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Is the State Ever Responsible for Its Actions?


Yesterday I filed a “friend of the Court” brief with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in the case of Gemtronics, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, a case I’ve reported on extensively for this and other websites. The question before the Fourth Circuit is whether to compensate a retired engineer, William Isely, who was falsely identified as the operator of a website that contained statements the FTC wanted to censor. My brief is reproduced below.

Informal Brief of S.M. Oliva as Amicus Curiae Supporting the Petitioners

William Isely1 defeated the Federal Trade Commission’s attempt to hold him legally responsible for a website he did not own, operate, or control. Isely now seeks to recover some of the $130,000 in attorney fees and other expenses he incurred defending himself. The Commission’s Administrative Law Judge held that Isely was eligible to recover an award under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 5 U.S.C. § 504, but ultimately denied his application because the Commission’s position was “substantially justified,” as defined by § 504(a)(1). On appeal the Commission affirmed.

This amicus brief addresses three questions:

1. Did the Commission apply the law of this Circuit correctly?

2. Was the Commission’s position “substantially justified” given the agency’s own prior decision proves there was not a reasonable investigation before it issued the complaint?

3. Do public policy considerations justify granting Isely’s Petition for Review and vacating the Commission’s previous order?


The answers are “no” to the first two questions and “yes” to the third. The Commission contradicted itself by holding its position in the prior litigation was “substantially justified” based on the ALJ’s earlier denial of Complaint Counsel and Isely’s motions for summary decision. Under the law of this Circuit, the Commission’s position cannot be “substantially justified” when there was an inadequate pre-complaint investigation, as was the case here. Additionally, the legislative history of the EAJA and the statute’s clearly stated objectives require the Commission to compensate Isely for his role in correcting the policy errors that led to his false prosecution.

1. The Commission failed to apply the law of this Circuit.

The Commission’s decision to issue a complaint against Isely was not “substantially justified” as defined by 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1). The Commission erroneously equated “substantially justified” with the standard for a summary decision under its Rules of Practice —analogous to the standard for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) — but the mere declaration that there were disputed facts does not satisfy the Commission’s burden of proof under the EAJA. This is consistent not only with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Pierce v. Underwood2, but the law of this Circuit established in Hess Mechanical Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board3, which the Commission failed to apply.

The Commission held that because there was a “genuine dispute” regarding the underlying facts of the administrative complaint, there was substantial justification for falsely prosecuting Isely.4 The ALJ elaborated that “the evidence upon which [the Commission] relies to oppose the Application is essentially the same evidence upon which it relied in support of its motion for summary decision in the Prior Adjudicative Proceeding.”5 The ALJ previously denied both sides’ motions for summary decision because “neither side’s evidence established an absence of disputed material facts, and it could not be concluded that either side was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”6 In affirming the ALJ’s denial of Isely’s EAJA application, the Commission said, “there is a presumption that a government case strong enough to survive a motion for summary judgment is substantially justified,” and that nothing in the prior proceeding against Isely rebutted that presumption.7

In Pierce, the Supreme Court considered — and rejected — a similar argument. There, the fee applicant argued, “[T]he weakness of the Government’s position is established by the objective fact that the merits were decided at the pleadings stage.” The Court disagreed, noting, “[S]ummary disposition proves only that the district judge was efficient.”8 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Hallmark Construction Co.9, explained that Pierce did not equate “substantially justified” with the standard for summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit remanded an EAJA application because the District Court gave the following explanation for denying the application:

While this court found Hallmark’s evidence…more persuasive, the government’s case was far from baseless. There existed a genuine dispute over which reasonable minds could differ. For that reason, Hallmark’s attempts to secure judgment prior to trial failed. … Failure to prevail at trial does not necessarily mean that the government’s litigative position was unreasonable or unjustified.10

The Seventh Circuit said this was an “insufficient explanation of the court’s conclusion” for an EAJA case, particularly given the district court’s emphatic rejection of the government’s litigating position on the merits.11

Hallmark is also noteworthy because the district court produced not one but two detailed orders regarding summary judgment.12 In Isely’s case, the ALJ never produced a written opinion on summary decision of any kind. The record shows he simply denied both parties’ motions orally in open court.13

When the Pierce court said the “substantially justified” standard is satisfied by the existence of a “genuine dispute,” it meant “justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person.”14 The Third Circuit, in Morgan v. Perry15, helpfully noted that to “satisfy” a reasonable person, “[W]e must scrutinize both the government’s prelitigation position and its litigation position.”16 Morgan cautioned that “[b]oth positions must be substantially justified and if either is not, attorney’s fees should be awarded to the prevailing party.”17 In this case, the Commission acknowledged deficiencies in its pre-litigation position yet still declared that position “substantially justified” simply because there was a “factual dispute.”

