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Re: Proving Natural Law

Luming Zhou — Tue, 07 Sep 2010 12:13:23 GMT

The problem remains, however, that Korzybski (as you are representing him) is still trying to talk about his system as a new system of logic. It's just a novel way of classifying statements, and I think - if there is any validity in his theory - he would be doing his work a great disservice by pointing out "flaws" in propositional logic or purporting to create a new system of logic.

I think we are in general agreement. I had been misrepresenting Korzybski all the time. And misinterpreting his work. And oversimplifying things.

My point was similar to zefreak and Liburne. So I didn't have to bring up Korzybski to prove my point. But I did. It overcomplicated things.

I realized what I did had been a rationalization for persuading "moral subjectivism." I now know what I did will not convince anyone because they, too, will rationalize their moral apriorism.

Re: Proving Natural Law

AJ — Mon, 27 Jul 2009 21:37:55 GMT

Thank your, AM, for the additional details. I have only read the wiki on this subject, but it looks potentially interesting.

The problem remains, however, that Korzybski (as you are representing him) is still trying to talk about his system as a new system of logic. It's just a novel way of classifying statements, and I think - if there is any validity in his theory - he would be doing his work a great disservice by pointing out "flaws" in propositional logic or purporting to create a new system of logic. He should call a spade a spade, or else people will simply discount him. His work loses nothing that way either.

In other words, I think you have a point but you're not explaining it in the most advantageous way. If you can accept that it's just a new (albeit possibly revolutionary) way of creating propositions in logic, we can have a much more fruitful discussion. Else people will just keep objecting that you can't change logic, etc.

Re: Proving Natural Law

nirgrahamUK — Mon, 27 Jul 2009 20:41:08 GMT

obviously you dont understand propositional logic. you only understand classification schemas

Re: Proving Natural Law

Luming Zhou — Mon, 27 Jul 2009 17:17:19 GMT

Both Aristotelian logic and propositional logic presupposes elementalism. Elementalism, a term coined by Korzybski, refers to the idea that we can identify, categorize, and label entities in the world into clear-cut categories, separate entities into black-and-white values, assume the all-or-nothingness of entities, and reduce complex interactions into linear relations. Besides the Aristotelian system, Korzybski criticized propositional logic and intuitionist logic for its elementalism.

General semantists practice non-elementalism, which implies the idea of categorization imperfections, fuzzy boundaries, and the dynamicism of language. Non-elementalism does not disprove elementalism. In practice, non-elementalism extends elementalism in a way which resolves many of the imperfections of elementalism.

You seem to have read very little about general semantics. Korzybski has discovered much more imperfections of propositional logic and intuitionist logic.

I have seen no web sources which completely summarizes general semantics. They only reveal a meager fraction of what Korzybski has ascribed about general semantics. You can read his book Science and Sanity here.

Rothbardian natural law requires us to presume propositional logic. Revealing the flaws of propositional logic will challenge Rothbardian natural law.

Re: Proving Natural Law

AJ — Tue, 21 Jul 2009 10:44:04 GMT

As an aside, AM, I read up a bit on general semantics, and it seems Korzybski's problem with Aristotelian logic was that it claimed that "the word is the essence of the thing defined," which of course is the fallacy that "the map is the territory." So if you consider that part of Aristotelian logic, then it is wrong - but everyday logic still stands. Korzybski's efforts to eliminate such basic cognative biases from logic are certainly headed in the right direction. However, I have not read his book, so I cannot say if he goes too far and throws out everyday logic along with Aristotle's mistaken notion. I'm all for the "Jim seems to be acting foolish," instead of "Jim is a fool," and agree that this pathology pervades modern thought and even science, but this is all just about being more accurate. Still, logic stands, or else nothing can be proven. Most of all, show me an application of the infinite-valued logic so amazing that it warrants a special designation. And let's stop using the term Aristotelian logic. Propositional logic or just "logic" would be better, because then there are no map-territory fallacies implied.

Re: Proving Natural Law

AJ — Tue, 21 Jul 2009 10:17:32 GMT

Anarcho-Mercantilist:

AJ:
It's still just an issue of definitions within everyday Aristotelian logic: "If X is an entity that 80% of people identify as a cat, then..."

