Economics Questions

Re: The Critique of Praxeology from the Point of View of Natural Science

Jon Irenicus — Tue, 27 Nov 2012 19:16:26 GMT

Isn't this redundant, or circular, or some kind of fallacy? Subjective perception is a mental phenomenon. But we exist in a material universe, so the burden seems to be on people who say mental phenomena aren't physical.

It isn't redundant. You'd have to show why it'd be a fallacy, and also in what manner it'd be circular. Or at least educate yourself on the context in which these questions arose, i.e. attempts by materialists to explain mental phenomena like consciousness and qualia through a purely physical description. It isn't a burden of proof hot potato situation.

Also, you aren't using reductionism to mean "science", so what are you using it to mean? And what is it opposed to (e.g. reductionism vs what)?

Here, go find out for yourself.

A mental phenomenon is not sensed; the sensory organs don't consciousness experience, for example, and conversely, for example, the consciouesness doesn't require sensory organs. Can you clarify?

What makes you think sensation refers solely to sense-perception? It can refer to a simple awareness of something.

A boat rises with the current, but it isn't identified with the current? What does that even mean? So we establish that a current causes a boat to move, but we haven't "identified" them? Please understand if I'm sort of confused by your reasoning here...what's your point?

Materialist philosophers have tried to identify mental phenomena with physical phenomena, usually the brain or neural system. They're not trying to merely establish correlations and hypothesise causation but to reduce the mental phenomena to physical phenomena, i.e. render an explanation of them purely in physical terms that leaves no further question marks. So it is a question of identification and not merely cause/effect connections.

Re: The Critique of Praxeology from the Point of View of Natural Science

hashem — Tue, 27 Nov 2012 03:05:47 GMT

@Jon Irenicus

It seems you're implying reality can be described in terms of a not-physical account. That's blowing my mind, can you clarify please?

bringing subjective phenomena in line with materialism

Isn't this redundant, or circular, or some kind of fallacy? Subjective perception is a mental phenomenon. But we exist in a material universe, so the burden seems to be on people who say mental phenomena aren't physical.

Also, you aren't using reductionism to mean "science", so what are you using it to mean? And what is it opposed to (e.g. reductionism vs what)?

...the sensation of a mental phenomenon...

A mental phenomenon is not sensed; the sensory organs don't consciousness experience, for example, and conversely, for example, the consciouesness doesn't require sensory organs. Can you clarify?

You can always show which areas of the body are active in conjunction to the [experience? perception?] of a mental phenomenon but in so doing you are not identifying the two with one another.

A boat rises with the current, but it isn't identified with the current? What does that even mean? So we establish that a current causes a boat to move, but we haven't "identified" them? Please understand if I'm sort of confused by your reasoning here...what's your point?

Science is advanced through identifying connections, and the more thoroughly a connection is established the more complete a theory (for example, of mental phenomena) becomes. But the component parts aren't "identified" with one another? Whatever that means, what bearing does it have on the fact of whether a theory plays out consistently?

Re: The Critique of Praxeology from the Point of View of Natural Science

Jon Irenicus — Mon, 26 Nov 2012 18:53:07 GMT

Thanks for the post Adam. Basically most attempts I've seen at bringing subjective phenomena in line with materialism have been to re-define them in terms of something else, i.e. some sort of proxy, perhaps locating them in some defined area of the brain.

The thing is, to give a completely physical account of them, the individual doing so needs to be able to do so in a way that they could describe them as a perfectly neutral observer, with no possession of such concepts. You couldn't because you'd never see them, let alone understand someone communicating them to you (I am leaving aside any complications arising from thoughts too being mental phenomena.)

Unless reductionist thinkers circumvent the self-referentiality of mental phenomena, I don't think a purely physical account is possible. You can always show which areas of the body are active in conjunction to the sensation of a mental phenomenon but in so doing you are not identifying the two with one another. You are still missing out the essentials of what makes a mental phenomenon just that. I'll re-read your post over the weekend since there's quite a lot packed into it, but I think it's a good starting point.

