What Has Government Done to Our Money? The Unraveling of Bretton Woods, 1968-1971
What Has Government Done to Our Money?
Murray N. Rothbard
IV.
The Monetary Breakdown of the West
6. Phase VI: The Unraveling of Bretton Woods, 1968-1971
As dollars piled up abroad and gold continued to flow outward,
the U.S. found it increasingly difficult to maintain the price of
gold at $35 an ounce in the free gold markets at London and
Zurich. Thirty-five dollars an ounce was the keystone of the
system, and while American citizens have been barred since 1934
from owning gold anywhere in the world, other citizens have
enjoyed the freedom to own gold bullion and coin. Hence, one way
for individual Europeans to redeem their dollars in gold was to
sell their dollars for gold at $35 an ounce in the free gold
market. As the dollar kept inflating and depreciating, and as
American balance of payments deficits continued, Europeans and
other private citizens began to accelerate their sales of dollars
into gold. In order to keep the dollar at $35 an ounce, the U.S.
government was forced to leak out gold from its dwindling stock
to support the $35 price at London and Zurich.
A crisis of confidence in the dollar on the free gold markets led
the United States to effect a fundamental change in the monetary
system in March 1968. The idea was to stop the pesky free gold
market from ever again endangering the Bretton Woods arrangement.
Hence was born the "two-tier gold market." The idea was
that the free-gold market could go to blazes; it would be
strictly insulated from the real monetary action in the
central banks and governments of the world. The United States
would no longer try to keep the free-market gold price at $35; it
would ignore the free gold market, and it and all the other
governments agreed to keep the value of the dollar at $35 an
ounce forevermore. The governments and central banks of the world
would henceforth buy no more gold from the "outside"
market and would sell no more gold to that market; from now on
gold would simply move as counters from one central bank to
another, and new gold supplies, free gold market, or private
demand for gold would take their own course completely separated
from the monetary arrangements of the world.
Along with this, the U.S. pushed hard for the new launching of a
new kind of world paper reserve, Special Drawing Rights (SDRs),
which it was hoped would eventually replace gold altogether and
serve as a new world paper currency to be issued by a future
World Reserve Bank; if such a system were ever established, then
the U.S. could inflate unchecked forevermore, in collaboration
with other world governments (the only limit would then be the
disastrous one of a worldwide runaway inflation and the crackup
of the world paper currency). But the SDRs, combatted intensely
as they have been by Western Europe and the "hard-money"
countries, have so far been only a small supplement to American
and other currency reserves.
All pro-paper economists, from Keynesians to Friedmanites, were
now confident that gold would disappear from the international
monetary system; cut off from its "support" by the
dollar, these economists all confidently predicted, the free-market gold price would soon fall below $35 announce, and even
down to the estimated "industrial" non-monetary gold
price of $10 an ounce. Instead, the free price of gold, never
below $35, had been steadily above $35, and by early 1973 had
climbed to around $125 an ounce, a figure that no pro-paper
economist would have thought possible as recently as a year
earlier.
Far from establishing a permanent new monetary system, the two-tier gold market only bought a few years of time; American
inflation and deficits continued. Eurodollars accumulated
rapidly, gold continued to flow outward, and the higher free-market price of gold simply revealed the accelerated loss of
world confidence in the dollar. the two-tier system moved rapidly
towards crisis-and to the final dissolution of Bretton
Woods. [4]
[4]
On the two-tier gold market, see Jacques Rueff, The
Monetary Sin of the West (New York: MacMillan, 1972).