Political Theory

Re: How would free market prisons work?

gotlucky — Fri, 29 Jun 2012 00:17:55 GMT

As I said above, we should probably continue this conversation in the thread that it is relevant.

Re: How would free market prisons work?

Minarchist — Fri, 29 Jun 2012 00:16:39 GMT

Block's position fundamentally misunderstands Rothbard's.

How would you summarize Rothbard's position?

Re: How would free market prisons work?

gotlucky — Fri, 29 Jun 2012 00:10:11 GMT

Block's position fundamentally misunderstands Rothbard's.

Re: How would free market prisons work?

Minarchist — Fri, 29 Jun 2012 00:08:08 GMT

It seems that Clayton is referring to the inalienability of the will.

The will certainly is inalienable. If that's Clayton's point, I don't understand what he saw in my comments which led him to believe that I view the will as alienable. I was clearly speaking about the alienation of rights, not of the will. O well...another non-conversation.

But anyway, I thought Clayton was taking Rothbard's position against voluntary slavery (for inalienable self-ownership) on the basis of the inalienability of the will - and this is what I've argued against, taking Block contra Rothbard.

EDIT: Looking back, here's what Clayton actually said:

A person cannot waive his right to defend himself from violence, it's inalienable...

So, Clayton is indeed saying that the rights are inalienable. And why are they?

...because he can always begin moving his hands and feet in such a way as to deflect the blows rained on him and return blows of his own

Because the will is inalienable.

It appears he is taking a Rothardian approach, as I thought.

Re: How would free market prisons work?

gotlucky — Thu, 28 Jun 2012 22:54:37 GMT

Minarchist:

Another way of putting it is: if rights are inalienable, then all violence is aggression.

It seems that Clayton is referring to the inalienability of the will. Contracts regarding people's wills are invalid (we are not talking about the transfer of property after death, we are talking about the mind and body). Someone saying that they waive their right to self-defense is making a claim regarding their will, and these are invalid. I suggest you read the thread Inalienability of the self.

Regarding the quote, the claim that rights are inalienable is a strange one, though most everyone knows it. Most peopel who use that phrase are talking about life, liberty and property (or the pursuit of happiness). Well, these are alienable. You can transfer the right to your life, depending upon the law. You can transfer the right to your liberty, depending upon the law. You can transfer your right to property. The will (mind and body) is different. No matter how much you want to, you cannot transfer your will to anyone else. Sure, someone could make a law saying so, but it could never be done.

Anyway, if you wish to read more about what I think on the matter, you can read the thread I linked to. I won't hijack this one.

Re: How would free market prisons work?

Minarchist — Thu, 28 Jun 2012 22:31:26 GMT

This is a Platonic way of thinking about rights

My view is that the right to defend oneself from aggression is not identical to the ability to defend oneself from aggression, but it does not follow that I think of rights are Forms or some such thing floating around in a Platonic otherworld - far from it. Rights are social phenomena. My right to defend myself from aggression exists insofar as "society" (putting aside the problems of speaking about abstractions in this way) agrees that it does. Whether I am in fact able to defend myself from aggression is an entirely separate matter.

One might say that my ability to defend myself rests in my arms, but my right to defend myself rests in the minds of other men.

Of course, some who believe in objective ethics would indeed place rights in some otherworld, but not I.

Re: How would free market prisons work?

Minarchist — Thu, 28 Jun 2012 22:08:40 GMT

A person cannot waive his right to defend himself from violence, it's inalienable because he can always begin moving his hands and feet in such a way as to deflect the blows rained on him and return blows of his own.

You are assuming that the right to defend oneself from violence is identical to the abilility to defend oneself from violence.

It is not.

If it were, then it would follow that if I am unable to defend myself from a given act of violence I have no right to do so.

Is that your position?

Also, if you believe that rights are inalienable, do you reject every kind of enforceable obligation? For example, if rights are inalienable, then how can a victim justly force a tortfeasor to pay restitution? Traditionally, libertarians have argued that the tortfeasor waives his right to be free from aggression insofar as he aggressed against his victim: i.e. the victim can violate the rights of the tortfeasor to the extent that the tortfeasor violated the rights of the victim. But if the tortfeasor's rights are inalienable, then he waives none of them through the commission of his tort, and therefore the victim who forces him to pay restitution is committing an act of aggression, no?

