MES - Chapter 2 d

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Chapter 2—Direct Exchange
(continued)
11.
Types of Exchangeable Goods
For the sake of clarity, the examples of exchangeable goods in this
chapter have mainly been taken from tangible commodities, such as
horses, fish, eggs, etc. Such commodities are not the only type of
goods subject to exchange, however. A may exchange his personal
services for the commodity of B. Thus, for example, A may give his
labor services to farmer B in exchange for farm produce. Furthermore, A
may give personal services that function directly as
consumers’ goods in exchange for another good. An individual
may thus exchange his medical advice or his musical performance for
food or clothing. These services are as legitimately
consumers’ goods as those goods that are embodied in
tangible, physical commodities. Similarly, individual labor services
are as much producers’ goods as are tangible capital goods.
As a matter of fact, tangible goods are valued not so much for their
physical content as for their services to the user, whether he is a
consumer or a producer. The actor values the bread for its services in
providing nourishment, the house for its services in providing shelter,
the machine for its service in producing a lower-order good. In the
last analysis, tangible commodities are also valued for their services,
and are thus on the same plane as intangible personal
“services.”
Economics, therefore, is not a science that deals
particularly with “material goods” or
“material welfare.” It deals in general with the
action of men to satisfy their desires, and, specifically, with the
process of exchange of goods as a means for each individual to
“produce” satisfactions for his desires. These
goods may be tangible commodities or they may be intangible personal
services. The principles of supply and demand, of price
determination, are exactly the same for any good, whether it
is in one category or the other. The foregoing analysis is applicable
to all goods.
Thus, the following types of possible exchanges have been covered by
our analysis:
(a) A
commodity for a commodity; such as horses for fish.
(b) A commodity for a personal service;
such as medical advice for butter, or farm labor for food.
(c) A personal service for a personal
service; such as mutual log-rolling by two
settlers, or medical advice for gardening labor, or teaching
for a musical performance.
In
cases where there are several competing homogeneous units, supply and
demand schedules can be added; in cases where one or both parties are
isolated or are the only ones exchanging, the zone of price
determination will be established as indicated above. Thus, if one
arithmetic teacher is bargaining with one violinist for an exchange of
services, their respective utility rankings will set the zone of price
determination. If several arithmetic teachers and several violinists
who provide homogeneous services form a market for their two goods, the
market price will be formed with the addition and intersection of
supply and demand schedules. If the services of the different
individuals are not considered as of equal quality by the demanders,
they will be evaluated separately, and each service will be priced
separately.
The supply curve will then
be a supply of units of a commodity possessed by only one
individual. This individual supply curve is, of course, sloped upward
in a rightward direction. Where only one individual is the supplier of
a good on the market, his supply curve is identical with the
market supply curve.
One evident reason for the confusion of exchange with a mere trade of
material objects is the fact that much intangible property cannot,
by its very nature, be exchanged. A violinist may own
his musicianly ability and exchange units of it, in the form of
service, for the services of a physician. But other personal
attributes, which cannot be exchanged, may be desired as
goods. Thus, Brown might have a desired end: to gain the genuine
approval of Smith. This is a particular consumers’ good which
he cannot purchase with any other good, for what he wants is the
genuine approval rather than a show of approval that might be
purchased. In this case, the consumers’ good is a property of
Smith’s that cannot be exchanged; it might be acquired in
some way, but not by exchange. In relation to exchange, this intangible
good is an inalienable property of
Smith’s, i.e., it cannot be given up. Another example is that
a man cannot permanently transfer his will, even though he may transfer
much of his services and his property. As mentioned above, a man may
not agree to permanent bondage by contracting to work for another man
for the rest of his life. He might change his mind at a later date, and
then he cannot, in a free market, be compelled to continue working
thereafter. Because a man’s self-ownership over his
will is inalienable, he cannot, on the unhampered market, be compelled
to continue an arrangement whereby he submits his will to the orders of
another, even though he might have agreed to this arrangement
previously.
On the other hand, when
property that can be alienated is transferred, it,
of course, becomes the property—under the sole and exclusive
jurisdiction—of the person who has received it in exchange,
and no later regret by the original owner can establish any claim to
the property.
Thus, exchange may occur with alienable goods; they may be
consumers’ goods, of varying degrees of durability; or they
may be producers’ goods. They may be tangible commodities or
intangible personal services. There are other types
of exchangeable items, which are based on these alienable goods. For
example, suppose that Jones deposits a good—say 1,000 bushels
of wheat—in a warehouse for safekeeping. He retains ownership
of the good, but transfers its physical possession to the warehouse
owner, Green, for safekeeping. Green gives Jones a warehouse
receipt for the wheat, certifying that the wheat is there for
safekeeping and giving the owner of the receipt a claim
to receive the wheat whenever he presents the receipt to the warehouse.