Morgan suggests the Commission neglected to ask an important question before reaching that conclusion: Why was there a factual dispute? The answer, as the Commission’s decision in the prior litigation established, was that the Commission failed to conduct an adequate pre-complaint investigation.

This Court’s decision in Hess Mechanical Corp. v. NLRB 18 further mandates an examination of a regulatory agency’s pre-complaint investigation to determine whether a “reasonable person” would have proceeded with the complaint. In Hess, a regional director for the National Labor Relations Board filed a complaint against an employer alleging wrongful termination of an employee. At a hearing before the ALJ, the director’s only evidence was an uncorroborated affidavit from the fired employee, who claimed he’d been fired for engaging in legally protected union activities. In fact, there was “a litany of complaints about” the employee’s work unrelated to union matters. The ALJ dismissed the complaint and the NLRB affirmed.19

As in this case, the agency denied the respondent’s subsequent application for attorney fees under the EAJA. The Hess ALJ said that since “the case depended on credibility determinations that could be resolved only after a hearing,” the NLRB’s position was “substantially justified.”

This Court reversed, rejecting the NLRB’s blanket assertion that a factual dispute existed that “substantially justified” an administrative proceeding. The Court noted, “[T]he weaknesses of the [NLRB's] case was obvious before the complaint was filed.”20 The only evidence was an uncorroborated affidavit from the fired employee. Conversely, the NLRB “faced uncontroverted evidence which supported” the respondent’s defense, and the agency made no effort to obtain additional evidence to corroborate its position:

The Board’s assertion that the pre-complaint evidence was not “conclusive” misses the mark. The point is that the relevant evidence before the General Counsel was substantial, and all of it indicated that [the respondent] had a valid defense. Under such circumstances, no reasonable party would have proceeded with the complaint without further investigation to ensure that the defense could be challenged. The record is devoid of any indication, for example, that the General Counsel ever questioned [the fired employee] regarding his poor performance or verified [his] claim that he gave union cards to several workers. Additional inquiry in this case, of course, would have uncovered only mounting evidence favoring [respondent]. The EAJA does not tell an agency how to handle a case, but the General Counsel cannot decline to conduct further inquiry and then plead his own failure to investigate as reason to conclude that his position was substantially justified.21 (emphasis added)

There’s little ambiguity here. Hess is controlling precedent that required the Commission, not Isely, to prove it conducted an adequate pre-complaint investigation to corroborate the allegations in the complaint. If the Commission chose not to conduct an adequate inquiry, it cannot then, consistent with Hess, plead such failure as grounds for avoiding an award under the EAJA. Yet that is exactly what the Commission did.

The Commission tried to ignored Hess. In a lone footnote to its final decision, the Commission attempted to distinguish this case by claiming “the FTC’s complaint was supported by evidence from numerous sources,” not a “single, uncorroborated affidavit,” as in Hess. That is misleading at best. In fact, the Commission’s “evidence” was arguably weaker then the NLRB’s case in Hess, where there was at least a complaining witness. The Commission never received a single complaint against Isely or produced a single independent witness who could testify to any wrongdoing by Isely. The Commission’s entire case was based on the work of a single agency employee who ignored every piece of information that might have led to the truth.

2. The Decision of the Commission in the previous litigation proves the pre-complaint investigation did not satisfy the requirements of Hess.

Altogether, the Commission produced three pieces of “evidence” to establish Isely controlled the content of the challenged website: The appearance of Isely’s contact information on various pages of the challenged website, a WHOIS search report, and two “undercover purchases” made by a Commission investigator. As the Decision of the Commission found, all of these items contained substantial clues that would have led a “reasonable” person to discover Isely was not the person responsible for the website and its advertising claims. The Commission’s failure to make those discoveries — and to proceed with litigation in ignorance — requires a conclusion that its decision to issue a complaint against Isely was not “substantially justified.”

a. The Commission never called Isely or investigated any other person identified on the challenged website.

