Action Axiom, Free Will, and Physics

I'm pretty good at knowing when I'm getting real world sensory data or just imagining or dreaming something.

what is your prior basis for comparison?

I would say that the right answer to the question was that he discovered a certain plant worked as an antidote when it was tried and it worked. Perhaps he got the inspiration to try it from a vision - after all, there is the apocryphal story about Newton being inspired by a falling apple - but the discovery that it worked can't be said to really have happened until real world results went as predicted.

why not? Clearly the information necessary for the theory of curing the ailment was provided in the vision. Administering the herb provides confirmation/lack thereof of the hypothesis. But the hypothetical answer is already known. And, who is to say that the experimental results are beond challenge? What if the patient really would have recovered anyway, and the herb is superfluous? Two false positives.

furthermore, lets say the shaman decided to consult a shaman three villages over via smoke signals. He gets the same answer as he would have in the vision. Does he now "know" the cure, based on the other shaman's experimental results?

And a stopped clock is right twice a day.

if your theory considers the clock to define the time of day, then the clock is always right and the solar system is wrong except for two brief periods every day.

Malachi:

I'm pretty good at knowing when I'm getting real world sensory data or just imagining or dreaming something.

what is your prior basis for comparison? 

Call this basis whatever you want. Even if the basis was just a hint, a "feeling", the fact that he's here now should be pretty convincing evidence of his ability to know whether the cars barreling down a road he's crossing are real or imaginary. The ones who fail to distinguish between the real and imaginary simply don't manage to stick around long enough to argue the alternative hypothesis. They just get run over.

 

Again, you seem to insist that I accept reject some sensory data as false meaningless. What is your basis for excluding dreams? When I imagine something, I do not hallucinate it.

The ones who fail to distinguish between the real and imaginary simply don't manage to stick around long enough to argue the alternative hypothesis.

More like those who insist that some sensory data must be meaningless suffer the consequences from shutting off that world of perception. Right now, I am waiting for someone to give me a reason to discount dreams and visions as valid sensory data. So far it seems like pure dogma.

I don't think there is anything in contention here. You're simply defining "real" differently. 

We tend to call sensory data "real" if we believe they give us reliable guidance on how to act to better our circumstances, that is, what results to expect if we perform various actions:

"I saw a real pillow flying at my head so I ducked." (In calling the pillow "real," you're effectively judging, after the fact, that you avoided a soft blow to the head by ducking.)

"I drempt I cut my finger, but when I woke up I saw that the cut wasn't real." (So it'd be a waste of time and money to go buy a band-aid.)

"I thought the dream of my dog running away was just a dream, but I woke up and he was really gone."* (So you would have done better to start hurrying to look for him before you ambled downstairs to check on him.)

"The glass looked like it was full of water, but it wasn't really." (The unreliable guidepost led you to refuse a refill even though you're thirsty.)

"I imagined an apple on the table even though there wasn't a real one there." (Since you knew you were just imagining it, you didn't waste time trying to grab it.)

*In this case we are forced, under this definition, to call the dream in some way real. But that is just as well, for if what happened in our dreams always came true, it would be natural to refer to the dreamworld as part of reality.

You're simply defining "real" differently.

if by that, you mean that I refrain from eliminating data based on prior decisions about what is and is not real, then yes.

We tend to call sensory data "real" if we believe they  (1) turn out to have lasting relevance to us ("I thought the dream of my dog running away was just a dream, but I woke up and he was gone.") (2) appear at a high level of detail, vividness, and resolution ("The dream looked and felt so real.") and  (3) connect coherently with the rest of the set of sensations that satisfy 1 and 2 above.

Do you guys regularly encounter what seems to be "unreal" sensory data? Could you perhaps give me a real world example of a person encountering such data?

my point here is that we disagreeing about the existence of meaningless sensory data. You seem to be trying to get me to admit to making the same prior distinction as yourselves, here. I see no basis to exclude sensory data in the above quote. If data seem to contradict data, that might be a clue that your theory is bunk.