Re: The Critique of Praxeology from the Point of View of Natural Science

filc — Sun, 25 Nov 2012 21:55:13 GMT

Your critique brings attention to the why or the reason for means/ends. Praxeology is not concerned with this nor is refuted by it. Praxeoogy is the formal acceptance that means and ends exist and considers the consequences of those items repsectively. Praxeology does not analyze the phsycological, naturalistic, or biological reasons for why means/ends exist. It accepts those things as givens and leaves that particular field of study to other, non-social, sciences.

So long as man is given at least the superficial control over his social destiny it is relevant for us to consider how best social discourse can proceed. If at some point in the future we reach the singularity, arrive at nirvana, or otherwise become assimilated into autamatons our consideration for praxeology and its study will likely expire. Untill then natural sciences really cannot speak for it or against it.

The concept of action involves the use of scarce means for satisfying the most

urgent wants at some point in the future, and the truths of economic theory involve the formal relations between ends and means, and not their specific contents. A man’s ends may be

“egoistic” or “altruistic,” “refined” or “vulgar.”

Or they may be driven by some naturalistic, chemical, or bioloical reason as mentioned .

Economics is not concerned with their content, and its laws apply regardless of the nature of these ends.

Murray Rothbard (2004). MES, Mises Institute

[EDIT]

Apologies. Jon already answered eloquently above. (3 posts above this one)

Re: The Critique of Praxeology from the Point of View of Natural Science

Adam Knott — Sun, 25 Nov 2012 18:21:08 GMT

The following argument is still in development and may be adjusted if or re-stated it if necessary.

*******

The stated goal is to describe a conscious state in physical terms. Here are the parameters and definitions:

1) We assume that a scientific observer can, in principle at least, locate various conscious states among the various objects of nature. That is, specific, locatable, conscious states 'exist' in nature, separate from the observer's mind in the same way that a tree is separate from an observer's mind. In general, we assume that conscious states are located in the brains of other humans and animals.

2) To begin with, we will assume that a physical description of a conscious state entails a causal description of events and entails at least two separate observations. The scientific observer must make at least two observations: (.....) and (.....)

(parentheses indicate a placeholder for an assumed future observation)

3) The scientist must, in principle, be able to make the observation himself.

This specific parameter means that if the scientific observer observes a subject who says “I feel pain,” then the utterance “I feel pain” (the utterance itself) counts as an observation of the scientist, but the referred to pain which the scientific observer does not himself observe, does not count as an observation. That is, with respect to a subject who reports his subjective experience to an observer, the report itself counts as a valid observation (the utterance or written object), but not the subjective experience of the subject.

4) We assume that the observing scientist has all the physical knowledge he requires. Any knowledge regarding physical processes requested by the scientific observer will be provided.

5) We will agree beforehand that in principle, an observation of a mechanical regularity does not count as an observation of a conscious state.

For example, when the scientific observer taps the knee of the subject with a rubber hammer and the knee of the subject twitches, this counts as an observation of a mechanical regularity and not as an observation of a conscious state.

Similarly, if the scientific observer were able to arrange a chain of causal physical processes, such that every time a button were pushed the subject uttered “I feel pain,” with mechanical regularity (the same kind of mechanical regularity we observe between switching a light switch and the lights going on), then this would count as an observation of a mechanical regularity and not an observation of a conscious state.

*****

Given these parameters and definitions, here are the questions:

1) If the goal is to describe conscious states in physical terms, does this require that the scientific observer be able to observe a conscious state? If he/she is going to correlate specific physical processes X with specific conscious states Y, does this require that the specific conscious states Y be observable, in order to verify or falsify that physical process X corresponds to or causes conscious state Y?

2) Given the parameters and definitions above, can a conscious state be observed by the observing scientist?

3) If conscious states must, in principle, be observable, in order to provide a description of conscious states in physical terms, and if the parameters and definitions above prevent, in principle, the observation of a conscious state, then, do the parameters and definitions above constitute a fair natural scientific standard?

I.e., is the standard imposed by the parameters and definitions above overly strict in comparison to the standards of observation generally required in natural science? Or is the observational standard a fair one and within the norms of what is required for natural scientific observation?

******

Explanation:

The question is whether it is possible to provide a physical (natural-scientific) account of conscious states if it is not possible to observe conscious states.