In exchange for this service as a guardian of the wheat, Jones pays him
a certain agreed amount of some other good, say emeralds. Thus, the
claim originates from an exchange of a commodity for a
service—emeralds for storage—and the price of this
exchange is determined according to the principles of the foregoing
analysis. Now, however, the warehouse receipt has come into existence
as a claim to the wheat. On an unhampered market, the claim would be
regarded as absolutely secure and certain to be honored, and therefore
Jones would be able to exchange the claim as a substitute
for actual physical exchange of the wheat. He might find another party,
Robinson, who wishes to purchase the wheat in exchange for horses. They
agree on a price, and then Robinson accepts the claim
on the warehouse as a perfectly good substitute for actual transfer of
the wheat. He knows that when he wants to use the wheat, he will be
able to redeem the claim at the warehouse;
the claim therefore functions here as a goods-substitute.
In this case, the claim is to a present good, since
the good can be redeemed at any time that the owner desires.
Here, the nature and function of the claim is simple. The claim is a
secure evidence of ownership of the good. Even simpler is a case where
ownership of property, say a farm, is transferred from A to B by
transferring written title, or evidence of
ownership, which may be considered a claim. The situation
becomes more complicated, however, when ownership is divided into
pieces, and these pieces are transferred from person to person. Thus,
suppose that Harrison is the owner of an iron mine. He decides to
divide up the ownership, and sell the various divided pieces, or shares,
of the good to other individuals. Assume that he creates 100 tickets,
with the total constituting the full ownership of the mine, and then
sells all but 10 tickets to numerous other individuals. The owner of
two shares then becomes a 2/100owner of the mine. Since there
is very little practical scope for such activity in a regime of direct
exchange, analysis of this situation will be reserved for later
chapters. It is clear, however, that the 2/100 owner is entitled to his
proportionate share of direction and control of, and revenue from, the
jointly owned property. In other words, the share
is evidence of part-ownership, or a claim to part-ownership,
of a good. This property right in a proportionate share of the
use of a good can also be sold or bought in exchange.
A third type of claim arises from a credit exchange
(or credit transaction). Up to this point we have
been discussing exchanges of one present good for
another—i.e., the good can be used at present—or
at any desired time—by each receiver in the exchange. In a
credit transaction, a present good is exchanged for a future
good, or rather, a claim on a future good.
Suppose, for example, that Jackson desires to acquire 100 pounds of
cotton at once. He makes the following exchange with Peters: Peters to
give Jackson 100 pounds of cotton now (a present good); and, in return,
Jackson gives Peters a claim on 110 pounds of
cotton one year from now. This is a claim on a future
good—110 pounds of cotton one year from now. The price of the
present good in terms of the future good is 1.1 pounds of future cotton
(one year from now) per pound of present cotton. Prices in such
exchanges are determined by value scales and the meeting of supply and
demand schedules, just as in the case of exchanges of present goods.
Further analysis of the pricing of credit transactions must be left for
later chapters; here it may be pointed out that, as explained
in the previous chapter, every man will evaluate a homogeneous good
more highly the earlier in time is his prospect of attaining it. A
present good (a good consisting of units capable of rendering
equivalent satisfaction) will always be valued more highly than the
same good in the future, in accordance with the individual’s
rate of time preference. It is evident that the various rates of time
preference—ultimately determined by relative
positions on individual value scales—will act to set the
price of credit exchanges. Moreover, the receiver of the
present good—the debtor—will
always have to repay a greater amount of the good
in the future to the creditor—the man who
receives the claim, since the same number of units is worth more as a
present good than as a future good. The creditor is rendering the
debtor the service of using a good in the present,
while the debtor pays for this service by repaying a greater amount of
the good in the future.
At the date when the claim finally falls due, the creditor
redeems the claim and acquires the good itself, thus ending
the existence of the claim. In the meanwhile, however, the claim is in
existence, and it can be bought and sold in exchange for other goods.
Thus, Peters, the creditor, might decide to sell the claim—or
promissory note—to Williams in exchange for a wagon. The
price of this exchange will again be determined by supply and demand
schedules. Demand for the note will be based on its security as a claim
to the cotton. Thus, Williams’ demand for the note (or
Peters’ demand to hold) in terms of wagons will be based on (a)
the direct utility and exchange-value of the wagon, and (b)
the marginal utility of the added units of cotton, discounted
by him on two possible grounds: (l) the length of time the claim has
left until the date of “maturity,” and (2) the
estimate of the security of the note. Thus, the less time
there remains to elapse for a claim to any given good, the higher will
it tend to be valued in the market. Also, if the eventual payment is
considered less than absolutely secure, because of possible
failure to redeem, the claim will be valued less highly in accordance
with people’s estimates of the likelihood of its failure.
After a note has been transferred, it becomes the property of the new
owner, who becomes the creditor and will be entitled to redeem the
claim when due.
When a claim is thus transferred in exchange for some other good (or claim),
this in itself is not a credit transaction. A
credit exchange sets up an unfinished payment on
the part of the debtor; in this case, Peters pays Williams the claim in
return for the other good, and the transaction is finished. Jackson, on
the other hand, remains the debtor as a result of the original
transaction, which remains unfinished until he makes his agreed-upon
payment to the creditor on the date of maturity.