First, there’s the presence of Isely’s name and telephone number on the challenged website. The Commission said that a webpage containing claims that the supplement RAAX11 could be used to treat cancer provided Isely’s name and telephone number with the statement, “If you are living in the US, just call Mr. Isely and he will explain how it works.”22 Although product manufacturers’ websites commonly provide contact information for their distributors — without implying the distributor controls the website — the Commission argued the presence of Isely’s contact information established him as the person responsible for the website’s content, including advertising claims about RAAX11.

The question a “reasonable person” would ask at this point is simple: Did the Commission call Isely to see if he’d explain how RAAX11 could treat cancer, as the manufacturer’s website directed? In fact, nobody from the Commission ever called Isely to see if he’d repeat or verify the claims on the website. To the contrary,

On two occasions Isely received telephone calls from women who said they had heard about a cancer study in the United States. The callers did not tell Isely where they had learned of the study. Isely told them he was not aware of any study and that he could not help them.23

If the Commission had called Isely and received a similar response, a reasonable investigator would have shifted his focus to other individuals named on the website. For example, the website identified “Dr. Steven Hall” as the author of a protocol on the use of RAAX11 to treat cancer. According to the Commission, “[T]he evidence presented at trial does not indicate there was any investigation of Dr. Hall” or the statements attributed to him on the website. Nor did the Commission investigate another U.S. distributor of RAAX11 identified on the website.24

b. The Commission never corroborated the information obtained from the WHOIS search.

The centerpiece of the Commission’s “investigation” was a WHOIS search conducted by the Commission’s investigator, Michael Liggins, on the challenged website’s domain. A “reasonable person” with experience in website management understands that WHOIS data is not, by itself, conclusive evidence of the owner, operator, or author of a website. Indeed, the WHOIS search engine Liggins used contained a disclaimer stating it could not guarantee the “accuracy or completeness” of the registration information provided.25

The Commission’s WHOIS search listed Isely as the registrant and Isely and George Otto as contacts. Actually, it listed “William Isley,” a misspelling of Isely’s name.26 Additionally, the search’s contact information included Isely’s home address, a telephone number that did not belong to Isely, and an email address that belonged to George Otto.27 The Commission made no effort to investigate or explain these inconsistencies.

More importantly, the Commission never investigated the ownership of the website, only the domain registration. The Commission acknowledged, “The identity of the legal owner of a website is obtainable from the ‘registrar’ of the website,”28 and noted that Liggins made no attempt to obtain this critical information:

When he investigated this matter, Liggins was aware of the difference between an “owner” of a website and the listed “registrant,” and was aware that an owner could list someone else as the registrant. Liggins did not know whether Isely had the user name and password to control the content of the [ ] website. Liggins does not recall that he contacted the registrar of the domain.29

Much as a telephone call to Isely would establish he never disseminated information about the use of RAAX11 in cancer treatment protocols, a telephone call to the website’s registrar would establish that George Otto, not Isely, was the sole owner and responsible party for the content of the challenged website. The failure to make these calls cannot be excused as anything other then nonfeasance by the Commission.

c. The Commission’s “undercover purchases” did not establish Isely’s control or responsibility for the challenged website.

In lieu of directly contacting Isely or taking any logical step to determine the ownership of the challenged website, the Commission and Liggins instead conducted a bizarre “undercover” operation designed to establish a pretext for invoking regulatory jurisdiction over Isely.30 Investigator Liggins made two purchases of RAAX11 from the challenged website using falsified names and credit card numbers. The website processed the orders on behalf of its owner, Takesun do Brasil, a foreign company controlled by George Otto. Takesun/Otto received the payments from Liggins via PayPal.31 Isely then fulfilled the orders as a courtesy to Otto, since Isely already had a supply of RAAX11 in the United States. Otto never reimbursed Isely for the shipments to Liggins’s aliases, and these were the only shipments Isely made on Otto’s behalf in the preceding two years.32

The Commission considered Isely’s fulfillment of these “undercover” purchases as conclusive evidence he was responsible for the advertising claims on the challenged website. No reasonable person would make that leap given the following inconsistencies documented by the Commission itself:

  • An email receipt for one purchase identified George Otto, not Isely, as the seller.33
  • In the other purchase, the website listed “Takesun do Brasil,” not Isely, as the seller, and a subsequent confirmation page listed “Takesun Portugal Lda. Verkauf Duetschland.”34
  • The credit card record for the undercover purchase listed “TAKESUNPORT” as the payee. The record also listed a telephone number with a Nebraska area code and the initials “CA.” At trial, Liggins admitted he “did not know” what any of these things meant, and he made no effort to learn.35

A “reasonable” person would conclude that Liggins purchased RAAX11 — a perfectly legal product — from a website owned, operated, and controlled by George Otto through Takesun do Brasil. The mere fact that Isely fulfilled the order as a courtesy to his foreign supplier does not establish any connection between Isely and the content of the challenged website.

