A friendly introduction to Hoppe's Argumentation Ethics

Reply

Conza88 replied on Tue, Jan 10 2012 10:55 AM

rated by 0 users

Graham Wright:

"As I've said before, in a conversation about beauty, "validity" doesn't come into it, and nor does contradiction.  Your opinions about beauty are what they are."

Are you going to do an AJ as well? And as I've said before:

"Again, how is "I like Picasso" not a truth claim. It is a claim to truth, but for that individual. From the epic quote about "objective" at the top of the page, AJ also chooses to ignore (since it shatters his flawed paradigm).

"In this model, an interior–exterior axis crosses with an individual–plural axis to create four quadrants of possible perspectives. These are the interior-individual (subjective), interior-plural (cultural), exterior-individual (objective), and exterior-plural (social/natural-science/systems). Various fields of knowledge are most at home in particular quadrants, while each quadrant is associated with distinctive forms of knowledge. In this view, human beings, for example, stand as both wholes and parts (“holons”)—both individuals and components of plurals—with both exterior and interior aspects. These aspects are both discrete and inseparable—all of them must be present for us to be the kind of beings that we are."

In the same way we say that the subjective theory of value is objective.. it is for that of value preferences (but individualized for that person). Notice the consistency aye?!"

With the addition of:

"And there is a further point: the very existence of a difference of opinion seems to imply that there is something objective about which disagreement can take place; for otherwise, there would be no contradictions in the different “opinions” and no worry about these conflicts. For a similar argument in refutation of moral subjectivism see G.E. Moore, Ethics (Oxford, 1963 [1912)), pp. 63ff”

— The Ethics of Liberty by Murray Rothbard, Chapter 2, Footnote 22.

Reply

Graham Wright replied on Tue, Jan 10 2012 1:09 PM

rated by 0 users

Gumdy:

Contradictory in the sense that "I am currently dead" is a contradictory statement? 

yes.

What statement in ethics, exactly, is contradictory in this sense?

"Your body is owned by society/government/me/any-other-unrelated-person."

"Late comers called tax-man own property you have aquired."

When you say own, I presume you mean in the normative sense, i.e. "ought to have ultimate decision-making jurisdiction over".

To say that these statements are contradictory in the same sense seems a little odd to me.  "I am currently dead" is an is-statement, but the other is an ought-statement.  How can contradictory mean the same thing for both these types of statement?

Gumdy:

"Rocks have rights" (and so, I can punish you for stepping on a rock)

I don't see how this follows from AE.  I mean, if P implies Q it does not follow that not-P implies not-Q. 

Reply

Gumdy replied on Tue, Jan 10 2012 1:19 PM

rated by 0 users

Graham Wright:

When you say own, I presume you mean in the normative sense, i.e. "ought to have ultimate decision-making jurisdiction over".

To say that these statements are contradictory in the same sense seems a little odd to me.  "I am currently dead" is an is-statement, but the other is an ought-statement.  How can contradictory mean the same thing for both these types of statement?

Well, actions (as opposed to movement in general) also have underling norms (I ought to achive the goal of the action). If the content of the proposition contradicts the goal of proposing the proposition, the proposition is contradictory in a performative way. One cannot also hold he wants to peacfuly resolve disputes.

Gumdy:

"Rocks have rights" (and so, I can punish you for stepping on a rock)

I don't see how this follows from AE.  I mean, if P implies Q it does not follow that not-P implies not-Q. 

This follow from the application of a consistant moral standar, towards moral agents.

Reply

Gumdy replied on Tue, Jan 10 2012 1:30 PM

rated by 0 users

From the article:

 

... And so it’s only fair to ask the golden question of political philosophy- How should conflicts be resolved?

At the most basic level, humans have two options:

1. Fight for control.
2. Talk it over.

Now, if one chooses to engage in violence against his girlfriend, over the use of the car, not much to say. If someone decides to act as in the animal realm, he can expect to be treated as an animal, and that’s it. Only if the participants choose to avoid violence and instead engage in discourse to resolve their dispute, the question of what is  justified arises. They are then engaged in an interaction. A goal oriented peaceful corporation, which we can now examine.

