Political Theory

Re: A 'criticism' of the Non-Aggression principle (2)

hashem — Tue, 22 Jan 2013 04:03:43 GMT

ToxicAssets:
you are saying that any justification is...intersubjective

I think that's the diametric opposite of what I'm saying. Justification is individually subjective. It doesn't mean anything except to the extent that someone acknowledges it, and even then it doesn't have any value in communication except to the extent that others acknowledge it. Still, the primary point is that it's subjective, not objective.

ToxicAssets:
But what if the parts judging the situation feel they subscribe to a mutual understanding of the NAP and that this understanding applied to the particular occasion is such that some perpetrated action is indeed justifiable? Where's the problem with that?

There's no problem. My point is that everyone needs to recognize that the action wasn't actually justified, it just seemed to be justified from the individual perspectives of several people. The corrolary point is that, from the perspectives of other individuals, the action may not be justified.

ToxicAssets:
But I think my troubles with what you've said before are maybe more related to you saying that the NAP merely "defines" aggression. What does that mean exactly?

I can't fault you for failing to read the entire thread. But I'd remarked that I didn't mean to say the NAP "defined" aggression. Rather, the NAP is a rule about boundaries on violence.

ToxicAssets:
And people usually have different ideas concerning specific instances, but their overall agreement on most items allow for some intersubjective assessments of justice.

But I want to hear what you think.

I acknowledge the possibility for agreement (what I think you mean when you say "intersubjective assessment"). As far as what I think, my contribution would be to clarify that activity isn't actually (read: objectively, necessarily, indisputably) justified as a matter of fact simply because several people agree about their feelings.

Re: A 'criticism' of the Non-Aggression principle (2)

ToxicAssets — Mon, 21 Jan 2013 08:56:26 GMT

hashem:

Not that either of our explanations are incredibly graceful, but I think we're understanding each other. Yes then, that seems to be what I'm saying.

A concept by definition can't be objective justification. As a concept, justice and justification are always subjective.

A rule may be used by a person to decide whether he thinks something is just. And something may be said to be just only from the perspective of people who feel that way.

Ok cool, I don't dispute that.

But then I don't understand why the NAP cannot be used to "justify action".

I mean, you are saying that any justification is an intersubjective assessment of a given situation based on commonly accepted rules of conduct.

I also think that, so there's no problem for me here.

But what if the parts judging the situation feel they subscribe to a mutual understanding of the NAP and that this understanding applied to the particular occasion is such that some perpetrated action is indeed justifiable? Where's the problem with that?

That's one point.

But I think my troubles with what you've said before are maybe more related to you saying that the NAP merely "defines" aggression. What does that mean exactly?

That the NAP has some embedded list of situations that are to be considered aggression? Or that this list is implicitly defined and can be precisely accessed by rational and careful application of the NAP?

This smells like circular reasoning to me.

What I think is that it is impossible to define aggression, due to the infinite possibilities of its manifestation, and even more infinite possibilities of its interpretation by the different people involved.

You can only list so many instances of what you consider aggression and what you consider justifiable reaction to such aggressions.

And people usually have different ideas concerning specific instances, but their overall agreement on most items allow for some intersubjective assessments of justice.

But I want to hear what you think.

Re: A 'criticism' of the Non-Aggression principle (2)

Live_Free_Or_Die — Fri, 18 Jan 2013 21:34:22 GMT

In my opinion consent > NAP.

Re: A 'criticism' of the Non-Aggression principle (2)

hashem — Fri, 18 Jan 2013 20:26:17 GMT

Not that either of our explanations are incredibly graceful, but I think we're understanding each other. Yes then, that seems to be what I'm saying.

A concept by definition can't be objective justification. As a concept, justice and justification are always subjective.

A rule may be used by a person to decide whether he thinks something is just. And something may be said to be just only from the perspective of people who feel that way.

Re: A 'criticism' of the Non-Aggression principle (2)

ToxicAssets — Fri, 18 Jan 2013 15:16:00 GMT

hashem:

ToxicAssets:
Aren't things morally justifiable with respect to accepted rules of conduct?

Yes, subjectively. From your perspective, you can justify, to yourself, something based on your subjective view of morality. That has no bearing on whether it's actually justified, objectively, and has no bearing on whether it's justified to other people.

But justice is a concept. Whether something is justified is necessarily a subjective matter, potentially different for each individual. So I can say, "justice was served," but that doesn't mean you necessarily believe justice was served.

ToxicAssets:
And isn't the NAP an attempt to a one-size-fits-all principle for rules of conduct? I suspect at least one of us is very confused.

Yes, the NAP is a rule. I already said that...

I think I get what you've said now. Correct if I'm wrong though.

You are saying that a rule cannot be justified itself.

A rule is (part of) the criterion used to justify or denounce a given situation.

And this justification will be valid insofar as the rule used as criterion is accepted by the people engaged in judging the righteousness of the situation.

Is that right?

Re: A 'criticism' of the Non-Aggression principle (2)

hashem — Fri, 18 Jan 2013 14:37:25 GMT

ToxicAssets:
Aren't things morally justifiable with respect to accepted rules of conduct?

Yes, subjectively. From your perspective, you can justify, to yourself, something based on your subjective view of morality. That has no bearing on whether it's actually justified, objectively, and has no bearing on whether it's justified to other people.

But justice is a concept. Whether something is justified is necessarily a subjective matter, potentially different for each individual. So I can say, "justice was served," but that doesn't mean you necessarily believe justice was served.

ToxicAssets:
And isn't the NAP an attempt to a one-size-fits-all principle for rules of conduct? I suspect at least one of us is very confused.

