Atheist Meta-Ethics: Neo-Nihilism - what do you think?

Hi,

What do you think of the neo-nihilist account on morality below?

Looks logical to me, and it's in line with subjectivism of the Austrians I guess.

As far as I understand things Rothbard would argue for natural rights, so where would he put the logical error in this video/text?

Video

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pmGL8NQ519Q

Transcript of video

http://forums.philosophyforums.com/threads/metaethics-neo-nihilism-37641.html

I don't know what Rothbard would say, but here is my question:

He says, "If we want to be rational, then we must...."  Why "ought" we be rational?  

"Looks logical to me, and it's in line with subjectivism of the Austrians I guess."

No, it isn't logically consistent. The subjective theory of value within economics is objective.

"As far as I understand things Rothbard would argue for natural rights, so where would he put the logical error in this video/text?"

Well for starters I'd imagine he'd point out that there is a difference between political philosophy & personal ethics / morality. Something a ton of people fail to fully recognise & understand.

"It is not the intention of this book [The Ethics of Liberty] to expound or defend at length the philosophy of natural law, or to elaborate a natural law ethic for the personal morality of man. The intention is to set forth a social ethic of liberty, i.e., to elaborate that subset of natural law that develops the concept of natural rights, and that deals with the proper sphere of ‘politics’, i.e. with violence and nonviolence as modes of interpersonal relations. In short, to set forth a political philosophy of liberty." - MNR, ETOL p.25

...

"Libertarianism, then, is a philosophy seeking a policy. But what else can a libertarian philosophy say about strategy, about “policy”? In the first place, surely-again in Acton’s words-it must say that liberty is the “highest political end,” the overriding goal of libertarian philosophy. Highest political end, of course, does not mean “highest end” for man in general. Indeed, every individual has a variety of personal ends and differing hierarchies of importance for these goals on his personal scale of values. Political philosophy is that subset of ethical philosophy which deals specifically with politics, that is, the proper role of violence in human life (and hence the explication of such concepts as crime and property). Indeed, a libertarian world would beone in which every individual would at last be free to seek and pursue his own ends-to “pursue happiness,” in the felicitous Jeffersonian phrase." - TEOL, chp 30

...

"Libertarianism is logically consistent with almost any attitude toward culture, society, religion, or moral principle. In strict logic, libertarian political doctrine can be severed from all other considerations; logically one can be - and indeed most libertarians in fact are: hedonists, libertines, immoralists, militant enemies of religion in general and Christianity in particular - and still be consistent adherents of libertarian politics. In fact, in strict logic, one can be a consistent devotee of property rights politically and be a moocher, a scamster, and a petty crook and racketeer in practice, as all too many libertarians turn out to be. Strictly logically, one can do these things, but psychologically, sociologically, and in practice, it simply doesn't work that way." - MNR

...

"How about Professor Block's second premise, that evil is only the initiation of violence? Here I think it is possible to partially reconcile the Block and Halliday positions. It is a question of what context we are dealing with. I would agree with Block that within the context of libertarian theory, evil must be confined to the initiation of violence. On the other hand, when we proceed from libertarianism to the question of wider social and personal ethics, then I would agree with Halliday that there are many other actions which should be considered as evil: lying, for example or deliberately failing to fulfill one's best potential. But these are not matters about which liberty - the problem of the proper scope of violence - has anything to say. In short, qua libertarian there is nothing wrong or evil about breaking dates, being gratuitously nasty to one's associates, or generally behaving like a cad: here not only do I join Professor Block, but I would expect Mr. Halliday and all other libertarians to do the same. On the other hand, qua general ethicist, I would join Mr. Halliday in denouncing such behavior, while Professor Block would not."

Recently; "Block: I'm shocked that I ever wrote it. I don't think I meant it. I agree, fully, with Murray."