Trade is said to be mutually beneficial because by choosing  to trade both willful participants demonstrate their common preference for the post-trade state of affairs over the pre-trade state of affairs. Otherwise they wouldn’t have voluntarily traded. Underling every voluntary corporation is some common goal. Lets reflect what goal then, is implied by choosing argumentation as means to resolve a conflict. The implied goal is that participants prefer to resolve their dispute without resorting to violence. (Also implied is that they are civilized man).

So violence-aversion, i.e achieving peaceful conflict resolution is the presupposition or demonstrated preference of the participants of an argument. The act of Argumentation, presupposes the basic norm of peaceful conflict resolution. In real terms, an actor engages in argument by speaking, expressing a proposition (by use of sound, hands ext.). An argument is nothing but an exchange of verbal propositions. Thereby, it is by the very act of expressing a proposition that one demonstrates his preference to resolve the given conflict without the use violence.

But then, a crazy professor like Hans Hermann Hoppe might ask, what if the actual content of your proposition is in direct contradiction with what is implied by the act of expressing it (the demonstrated presupposition of argumentation)? What if the content of your proposition is something like- “I don’t care about what you have to say, violence is the only way to resolve disputes…”?

In philosophy propositions that contradict what is directly implied by the very act of expressing them are called performative contradictions. Propositions such as- “I can’t express propositions”, or “I am currently dead” are performative contradictions. An attempt to argue them is by itself contradictory. From very act of arguing them implies they are false. A participant who by expressing a proposition argues for violence is thus engaged in such a performative contradiction.

Contemplating such propositions will make their incoherence clear. What point is there to argue with someone who openly states the result of the argument is of no interest to him? That argumentation has no bearing on how the conflict should be resolved? And so, the presupposition of argumentation- violence-free conflict resolution, cannot logically be denied. From this first presupposition we can derive other, directly derived presuppositions, which also cannot be denied. For example, it is presupposed in argumentation that- “Claims need justification”. Trying to deny this- “I don’t need to justify my claims…” contradicts the underling first presupposition of achieving conflict resolution based on non-violent, i.e verbal means. If anyone can just claim whatever nonsense he wants, with no need to provide justification, the dispute cannot be peacefully resolved on the basis of nothing but claims. So we can also say that “Claims need to be justified” is another, derived, presupposition of argumentation. We can see that argumentation is not random, free floating statements, but a practical affair with guiding underling presuppositions which cannot be rationaly denied.

 

 

Reply

Graham Wright replied on Tue, Jan 10 2012 2:37 PM

rated by 0 users

Gumdy:

Graham Wright:

When you say own, I presume you mean in the normative sense, i.e. "ought to have ultimate decision-making jurisdiction over".

To say that these statements are contradictory in the same sense seems a little odd to me.  "I am currently dead" is an is-statement, but the other is an ought-statement.  How can contradictory mean the same thing for both these types of statement?

Well, actions (as opposed to movement in general) also have underling norms (I ought to achive the goal of the action).

I'm not sure about that.  Action implies the actor had a preference for the goal, certainly.  But isn't it possible to do something that one believes one ought not to do? 

Reply

Graham Wright replied on Tue, Jan 10 2012 3:17 PM

rated by 0 users

Gumdy, your article is well-written but it lacks an explicit definition of argument at the beginning and at times as I'm reading I'm left wondering whether a slight change to your definition has crept in.  Would you accept this definition of argumentation... the act of participants engaging in discourse to resolve a conflict as an alternative to violence. 

Reply

Gumdy replied on Tue, Jan 10 2012 3:32 PM

rated by 0 users

"Action implies the actor had a preference for the goal, certainly. "

And so the actor must hold that he preferes achiving the goal.

"But isn't it possible to do something that one believes one ought not to do?"