This question owes to a close reading of an account of conscious states in physical terms given by John Searle. The article is “Biological Naturalism” and can be found here:

http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~jsearle/

I believe Searle’s short 14 page essay is must-reading for those who are seriously interested in praxeology. Searle is trying to show that it is in principle possible to provide a physical description of conscious states. On page 3 he provides the following definition of a conscious state:

“Some things such as pains, tickles and itches, only exist when experienced by a human or animal subject, and they have a subjective or first person ontology.”

On page 11, Searle then provides a descriptive account of a physical account of a conscious state wherein he assumes that we had the required knowledge of physical processes:

“We could then say, “This guy is in pain, even though he does not feel it yet. The thalamocortical system definitely shows the presence of pain, though it is unfelt.”

(emphasis added)

On page 3, Searle defines the subjective conscious state pain as only existing when felt or experienced by a subject, and on page 11 when Searle assumes we have all the physical knowledge we need, he describes the state pain as “present” though unfelt by the subject. We can see immediately that there is an egregious inconsistency in Searle’s account, and this has nothing to do with the state of physical knowledge, because Searle assumes for the purpose of his example that we have the requisite physical knowledge.

At first I tried to understand Searle’s contradiction by assuming that it may have been intentional on his part, and that by intentionally maintaining this theoretical contradiction Searle solves some epistemological/structural problem. From this assumption I tried to figure out the specific problem he may have been trying to solve by defining pain in one instance as a subjective experience, and in another instance as objectively present and not subjectively experienced.

I’ve recently come to the realization that perhaps this contradiction was unintentional on Searle’s part. Perhaps this mistake is not the result of a clever attempt to mend a broken theory. Perhaps the contradiction is inadvertent, and due to the unobservability of conscious states. If this latter interpretation is correct then the reason why Searle commits this serious error may be something like the following:

Searle has imagined that conscious states “exist” out in extended nature, inside the heads of other humans and animals. But he has not actually observed them in these locations. He then attempts to describe how these conscious states—which he himself has mentally projected to a specific location in nature—can be described in physical terms. In his eventual physical description of conscious states (page 11 in his essay) he again mentally projects a conscious state to a specific location, this time, to the thalamocortical system of the subject in front of him. In his written theoretical account, Searle inadvertently provides two conflicting accounts of subjective states: 1) they only exist when subjectively experienced, and 2) they are objectively observable by the observer but not yet experienced by the subject. And this happens not because Searle is intentionally trying to reconcile an irreconcilable theory, but because the conscious state in question was never observed by Searle in any location, but was instead mentally projected by him.

In other words, Searle “locates” conscious states in contradictory places within his own theoretical framework inadvertently, because he confuses his own projection or imagination of conscious states with their ontological existence in various locations in nature. Stated differently, the ontological existence of conscious state X at location Y in nature was, strictly speaking, never observed by Searle, but supplied by him. Given that the location of the conscious state in question is not observed but supplied, it is natural that Searle locates conscious states at various places in nature, even in places where they should not be according to his written theoretical framework. Searle’s actual method of locating conscious states in nature—by mentally projecting them—is at odds with his theoretical framework in which he purports to demonstrate that they are physically produced.

*****

The idea that social entities can be conceived as a categorial aspect of the one who apprehends them is not a new idea. When praxeology was being taught and explored in the first half of the twentieth century these insights were made and understood by Mises, Schutz, Hayek and others.

Human knowledge is conditioned by the structure of the human mind. If it chooses human action as the subject matter of its inquiries, it cannot mean anything else than the categories of action which are proper to the human mind and are its projections into the external world of becoming and change. (Human Action, 3^rd rev. p. 36)

Not our senses, but understanding, a mental process, makes us recognize social entities. (p. 43)

We thus always supplement what we actually see of another person’s action by projecting into that person a system of classification of objects which we know, not from observing other people, but because it is in terms of these classes that we think ourselves. (Hayek, “The Facts of the Social Sciences”)

…in discussing what we regard as other people’s conscious actions, we invariably interpret their action on the analogy of our own mind: that is, that we group their actions, and the objects of their actions, into classes or categories which we know solely from the knowledge of our own mind. (Hayek, “The Facts of the Social Sciences”)

Ironically, Searle himself made similar insights in his short classic Minds, Brains and Science:

For a large number of social and psychological phenomena the concept that names the phenomenon is itself a constituent of the phenomenon. In order for something to count as a marriage ceremony or a trade union, or property or money or even a war or revolution people involved in these activities have to have certain appropriate thoughts. In general they have to think that’s what it is. So, for example, in order to get married or buy property you and other people have to think that that is what you’re doing. Now this feature is crucial to social phenomena.

