information" gathered by a body that is central and is an agency. Ending this wonderful diatribe on a "right-wing" note, he says, "No one will save America except Americans who put their own country first." 

Louis Bromfield: Northern Agrarian and Cold War Critic 

Like Charles Beard, novelist Louis Bromfield supported one war and rejected its successors. A writer and farmer, Bromfield was a Jeffersonian. He was critical of New Deal methods, but soft on the CCC and some aspects of the TVA.23 His fondness for France and its peasantry (he had farmed in France) and a corresponding dislike for Germany doubtless has some bearing on his support for intervention in World War II. 

When World War II ended in a civilizational train-wreck followed by mobilization-in-permanence, or Cold War, Bromfield became an outspoken opponent of intervention. His most complete critique was A New Pattern for a Tired World (1954). Here he developed a contrast between cartelistic European capitalism and an American model of free competition. Europe had exported its controlled, top-down style of state-allied capitalism to its colonial empires. Those colonies were now engaged in throwing off that system. 

American interventionist policy was on a collision course with those revolutions in a hopeless attempt to "contain" them in the name of anticommunism. The policy thrived under growing government secrecy and "Big Lie" propaganda and fear-mongering. It was fed by a "Messiah complex, peculiarly an Anglo-Saxon disease which at times can border on the ecstatic and the psychopathic." The drive to export our way of life and "democracy" and the smugness with which American personnel undertook their supposed "world responsibilities" stirred up resentment abroad.24 

What the world needed was to get through a period of revolutionary adjustment with as little war as possible. The world needed freer trade and the sound development of agriculture, not US embargoes and so-called foreign aid. America's "attempt to dominate and direct the whole course, not only of Asia, but of the world, is a policy of insanity which can only cause war after war and the eventual ruin of this nation." If in throwing off colonialism Asians chose "the disastrous experiment of Communism," that was "Asia's problem and none of our own."25 

Further: "The arrogant assertion that Korea, lying in the very midst of the Russo-Chinese-Japanese orbit, is our frontier is an idiotic assumption which cannot be maintained save at huge expense or the prospect of a third World War and economic ruin. If Korea is our frontier, so then is every nation in the world, and we are tempted to ask whether our future policy will be one of maintaining military installations and conscripted armies in every nation of the world." 

As for our intervention to save the French position in Indo-China, it had been "merely disastrous" in every way. "It is an intervention and a battle which in the long run can never be won by either France or the US even though we pour more millions and more lives into the d bacle for years to come."26

There is much Bromfield’s book which I cannot summarize here. His did say it might be less painful just to be blown up now by atomic bombs than live through decades of the interventionists’ ruinous world meddling (if those were the choices). 

Dan Smoot: Petty Bourgeois Enrag 

Leaving for another time (and with some regret), the redoubtable Garet Garrett, I wish mention an outlier of the Old Right - Dan Smoot, college drop-out (Harvard), FBI agent, radio commentator, and elite theorist. One naturally wonders if Smoot’s interest in elite theory owes anything to his high school friendship with C. Wright Mills. The concern shown about the Council on Foreign Relations and related groups in Smoot’s The Invisible Government (1962) got no respect, as the expression goes, until taken up by leftists like Holly Sklar. 

What is interesting, today, is Smoot’s handling, in The Dan Smoot Report of August 17, 1964, of precisely that war which Bromfield had said would be futile and disastrous. The account is hostage to certain factual and ideological assumptions shared with the New Right, but reality quickly breaks through. Thus Smoot writes: "South Vietnam commanders seem reluctant to engage the enemy in ground combat. Hence, they rely too much on 'sophisticated American weaponry.' Bombardment (with American planes and weapons) of South Vietnam villages (which have been occupied by communist guerrillas), often kills women and children--doing greater harm than the communist guerrillas do." 

Many Vietnamese now hated their supposed protectors. Giving the background of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, Smoot announces his agreement with Senators Wayne Morse of Oregon and Ernest Gruening of Alaska, men with whom he agreed on little, but the only two Senators to vote against the resolution. Quoting Morse, he says, "All Vietnam is not worth the life of a single American boy." The "important thing is for us to avoid war"--something we cannot do "if we continue the policy of world-meddling." He states that most of our foreign allies and independents are in it for the money and have little desire to fight the supposed common foe. 

Reverting to constitutional republicanism, Smoot argues that "[o]ur government has no constitutional authority to defend or support any portion of the foreign world." He suggests a return to the foreign policy laid down by George Washington – genuine defense of American territory and nothing else. "Whether other nations 'go communist' is no affair of ours." He shows some illusions about unleashing Chiang Kai-shek in our stead but stays the course: "Bankruptcy and death await us unless we disengage from involvement in the political and military affairs of the rest of the world, and look to our own national defense. [W]e simply do not have enough men to fight Asia’s wars for her."27 Not "an advanced peace position" perhaps (as Murray Rothbard once said in a similar connection), but much, much better than what LBJ, the paper of record, and the foreign policy establishment were selling that week. (I do not know if Smoot continued to write along these lines thereafter.) 