 

As far as I know of his feelings towards nihilism / where he has mentioned it;

"The essential message of deconstructionism and hermeneutics can be variously summed up as nihilism, relativism, and solipsism. That is, either there is no objective truth or, if there is, we can never discover it. With each person being bound to his own subjective views, feelings, history, and so on, there is no method of discovering objective truth. In literature, the most elemental procedure of literary criticism (that is, trying to figure out what a given author meant to say) becomes impossible. Communication between writer and reader similarly becomes hopeless; furthermore, not only can no reader ever figure out what an author meant to say, but even the author does not know or understand what he himself meant to say, so fragmented, confused, and driven is each particular individual. So, since it is impossible to figure out what Shakespeare, Conrad, Plato, Aristotle, or Machiavelli meant, what becomes the point of either reading or writing literary or philosophical criticism?" - The Hermeneutical Invasion of Philosophy and Economics - MNR

...

"The beginning stage of nihilism, Rothbard maintains, occurred in art. "First, the left-liberals preached l'art pour l'art in aesthetics, and, as a corollary in ethics, trumpeted the new view that there is no such thing as a revealed or objective ethics, that all ethics are 'subjective,' that all of life's choices are only personal, emotive 'preferences'" (p. 296).

The denial of objective standards in the name of freedom led to death and destruction. Rothbard maintains that ethical nihilism results in the overthrow of the most basic human rights, including the right not to be murdered. He has not the slightest sympathy for the rampant pro-euthanasia movement. "No, the mask is off, and Doctor Assisted Death and Mr. Liberal Death with Dignity, and all the rest of the crew turn out to be Doctor or Mister Murder. Watch out Mr. And Ms. America: liberal humanists, lay and medical, are . . . out to kill you" (p. 303)." - David Gordon reviewing The Irrepressible Rothbard.

...

The following is Chapter 44 of The Irrepressible Rothbard.

"How can anyone, finding himself surrounded by a rising tide of evil, fail to do his utmost to fight against it? In our century, we have been inundated by a flood of evil, in the form of collectivism, socialism, egalitarianism, and nihilism. It has always been crystal clear to me that we have a compelling moral obligation, for the sake of ourselves, our loved ones, our posterity, our friends, our neighbors, and our country, to do battle against that evil."
 

I'd recommend you check this out. Post already too long, here is the part of interest: "The combination of an objective personal ethics with a political system of freedom is, then, logically consistent." ...

The authors' version of ethics excludes this suggestion. They embrace "individualistic perfectionism." There is no fixed pattern to which every individual, in his pursuit of eudaimonia, must conform. Rather, "the generic goods and virtues that constitute human flourishing only become actual, determinate, and valuable realities when they are given particular form by the choices of flesh-and-blood persons. The importance or value of these goods and virtues is rooted in factors that are unique to each person, for it is not the universal as such that is valuable. . . Human flourishing is not simply achieved and enjoyed by individuals, but it is individualized."(pp.132-33)

Lewis S., you don't have to be rational but most of us prefer to be rational

 

I guess I fall in line here.  A good book I'd recommend is Ethics:  Inventing Right and Wrong by J.L. Mackie.  Basically it seems to me that the idea of morality is that your feelings and intuitions about what you feel you think you want to do somehow have to be justified.  I take the approach that it just "is".  Humans evolved to value fairness, kindness, justice, etc. in relation to brutality, extortion, etc.  You can pose an argument that says, "if you want to be consistent with your own personal values, then non-aggression is the way to go..." or "you might approve of non-aggression when you stop to think about it..." without appealing to any sort of ethical normativity.

Basically what I think is that it suffers from the same problem religion poses:  square pegs in round holes.  It is an attempt to stuff every worldview, every thought, every emotion, and every person into a box and slap a "'right" or "wrong" answer on it.  If you want to argue how to best achieve human fulfillment, that is one thing.  To say one ought to value human fulfillment is another and really is just an opinion (that 99.99% of us happen to share, but that doesn't change it from subjective to objective).