Plenty of sensory data are "unreal" by that definition. You see glass that looks full, but it turns out to be empty. Then you judge (post hoc) that the initial sensory data was unreal by that definition, because it was not a reliable guidepost. I edited the post to make it clearer with a bunch of examples and distilled the definition to a single requirement.

You're simply defining "real" differently.

if by that, you mean that I refrain from eliminating data based on prior decisions about what is and is not real, then yes.

AJ:

Plenty of sensory data are "unreal" by that definition. You see glass that looks full, but it turns out to be empty. Then you judge (post hoc) that the initial sensory data was unreal by that definition, because it was not a reliable guidepost. I edited the post to make it clearer with a bunch of examples and distilled the definition to a single requirement.

That sounds like your interpretation of sensory data was flawed. Or are you suggesting that the photons entering your iris were false photons? I will address your edited post presently, assuming my guest does not arrive before I finish.

Real = a member of the set of all extant things

Well that just pushes the question back: What do you mean by "extant things"?

AJ:

I don't think there is anything in contention here. You're simply defining "real" differently. 

We tend to call sensory data "real" if we believe they give us reliable guidance on how to act to better our circumstances, that is, what results to expect if we perform various actions:

Thus leading to the dismissal of sensation that doesnt fit your theory, because you do not consider it "actionable intelligence" in a sense.

"I saw a real pillow flying at my so I ducked." (In calling the pillow "real," you're effectively judging, after the fact, that you avoided a soft blow to the head by ducking.)

I find it hard to imagine someone qualifying a projectile as real in the absence of the local existence of illusory missiles. Is this the case anywhere that you know of?

"I drempt I cut my finger, but when I woke up I saw that the cut wasn't real." (So it'd be a waste of time and money to go buy a band-aid.)

You mean you had a dream in which you cut your finger, when you woke up and saw your intact finger you realized that interpreting dreamworld events as literal analogues to waking-world events might not be useful in this instance.

"I thought the dream of my dog running away was just a dream, but I woke up and he was really gone."* (So you'd better start hurrying to look for him before you amble downstairs to check on him.)

So you discovered that your theory discounting the information in dreams was incorrect. So much for "just a dream."

"The glass looked like it was full of water, but it wasn't really." (The unreliable guidepost led you to refuse a refill even though you're thirsty.)

Perhaps you should look more closely next time. The answer is the same, care and attention in collection and analysis of sensory data. Or do you argue that we should always ask for refills?

"I imagined an apple on the table even though there wasn't a real one there." (Since you knew you were just imagining it, you didn't waste time trying to grab it.)

I have a particularly vivid imagination, and when I visualize an event or an object, My visual cortex doesnt get confused. So I understand this example, I just dont see how it is relevant.

*In this case we are forced, under this definition, to call the dream in some way real. But that is just as well, for if what happened in our dreams always came true, it would be natural to refer to the dreamworld as part of reality.

what do you define as "came true"? My entire inquiry is specifically geared towards the basis for your distinction here. What happens in the dreamworld does come true, as it happens. This is part of reality. What don't you get?

AJ:

Well that just pushes the question back: What do you mean by "extant things"?

Objects, as distinct from subject. Did you expect me to come up, somehow, with an un-parse-able definition?

I expected a definition that I could interpret in just one way in this context. 

Thus leading to the dismissal of sensation that doesnt fit your theory, because you do not consider it "actionable intelligence" in a sense.

Dismissal? Theory? All I've done so far is propose a definition and give some examples of how it reflects typical English usage.

what do you define as "came true"?

The dream came true means the dream turned out to provide reliable guidance for my waking actions. 

Malachi:

I'm pretty good at knowing when I'm getting real world sensory data or just imagining or dreaming something.

what is your prior basis for comparison?