If you truly believe that rights are inalienable (and don't make arbitrary distinctions such that certain kinds of rights [e.g. those which concern the body] are and others aren't), pure pacifism is the result. And keep in mind this isn't just for torts, it would be for contractual obligations as well: e.g. a creditor could not force his debtor to repay. Essentially, the doctine of inalienability eliminates the possibility for any legitimate use of force: i.e. force where the recipient thereof either explicitly (by contract) or implicitly (by committing a tort) waived his right to be free from aggression [to some extent, to a certain person, etc].

Another way of putting it is: if rights are inalienable, then all violence is aggression.

Re: How would free market prisons work?

Clayton — Thu, 28 Jun 2012 02:27:43 GMT

waives (sells or forfeits, as the case may be) his right to be free from violence

This doesn't make any sense. A person cannot waive his right to defend himself from violence, it's inalienable because he can always begin moving his hands and feet in such a way as to deflect the blows rained on him and return blows of his own. This is a Platonic way of thinking about rights and it's mistaken.

Clayton -

Re: How would free market prisons work?

gotlucky — Thu, 28 Jun 2012 02:08:48 GMT

kelvin_silva:

Question. What if the murderer didnt want to obey the court?? After all it IS a voluntary society. Unless your volition is taken away as soon as yo commit crime?

If a murderer didn't want to be a part of the legal system, it seems likely he would become an outlaw.

Re: How would free market prisons work?

Kelvin Silva — Thu, 28 Jun 2012 00:46:03 GMT

I think one point that should be made is that some people will say:

If in the free market system, a murderer only has to pay money to the victim's family, then arent you saying that money = a life?

--This is iffy because even if the murderer went to jail under state rule, does that mean that the amount of time spent in jail equals a life? I dont think so.

Only life = life, but in most civilized societies, lex talionis would not be the prevailing ruling.

So yes in the free market system payment for a murder doesnt bring about Justice but it does try to settle the case like and prevent Open conflict like Clayton said.

Question. What if the murderer didnt want to obey the court?? After all it IS a voluntary society. Unless your volition is taken away as soon as yo commit crime?

Re: How would free market prisons work?

Minarchist — Fri, 06 Apr 2012 03:14:05 GMT

Some additional thoughts on debt-slavery:

As I said before, the owner of the debt-slave has the right to use violence for the purpose of extracting the debt. It follows that the owner is liable for any use of force other than for the purpose of extracting the debt, and so the debt-slave may rightfully seek restitution from his owner for such a violation of the terms of their relationship, or designate an agent who may do so on his behalf and per whatever terms the debt-slave and the agent may have agreed upon (e.g. the agent gets a share of the restitution in payment for his services).

Problem: what if the debt-slave is physically unable to file suit because his owner is confining him, and for the same reason he is unable to designate an agent (and did not already designate an agent before beginning his term of servitude)? Is this poor soul just doomed?

If the slave is locked away and no one can meet with him to be designated his agent, then I would argue that anyone (who has proven that he tried and failed to meet with the slave to be designated his agent) can homestead the right to restitution against the owner of the debt-slave. If he proves his case, then the agent of the debt-slave should be entitled to the restitution from the owner, but only after he sees to it that the debt-slave is actually freed from his former owner's custody. In this case, the debt-slave doesn't get any restitution for the abuse he suffered, but at least he's free.

Re: How would free market prisons work?

Minarchist — Thu, 05 Apr 2012 04:26:53 GMT

If Bob owns John, it does not mean that Bob can do whatever he wants (physically) with John: i.e. John might refuse to cooperate. Bob does not control John's will. What it means for Bob to own John is for Bob to be able to do whatever he wants (legally) with John, such that no one can make a legitimate claim against Bob for doing anything with John, including John himself.

Likewise, if Bob owns a horse, it does not mean that he can do whatever he wants (physically) with the horse: i.e. the horse might refuse to cooperate. Bob does not control the horse's will. What it means for Bob to own the horse is for Bob to be able to do whatever he wants (legally) with the horse, such that no one can make a legitimate claim against Bob for doing anything with the horse.