 

And on the other point, I guess I don't differ Nietzsche and folks such as that because I do believe in our ability to apprehend objective reality in some form.  As I see it, we all experience this reality from different perspectives.  So some statements about reality I believe are more reliable and accurate than others and I don't disown epistemology.  Yes, the subjective theory of value is objective.  A moralizing Austrian would have to say that STOV is a description about values but there is some vague, transcendental moral realm that is floating in the ether that computates all action and spits out a binary right or wrong answer.  Not really buying that.

 

"Action is, by definition, always rational. One is unwarranted in calling goals of action irrational simply because they are not  worth striving for from the point of view of one’s own valuations. "

~ Epistemological Problems of Economics, p. 35, Mises

"A moralizing Austrian"

No such thing. Austrian economics is value free.

"Not really buying that."

That's good, because that isn't what is being sold.

@Eric080: You can put the need for justification of one's actions on less squishy ground by incorporating the potential for one's actions to involve oneself in conflict with other humans. In general, this is what we mean by moral consideration as opposed to, say, simple planning. If morality is just calculating the consequences of one's actions, then there is no difference between cutting down a tree and shooting someone... the prudent person will simply calculate the consequences of his or her actions either way. But non-sociopaths naturally find this kind of idea revolting - might does not make right and murdering someone is wrong even if you can get away with it.

The difference is that, while cutting down a tree might be risky, the tree's relatives will not try to take revenge on you for cutting it down. If you cut it down without incident, then you are home free. The tree is just an inanimate object with no social context or ability to calculate and act. But if you murder my brother, I might just hunt you down and kill you. There is published literature that goes over how we can expect that morality-like social norms would emerge from this (evolutionary ethics). Humans think about right and wrong for a reason.

But this is all purely descriptive at this point. It won't help you sort through a moral problem like "should I get an abortion?" To get to the normative side of things involves opening a whole other can of worms.

Clayton -

Yes there is such a thing as a moralizing Austrian, one who adheres to Austrian economic theory and moralizes at the same time!   The moralizing bit doesn't have anything to do with Austrian econ per se.

Okay but Clayton, if I did murder your brother I would feel bad.  That is my internal reaction.  So this feeling (evolved due to natural selection) factors into the cost/benefit analysis.  It sounds cold and logical because it is, but I think this is toned down by saying something to the effect of "I respect human life, therefore I do not kill."

@Eric080: Right, but we mean something stronger than "you'll feel bad if you murder someone" when we say "murder is (morally) wrong" because there is no contradiction in saying that it is wrong to murder even when a sociopath (who feels no more guilt than if he were felling a tree) does it. So, we are passing a judgment on someone's actions regardless of their own assessment of their actions. I am working on this subject in my spare time and I think there is some confusion in moral philosophy because, on first instinct, we try to evaluate normative assessments on the basis of the assessment of the acting individual himself or herself. In reality, moral judgments are aesthetic evaluations (or expressions of valuation, however you want to look at it) made by others regarding the actions of an individual. When I say, "murder is wrong" I mean that when someone else murders, I find that action disgusting, revolting, angering, upsetting, etc. The thought of one person murdering another brings me dissatisfaction, whereas the thought of people not murdering each other brings me satisfaction. The murderer's own feelings about his actions are irrelevant. 

Looked at in this way, moral norms can be thought of in the same kind of category as market prices: an objective criterion that emerges from the uncoordinated, independent, subjective valuations of many individuals. Just like you can't buy a brand new Ferrari for $1 even though your subjective valuation of a Ferrari may be no higher than $1 (you are bid out of the market so that your valuation is irrelevant) so you cannot change the definition of murder by simply becoming a sociopath and refusing to agree that killing an innocent human being is wrong. Your valuations are so far removed from the "going price" - that is, ordinary social norms - that they are irrelevant.

This is my own theory and I'm still hammering it out.

Clayton -

 

"Action is, by definition, always rational. One is unwarranted in calling goals of action irrational simply because they are not  worth striving for from the point of view of one’s own valuations.