The several types of claims, therefore, are: on present goods, by such
means as warehouse receipts or shares of joint ownership in a
good; and on future goods, arising from credit transactions.
These are evidences of ownership, or, as in the latter case, objects
that will become evidence of ownership at a later
date.
Thus, in addition to the three types of exchanges mentioned above,
there are three other types whose terms and principles are
included in the preceding analysis of this chapter:
(d) A
commodity for a claim; examples of this are: (1) the deposit
of a commodity for a warehouse receipt—the claim to a present
good; (2) a credit transaction, with a commodity exchanged for a claim
to a future commodity; (3) the purchase of shares of
stock in a commodity by exchanging another type of commodity
for them; (4) the purchase of promissory notes on a debtor by
exchanging a commodity. All four of these cases have been
described above.
(e)
A claim for a service; an example is personal service being exchanged
for a promissory note or warehouse receipt or stock.
(f)
A claim for a claim; examples would be: exchange of a promissory note
for another one; of stock shares for a note; of one type of stock share
for another; of a warehouse receipt for any of the other types
of claims.
With all goods analyzable into categories of tangible
commodities, services, or claims to goods (goods-substitutes),
all six possible types of exchanges are covered by the utility
and supply-demand analysis of this chapter. In each case,
different concrete considerations enter into the formation of the value
scales–such as time preference in the case of credit
exchanges; and this permits more to be said about
the various specific types of exchanges. The level of analysis
presented in this chapter, however, encompasses all possible
exchanges of goods. In later chapters, when indirect exchange
has been introduced, the present analysis will apply also, but further
analysis will be made of production and exchange problems involved in
credit exchanges (time preference); in exchanges for capital
goods and consumer goods; and in exchanges for labor services (wages).
12.
Property: The Appropriation of Raw Land
As we have stated above, the origin of all property is
ultimately traceable to the appropriation of an unused
nature-given factor by a man and his “mixing” his
labor with this natural factor to produce a capital good or a
consumers’ good. For when we trace back through gifts and
through exchanges, we must reach a man and an unowned natural resource.
In a free society, any piece of nature that has never been used is
unowned and is subject to a man’s ownership through his first
use or mixing of his labor with this resource.
How will an individual’s title to the nature-given factor be
determined? If Columbus lands on a new continent, is it
legitimate for him to proclaim all the new continent his own,
or even that sector “as far as his eye can see”?
Clearly, this would not be the case in the free society that we are
postulating. Columbus or Crusoe would have to use
the land, to “cultivate” it in some way, before he
could be asserted to own it. This “cultivation”
does not have to involve tilling the soil, although that is one
possible form of cultivation. If the natural resource is land, he may
clear it for a house or a pasture, or care for some plots of timber,
etc. If there is more land than can be used by a limited labor
supply, then the unused land must simply remain unowned until
a first user arrives on the scene. Any attempt to claim a new
resource that someone does not use would have to be considered
invasive of the property right of whoever the first user will turn out
to be.
There is no requirement, however, that land continue
to be used in order for it to continue to be a man’s
property. Suppose that Jones uses some new land, then finds it is
unprofitable, and lets it fall into disuse. Or suppose that he clears
new land and therefore obtains title to it, but then finds that it is
no longer useful in production and allows it to remain idle. In a free
society, would he lose title? No, for once his labor is mixed
with the natural resource, it remains his owned land. His labor has
been irretrievably mixed with the land, and the land is
therefore his or his assigns’ in perpetuity. We
shall see in later chapters that the question whether or not
labor has been mixed with land is irrelevant to its market price or
capital value; in catallactics, the past is of no interest. In
establishing the ownership of property, however, the question is
important, for once the mixture takes place, the man and his heirs have
appropriated the nature-given factor, and for anyone else to seize it
would be an invasive act.
As Wolowski and Levasseur state:
Nature
has been appropriated by him (man) for his use; she has become
his own; she is his property.
This property is legitimate; it constitutes a right as sacred
for man as is the free exercise of his faculties. It is his because it
has come entirely from himself, and is in no way anything but an
emanation from his being. Before him, there was scarcely anything but
matter; since him, and by him, there is interchangeable
wealth. The producer has left a fragment of his own person in
the thing which has thus become valuable, and may hence be regarded as
a prolongation of the faculties of man acting upon external
nature. As a free being he belongs to himself; now, the cause, that is
to say, the productive force, is himself; the effect, that is to say,
the wealth produced, is still himself. Who shall dare contest his title
of ownership so clearly marked by the seal of his personality?
Some critics, especially the Henry Georgists, assert that, while a man
or his assigns may be entitled to the produce of his own labor or
anything exchanged for it, he is not entitled to an original,
nature-given factor, a “gift of nature.” For one
man to appropriate this gift is alleged to be an invasion of a
common heritage that all men deserve to use equally. This is a
self-contradictory position, however. A man cannot produce
anything without the co-operation of original nature-given
factors, if only as standing room. In order to produce and possess any
capital good or consumers’ good, therefore, he must
appropriate and use an original nature-given factor. He cannot form
products purely out of his labor alone; he must mix
his labor with original nature-given factors. Therefore, if
property in land or other nature-given factors is to be denied
man, he cannot obtain property in the fruits of his labor.