In Isely’s case, as in Hess, “no reasonable party would have proceeded with the complaint without further investigation to ensure that the defense could be challenged.” By declining to conduct a proper investigation before proceeding to issue a complaint against Isely, the Commission cannot now plead its own “failure to investigate as reason to conclude that [its] position was substantially justified.” On these grounds alone, the Court should vacate the Commission’s order denying Isely an award under the EAJA.

3. Public policy — including the legislative history of the EAJA — supports granting Isely’s Petition for Review.

There are compelling public policy reasons to grant Isely’s petition. The Commission is not acting as an Article III court that was bound only to consider the strict text of a statute (as the Supreme Court was in Pierce36). It is a “legislative agency” expected to “carry into effect legislative policies” by “filling in and administering the details embodied” by statutes.37 Since the Commission acted as a legislative agency when it targeted Isely as part of a broader campaign restrict Internet marketing of dietary supplements — a policy that lacked express congressional authorization — the Commission must be equally vigorous in carrying out the express legislative mandate of Congress by compensating Isely.

a. Congress enacted the EAJA to address the disproportionate burden of government regulation on small businesses and individuals.

It is appropriate to this case that the 1979 Senate committee report on the original EAJA included a lengthy quotation — from a previous congressional hearing — from the FTC’s former chief economist, Dr. Frederic M. Scherer, who testified about the impact of Commission enforcement policies on small businesses:

I had not fully realized until I came to Washington how unfairly the burden of federal regulation and antitrust enforcement falls upon small as compared to large companies. The corporate giants can and do maintain stables of highly skilled attorneys who advise them how to stay clear of the law and defend them if they nevertheless run afoul. Smaller firms are less able to afford such counsel, and the law firms they retain typically lack the specialized knowledge needed to cope with a body of statutory, case, and regulatory law as complex as [antitrust law]. As a result, such small firms are likely to get into trouble and to settle by consent if a complaint is brought.38

More than 30 years later, Dr. Scherer’s testimony remains an accurate description of the disproportionate burden that small businessmen like William Isely face when dealing with the Commission. Congress enacted the EAJA to try and level the playing field:

The [EAJA] rests on the premise that certain individuals … may be deterred from seeking review of, or defending against, unreasonable governmental action because of the expense involved in securing the vindication of their rights. These economic deterrents … are magnified in these cases by the disparity between the resources and expertise of these individuals and the government.39

Congress was particularly concerned that agencies like the Commission would use its “greater resources and expertise” to “force compliance with its position.” In turn, this would establish future precedent “on the basis of an uncontested order rather than the thoughtful presentation and consideration of opposing views.” Congress cited Dr. Scherer’s testimony about his experiences at the Commission as “evidence that small businesses are the target of agency action precisely because they do not have the resources to fully litigate the issue,” and the EAJA was necessary to prevent “truncated justice” from compromising the regulatory decision-making process.40

In contrast to the ALJ’s position in denying Isely’s application, Congress did not anticipate EAJA fee awards only in cases where there was an absence of disputed facts or law. Congress understood that “adjudicated or civil action provides a concrete adversarial test of government regulation and thereby insures the legitimacy and fairness of the law,” because only a contested hearing could prove “that the policy or factual foundation underlying an agency rule is erroneous or inaccurate.”41 Since adjudication, in this context, is necessary for “refining and formulating public policy,” Congress thought it unfair that a small businessman, like Isely, might be forced “to finance through their tax dollars unreasonable government action and also bear the costs of vindicating their rights.”42

b. The Commission’s recent history suggests a lack of institutional control that emphasizes the necessity of meaningful EAJA relief.