I'd disagree with that statement. To me there are actions (of humans) that are rational and other that are not. The distinction isn't however always clear.

If someone is walking in his sleep, is that considered rational or merely a vegetative response? Asked differently would sleepwalking be considered an action at all?

I believe Mises defines action as purposeful behavior.  Purposeful behavior implies planning and reasoning capacity, therefore the only irrational behavior is reflexive or instinctive, like breathing or sneezing.  That is, if I understand correctly.

EDIT: as far as sleepwalking goes, one cannot purposefully sleepwalk, so it seems it would not be considered "action" in the Misesean sense?  Someone help me with this please...?

BTW: When I posted my question, I interpreted the speaker's use of the term through this lense, though he seems to be using the term (rational) to mean "consistent." 

Exceptional video, and one which I feel I agree with almost wholeheartedly (this may be a good description of my position). It fairly thoroughly debunks the lie of objective morality, something which so many libertarians are unfortunately whole heatedly attached to. Rothbard's otherwise exceptional and monumentous career was marked again and again with his attempts to prescribe an objective, atheistic, and non-utilitarian ethic by which he could denounce all those who disagreed with him as evil, yet he never truly confronted the fundamental problems with morality. Truly his ethics were far more logical and non contradictory, but such is irrelevant to the fact that this undertaking was, in the end, a failure.

My understanding of the video is: "There are no objective values, so operate according to your subjective values." To me this seems so obvious as to be hardly worth stating. Is there any affirmative tenet advanced by "neo-nihilism," or is it simply a rejection of other ideas?

So they objectively value subjective ethics?

Clayton:

Looked at in this way, moral norms can be thought of in the same kind of category as market prices: an objective criterion that emerges from the uncoordinated, independent, subjective valuations of many individuals.

You should consider the fact that different people's moral norms are unlikely to be "uncoordinated" and "independent" of each other; in fact, moral norms are inherently a multi-person affair. To take a simple example: driving on the right (or left) side of the road. It's not that every person, taken individually, overwhelmingly prefers to drive on the right, but they each make their decision based on others' prior and expected future decisions, resulting in a "norm" that you should drive on the right (and that anyone who doesn't is reckless and dangerous).

Sieben:

So they objectively value subjective ethics?

They're not literally commanding anyone to do anything; they say "if we want to be rational...". When I say "so operate according to your subjective values," this isn't literally a command either. In fact, since it's impossible to operate under anything other than your subjective values, this "command" is entirely devoid of content, and so the substance of the video's message is just "There are no objective values, so." Which is why I'm having trouble figuring out what "neo-nihilism" actually advances.

zavoi:

They're not literally commanding anyone to do anything; they say "if we want to be rational...". When I say "so operate according to your subjective values,

Neither does ethics. It says "if you want to be moral do X".

zavoi:

since it's impossible to operate under anything other than your subjective values,

You can choose your subjective values though

zavoi:

Which is why I'm having trouble figuring out what "neo-nihilism" actually advances.

If they are saying we should value subjective ethics, they are not nihilists.

No comment on the content, but I'd like to point out that even if you are simply refuting bad theory, these days it seems you have to label yourself with something in order to be taken seriously. I don't know if that is the case with neo-nihilism, but in philosophy in general I think the biggest advancements to be gained are actually in trashing the nonsense theories that distract people, especially Platonism (or whatever that theory is called that tries to tell people that naming something makes it real; apologies to any Platonists if I got the wrong title - no time to do the research right now).

"Yes there is such a thing as a moralizing Austrian, one who adheres to Austrian economic theory and moralizes at the same time! "

No, there is no such thing as a moralizing 'Austrian' qua Austrian Economist.

"The moralizing bit doesn't have anything to do with Austrian econ per se."

Yep, so why say it's a moralizing "Austrian"?