Furthermore, in the question of land, it is difficult to see what
better title there is than the first bringing of this land from a
simple unvaluable thing into the sphere of production. For that is what
the first user does. He takes a factor that was previously unowned and
unused, and therefore worthless to anyone, and converts it
into a tool for production of capital and consumers’ goods.
While such questions as communism of property will be discussed in
later parts of this book, it is difficult indeed to see why the mere
fact of being born should automatically confer upon one some aliquot
part of the world’s land. For the first user has
mixed his labor with the land, while neither the newborn child nor his
ancestors have done anything with the land at all.
The problem will be clearer if we consider the case of animals.
Animals are “economic land,” because they are
equivalent to physical land in being original, nature-given factors of
production. Yet will anyone deny title to a cow to the man
that finds and domesticates her, putting her to use? For this is
precisely what occurs in the case of land. Previously valueless
“wild” land, like wild animals, is taken and
transformed by a man into goods useful for man. The
“mixing” of labor gives equivalent title in one
case as in the other.
We must remember, also, what “production” entails.
When man “produces,” he does not create matter. He
uses given materials and transforms and rearranges them into
goods that he desires. In short, he moves matter further toward
consumption. His finding of land or animals and putting them to use is
also such a transformation.
Even if the value accruing to a piece of land at present is
substantial, therefore, it is only “economic land”
because of the innumerable past efforts of men at work on the land.
When we are considering legitimacy of title, the fact that land always
embodies past labor becomes extremely important.
If animals are also “land” in the sense of given
original nature factors, so are water and air. We have seen that
“air” is inappropriable, a condition of
human welfare rather than a scarce good that can be owned. However,
this is true only of air for breathing under usual conditions. For
example, if some people want their air to be changed, or
“conditioned,” then they will have to pay for this
service, and the “conditioned air” becomes a scarce
good that is owned by its producers.
Furthermore, if we understand by “air” the medium
for the transmission of such things as radio waves and television
images, there is only a limited quantity of wave lengths available for
radio and for television purposes. This scarce factor is
appropriable and ownable by man. In a free society, ownership of these
channels would accrue to individuals just like that of land or animals:
the first users obtain the property. The first user, Jones, of the wave
length of 1,000 kilocycles, would be the absolute owner of this length
for his wave area, and it will be his right to continue using
it, to abandon it, to sell it, etc. Anyone else who set up a
transmitter on the owner’s wave length would be as guilty of
invasion of another’s property right as a trespasser
on someone else’s land or a thief of someone else’s
livestock.
The same is true of water. Water, at least in
rivers and oceans, has been considered by most people as also
inappropriable and unownable, although it is conceded to be ownable in
the cases of (small) lakes and wells. Now it is true that the high
seas, in relation to shipping lanes, are probably
inappropriable, because of their abundance in relation to shipping
routes.
This is not
true, however, of fishing rights in oceans. Fish
are definitely not available in unlimited quantities
relatively to human wants. Therefore, they are
appropriable—their stock and source just as the captured fish
themselves. Indeed, nations are always quarreling about
“fishing rights.” In a free society, fishing rights
to the appropriate areas of oceans would be owned by the first
users of those areas and then usable or salable to other individuals.
Ownership of areas of water that contain fish is directly
analogous to private ownership of areas of land or forests that contain
animals to be hunted. Some people raise the difficulty that water flows
and has no fixed position, as land does. This is a completely
invalid objection, however. Land “moves”
too, as when soil is uprooted in dust storms. Most important,
water can definitely be marked off in terms of latitudes and
longitudes. These boundaries, then, would circumscribe the
area owned by individuals, in the full knowledge that fish and water
can move from one person’s property to another. The
value of the property would be gauged according to this knowledge.
Another argument is that appropriation of ownership by a first user
would result in an uneconomic allocation of the nature-given
factors. Thus, suppose that one man can fence, cultivate, or otherwise
use, only five acres of a certain land, while the most economic
allocation would be units of 15 acres. However, the rule of first
ownership by the first user, followed in a free society,
would not mean that ownership must end with this allocation. On the
contrary. In this case, either the owners would pool their assets in
one corporate form, or the most efficient individual owners would buy
out the others, and the final size of each unit of land in production
would be 15 acres.
It must be added that the theory of land ownership in a free society
set forth here, i.e., first ownership by the first user, has nothing in
common with another superficially similar theory of land
ownership—advanced by J.K. Ingalls and his disciples in the
late nineteenth century. Ingalls advocated continuing
ownership only for actual occupiers and personal users of the
land. This is in contrast to original ownership by
the first user.