Re: How would free market prisons work?

Minarchist — Thu, 05 Apr 2012 04:09:17 GMT

It is not at all obvious that debt-slavery or any kind of slavery could exist in a private law society. Rothbard's arguments on this point (from the standpoint of the inalienability of the will) are very persuasive

Slavery does not involve alienation of the will. When a person becomes a slave he does not become an automaton. When a person becomes a slave, he waives (sells or forfeits, as the case may be) his right to be free from violence: either totally and unconditionally (as with chattel slavery) or partially and conditionally (as with lesser forms of slavery). But the same is true with all obligations, whether contractual or arising from torts. To be obligated to do anything is to have waived your right (by contract or by tort) to be free from violence to a certain degree: i.e. insofar as the other party can justly use violence to force you to fulfill your obligation.

See Block's "Toward a Libertarian Theory of Inalienability...." http://mises.org/journals/jls/17_2/17_2_3.pdf

I like to analyze these kinds of questions from the point at which it would matter one way or another: a real dispute. John Slave escapes the plantation. Bob Slaveholder manages to track him down - however, by this time, John Slave has become fairly well-to-do and is armed. Bob Slaveholder decides an armed conflict with John Slave is not worth it, so he files a lawsuit instead. In the lawsuit, Bob Slaveholder argues "John Slave, the defendant, is my property. He is currently ensconced in his home and will not allow himself to be repossessed by me. This lawsuit is seeking to force John Slave to be peaceably repossessed or to pay $X in damages and restitution."

Now, there is something odd about having a dispute with your own property. After all, you'd never sue your pet goat or the family tractor. And this is precisely where I think the approach used by Hoppe in his Argumentation Ethics does apply. Namely, John Slave can point out that he must not be Bob Slaveholder's property precisely because Bob Slaveholder is suing him. If John Slave were, in fact, the property of Bob Slaveholder, no such lawsuit could come into being anymore than the lawsuit "Bob Slaveholder v. Bob Slaveholder's Tractor". I can't imagine why a private law court would see it any other way.

Again, slavery does not involve alienation of the will. There is nothing "odd" about the fact that a slave can appear in a courtroom and argue with his owner about whether he is in fact a slave. Like with any case, it would depend on who had the evidence. Does Bob Slaveholder have the contract where John Slave agreed to be a slave for 5-years in exchange for room and board, can Bob Slaveholder prove that the other person in the courtroom is in fact John Slave, etc. There's no difficulty here.

But for all the reasons given by economists spelling out the reasons that chattel slavery died of economic causes, I doubt that such enclaves of slavery would be economically significant or widespread.

I quite agree.

Re: How would free market prisons work?

eliotn — Wed, 04 Apr 2012 19:21:50 GMT

"I know a lot of socialist anarchists want to abolish prisons and end punishing criminals all together which I think is insane. I support having a free market prison system with competing prisons. Only I've encountered some problems with this view. First of all, who would pay the private prison company? Who is the "customer?" I know there's solutions here but I want to ask others."

I think prisons could live on, but not as an involuntary, coercive option abused by the state. Rather, they would be more like a system that criminals could use to try to prove that they are trustworthy, or as an alternate agreement of how to pay restitution, or as a way for the criminal to more securly promise that restitution will be paid. Prisons would not be specialized buildings, as such things are expensive. Rather, the imprisonment would be agreements to restrict ones own behavior. It would more resemble the home imprisonment system currently used for some criminals, where the criminal will be monitored, and imprisoned in his own house. In a sense then, the "customer" is the criminal, instead of the state.

Slightly off topic, I haven't seen any mention of the home imprisonment systems currently in use by the state on mises.org, where a criminal is forced to follow a particular schedule, and monitored. I would appreciate it if someone could show me an article or forum post discussing this.

Re: How would free market prisons work?

Autolykos — Wed, 04 Apr 2012 15:54:15 GMT

Clayton, if you're defining "slavery" as "ownership of a person by someone other than himself", then I'd say that neither debt-slavery nor any other form of slavery as a legal institution is impossible in an anarcho-capitalist society. But I do think that debt bondage or indentured servitude would likely exist as such.