----

"Truly his ethics were far more logical and non contradictory, but such is irrelevant to the fact that this undertaking was, in the end, a failure."

The only failure here is your analysis & baseless assertions.

or whatever that theory is called that tries to tell people that naming something makes it real

Platonism is predicated on certain ideal concepts (like "horse" or "yellow") having real existence in their own abstract realm. You could call it an ideal realism. It has little to do with naming things but rather archetypes.

Conza, it's like saying "a brown fox".  You're describing a noun.  Austrian in this sense is an adherent to Austrian econ.  Moralizing is the description.  Since the thing I was talking about was subjective theory of value in relation to ethics, the point being made was that an Austrian who just so happens to moralize definitionally accepts STOV, but at the same time maintains that some values ought to be held instead of others.  I was just....Laying it out.

"Conza, it's like saying "a brown fox"."

No, it's like saying "a square circle."

"You're describing a noun.  Austrian in this sense is an adherent to Austrian econ.  Moralizing is the description. "

It's exactly like the comical attempt of "thick" and "thin" libertarianism.

And why did you stop at economic school of thought? Why not political philosophy? Religion? Epistemology? How about methodology within the natural sciences? And on and on.

"Since the thing I was talking about was subjective theory of value in relation to ethics, the point being made was that an Austrian who just so happens to moralize definitionally accepts STOV, but at the same time maintains that some values ought to be held instead of others.  I was just....Laying it out."

Moralize, eh? Like? What and who maintains that some values ought to be held instead of others?

"The only failure here is your analysis & baseless assertions."

How is my analysis a failure? Indeed such by itself is a baseless assertion.

Rothbard's entire career on the subject of moral philosophy was based upon a non-utilitarian standard of ethics based upon the concept of self ownership but he never once answered the question of why one inherently should respect the ownership of others. He acted as though he had an irrefutable objective set of ethics when, in the end, he had nothing but an opinion that you should respect the self ownership of others based upon a set property norm. His ethics would have been just as valid had they been utility based.

It is particularly odd that Rothbard should take this approach when the reason that the Austrian school really works is because it understands subjective value and the fact that value preferences shift from person to person, yet Rothbard tries to set an objective value despite being one of the Austrian School's greatest economists. Such is ironic and contradictory.

I hope this clarifies the above statement.

 

 

Sieben:

Neither does ethics. It says "if you want to be moral do X".

"If you want to be socialist, redistribute wealth."

"If you want to be shomer Shabbat, don't turn on lights on Saturday."

"If you want to be a {long list of 1,000 randomly-chosen actions}-er, do {one of those actions}."

What distinguishes "moral" from any other category of actions that someone could come up with?

@Zavoi: Morality is not a strategy. That is, morality is not about means, it's about ends. Morality is a subset of valuation.

Clayton -

Zavoi:

What distinguishes "moral" from any other category of actions that someone could come up with?

Nothing. Why do you want to be ethical? Personal taste probably...

Morality is kind of this bundled term. Its the synthesis between our decision making process (do this, don't do that), a green/red flag if you will, and a standard of conduct. I see no reason to bundle these concepts. They are analytically distinct.

This is more commonly known as Moral Anti-Realism

"How is my analysis a failure? Indeed such by itself is a baseless assertion."

Negative, considering it was pointed out you didn't make an argument. The burden of proof doesn't lie with me. In any case, it's what you have now taken it upon yourself todo.

"Rothbard's entire career on the subject of moral philosophy"

Moral philosophy? Ahhh, you mean political philosophy - right?

"was based upon a non-utilitarian standard of ethics"

I believe the words you are looking for: a rationalist axiomatic-deductive objective ethics.

"but he never once answered the question of why one inherently should respect the ownership of others."

That's because your question is completely irrelevent to political philosophy. This is basic stuff bro.