The Ingalls system would, in the first place, bring about a highly
uneconomic allocation of land factors. Land sites where small
“homestead” holdings are uneconomic would be forced
into use in spite of this, and land would be prevented from entering
other lines of use greatly demanded by consumers. Some land would be
artificially and coercively withdrawn from use, since land that could
not be used by owners in person would have to lie
idle. Furthermore, this theory is self-contradictory, since it would
not really permit ownership at all. One of the prime
conditions of ownership is the right to buy, sell, and dispose
of property as the owner or owners see fit. Since small
holders would not have the right to sell to nonoccupying large holders,
the small holders would not really be owners of the land at all. The
result is that on the ownership question, the Ingalls thesis reverts,
in the final analysis, to the Georgist view that Society (in the
alleged person of the State) should own the land.
13.
Enforcement Against Invasion of Property
This work is largely the analysis of a market society
unhampered by the use of violence or theft against any
man’s person or property. The question of the means
by which this condition is best established is not at present
under consideration. For the present purpose, it makes no difference
whether this condition is established by every man’s
deciding to refrain from invasive action against others or
whether some agency is established to enforce the abandonment of such
action by every individual. (Invasive action may be defined as any
action—violence, theft, or fraud—taking away
another’s personal freedom or property without his
consent.) Whether the enforcement is undertaken by each person or by
some sort of agency, we assume here that such a condition—the
existence of an unhampered market—is maintained in some way.
One of the problems in maintaining the conditions of a free market is
the role of the enforcing agency—whether individual or
organizational—in exchange contracts. What type of contracts
are to be enforced to maintain the conditions of an unhampered market?
We have already seen that contracts assigning away the will of an
individual cannot be enforced in such a market, because the
will of each person is by its nature inalienable. On the other hand, if
the individual made such a contract and received another’s
property in exchange, he must forfeit part or all of the property when
he decides to terminate the agreement. We shall see that fraud may be
considered as theft, because one individual receives the
other’s property but does not fulfill his part of the
exchange bargain, thereby taking the other’s property without
his consent. This case provides the clue to the role of contract and
its enforcement in the free society. Contract must be considered as an
agreed-upon exchange between two persons of two goods, present or
future. Persons would be free to make any and all property contracts
that they wished; and, for a free society to exist, all contracts,
where the good is naturally alienable, must be enforced. Failure to
fulfill contracts must be considered as theft of the other’s
property. Thus, when a debtor purchases a good in exchange for a
promise of future payment, the good cannot be considered his
property until the agreed contract has been fulfilled and payment made.
Until then, it remains the creditor’s property, and
nonpayment would be equivalent to theft of the creditor’s
property.
An important consideration here is that contract not
be enforced because a promise has been made that is not kept.
It is not the business of the enforcing agency or agencies in the free
market to enforce promises merely because they are promises; its
business is to enforce against theft of property, and contracts are
enforced because of the implicit theft involved.
Evidence of a promise to pay property is an
enforceable claim, because the possessor of this claim is, in effect,
the owner of the property involved, and failure to redeem the claim is
equivalent to theft of the property. On the other hand, take the case
of a promise to contribute personal services without an advance
exchange of property. Thus, suppose that a movie actor agrees
to act in three pictures for a certain studio for a year. Before
receiving any goods in exchange (salary), he breaks the
contract and decides not to perform the work. Since his personal will
is inalienable, he cannot, on the free market, be forced to
perform the work there. Further, since he has received none of the
movie company property in exchange, he has committed no theft, and thus
the contract cannot be enforced on the free market. Any suit for
“damages” could not be entertained on an unhampered
market. The fact that the movie company may have made
considerable plans and investments on the expectation that the
actor would keep the agreement may be unfortunate for the company, but
it could not expect the actor to pay for its lack of foresight and poor
entrepreneurship. It pays the penalty for placing too much confidence
in the man. The movie actor has not received and kept any of the
company’s property and therefore cannot be held accountable
in the form of payment of goods as “damages.”
Any such enforced payment
would be an invasion of his property rights on the free market
rather than an attack upon invasion. It may be considered more
moral to keep promises than to break them, but the condition of a free
market is that each individual’s rights of person
and property be maintained, and not that some further
standard of morals be coercively imposed on all. Any coercive
enforcement of such a moral code, going beyond the abolition
of invasive acts, would in itself constitute an invasion of individual
rights of person and property and be an interference in the free market.
It certainly would be consonant with the free market, however,
for the movie company to ask the actor to pay a certain sum in
consideration of his breaking the contract, and, if he
refuses, to refuse to hire him again, and to notify other
prospective contracting parties (such as movie companies) of
the person’s action. It seems likely that his prospect of
making exchanges in the future will suffer because of his action. Thus,
the “blacklist” is permissible on the free market.
Another legitimate action on the free market is the boycott,
by which A urges B not to make an exchange with C, for whatever reason.
Since A’s and B’s actions are purely
voluntary and noninvasive, there is no reason for a boycott not to be
permitted on the unhampered market. On the contrary, any coercive
action against a boycott is an invasion against the rights of free
persons.