Yes, the NAP is a rule. I already said that...

Re: A 'criticism' of the Non-Aggression principle (2)

ToxicAssets — Fri, 18 Jan 2013 09:44:18 GMT

hashem:

Thanks GotLucky for understanding.

It seems OP is in a debate of sorts, where he is championing the NAP as a moral foundation.

But his opposition is wrong, also. The opposition says, "NAP could be used to justify almost any violent act as long as it was framed in terms of property."

The opposition is wrong because the NAP isn't about justice. It's merely a positive social norm about property rules. It isn't right or wrong, moral or immoral, just or unjust. It is a rule, and even then only to the extent that it has been A) suggested and B) accepted. The NAP doesn't justify any action.

But even on the face of it, the idea that the NAP could justify an action displays manifest ignorance of the NAP, because the NAP only defines what is to be considered aggression. It doesn't say what may be done in response to aggression.

Aren't things morally justifiable with respect to accepted rules of conduct?

And isn't the NAP an attempt to a one-size-fits-all principle for rules of conduct?

I suspect at least one of us is very confused.

Re: A 'criticism' of the Non-Aggression principle (2)

hashem — Thu, 17 Jan 2013 20:09:06 GMT

Re: Osama, I'd need you to make the question more specific.

Willy Truth:
[Re:] the NAP, to what extent is violence morally permissible once violence is initiated against you?

A few different responses, again to a question that's not as specific as it should be. In the first place, the NAP isn't about morals, it's just a rule. In the second place, the NAP doesn't permit action, it just says what sort of action won't be tolerated.

Re: morality, I don't think permission to use violence, or justification for the use of violence, depends on environmental circumstances. Rather, a brain simply does, as a matter of fact, decide to use or not to use violence—the choice is utterly independent of third-party or mystical permission or justification.

Willy Truth:
Another difficult question is what can be done with someone who is mentally unstable who is attempting to harm themself or others? May we initiate force against him to restrain him?

Quite literally, you can do anything within your power. Should you? That's up to your brain. Will you? That's up to your brain. It has nothing to do with the NAP or the subjective morality of others or some alleged justification.

Re: A 'criticism' of the Non-Aggression principle (2)

Willy Truth — Thu, 17 Jan 2013 17:20:17 GMT

Another difficult question is what can be done with someone who is mentally unstable who is attempting to harm themself or others? May we initiate force against him to restrain him?

Re: A 'criticism' of the Non-Aggression principle (2)

Willy Truth — Thu, 17 Jan 2013 16:34:04 GMT

So if someone were to attempt to defend Osama bin Laden for not initiating violence--merely retaliating--how would you respond?

I ask because I'm curious about the arbitrary lines drawn around the NAP, to what extent is violence morally permissible once violence is initiated against you?

Re: A 'criticism' of the Non-Aggression principle (2)

hashem — Tue, 02 Oct 2012 19:35:57 GMT

You're exactly right, that was my mistake. In fact I understand that, I don't know why I what I was thinking when I wrote that lol.

Re: A 'criticism' of the Non-Aggression principle (2)

JackCuyler — Tue, 02 Oct 2012 18:10:51 GMT

hashem:
But even on the face of it, the idea that the NAP could justify an action displays manifest ignorance of the NAP, because the NAP only defines what is to be considered aggression. It doesn't say what may be done in response to aggression.

The NAP does not define what is to be considered aggression. It is merely a "rule", as you say, prohibitting it. What constitutes aggression and therefore breaks the rule, is often debated. As for not saying what may be done in response, that's true to a point, however, if the reponse escalates to the point that it is itself aggression, the NAP as as much or as little to say about it as the initial aggression.

Re: A 'criticism' of the Non-Aggression principle (2)

Anenome — Tue, 02 Oct 2012 16:59:49 GMT

Cortes:

How is the NAP not an ethical or moral system?

It is. It is defined as the moral stance that aggression is illegitimate.

Therefore the definition of aggression and limits thereof become important, and only a propertarian view of ethical limits can make any sense out of the field. The idea that 'your freedom to swing your fist ends where my nose begins' is perfect in its propertarian delineation of exactly where your rights end and mine begin. Any attempt to make ethical sense out of the world without using property ends up based on fuzzy whim and feeling.

Re: A 'criticism' of the Non-Aggression principle (2)

gotlucky — Tue, 02 Oct 2012 15:43:55 GMT

The NAP itself is just a statement that if you initiate coercion against another person or his rightful property, then you have wronged him. Libertarianism is the result of the NAP. Libertarianism is the system. The NAP is a standard to measure whether an action is consistent with libertarianism. You will find few libertarians who will have no opinion on the rightness or wrongness of lying, blackmail, prostitution, drug use, etc. But to the libertarian, it doesn't matter if he personally considers it wrong to lie or use drugs, he believes that legally you may do these things - with the one exception being that in doing these actions, you do not violate another's rights.

So you can end up with a person like Ron Paul who considers drug use to be wrong, but at the same time he believes that it ought to be legal, whereas using force to prevent or punish someone for using drugs ought to be illegal. Libertarianism is a political ethic. Of course, you might find someone whose personal ethic matches his political ethic, but even then I don't think it will match 100%. After all, even if you found a libertarian who thought lying was right, I doubt he would say that if someone was lying to him. He'd probably just say that it was wrong, but that it ought not be punished with violence.

Re: A 'criticism' of the Non-Aggression principle (2)

Cortes — Tue, 02 Oct 2012 09:29:51 GMT

How is the NAP not an ethical or moral system?