"For we are not, in constructing a theory of liberty and property, i.e., a "political" ethic, concerned with all personal moral principles. We are not herewith concerned whether it is moral or immoral for someone to lie, to be a good person, to develop his faculties, or be kind or mean to his neighbors. We are concerned, in this sort of discussion, solely with such "political ethical" questions as the proper role of violence, the sphere of rights, or the definitions of criminality and aggression. Whether or not it is moral or immoral for "Smith" - the fellow excluded by the owner from the plank or the lifeboat - to force someone else out of the lifeboat, or whether he should die heroically instead, is not our concern, and not the proper concern of a theory of political ethics.[5]" - MNR

"He acted as though he had an irrefutable objective set of ethics when, in the end, he had nothing but an opinion that you should respect the self ownership of others based upon a set property norm."

Nope, not just an opinion. And "in the end", he recognised argumentation ethics.

"In a dazzling breakthrough for political philosophy in general and for libertarianism in particular, he [Hoppe] has managed to transcend the famous is / ought, fact / value dichotomy that has plagued philosophy since the days of the scholastics, and that had brought modern libertarianism into a tiresome deadlock. Not only that: Hans Hoppe has managed to establish the case for anarcho-capitalist-lockean rights in an unprecedentedly hard-core manner, one that makes my own natural law / natural rights position seem almost wimpy in comparison." - Murray N. Rothbard, "Beyond Is and Ought," Liberty (Nov. 1988): 44-45, 44.

...

"Nevertheless, by coming out with a genuinely new theory (amazing in itself, considering the long history of political philosophy) Hoppe is in danger of offending all the intellectual vested interests of the libertarian camp. Utilitarians, who should be happy that value freedom was preserved, will be appalled to find that Hoppean rights are even more absolutist and "dogmatic" than natural rights. Natural rightsers, while happy at the "dogmatism" will be unwilling to accept an ethics not grounded in the board nature of things. Randians will be particularly upset on the satantic immanual kant and his "synthetic a priori". Randians might be mollified, however, to learn that Hoppe is influence by a group of German Kantians (headed by mathematician Paul Lorenzen) who interpret Kant as a deeply realistic Aristotelian, in contrast to the Idealist interpretation common in the U. S.

As a natural rightser, I don't see any real contradiction here, or why one cannot hold to both the natural rights and the Hoppean rights ethic at the same time. Both rights ethics, after all, are grounded, like the realist version of Kantianism, in the nature of reality. Natural law, too, provides a personal and social ethic apart from libertarianism; this is an area Hoppe is not concerned with...." - MNR, pg 2.
 

"Can you clarify something for me; are you saying libertarianism, a certain moral system, Austrian economics, and anarcho-capitalism are interchangeable synonymous words, or did I completely miss your point?"

Sure. No, that's not what I'm saying. Libertarianism is a political philosophy - which is a subset of ethics, it has nothing to do with Austrian Economics - which is value free. For eg. you can have an Austrian Economist - who understands the praxeological considerations, i.e that rent control destroys, but in term - he is a Nazi (political philosophy) and supports the Israeli government adopting such a policy.

The question of religion is another completely different ballpark. Where natural law ultimately comes from is completely irrelevent to political philosophy. Natural law is neither anti-religious, or pro-religious. It's a different ontological question. There is also the type of personal ethics one adopts. 

My point was - why stop at Austrian? Why not a "moralizing" Utilitarian-Libertarian-Austrian-Athiest-NeoKantian? Could probably add some more onto that, anyway it was a brief attempt at argumentum ad absurdum. Libertarianism I'd use as a general description of those who try and apply the NAP as their principle. Anarcho-capitalism is the logical conclusion of libertarianism.