If default on contracted debts is to be considered as equivalent to
theft, then on the unhampered market its treatment by the enforcing
agency will be similar to that of theft. It is clear—for
example, in the case of burglary—that the recovery of the
stolen property to its owner would be the fundamental consideration for
the enforcing agency. Punishment of the wrongdoer would be a
consideration subsidiary to the former. Thus, suppose A has stolen 100
ounces of gold from B. By the time A has been
apprehended by the enforcing agency, he has dissipated the 100 ounces
and has no assets by which the 100 ounces can be obtained. The main
goal of the enforcement agency should be to force A to return the 100
ounces. Thus, instead of simply idle imprisonment, the agency could
force the thief to labor and to attach his earnings to make up the
amount of the theft, plus a compensation for the delay in time. Whether
this forced labor is done in or out of prison is immaterial here. The
main point is that the invader of another’s rights on the
free market gives up his rights to the same extent. The first
consideration in the punishment of the aggressor against
property in the free market is the forced return of the equivalent
property.
On the other hand, suppose
that B voluntarily decides to forgive A and grant the latter a gift of
the property; he refuses to “press charges” against
the thief. In that case, the enforcement agency would take no action
against the robber, since he is now in the position of the receiver of
a gift of property.
This analysis provides the clue to the treatment of defaulting debtors
on the free market. If a creditor decides to forget about the debt and
not press charges, he in effect grants a gift of his property to the
debtor, and there is no further room for enforcement of
contract. What if the creditor insists on keeping his
property? It is clear that if the debtor can pay the required
amount but refuses to do so, he is guilty of pure fraud, and the
enforcing agency would treat his act as such. Its prime move
would be to make sure that the debtor’s assets are
transferred to their rightful owner, the creditor. But suppose
that the debtor has not got the property and would be willing to pay if
he had it? Does this entitle him to special privilege or coerced
elimination of the debt, as in the case of bankruptcy laws? Clearly
not. The prime consideration in the treatment of the debtor
would be his continuing and primary responsibility to redeem
the property of the creditor. The only way by which this treatment
could be eliminated would be for the debtor and the creditor
to agree, as part of the original contract, that if the debtor makes
certain investments and fails to have the property at the date
due, the creditor will forgive the debt; in short, he grants the debtor
the rights of a partial co-owner of the property.
There could be no room, in a free society such as we have
outlined, for “negotiable instruments.”
Where the government designates a good as
“negotiable,” if A steals it from B and then sells
it to C without the latter’s knowledge of the theft, B cannot
take the good back from C. Despite the fact that A was a thief and had
no proper title to the good, C is decreed to be the legitimate owner,
and B has no way of regaining his property. The law of negotiability is
evidently a clear infringement of property right. Where property rights
are fully defended, theft cannot be compounded in this manner.
The buyer would have to purchase at his own risk and make sure that the
good is not stolen; if he nonetheless does buy stolen goods, he must
try to obtain restitution from the thief, and not at the
expense of the rightful owner.
What of a cartel agreement? Would that be enforceable in a free
society? If there has been no exchange of property, and A, B, C .
. . firms agree among themselves to set quotas on their
production of a good, this agreement would surely not be illegal, but
neither would it be enforceable. It could be only a simple promise and
not an enforceable case of implicit theft.
One difficulty often raised against a free society of individual
property rights is that it ignores the problem of “external
diseconomies” or “external
costs.” But cases of “external
diseconomy” all turn out to be instances of failure of government—the
enforcing agency—adequately to enforce individual property
rights. The “blame,” therefore, rests not on the
institution of private property, but on the failure of the
government to enforce this property right against various subtle forms
of invasion—the failure, e.g., to maintain a free society.
One instance of this failure is the case of smoke, as well as air
pollution generally. In so far as the outpouring of smoke by
factories pollutes the air and damages the persons and
property of others, it is an invasive act. It is equivalent to an act
of vandalism and in a truly free society would have been punished after
court action brought by the victims. Air pollution, then, is not an
example of a defect in a system of absolute property rights,
but of failure on the part of the government to preserve property
rights. Note that the remedy, in a free society, is not the creation of
an administrative State bureau to prescribe regulations for smoke
control. The remedy is judicial action to punish
and proscribe pollution damage to the person and property of others.
In a free society, as we have stated, every man is a self-owner. No man
is allowed to own the body or mind of another, that being the essence
of slavery. This condition completely overthrows the basis for
a law of defamation, i.e., libel (written defamation) or
slander (oral defamation). For the basis of outlawing defamation is
that every man has a “property in his own
reputation” and that therefore any malicious or
untruthful attack on him or his character (or even more, a truthful
attack!) injures his reputation and therefore should be punished.
However, a man has no such objective property as
“reputation.” His reputation is simply
what others think of him, i.e., it is purely a function of the
subjective thoughts of others. But a man cannot own
the minds or thoughts of others. Therefore, I cannot invade a
man’s property right by criticizing him publicly. Further,
since I do not own others’ minds, either, I cannot force
anyone else to think less of the man because of my criticism.