I'm not sure what "believes" means here. Both accept the conflict ought to be resolved via discourse, which is the basic norm.

Reply

Gumdy replied on Tue, Jan 10 2012 3:33 PM

rated by 0 users

Would you accept this definition of argumentation... the act of participants engaging in discourse to resolve a conflict as an alternative to violence.

 

Sure, and we can drop the suffix "as an alternative to violence" because discourse is already non violent.

Reply

Graham Wright replied on Tue, Jan 10 2012 5:03 PM

rated by 0 users

OK, that is a far narrower definition than I have considered so far.  It's only discourse engaged in with the goal of resolving a conflict.  And conflict refers to a dispute about a scarce good.  So an aggressor making a verbal case to try to avoid a punishment is arguing.  The scarce good there is whatever the aggression was about.  What of non-libertarian political philosophers?  Are they arguing when they talk favorably of e.g. socialism?  I suppose since political philosophy is all about 'who owns what scarce goods' I can accept this.  But what else counts as an argument?  Not two physicists "arguing" about whether String Theory has merit.  Not two film buffs "arguing" about the greatest film ever made.  It seems to me that neither of these are arguments by this new definition (Where's the conflict?  What scarce good is involved?).  Do you agree?

Reply

Gumdy replied on Tue, Jan 10 2012 5:50 PM

rated by 0 users

OK, that is a far narrower definition than I have considered so far. ... I suppose since political philosophy is all about 'who owns what scarce goods' I can accept this...

It is not narrow nor wide- it is precisely the relevant scope. This is just what is at the core of politics...

It seems to me that neither of these are arguments by this new definition (Where's the conflict?  What scarce good is involved?).  Do you agree?

I agree, but I'm not interested in who is right about string theory. I am interested who is right about capitalism.

Reply

Charles Anthony replied on Wed, Jan 11 2012 2:22 PM

rated by 0 users

Gumdy:

Graham Wright:

  Would you accept this definition of argumentation... the act of participants engaging in discourse to resolve a conflict as an alternative to violence. 

Sure, and we can drop the suffix "as an alternative to violence" because discourse is already non violent.

So, what is the definition of argumentation? 

Reply

Gumdy replied on Wed, Jan 11 2012 2:32 PM

rated by 0 users

Hello Charles.

Actions logically imply intentions. Trade implies intentions as well as argumentation. If they deny they want to peacfully resolve the dispute the can also (of course) deny the NAP, but no point in justifying anything to them, of furthr talking, because just like animals they don't hold it to be relevant.

Reply

Graham Wright replied on Wed, Jan 11 2012 2:41 PM

rated by 0 users

It's narrower than the commonly-used definition.  I mean, most people would say its possible to "argument about how to resolve a conflict", whereas to us, now, that is a pleonasm, because all "arguments" are about how to resolve a conflict.  There are things that everyday people would describe as an argument, that are not arguments to us.  "Argument about physics" and "argument about films" are now contradictions-in-terms to us.

There are some places where I feel you might have reverted to the commonly-used definition...

Gumdy:

Underling every voluntary corporation is some common goal. Lets reflect what goal then, is implied by choosing argumentation as means to resolve a conflict.

You may have intended this as a pleonasm, or you may have meant 'choosing discourse'. 

Gumdy:

The act of Argumentation, presupposes the basic norm of peaceful conflict resolution. In real terms, an actor engages in argument by speaking, expressing a proposition (by use of sound, hands ext.). An argument is nothing but an exchange of verbal propositions. Thereby, it is by the very act of expressing a proposition that one demonstrates his preference to resolve the given conflict without the use violence.

This is problematic to me because you're using the term 'proposition', which, like argument, usually has a broader meaning than just relating to conflict resolution.  You could narrow the definition of proposition down to only refer to statements made during arguments.  Or you could keep the conventional definition of proposition, but then your last sentence is not true.  Not every act of expressing of proposition demonstrates that; only propositions expressed during arguments; only propositions expressed during discourse engaged in to resolve a conflict.