Do you mean how do I know if I'm awake instead of dreaming? Granted I have had vivid dreams, and I do know a trick I can use in a dream to determine I am dreaming. But I don't recall ever being awake (i.e., consciously interacting with the real world environment), going about my day, and felt as if I were in a dream state.

Drugs are a different matter, but still not something I would confuse with the dream state, per se. About 10 years ago I had my wisdom teeth removed and took Vicodin for a few days afterward. I defintely felt a little "spacey" and would drift in and out of sleep at times, though I was pretty much lying down with ice on my face the whole time, so that was fine.

Clearly the information necessary for the theory of curing the ailment was provided in the vision. Administering the herb provides confirmation/lack thereof of the hypothesis. But the hypothetical answer is already known.

It isn't "known" until it is tested. If I flip a coin to decide yes/no answers to questions I know nothing about, I can't say that I "knew" the answers to the 50% of questions I will, statistically speaking, answer correctly.

And a stopped clock is right twice a day.

if your theory considers the clock to define the time of day, then the clock is always right and the solar system is wrong except for two brief periods every day.

A clock doesn't define time, it measures time. If I could tell time with sufficient precision by looking at the solar system, what would I need the clock for?

AJ:

I expected a definition that I could interpret in just one way in this context. 

Something is real if it is something you can know through experience. I am sorry, I am not God, I cannot step outside of myself to tell you what is "real" in an objective sense. Something is real insofar as it is extant. Some things are experienced, and other things are inferred. Most any complicated idea is the result of a theoretical interpretation that is a mixture of personally experienced events, personally selected ideology, and emotional detritus. If I experience something, I know it exists on some level. The significance I assign to the experience is largely a matter of where it fits in my theory. Your theory excludes dreams, I would like to know on what basis? I told you I do not exclude data. Data is real.

Dismissal? Theory? All I've done so far is propose a definition and give some examples of how it reflects typical English usage.

I did not realize you spoke for the English.

The dream came true means the dream turned out to provide reliable guidance for my waking actions.

sensory data requires interpretation. A prophetic vision experienced during sleeping hours might be the easiest to interpret, but this doesnt mean all sensory data should conform to the same interpretation.

Do you mean how do I know if I'm awake instead of dreaming? Granted I have had vivid dreams, and I do know a trick I can use in a dream to determine I am dreaming. But I don't recall ever being awake (i.e., consciously interacting with the real world environment), going about my day, and felt as if I were in a dream state.

no, what is your basis for defining those categories. What is a "dream"? When you "imagine something" do you get sensory data? What is your basis for acceptance of some sensory data and dismissal of other data?

It isn't "known" until it is tested. If I flip a coin to decide yes/no answers to questions I know nothing about, I can't say that I "knew" the answers to the 50% of questions I will, statistically speaking, answer correctly.

so if the test isnt performed, can we say anything about the efficacy of the cure?

A clock doesn't define time, it measures time. If I could tell time with sufficient precision by looking at the solar system, what would I need the clock for?

and defining an experience as "not real" does not make it irrelevant to your life experience.

For me, the "dream state" is the period during which I experience touch, sounds, sights, emotions, etc. while my body is asleep. All of the things I encounter during that time are sometimes close simulations of experiences I could have while awake, however they are not occuring in "reality." They things I see are not the result of my eyes detecting photons and transmitting the information to my brain, and likewise for the things I might hear, say, touch, and taste.

Malachi:

defining an experience as "not real" does not make it irrelevant to your life experience.

 

I wholeheartedly agree.

For me, the "dream state" is the period during which I experience touch, sounds, sights, emotions, etc. while my body is asleep.

thats a good description

All of the things I encounter during that time are sometimes close simulations of experiences I could have while awake, however they are not occuring in "reality."

why is this distinction relevant to you?

They things I see are not the result of my eyes detecting photons and transmitting the information to my brain, and likewise for the things I might hear, say, touch, and taste.

yet somehow you still have these experiences. And, on some arbitrary basis, you dismiss them from consideration. Is this why? Because you cannot explain from whence they come?