…many of the terms that describe social phenomena have to enter into their constitution. And this has the further result that such terms have a peculiar kind of self-referentiality. ‘Money’ refers to whatever people use and think of as money. ‘Promise’ refers to whatever people intend and regard as promises. I am not saying that in order to have the institution of money people have to have that very word or exact synonym in their vocabulary. Rather, they must have certain thoughts and attitudes about something in order that it counts as money and those thoughts and attitudes are part of the very definition of money. (Searle, Minds, Brains and Science, p. 78)

Thus, Searle has at some point in his thinking recognized the mental constitution of social entities. The thought (or “attitude” or intention) that a person has is part of the constitution of the social object he apprehends. For some reason Searle has simply forgotten to apply these same insights to the social phenomena which are conscious states.

As those familiar with Mises’s writings know, the concept of “categories” is central to Mises’s social thinking. Categories are essentially classifications by which we organize our conscious experience. We can refer to such categories as “categories of action” or as “categories of consciousness.” With regard to the consciousness of an observed subject, we can apply the notion of ‘categories’ in the following way.

We can conceive that aspect of the person in front of me which I perceptually observe as belonging to the ‘category’ of perceptible things or objects. By contrast, we can conceive that aspect of the person in front of me which I do not perceptually observe, but which I assume is “there” (i.e., his mind, consciousness, purpose, intention, etc.), as belonging to the ‘category’ of nonperceptible things. This latter category is a category of “unobservables whose unobservability is a matter of epistemological principle.”(Human Action, 3^rd rev. p. 57)

It is important to state clearly and explicitly that when we refer to “categories” we mean categories of ourselves as observers. The category of perceptible objects and the category of the nonperceptible are categories of my consciousness, and they apply to every object of my apprehension. As Mises writes:

For man every cognition is conditioned by the logical structure of his mind and implied in this structure. (Human Action, 3^rd rev. p. 86)

The logical structure of my mind, and the logical structure of those things I apprehend, are the same thing. When I apprehend the person in front of me, the perceptible aspect of this person is a perception of mine. Likewise, the unperceptible aspect of that person is a category of mine; a category of my consciousness. In other words, the person in front of me is “constituted,” as it were, of my conscious categories. His body “belongs” to my category of perceptible objects, while his mind “belongs” to my category of unperceptibility.

We are thus able to provide a solution to the important unsolved problem of social science noted by Alfred Schutz:

We must, then, leave unsolved the notoriously difficult problems which surround the constitution of the Thou within the subjectivity of private experience. We are not going to be asking, therefore, how the Thou is constituted in an Ego…As important as these questions may be for epistemology and, therefore, for the social sciences, we may safely leave them aside in the present work.(The Phenomenology of the Social World, 1972, p. 98)

The question is how to conceive the subjective experience of another mind. The proposed solution is to conceive ‘other minds’ as belonging to a category of nonperceptibles.

In principle, we can apply this categorial approach to every object of our apprehension. Take for example the wall in front of me. I may assign the perceptible part of the wall (what I refer to as the front of it) to the category of perceptible objects. And I may assign the unperceptible part of the wall (what I refer to as the back of it) to the category of nonperceptibility. In general, I will assign to the category of nonperceptibility those things Y which I assume “exist” as I observe or perceive X. This includes such things as minds, consciousnesses, intentions, purposes, concepts, time, the future, tomorrow, the past, the other side of things, and perhaps many other things yet to be considered. These are all examples of things that I assume exist, in relation to something else that I observer or perceive. When perceivable or observable objects appear in my action (appear to my consciousness) I attribute to these objects, in addition, attributes which I do not perceive or observe. Paraphrasing the quote from Hayek above:

We thus always supplement what we actually see….. by projecting…. a system of classification ….. which we know, not from observing…..but because it is in terms of these classes that we think ourselves.

In this way, any object that appears in my action may be conceived as constituted of the various categories of my action.