VII. A Final Word 

As can be seen by these few examples, critics of war and intervention are a varied lot. They have shared a commitment to classical liberalism, constitutional republicanism, and revulsion to war, or to some combination of these elements. Perhaps they took to heart the couplet placed at the head of Samuel Pettengill’s essay in The Freeman

"War--after all, what is it that the people get? Why--widows, taxes, wooden legs and debt." 

Not a bad starting point, but even better when informed by classical liberal and republican ideas. 


[This paper was delivered at "The History of Liberty," a Mises Institute conference in Auburn, Alabama, January 2000.]

  • 1. Paul Wilson, An Enemy of the State 
  • 2. Ralph Raico, "Classical Liberal Exploitation Theory: A Comment on Professor Liggio’s Paper," Journal of Libertarian Studies, 1, 3 (1977), 179-184. 
  • 3. Ralph Raico, "Classical Liberal Roots of the Doctrine of Classes" in Yuri N. Maltsev, ed., Requiem for Marx (Auburn: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1993), 189-220. 
  • 4. Ralph Raico, "World War I: The Turning Point" and "Rethinking Churchill" in John V. Denson, ed., The Costs of War, 2d. ed. (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1999), 203-247 and 321-360. 
  • 5. W. W. Boyce, "The Annexation of Cuba" in Philip S. Foner and Richard C. Winchester, eds., The Anti-Imperialist Reader (New York, 1984), pp. 48-50. 
  • 6. Boyce, "Annexation of Cuba," 49-50. 
  • 7. On Boyce’s critique of the Richmond government, see Richard E. Beringer, Herman Hattaway, Archer Jones, and William N. Still, Jr., Why the South Lost the Civil War (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1986), 31, 289-90.
  • 8. Alexander H. Stephens, A Constitutional View of the Late War Between the States, volume II (Philadelphia: National Publishing Company, 1870), p. 668. 
  • 9. Quoted in Gaines M. Foster, Ghosts of the Confederacy: Defeat, the Lost Cause, and The Emergence of the New South, 1865 to 1913 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 150-152.
  • 10. Quoted in C. Vann Woodward, Tom Watson: Agrarian Rebel (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 335. 
  • 11. Moorfield Storey, Our New Departure, excerpted in Louis Filler, ed., Late Nineteenth-Century American Liberalism: Representative Selections, 1880-1900 (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962), 234-42.
  • 12. Randolph Bourne, "The War and the Intellectuals," Seven Arts, June 1917, reprinted in Arthur and Lila Weinberg, eds., Instead of Violence (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1963), 246-53. 
  • 13. Frank Chodorov, "A Byzantine Empire of the West," analysis, April 1947 (placed in The Congressional Record, vol. 93, part II, pp. A2015-16, by Congressman Howard Buffett). 
  • 14. Frank Chodorov, "Misguided Patriotism," Human Events, March 14, 1947, pp. 1-4. 
  • 15. William F. Buckley, Jr., "A Dilemma of Conservatives," The Freeman, 5, 2 (August 1954), pp. 51-52, and Frank Chodorov, "Reds Are Natives," ibid., pp. 45-46.
  • 16. Frank Chodorov, "The Return of 1940?", The Freeman, 5, 3 (September 1954), p. 81, and "The New Imperialism," ibid., 5,5 (November 1954), p. 162.
  • 17. William S. Schlamm, "But It Is Not 1940," ibid., pp. 169-171.
  • 18. Frank Chodorov, "A War to Communize America," ibid., 171-174 (my italics in the last quotation).
  • 19. Frank Chodorov, Out of Step (New York: Devin-Adair Co., 1962), Chi. XI, "Isolationism," pp. 113-123.
  • 20. Samuel B. Pettengill, Smoke-Screen (New York: Southern Publishers, 1940), 13, 79. 
  • 21. Samuel B. Pettengill, "The Grand Strategy of Freedom," reprinted in John T. Flynn, The Road Ahead: America’s Creeping Revolution (New York: Devin-Adair, 1949), 190-97.
  • 22. Samuel B. Pettengill, "Forty Years of Intervention," The Freeman, 5, 4 (October 1954), 123-25.
  • 23. See Louis Bromfield, Pleasant Valley (New York: Ballantine Books, 1971[1943]).
  • 24. Louis Bromfield, A New Pattern for a Tired World (London: Cassell and Co., 1954), 7, 9.
  • 25. Ibid., 209.
  • 26. Ibid., 211, 210.
  • 27. Dan Smoot, "War and Politics – 1964," The Dan Smoot Report, 10, 33 (August 17, 1964), 257-64.
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