This may clear things up; (context is discussion about thick and thin libertarianism) - may be helpful here though. From Wilderness:

"I came at it from the opposite direction which I think Conza is doing.  It's as if you are reading the story from the left column to the right column and I am reading it from the right to the left, ie. opposite direction.  It gives the name a whole other meaning.  The way I was reading it, is the noun (libertarian) is being added upon by the adjective, ie. thick or thin.  The noun is staying political and the adjective is determining the kind of politics, ie. the noun.  Read the way you put it, the noun is political but the adjective is a whole separate concept, yet, such a concept is still being discussed within a class of political individuals called libertarians so the thin and thick by such an effort might only have to do with libertarians and nobody else.  But is that true?  Are there no thick and thin socialists?  I don't know.  But it would seem the way you are using the terms thick and thin they are not dependent on libertarian, ie. the politics.  So if thick and thin are not dependent on politics then thick and thin has to be able to be used with other political stances.  Now if thick and thin can't be used by other political stances and if the thick and thin are only "indicating... a broader group of values", then I don't really have a problem with that.

To attach non-political values to a political term will make it a bit flustering unless of course it is vetted out as to what you mean, I mean, Conza means, etc....  I think Conza sees the adjective as influencing the noun.  Adjectives do that.  That's why they are grammatical of that sense.  But if thin and thick are nouns too and libertarian remains a noun, then I think that's what you are talking about.  And as I said how can I really have a problem with that because that would be what I'm saying and what Conza and even E.R. are saying.  Political is not 'these broader values'.  We are all agreeing with that.  But does the grammar and thus meaning if thick and thin are adjectives placed onto the noun really doing that?  I incline no."

Conza, look :

 

"A brown fox".  Fox is the noun, brown describes his color.  "A moralizing Austrian."  Austrian (adherent of the economic school and appreciator of the subjective theory of value) is the noun, moralizing describes a particular Austrian.  I never said all Austrians were moralizers and I never said they had one unified code of ethics, just like saying all foxes are not definitionally brown.  You compare it to a square circle which is a logical contradiction.  A moralizing Austrian is not a logical contradiction.

 

I narrowed my discussion to what Austrians tend to believe since I am under the assumption that we all like the Austrian school on here.  What I was attempting to say (but didn't spell out very well) was that Austrians believe value is definitionally subjective.  Some Austrians extend this descriptive aspect to social behavior and leave it at that by denying moral normativity, but some don't as they believe that while value is subjective, there are still actions that ought to be valued.  Like I said, I was just trying to describe the situation.

 

As for Rothbard, I don't necessarily accept deontology, but I think when you get down to it, most human beings believe that we own ourselves.  So Rothbard's deductions are perfectly valid (if you own yourself, you own your labor and if you own your labor, you own what you "mix" your labor with).  There's no ultimate reason to be logically consistent, but most of us want to and if you deny the right to ownership and support taxes while at the same time assuming that we own ourselves and our labor, then you are contradicting yourself.

Rothbard's argument for self-ownership are that the alternatives are praxeologically untenable. He may rely on Aristotelian/NR arguments here and there but his ultimate case for self-ownership is that; it's far more Kantian than Aristotelian. Hoppe relies on arg. ethics and a less well known argument formulated in Kinsella's How we come to own ourselves. They're fairly minimalist arguments, like Anthony de Jasay's in Against Politics, which is why I like them.

Sieben:

Nothing. Why do you want to be ethical? Personal taste probably...

In that case, then, it seems that you are a "neo-nihilist" as well.

Zavoi:

In that case, then, it seems that you are a "neo-nihilist" as well.

Just because I think prescriptive morality is a useful concept does not make me a nihilist... 2+2=4 by definition of its symbols and etc.

Sieben:

2+2=4 by definition of its symbols and etc.

What is your definition of the symbol "moral"? Is it a long, unstructured list of actions? (In which case your position is indistinguishable from neo-nihilism.) Or is your definition something like "that which it is possible to coherently argue for"? (This, in my view, is the only definition that could potentially provide a non-trivial basis for ethics.)

zavoi:

(In which case your position is indistinguishable from neo-nihilism.)

Nihilists are a diverse bunch, but if being a "neo nihilist" means you claim ethical propositions are false then I am not one. Ethical propositions simply have no truth content and are therefore not capable of being true/false.