Conclusion

Due to the past success of the natural sciences, it is commonly assumed that if we had more knowledge of physical processes we could explain consciousness—and thus social phenomena—entirely in physical terms. The belief that natural science will one day provide answers to social questions implies that we have a choice between two different ways to understand social phenomena; we may choose science or discursive philosophy. However, for epistemological reasons, it may be impossible to provide a physical explanation of social phenomena. Can a science that relies on observation provide a satisfactory explanation of phenomena comprised of unobservable aspects? This is a question that has important implications for praxeology.

Re: The Critique of Praxeology from the Point of View of Natural Science

Clayton — Wed, 21 Nov 2012 21:39:25 GMT

To the praxeologist, what is "man"?

Homo sapiens. Man is to the praxeologist what bird is to the ornithologist, except that the praxeologist has one advantage that the onrithologist does not have... he is himself a sample of the object under study which gives him a vast amount of information about the subject before he even begins systematic study.

Clayton -

Re: The Critique of Praxeology from the Point of View of Natural Science

Jon Irenicus — Wed, 21 Nov 2012 21:04:06 GMT

The "it" in question is the unified sensation of consciousness that every agent experiences, which is also that which possesses our thoughts, beliefs, concepts, sensations etc. Whether it controls just a portion of the body, all of it or just as much as it needs to, leaving the rest on automatic, is inconsequential.

The sensation of choice is simply the idea that we're faced with an array of of alternative options. This is what free will revolves around and what compatibilists argue determinism doesn't rule out. Praxeology, strictly speaking, doesn't require for this to be ontologically true, and I don't even think it requires it to be experientially true, come to think of it. Arguably it only requires that from our perspective it is how we view and interact with the world. Trying to look at things from a God's eye is of no practical relevance to us. This isn't what Adam is trying to probe into, anyway. He is confronting a different issue, namely whether there is indeed an epistemic gap when it comes to consciousness, i.e. whether it can, in principle, be fully reduced to material constituents.

Re: The Critique of Praxeology from the Point of View of Natural Science

gotlucky — Wed, 21 Nov 2012 21:01:24 GMT

"Man acts" means that the being belonging to homo sapiens is doing something, and in the case of praxeology this is a decided choice as opposed to reflexive. There are certain relevant processes that go on in the brain, and those processes cause the chosen action to be. Whether you want to call those processes free will or the conscious self experiencing the results of those processes is irrelevant to praxeology. The relevant processes in the relevant being cause a measurable action, and that is what praxeology is concerned with. There are irrelevant processes in the relevant being that cause other types of action, but for the purpose of praxeology, those actions are reflexive and not considered action proper.

Re: The Critique of Praxeology from the Point of View of Natural Science

hashem — Wed, 21 Nov 2012 20:48:14 GMT

gotlucky:
To be honest, I have no idea why you would think people mean that the entire body is consciously aware...when someone says "man acts", they are referring to the being known as man.

This is elementary... Within the context of praxeology, a being has "a specific existence, it must have certain definite, definable, delimitable attributes, that is, every thing must have a specific nature. Every being, then, can act or behave only in accordance with its nature."

So I ask you again, what does the praxeologist MEAN when he says, "man" acts. To the praxeologist, what is "man"?

Jon Irenicus:
It stands on the sensation of possessing the ability to choose.

Then I pose the same question to you: What possesses this ability you call "choosing"? What is even meant by "choose"?

Re: The Critique of Praxeology from the Point of View of Natural Science

Jon Irenicus — Wed, 21 Nov 2012 19:32:12 GMT

Praxeology stands or falls on the foundation of so-called "free" will. See Rothbard.

It doesn't, really. It stands on the sensation of possessing the ability to choose. Whether or not there is an objective validity to this is irrelevant. For what it's worth, epistemology is predicated on this to an equal extent, as is by consequence the scientific method.

Re: The Critique of Praxeology from the Point of View of Natural Science

gotlucky — Wed, 21 Nov 2012 04:54:18 GMT

hashem:

Ok then, please help me out. When a praxeologist says, "Man acts," what does he mean? My understanding is this:

According to praxeologists, "man" is a human's entire body. The whole thing is consciously aware and the whole thing consciously processes input to arrive at an output called "choice".