The foregoing observations should firmly remind us that what the
enforcing agency combats in a free society is invasion of the physical
person and property, not injury to the values
of property. For physical property is what the person owns; he does not
have any ownership in monetary values, which are a function of what others
will pay for his property. Thus, someone’s vandalism against,
or robbery of, a factory is an invasion of physical property
and is outlawed. On the other hand, someone’s shift from the
purchase of this factory’s product to the purchase of a
competing factory’s product may lower the monetary
value of the former’s property, but this is certainly not a
punishable act. It is precisely the condition of a free society that a
property owner have no unearned claim on the
property of anyone else; therefore, he has no vested right in
the value of his property, only in its physical existence. As for the
value, this must take its chance on the free market. This is the
answer, for example, to those who believe that
“undesirable” businesses or people must be legally
prevented from moving into a certain neighborhood because this
may or will “lower the existing property value.”
One method of acquiring property that we have not discussed yet is fraud.
Fraud involves cases where one party to an agreed-upon exchange
deliberately refuses to fulfill his part of the contract. He thus
acquires the property of the other person, but he sacrifices either
none of the agreed-upon goods or less than he had agreed. We have seen
that a debtor’s deliberate failure to pay his
creditor is equivalent to an outright theft of the creditor’s
property.
Another example of fraudulent action is the following
exchange: Smith agrees to give up 15 ounces of gold to Jones
in exchange for a package of certain specified chinaware. When he
receives the package, after having given up the gold, Smith finds that
he has received an empty crate instead of the goods that the two had
agreed to exchange. Jones has falsely represented the goods that he
would exchange, and here again this is equivalent to outright
theft of Smith’s property. Since the exchange has been made
falsely, the actual form of which might not have been contracted had
the other party not been deceived, this is not an example of voluntary
exchange, but of one-sided theft. We therefore exclude both explicit
violence and the implicit violence of fraud from our definition of the
market—the pattern of voluntary interpersonal exchanges. At
this point we are dealing only with an analysis of the market
unhampered by fraud or violence.
We have not here been discussing what type of enforcing agency will be
set up or the means it will use, but what type of actions the agency
will combat and what type will be permissible. In a free
market, all invasive acts by one person against another’s
property, either against his person or his material goods, will be
combatted by the enforcing agency or agencies. We are assuming here
that there are no invasive acts in the society, either because no
individuals commit them or because they are successfully combatted and
prevented by some sort of enforcing agency. The problem then
becomes one of defining invasive, as distinguished from
noninvasive, acts, and this is what has been done here in various
typical examples. Each man would be entitled to ownership over his own
person and over any property that he has acquired by
production, by appropriation of unowned factors, by receiving gifts, or
by voluntary exchange. Never has the basis of the free, noninvasive, or
“voluntaryist” society been described more
clearly in a brief space than by the British political philosopher
Auberon Herbert:
(1)
The great natural fact of each person being born in possession of a
separate mind and separate body implies the ownership of such mind and
body by each person, and rights of direction over such mind and body;
it will be found on examination that no other deduction is reasonable.
(2)
Such self-ownership implies the restraint of violent or fraudulent
aggressions made upon it.
(3)
Individuals, therefore, have the right to protect themselves by force
against such aggressions made forcibly or fraudulently, and they may
delegate such acts of self-defense to a special body called a
government . . .
Condensed
into a few words, our Voluntaryist formula would run: “The
sovereignty of the individual must remain intact, except where the
individual coerced has aggressed upon the sovereignty of another
unaggressive individual.”
Elaborating on the first point, Herbert continued:
If
there is one thing on which we can safely build, it is the great
natural fact that each human being forms with his or her body and mind
a separate entity—from which we must conclude that the
entities belong to themselves and not to each other. As I have said, no
other deduction is possible. If the entities do not belong to
themselves, then we are reduced to the most absurd conclusion. A or B
cannot own himself; but he can own, or part own, C or D.
On the importance of services, see
Arthur Latham Perry, Political Economy
(21st ed.; New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1892), pp.
124–39.
This is not to deny, of course,
that the existence of several violinists of
different quality will affect the consumer’s evaluations of
each one.
If he has taken the property of
another by means of such an agreement, he will, on the free
market, have to return the property. Thus, if A has agreed to work for
life for B in exchange for 10,000 grams of gold, he will have to return
the proportionate amount of property if he terminates the arrangement
and ceases the work.
In other words, he cannot make
enforceable contracts binding his future personal actions. (On contract
enforcement in an unhampered market, see section 13 below. This applies
also to marriage contracts. Since human
self-ownership cannot be alienated, a man or a woman, on a free market,
could not be compelled to continue in marriage if he or she no longer
desired to do so. This is regardless of any previous agreement. Thus, a
marriage contract, like an individual labor contract, is, on an
unhampered market, terminable at the will of either one
of the parties.
In a credit transaction, it is not
necessary for the present and the future goods exchanged to be the same
commodity. Thus, a man can sell wheat now in exchange for a certain
amount of corn at a future date. The example in the text, however,
highlights the importance of time preference and is also more
likely to occur in practice.
Léon Wolowski and
Émile Levasseur, “Property,” Lalor’s
Cyclopedia of Political Science, etc.
(Chicago: M.B. Cary & Co., 1884), III, 392.