Malachi:

All of the things I encounter during that time are sometimes close simulations of experiences I could have while awake, however they are not occuring in "reality."

why is this distinction relevant to you?

Because dream events are not are not actually "real" in the sense of being interactions with the outside world. In my dream I might be able to fly, or jump over skyscrapers, or be chased by monsters. I may encounter people I know, yet these encounters are not actually part of my shared history with those people. If I dream I am at work, nothing I do is actually done in reality and I cannot expect wages for it.

Dreams do not have a consistent history and events in them do not require action like they do in the real world.

yet somehow you still have these experiences. And, on some arbitrary basis, you dismiss them from consideration. Is this why? Because you cannot explain from whence they come?

I'm not sure I know what you mean by "dismiss them from consideration," but I do not regard them as actual interactions with the real world. And I can easily explain where my dreams come from: they come from my brain. My hopes, concerns, fears, desires; things that are on my mind to some degree or another. I believe dreams have value for introspection as well as for "fun." 

Malachi, as I said, I present no theory; as far as I'm concerned we haven't moved past the definitions phase yet. And no, I'm not defining the word "real" in such a way that it excludes dreams. I think my definition is pretty clear.

Josh:

I'm pretty good at knowing when I'm getting real world sensory data or just imagining or dreaming something.

How do you know?

Josh:

the discovery that it (snake antidote) worked can't be said to really have happened until real world results went as predicted.

Fair enough, but does it seem rational to consider this a coincidence?  Of all the thousands of plant species in this one man's immediate enviroment?

Josh:

And a stopped clock is right twice a day.

If the shaman had the same record, he'd probably be out of a job real quick!

Because dream events are not are not actually "real" in the sense of being interactions with the outside world. In my dream I might be able to fly, or jump over skyscrapers, or be chased by monsters. I may encounter people I know, yet these encounters are not actually part of my shared history with those people. If I dream I am at work, nothing I do is actually done in reality and I cannot expect wages for it.

you just described a few things that dreams are not. There are an infinite number of things that dreams are not. Can you tell me what dreams are? Failing that, can you give me a positive reason to dismiss the dream world from consideration? I could easily say that "the real world is not relevant because the real world is not an eggnog milkshake." why would your dreams of being at work have to count as hours on the time clock for them to be significant? 

Dreams do not have a consistent history and events in them do not require action like they do in the real world.

its hard for me to see how you can make such broad and far-reaching claims. For example, what consistency do you expect, in order to observe a lack thereof? Perhaps you are not interpreting the dreams correctly. Conceptually, you have been consistent throughout your posts, but you used different words each time. Could I then claim that your posts did not exhibit consistency?

I'm not sure I know what you mean by "dismiss them from consideration," but I do not regard them as actual interactions with the real world. And I can easily explain where my dreams come from: they come from my brain. My hopes, concerns, fears, desires; things that are on my mind to some degree or another. I believe dreams have value for introspection as well as for "fun."

this is more what I was looking for. How can you judge that the origins of the dreams are confined to your brain?

AJ:

Malachi, as I said, I present no theory; as far as I'm concerned we haven't moved past the definitions phase yet. And no, I'm not defining the word "real" in such a way that it excludes dreams. I think my definition is pretty clear.

We tend to call sensory data "real" if we believe they give us reliable guidance on how to act to better our circumstances, that is, what results to expect if we perform various actions:

this definition references a theory of cause and effect. Data is judged to be "real" if it is reliable when computed through your understanding of cause and effect. I suggest that if your theory of the universe is not 100% complete or accurate, and if you eliminate data based on its conformity to your theory of the universe, then you put yourself in an echo chamber where everything that your theory accounts for is seen as evidence to support your theory, and everything that your theory does not account for is seen as irrelevant.

"what we've got here is failure to communicate. Some men you just can't reach. So, you get what we had here last night, which is the way he wants it. Well, he gets it! And I don't like it any more than you men."