I was correct - you are misunderstanding what people and especially praxeologists mean by "man" and "man acts". To be honest, I have no idea why you would think people mean that the entire body is consciously aware...when someone says "man acts", they are referring to the being known as man. In this case, it's an abstract notion of man, but this applies to concrete humans as well.

For instance, if John kicks the ball, we are not saying that all the cells in John's body kicked the ball, nor are we saying that his nose hairs were responsible for the decision to kick the ball. So when we say, "Man acts", we are not saying that the nose hairs are responsible for whatever action the man does. Man is just referring to the being, and different aspects of that being are involved in the chosen action depending upon what the action is, and the aspects that are involved are involved in varying degrees depending upon the relevancy to the specific action.

But really, I've never heard anyone claim that the entire body is conscious. I've never heard a layman state this, and I've never heard a praxeologist state this either.

Re: The Critique of Praxeology from the Point of View of Natural Science

hashem — Wed, 21 Nov 2012 04:33:57 GMT

gotlucky:
I think you are misunderstanding how people use the word "man".

Ok then, please help me out. When a praxeologist says, "Man acts," what does he mean? My understanding is this:

According to praxeologists, "man" is a human's entire body. The whole thing is consciously aware and the whole thing consciously processes input to arrive at an output called "choice". Thus their reliance on and defense of incomprehensible concepts like "free will" as major pillars of their perspective, as pointed out by Rothbard himself.

I'm arguing that the entire body isn't conscious. What's conscious is fractions of the brain, which experience choice as opposed to managing and governing and orchestrating it. The unconscious brain stores and process input which results in output experienced by the conscious brain. Whether you call this experience "free will" or "action" or "choice" doesn't mean the conscious brain orchestrated it—the consciousness is responsible for experiencing, not storing, processing, and outputting.

The red herring in discussions like this is the false dichotomy: either the consciousness directs choice (instead of experiencing output called "choice"), OR mental phenomena don't exist. I'm arguing that the mental phenomenon called consciousness is real, and choice does happen; but choice is orchestrated by the unconscious brain (input > store > process > output) and experienced by the conscious brain.

Thus praxeology can be comprehensible, if "man" means "the conscious brain" and concepts like acting, choosing, or free will describe things the conscious brain doesn't orchestrate but experiences. So "man acts" really means "the conscious brain experienced the automatic, non-consciously-controllable output of automatic processes in the body and brain".

Jon Irenicus:
This isn't a free will discussion

Praxeology stands or falls on the foundation of so-called "free" will. See Rothbard.

Re: The Critique of Praxeology from the Point of View of Natural Science

Lady Saiga — Tue, 20 Nov 2012 21:33:08 GMT

Sorry Clayton, I didn't mean you at all. I am probably misreading the OP's most recent post.

Re: The Critique of Praxeology from the Point of View of Natural Science

Clayton — Tue, 20 Nov 2012 21:30:54 GMT

This account of morality, however, makes me uncomfortable.

What about it makes you uncomfortable? For your reference, here's an introductory article on my thoughts regarding morality.

I think all you’re proposing is a rearrangement of the wording used to describe human action for the purposes of placating those who think that only the measurable is of value.

Hmm, I would certainly not characterize my thoughts on the subject this way. What leads you to say that?

Clayton -

Re: The Critique of Praxeology from the Point of View of Natural Science

Adam Knott — Tue, 20 Nov 2012 21:03:35 GMT

"At any rate, all I can say in reaction is that we have no other reasonable course but to act as though the evidence of our experience is true,"

The argument isn't about practical action. It is a question of the most suitable theoretical method for describing the relationship between the phenomena.

"There just isn’t a meaningful way to make objective observations in this area."

Both those who advocate a physical description of consciousness, and those who advocate objective social theories, hold that this is only because there is not yet enough physical knowledge, or not yet a good enough objective social theory, respectively. They maintain that upon further advances in their disciplines, the problems will be solved.

"I think all you’re proposing is a rearrangement of the wording used to describe human action for the purposes of placating those who think that only the measurable is of value."

Then you're not understanding what's going on. I'm describing the naturalist point of view as clearly as I can so that those who are interested can understand why praxeology is rejected on grounds which its opponents consider scientific.