See the vivid discussion by Edmond
About, Handbook of Social Economy (London:
Strahan & Co., 1872), pp. 19–30. Even urban sites
embody much past labor. Cf. Herbert B. Dorau and Albert G. Hinman, Urban
Land Economics (New York: Macmillan & Co., 1928), pp.
205–13.
If a channel has to be a certain
number of wave lengths in width in order to permit clear transmission,
then the property would accrue to the first user, in terms of such
width.
Professor Coase has demonstrated
that Federal ownership of airwaves was arrogated, in the
1920’s, not so much to alleviate a preceding
“chaos,” as to forestall this very acquisition of
private property rights in air waves, which the courts were in the
process of establishing according to common law principles. Ronald H.
Coase, “The Federal Communications
Commission,” Journal of Law and Economics,
October, 1959, pp. 5, 30–32.
It is rapidly becoming evident
that air lanes for planes are becoming scarce and,
in a free society, would be owned by first users—thus
obviating a great many plane crashes.
Flowing water
should be owned in proportion to its rate of use by the first
user—i.e., by the “appropriation” rather
than the “riparian” method of ownership. However,
the appropriator would then have absolute control over his
property, might transfer his share, etc., something which cannot be
done in those areas, e.g., states in the West, where an approach to
appropriation ownership now predominates. See
Murray N. Rothbard, “Concerning Water,” The
Freeman, March, 1956, pp. 61–64. Also see
the excellent article by Professor Jerome W. Milliman, “Water
Law and Private Decision-Making: A Critique,” The
Journal of Law and Economics, October,
1959, pp. 41–63; Milliman, “Commonality, the Price
System, and Use of Water Supplies,” Southern
Economic Journal, April, 1956, pp. 426–37.
On Ingalls and his doctrines, see
James J. Martin, Men Against the State (DeKalb,
Ill.: Adrian Allen Associates, 1953), pp. 142–52, 220ff.,
246ff. Also cf. Benjamin R. Tucker, Instead of a Book
(2nd ed.; New York: B.R. Tucker, 1897), pp. 299–357, for the
views of Ingalls’ most able disciple. Despite the underlying
similarity and their many economic errors, the Ingalls-Tucker group
launched some interesting and effective critiques of the Georgist
position. These take on value in the light of the excessive kindness
often accorded to Georgist doctrines by economists.
This is true even
if the actor had previously agreed in a contract that he would pay
damages. For this is still merely a promise; he has not implicitly
seized someone else’s property. The object of an enforcing
agency in a free society is not to uphold promise-keeping by force, but
to redress any invasions of person and property.
Sir Frederick Pollock thus
describes original English contract law:
Money
debts, it is true, were recoverable from an early time. But this was
not because the debtor had promised to repay the loan; it was
because the money was deemed still to belong to the creditor,
as if the identical coins were merely in the debtor’s
custody. The creditor sued to recover money . . . in exactly the same
form which he would have used to demand possession of land . . . and
down to Blackstone’s time the creditor was said to have a
property in the debt—property which the debtor had granted
him. Giving credit, in this way of thinking, is not reliance on the
right to call thereafter for an act . . . to be performed by the
debtor, but merely suspension of the immediate right to possess
one’s own particular money, as the owner of a house lot
suspends his right to occupy it. . . . The foundation of the
plaintiff’s right was not bargain or promise, but the unjust
detention by the defendant of the plaintiff’s money or goods.
(Sir Frederick Pollock, “Contract,” Encyclopedia
Britannica [14th ed.; London, 1929], VI, 339–40)
Wordsworth Donisthorpe, Law
in A Free State (London: Macmillan & Co., 1895), p.
135:
In
Rome one could recover stolen goods, or damages for their loss, by what
we should call a civil process, without in the least affecting the
relation between the thief and the public by reason of the theft.
Restitution first and punishment afterwards was the rule.
This reason for the
unenforceability of a cartel agreement in a free society has no
relation to any common-law hostility to agreements allegedly
“in restraint of trade.” However, it is very
similar to the English common-law doctrine finally worked out
in the Mogul Steamship Case
(1892). See William L. Letwin, “The
English Common Law Concerning Monopolies,” University
of Chicago Law Review, Spring, 1954, pp. 382ff.
Noise is
also an invasive act against another, a transmission of sound waves
assaulting the eardrums of others. On “external
diseconomies,” the only good discussion by an economist is
the excellent one in Mises, Human Action, pp.
650–53. For an appreciation of the distinction
between judicial and administrative action in a free society,
as well as a fine grasp of property rights and governmental
enforcement, see the classic discussion of adulteration in Donisthorpe,
Law in A Free State, pp. 132–58.
Similarly, blackmail
would not be illegal in the free society. For blackmail is the receipt
of money in exchange for the service of not publicizing
certain information about the other person. No violence or threat of
violence to person or property is involved.
Similarly, blackmail
would not be illegal in the free society. For blackmail is the receipt
of money in exchange for the service of not publicizing
certain information about the other person. No violence or threat of
violence to person or property is involved.