My definition is not a theory, nor does it "reference" a theory. It simply specifies a set of sensations that we feel a certain way about and NAMES them. I'm not sure how to make this any clearer.

AJ:

My definition is not a theory, nor does it "reference" a theory. It simply specifies a set of sensations that we feel a certain way about and NAMES them. I'm not sure how to make this any clearer.

We tend to call sensory data "real" if we believe they give us reliable guidance on how to act to better our circumstances, that is, what results to expect if we perform various actions:

How is this not a direct reference to your theory of cause and effect? "we believe they give us reliable guidance" surely you do not claim to KNOW that your belief is correct. That means it is a theory. If you dont believe certain data give you reliable guidance, and so you label that data as "not real," you have excluded data based on its correspondence of your theory of cause and effect. "It simply specifies a set of sensations that we feel a certain way about and NAMES them." "feel a certain way about" would be a reference to your prior assumptions.

The definition mentions a feeling that people may have, and although that feeling may be the result of each person's own theory of cause and effect (or just their unreasoned feelings), no such theory is proposed by the definition. The definition only points to sensations, only names them, only gives a key for the readers to understand the terms used in the upcoming discussion. I am making a point about word usage, not a theory. We need to define terms BEFORE moving into the theory phase, and this exchange is a perfect example of why.

For example, if Winston believes that the jagged line on his visual field is a crack in his window (meaning that he will, for instance, want to avoid bumping into it), he will call it real, and if he believes it's a trick of the light, he won't call it real (since he doesn't believe it means anything for his actions). The is the definition I'm proposing, again, in simpler terms: Real sensations = sensations the speaker believes provide reliable guidance for his actions.

The definition mentions a feeling that people may have, and although that feeling may be the result of each person's own theory of cause and effect (or just their unreasoned feelings), no such theory is proposed by the definition.

that feeling is necessarily the result of a theory of cause and effect. Your definition of "real" presupposes several things. It presupposes a real/unreal distinction, and it presupposes a theory of cause and effect. My point is (and has been from the beginning) that your decision to eliminate certain data as "not real" has the tendency to put you in an echo chamber where everything that reinforces your theory of cause and effect is valid data, and everything that suggests a different theory is invalid data. "no such theory is proposed by the definition" you should have said "no specific theory" which would make my point more clear. My problem is with dogmatic exclusion of evidence based on any theory.

The definition only points to sensations, only names them, only gives a key for the readers to understand the terms used in the upcoming discussion.

And note how convenient the upcoming discussion would be for you if you were able to beg the question in this manner. I reject the real/unreal distinction. Things are real insofar as they are sensed or thought of. Interpretation starts when the senses are filtered into percepts. This interpretation relies on theory. I reject the dogmatic dismissal of sense data.

I am making a point about word usage, not a theory. We need to define terms BEFORE moving into the theory phase, and this exchange is a perfect example of why.

I am making a point about terms. see

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theoretical_definition

AJ:

For example, if Winston believes that the jagged line on his visual field is a crack in his window (meaning that he will, for instance, want to avoid bumping into it), he will call it real, and if he believes it's a trick of the light, he won't call it real (since he doesn't believe it means anything for his actions). The is the definition I'm proposing, again, in simpler terms: Real sensations = sensations the speaker believes provide reliable guidance for his actions.

If he believes it to be a trick of the light he should call it a real trick of the light, instead of creating a mental category that makes no sense. This is exactly what I am talking about. And, you did it again. "Real sensations = sensations the speaker believes provide reliable guidance for his actions" when viewed through the lens of causal relationships. Meaning anything defined as "unreal" is divorced from cause/effect, and therefore meaningless, and cold not possibly suggest modification to his theory of cause/effect.

Jackson LaRose:

How do you know?

Unless I am The Solipsist, I know.

Of all the thousands of plant species in this one man's immediate enviroment?