The second part of Dr. Scherer’s testimony cited in the legislative report on the EAJA further underscores a basic problem that Congress wanted to address — the economic incentives for Commission staff attorneys to target small businesses as a means of furthering their own careers:

What I have learned since joining the Commission staff is that many attorneys measure their own success in terms of the number of complaints brought and settlements won. In the absence of broader policy guidance, therefore, the typical attorney shies away from a complex, long, uncertain legal contest with well represented giant corporations and tries to build a portfolio emphasizing small, easy-to-win cases. The net results of these three broad propensities is that it is the little guys, not the giants who dominate our manufacturing and trade industries, who typically get sued.43

The Commission’s prosecution of Isely is a case in point. This was not a case where the Commission responded to a customer complaint or reacted as an impartial enforcer of the law. Rather, the Commission pursued Isely and dozens of other small businesses as part of a policy initiative known as “Operation False Cures”:

Initiated with an online surf for fraudulent cancer cure products in June 2007, the FTC sent warning letters via e-mail to 112 Web sites marketing everything from essiac tea and other herbal blends (some containing highly toxic herbs), to laetrile, shark cartilage, coral calcium, mushroom extract, and black salve (a corrosive product that can cause burns and scarring) – all promoted to prevent, cure, or treat cancer. Of the 112 sites contacted by the FTC, nearly 30 percent either shut down their sites or removed the cancer claims. The remainder were reviewed to determine whether law enforcement was appropriate, with some referred to FDA or Canadian authorities. The FTC followed this effort with 11 enforcement actions charging companies and individuals with making false or unsubstantiated cancer claims, and in some cases even misrepresenting that there was scientific proof that their products worked.44

Operation False Cures certainly qualifies as building “a portfolio emphasizing small, easy-to-win cases.” Many, if not most, of the websites targeted by the Commission were operated by individuals like Isely whose income from the sale of herbal and dietary supplements could never cover the fees for attorneys with the type of “specialized knowledge” — to cite Dr. Scherer — required to challenge the Commission’s superior resources in an adjudicated proceeding.45

This type of enforcement “sweep” creates a high risk of false positives, as was the case with Isely. In the absence of market forces, there is no incentive for Commission staff to get the facts right. The Commission has the resources — and the monopoly power — to stonewall overmatched respondents for years, insisting its position must be correct even in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary. There is no self-correction mechanism to minimize the risk of Commission error at the expense of innocent parties.

In short, the Commission lacks institutional control. This is corroborated by a number of recent incidents:

  • In 2005 the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC reversed a Commission order that the court said “relied on somewhat forced evidence” and, ignoring “the overwhelming evidence that contradicts the Commission’s conclusion … instead relied on information that was not even in the record.”46 The court further chided the Commission for ignoring public policy concerns and arguing a liability theory that would exacerbate the “the costs of lawsuits” and “the public problems associated with overcrowded court dockets.”47
  • In 2008 the District of Columbia Circuit ended the Commission’s seven years of litigation against Rambus Inc., condemning an “aggressive interpretation of weak evidence”48 and declaring, “The Commission’s findings are murky,”49 in an attempt to support a theory of liability previously rejected by the Federal Circuit in another case involving the same company and set of facts.
  • In February 2010, Commissioner John Thomas Rosch issued an extraordinary dissent from a proposed consent order against an employee of a physician group that was the subject of a previous Commission order. Rosch said he was “gravely concerned” that the Commission’s decision to prosecute the employee “can be viewed as retaliation for [her] decision to exercise her First Amendment rights when she publicly criticized the Commission’s initial decision” against her employer; Rosch further said the Commission “reneged” on a previous agreement, undermining the Commission’s ability to negotiate future settlements.50
  • In the present case, Commission Secretary Donald S. Clark’s office illegally published Isely’s original, unredacted application for an award of attorney fees ­— containing the personal financial information of Isely and his wife — on the Commission’s public website.51 Separately, the Commission’s general counsel refused a Freedom of Information Act request for information about the Commission’s spending in this case.52

In cases like Rambus and Schering-Plough, the innocent parties were not eligible for an award under the EAJA because of their net worth.53 This only accentuates the importance of granting awards to parties who are eligible. The EAJA is one of the few mechanisms available for holding the Commission — which is composed of unelected lawyers with a professional self-interest in maximizing the agency’s power and prestige — accountable to the general public.

This Court should be especially skeptical of allowing the Commission to fall back on the “presumption” that a case is “substantially justified” if it survives summary judgment. That may be appropriate in civil litigation, like Pierce, where an independent Article III judge reviews the pleadings and evidence. But in an agency case, where there is no separation between investigator, prosecutor, and judge, such a standard effectively renders the EAJA moot.54 There will never be an FTC case that fails to survive summary decision, because even if an ALJ were so inclined to grant such a motion by a respondent, the Commission can — and would — overrule that decision and remand the case for adjudication on the merits. The “substantially justified” standard will be no more than the “reason to believe” standard applied by the Commission in deciding whether to issue complaints.