I am not saying these are irreconcilible problems, but it's worth getting these things cleared up.

Reply

Gumdy replied on Wed, Jan 11 2012 2:47 PM

rated by 0 users

Graham,

It's simply the relevant context for politics. This is the context of political argumentation, which we are talking about.

Reply

Charles Anthony replied on Wed, Jan 11 2012 2:48 PM

rated by 0 users

Gumdy:

Actions logically imply intentions.

Reply

Gumdy replied on Wed, Jan 11 2012 2:56 PM

rated by 0 users

but so in human action.

Reply

Charles Anthony replied on Wed, Jan 11 2012 3:43 PM

rated by 0 users

Not even. 

Anyway, avoiding violence has nothing to do with the NAP. 

Reply

Gumdy replied on Wed, Jan 11 2012 4:15 PM

rated by 0 users

Charles, you don't seem to be interested in any discussion, so I'm just going to leave it there.

Reply

Graham Wright replied on Wed, Jan 11 2012 4:33 PM

rated by 0 users

Gumdy,

Are you going to address the points I raised?

Reply

Gumdy replied on Wed, Jan 11 2012 4:40 PM

rated by 0 users

Graham,

I probably don't understand you. do you see any fallacy in the logic?

Reply

Graham Wright replied on Thu, Jan 12 2012 2:21 PM

rated by 0 users

If you are being inconsistent with definitions, then there may be an equivocation fallacy there.

Reply

Gumdy replied on Thu, Jan 12 2012 2:26 PM

rated by 0 users

 

If you are being inconsistent with definitions, then there may be an equivocation fallacy there.

 

Where (equivocation)?

Reply

Graham Wright replied on Thu, Jan 12 2012 4:29 PM

rated by 0 users

I don't know.  It depends on how you reconcile the problem I already pointed out.

Reply

Gumdy replied on Thu, Jan 12 2012 5:28 PM

rated by 0 users

Since I'm not sure if it's a problem, or if I understand, lets say I don't. What than is the equivocation?

Reply

Charles Anthony replied on Fri, Jan 13 2012 9:10 AM

rated by 0 users

Why should anybody waste effort finding a logical fallacy unless the premises used in that logic are justified?  You did not justify your premises and you never showed where Hoppe did -- assuming he did. 

You said actions logically imply intentions but you never proved that.  [You never will be able to prove it because it is a false statement by the way.]  When I pointed that out, you ignored it and just said "Yes, they do."   If that is what you pass off as argumentation, then you should bow out of trying to convince people that there is anything in AE that is worth considering. 

Reply

Gumdy replied on Fri, Jan 13 2012 9:39 AM

rated by 0 users

Charles,

Human action is purposeful and so, purposeful action betrays preference. Trade betray preference, eating a banana betray preference, and discourse betray preference. This is why the actions of an actor imply his demonstrated preference. This is the bases of both Austrian Economics and ArgEthics. The question of free will, and praxeology, I wish not to debate here. I recommend reading Rothbard clear words (which I linked to in the article as well). If you have questions regarding praxeology, I recommend opening a new thread.

Reply

Charles Anthony replied on Fri, Jan 13 2012 9:50 AM

rated by 0 users

Gumby,

Stop being disingenuous.  Praxeology is not the failure in your attempt to defend AE.  Your premises are the achilles heel. What you quoted from Rothbard does not prove that:

person arguing = person wants to avoid violence 

If you can show where Hoppe proves that false statement, please offer it.  Long-winded videos of Hoppe saying essentially nothing do not count as proof of the above premise. 

Reply

nirgrahamUK replied on Fri, Jan 13 2012 9:56 AM

rated by 0 users

Charles, let me try to boil the point down one last time.

An argument where two people put forward ideas and try to get at the truth, is different from a *situation* where someone is using force to *coerce* someone else to say some words in english that sound like *you win the argument* under threat of force.

Do you dispute this ?