How long had they lived in that environment? All of their lives, for generations stretching back who knows how far? I would imagine there were a great many unsuccessful attempts to treat snake envenomation for a very long time before this particular shaman tried this plant in an way that worked.

And a stopped clock is right twice a day.

If the shaman had the same record, he'd probably be out of a job real quick!

If a shaman's visions were right twice a day, I think he would be extraordinarily popular.

If a shaman's visions were right twice a day, I think he would be extraordinarily popular.

hell, they might even make him the shaman.

 

Malachi, you're not recognizing the difference between a definition of a term, and statement using a term interpreted with YOUR definition. You keep substituting your own definition of "real" into my definition and then interpreting it like a proposition. I say "Let's define real sense data as X" and you see instead "X are the real ("valid") sense data." It's easy to tell you're doing this because you say things like "I reject the real/unreal distinction." You're not reading. I'm not using your definition and then making a statement; I'm proposing my own definition and making NO statement with it at all. I'm not rejecting any sense data as "invalid" (whatever that even means). You might even be surprised that we're in agreement about sense data, since as of now you have no way of knowing what I thin k about them since I've said zero about that so far.

Your act of proposing a definition is a statement. That definition refers to a theory, and implies a distinction I am not willing to make. By saying that some sense data are real, you make a statement about sense data, even if you expand the set of real sense data to include all sense data (as I do). Taking my position just makes your statement trivial.

Josh:

 

Malachi:

How can you judge that the origins of the dreams are confined to your brain?

Because my nightcap has a tin-foil liner and they can't be beamed in. Seriously though, I have simply found no compelling reason to believe that dream events are taking place anywhere besides the brain of the dreamer. If people can be shown to communicate with one another in dreamed experiences (and If such a thing were possible, I think it would be easily demonstrable), I would immediately change my mind.

Well at least you try to keep an open mind. It's not easily demonstrable when you grow up immersed in a culture full of propaganda that derides anything outside of a narrow band of materialistic interests. Lucid dreaming is way more lame than dirtbikes, bro

Josh:

Unless I am The Solipsist, I know.

This does not answer the question, "how do you know?".

So, I'm assuming here that you think the shaman tried it out first, then told everyone he had discovered it in a dream.  In other words, he's full of it.  Why to you consider that conclusion superior?

 

Malachi:

Your act of proposing a definition is a statement. That definition refers to a theory, and implies a distinction I am not willing to make. By saying that some sense data are real, you make a statement about sense data, even if you expand the set of real sense data to include all sense data (as I do). Taking my position just makes your statement trivial.

You mean you're reading into my definition more than is there, assuming I'm making it with some ulterior motive, like perhaps that I want to dismiss certain sensory data. Well I'm not doing that. I'm simply trying to make a clear definition. I have no agenda, no theory to propose. I don't even think this is a field where it makes sense to have a theory or a position, even though it is fashionable in philosophy to do so. As far as I'm concerned it's solely a matter of clarifying the language. 

AJ:

Malachi:

Your act of proposing a definition is a statement. That definition refers to a theory, and implies a distinction I am not willing to make. By saying that some sense data are real, you make a statement about sense data, even if you expand the set of real sense data to include all sense data (as I do). Taking my position just makes your statement trivial.

You mean you're reading into my definition more than is there, assuming I'm making it with some ulterior motive, like perhaps that I want to dismiss certain sensory data. Well I'm not doing that. I'm simply trying to make a clear definition. I have no agenda, no theory to propose. I don't even think this is a field where it makes sense to have a theory or a position, even though it is fashionable in philosophy to do so. As far as I'm concerned it's solely a matter of clarifying the language. 

How would you react in this analogous situation?

"we use the term "retard" to refer to human beings who are so foolish or stupid that they do not deserve to live. Bear in mind I have not identified any specific retards, nor do I claim that any actual retards exist. Furthermore, I do not propose a standard by which to evaluate the qualities that might make someone a retard. I am simply defining terms here. It is a matter of language and not theory"