Starting with the Supreme Court’s decision in Pierce and continuing with this Court’s decision in Hess, the law clearly requires the Commission assess its pre-complaint investigation ­— or lack thereof — and not simply fall back on the platitude that surviving summary judgment creates a “genuine dispute” that exempts the Commission from EAJA liability. Such arguments defy the plain meaning of the EAJA and Congress’s public policy objectives in enacting the law.

Accordingly, this Court should grant Isely’s Petition for Review.

  • 1. The Commission’s complaint named Isely and his closely held corporation, Gemtronics, as co-respondents. Because the Decision of the Commission held that Gemtronics is an inactive shell corporation, this brief will simply refer to “Isely” rather than “Petitioners.” 
  • 2. 487 U.S. 552 (1988). 
  • 3. 112 F.3d 146 (4th Cir. 1997). 
  • 4. Leibowitz Opinion at 4. For simplicity’s sake, the Commission order under review before this Court will be referred to as “Leibowitz opinion,” to distinguish it from the ALJ’s Initial Decision and the Decision of the Commission in the prior litigation, which will be referred to as “Gemtronics Decision.” 
  • 5. ALJ’s Initial Decision at 11. 
  • 6. Ibid.
  • 7. Leibowitz Opinion at 6.
  • 8. 487 U.S. at 569.
  • 9. 200 F.3d 1076 (2000).
  • 10. 200 F.3d at 1079 (citing District Court’s Order Denying Attorney Fees, April 5, 1999).
  • 11. Ibid.
  • 12. Ibid. at 1078.
  • 13. Gemtronics Decision at 2.
  • 14. Gemtronics Decision at 2.
  • 15. 142 F.3d 670 (3rd Cir. 1998).
  • 16. Id.
  • 17. Id.
  • 18. 112 F.3d 146 (1997).
  • 19. Ibid. at 148.
  • 20. Ibid. at 150.
  • 21. Ibid.
  • 22. Gemtronics Decision at 19.
  • 23. Ibid. at 21.
  • 24. Ibid. at 32.
  • 25. Ibid. at 29.
  • 26. Ibid. at 28.
  • 27. Ibid.
  • 28. Ibid.
  • 29. Ibid. at 32.
  • 30. No doubt this was, in part, because the Commission did not have jurisdiction over George Otto, a non-U.S. citizen, or his foreign companies. Isely was the only available target in the United States.
  • 31. Gemtronics Decision at 23.
  • 32. Ibid. at 25.
  • 33. Ibid. at 23.
  • 34. Ibid. at 24.
  • 35. Ibid.
  • 36. See, e.g., 487 U.S. at 567.
  • 37. Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628 (1935).
  • 38. Equal Access to Justice Act, 96th Cong., 1st sess., 1979, S. Rep. 253, at 5, n1.
  • 39. Ibid. at 1.
  • 40. Ibid. at 5.
  • 41. Ibid at 5­–6.
  • 42. Ibid.
  • 43. Ibid. at 5, n1.
  • 44. Senate Special Committee on Aging, Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission on Deceptive Marketing of Dietary Supplements ­– FTC Enforcement Activities, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., 2010, at 11.
  • 45. See, e.g., S.M. Oliva, “Consumer Protection or Legal Extortion?” Mises Daily, July 10, 2008, http://mises.org/daily/3035.
  • 46. 402 F.3d 1056, 1070.
  • 47. Ibid. at 1076.
  • 48. Rambus, Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 469 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
  • 49. Ibid. at 467.
  • 50. In the Matter of M. Catherine Higgins, FTC File No. 051-0252, Dissenting Statement of Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch, Feb. 5, 2010, at 2.
  • 51. S.M. Oliva, “FTC Illegally Published Elderly Couple’s Financial Information,” Mises Economics Blog, Dec. 10, 2009, http://blog.mises.org/11216.
  • 52. S.M. Oliva, “FTC Thinks Concealing Information Helps the Public,” Mises Economics Blog, April 1, 2010, http://blog.mises.org/12350.
  • 53. The EAJA limits awards to individuals with a net worth of less than $2 million and businesses with a net worth of less than $7 million. See 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(B).
  • 54. In some cases, the Commission has dispensed with the pretense of ALJ independence altogether by designating a commissioner — even one who participate in the decision to issue the complaint — as the ALJ. See S.M. Oliva, “When Experts Lack Expertise,” Mises Economics Blog, April 15, 2010, http://blog.mises.org/12491.

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