Reply

Gumdy replied on Fri, Jan 13 2012 10:02 AM

rated by 0 users

Charles,

I have also written about this in the article (as this is the base). See paragraphs 3-11.

Reply

Charles Anthony replied on Fri, Jan 13 2012 10:37 AM

rated by 0 users

nirgrahamUK:

An argument where two people put forward ideas and try to get at the truth, is different from a *situation* where someone is using force to *coerce* someone else to say some words in english that sound like *you win the argument* under threat of force.

Do you dispute this ?

Whether I dispute it or not is irrelevent.  You are passing this fleetingly-convincing argument off as objective proof -- that is not good enough. 

Just in case it matters, yes, I dispute it because it is a stupid false statement.  Nobody has the capacity to know what the intentions are of a person, for goodness' sake.  Without an intelligent definition of arguing from you AEadvocates, I see no reason to even pay attention to what you said. 

Reply

nirgrahamUK replied on Fri, Jan 13 2012 10:49 AM

rated by 0 users

>>Nobody has the capacity to know what the intentions are of a person, for goodness' sake.

actually this is irrelevant. because we can still posit that IF intentions are to 'mouth words that one doesnt mean' then X and IF intentions are to mouth words that one does mean' then Y .

The hypothetico-deductive constructions are how we do economics? do you have a a problem with it? Do you say intentions are impossible to discern therefore Misesian Economics / Praxeology is not worth anyones attention?

I'm cool with you disputing it, but not for such paltry reasons.... c'mon....

Reply

Charles Anthony replied on Fri, Jan 13 2012 11:05 AM

rated by 0 users

Still no proof. 

nirgrahamUK:

>>Nobody has the capacity to know what the intentions are of a person, for goodness' sake.

actually this is irrelevant. because we can still posit that IF intentions are to 'mouth words that one doesnt mean' then X and IF intentions are to mouth words that one does mean' then Y .

nirgrahamUK:

The hypothetico-deductive constructions are how we do economics? do you have a a problem with it? Do you say intentions are impossible to discern therefore Misesian Economics / Praxeology is not worth anyones attention?

I'm cool with you disputing it, but not for such paltry reasons.... c'mon....

Reply

nirgrahamUK replied on Fri, Jan 13 2012 11:14 AM

rated by 0 users

so you can do economics without appeal to the notion of exchange?  because exchange would require that you allow that the agents have certain intentions....

Reply

Charles Anthony replied on Fri, Jan 13 2012 11:29 AM

rated by 0 users

Still no proof. 

nirgrahamUK:

so you can do economics without appeal to the notion of exchange? 

The equivocation of definitions was raised and never addressed.  I think I know why.   Equivocation is the method of argumentation in favor of AE or possibly, AEadvocates do not have the capacity to see their leaps in logic. 

Reply

nirgrahamUK replied on Fri, Jan 13 2012 11:32 AM

rated by 0 users

Others may have equivocated can you put that on me. When I asked you my question I was trying to find out whether her you could or would make conceptual distinctions. I expects that you might given that you are comfortable enough to consider praxeology of merit.

Reply

Gumdy replied on Fri, Jan 13 2012 11:51 AM

rated by 0 users

What a men internally feels/realy believes/thinks is simply irrelevant. To deny the presupposition is to void the argument.

Reply

Graham Wright replied on Fri, Jan 13 2012 1:58 PM

rated by 0 users

Gumdy, just work it through.  If 'proposition' is 'a statement made during an argument' and 'argument' is as we agreed above 'the act of participants engaging in discourse to resolve a conflict', then 'to express a proposition' means 'to make a statement during discourse engaged in to resolve a conflict'.

Now here's your paragraph:

Gumdy:

The act of Argumentation, presupposes the basic norm of peaceful conflict resolution. In real terms, an actor engages in argument by speaking, expressing a proposition (by use of sound, hands ext.). An argument is nothing but an exchange of verbal propositions. Thereby, it is by the very act of expressing a proposition that one demonstrates his preference to resolve the given conflict without the use violence.

Substituting in these definitions, we get:

The act of {engaging in discourse to resolve a conflict}, presupposes the basic norm of peaceful conflict resolution. In real terms, an actor engages in {discourse to resolve a conflict} by speaking, {making a statement during discourse engaged in to resolve a conflict}  (by use of sound, hands ext.). {Discourse engaged in to resolve a conflict} is nothing but an exchange of verbal {statements made during discourse engaged in to resolve a conflict}. Thereby, it is by the very act of {making a statement during discourse engaged in to resolve a conflict} one demonstrates his preference to resolve the given conflict without the use violence.

Now, the first sentence is false, unless you consider actions in general to presuppose norms, which they don't, they only demonstrate preferences.  The second sentence is false, because speaking is not equivalent to making a statement during discourse engaged in to resolve a conflict.  The third sentence is false, unless you consider discourse to be limited to verbal exchanges, and if you do then the sentence is tautological.  The last sentence is trivially true, because all actions demonstrate that the actor had a preference for the goal of the action.

Does this make the problem clearer to you? 

Reply

Gumdy replied on Fri, Jan 13 2012 2:13 PM

rated by 0 users

Yes, thank you, I now understand what you are talking about.

The act of {engaging in discourse to resolve a conflict}, presupposes the basic norm of peaceful conflict resolution.

Now, the first sentence is false, unless you consider actions in general to presuppose norms, which they don't, they only demonstrate preferences.

This is just semantic. Discourse is non violent, once it is violent, it's not discourse. so if you want to resolve an argument via discourse it also is presupposed (by the nature of discourse) that you want to resolve it in a non-violent way.

an actor engages in {discourse to resolve a conflict} by speaking, {making a statement during discourse engaged in to resolve a conflict}  (by use of sound, hands ext.).

The second sentence is false, because speaking is not equivalent to making a statement during discourse engaged in to resolve a conflict.

No, again, this is only talking about waht it physically  means to engage in argument, I don't see anything false here.

{Discourse engaged in to resolve a conflict} is nothing but an exchange of verbal {statements made during discourse engaged in to resolve a conflict}.

A proposition is not nessaseraly expressed in an argument, it's a more general term which is relevant and is a part of an argument. From the begining you are fusing definition and context. This isn't a big deal, just I think this might be confusing when you substitue things...

Reply

Graham Wright replied on Fri, Jan 13 2012 4:27 PM

rated by 0 users

Gumdy:

Yes, thank you, I now understand what you are talking about.

The act of {engaging in discourse to resolve a conflict}, presupposes the basic norm of peaceful conflict resolution.

Now, the first sentence is false, unless you consider actions in general to presuppose norms, which they don't, they only demonstrate preferences.

This is just semantic. Discourse is non violent, once it is violent, it's not discourse. so if you want to resolve an argument via discourse it also is presupposed (by the nature of discourse) that you want to resolve it in a non-violent way.

Yes.  "Want" being the operative word.  It's a preference being demonstrated; a goal being presupposed, not a norm.  If you had said "ought" instead of "want", you'd have been claiming that a norm was being presupposed, and I would have disagreed.

Gumdy:

an actor engages in {discourse to resolve a conflict} by speaking, {making a statement during discourse engaged in to resolve a conflict}  (by use of sound, hands ext.).

The second sentence is false, because speaking is not equivalent to making a statement during discourse engaged in to resolve a conflict.

No, again, this is only talking about waht it physically  means to engage in argument, I don't see anything false here.

Well if it's not false, it's tautological.  Depends how you meant the comma.  You're not really saying anything here, except that 'discourse can include speaking'.  Well, thanks!

Gumdy:

{Discourse engaged in to resolve a conflict} is nothing but an exchange of verbal {statements made during discourse engaged in to resolve a conflict}.

A proposition is not nessaseraly expressed in an argument, it's a more general term which is relevant and is a part of an argument. From the begining you are fusing definition and context. This isn't a big deal, just I think this might be confusing when you substitue things...