In Aristotelian logic, if you change the '80%' to an '81%', then you must create a new conditional for this specific instance. Aristotelian logic does not recognize the '80%' as a variable, but as a constant. We must therefore enumerate conditionals indefinitely for it to match infinite-valued logic.

It's still just, "Let 0 <= N <= 100. If X is an entity that N% of people identify as a cat, then..." I'd really prefer to call this just normal everyday logic where one is applying a basic trick from highschool algebra to describe a set of propositions - an infinite set to be sure, but again, can we get an example of an application of this "infinite valued logic" that is so substantialy useful as to warrant its own special designation?

Anarcho-Mercantilist:
It merely notes that the Aristotelian laws of logic do not always hold in terms of logical soundness in relation to the real-world.

I think this could be better stated as, "An over-simplified formulation of premises in everyday logic creates practical problems in the real world." No argument here, but I think you're running into opposition on this forum because of statements like the bolded portion above, where it sounds like you're saying everyday (Aristotelian? Propositional? I would just say "obvious" or "self-evident") logic is not logically sound, which again would be a mismatch of terms. Logical soundness refers only to the premises of an argument, not to the system of logic. Citing sources won't change that, although they may be very interesting in their own right and I'd like to check them out. The issue in contention appears to be how to best state premises, and in that I don't think anyone is necessarily disagreeing with you.

Re: Proving Natural Law

Luming Zhou — Tue, 21 Jul 2009 03:56:35 GMT

nirgrahamUK:
if you took first year logic at college/university you would understand that if (P&~P) = true, anything follows.

The law of the excluded middle can only work if P equals either 100% true or 100% false. It does not allow fuzzy values such as 90% true or 30% true.

AJ:
It's still just an issue of definitions within everyday Aristotelian logic: "If X is an entity that 80% of people identify as a cat, then..."

In Aristotelian logic, if you change the '80%' to an '81%', then you must create a new conditional for this specific instance. Aristotelian logic does not recognize the '80%' as a variable, but as a constant. We must therefore enumerate conditionals indefinitely for it to match infinite-valued logic.

If you try to change the constant into a variable, then Aristotelian logic only allows you to use two variables: either '100%' or '0%'.

Prototype theory explains how the mind categorizes entities. This makes it useful for artificial intelligence research. nirgraham made a valid point that prototype theory does not explicitly try to reformulate the Aristotelian laws of logic.

However, I borrowed some ideas from prototype theory in order to extend Aristotelian logic to allow infinite values. I also borrowed my idea that one cannot possibly define anything in full detail, my idea that judgments can change, and my idea about 'cut-off points' all from general semantics.

General semantics does not 'disprove' nor 'reject' Aristotelian logic in the sense that it rejects it entirely. I already had repeated this in this thread for about ten times. Rather, it cites that these rules of logic can create potential problems. It merely notes that the Aristotelian laws of logic do not always hold in terms of logical soundness in relation to the real-world. It therefore extends Aristotelian logic with some principles that helps to increase accuracy and precision.

Please note that the word 'semantics' in 'general semantics' does not have anything to do with 'semantics' in the sense of the study of meaning. General semantics does not necessarily have anything to do with my terminological clarifications in this thread. I used to clarify about terminology long before I had discovered general semantics.

You can learn more about general semantics by reading Alfred Korzybski's work Science and Sanity. I read that book twice, and it is well-worth a read. If you read this 800-page book, you will acquire vast knowledge of the state of science in the year 1933. In addition, you may find these two other books useful in learning general semantics: S. I. Hawakaya's Language in Thought and Action, and Susan and Bruce Kodish's book Drive Yourself Sane: Using the Uncommon Sense of General Semantics. Although the latter two leaves out many details, you might read them more easily than reading Korzybski's Science and Sanity.

Re: Proving Natural Law

AJ — Mon, 20 Jul 2009 23:55:20 GMT

nirgrahamUK:

if you took first year logic at college/university you would understand that if (P&~P) = true, anything follows. anything. P follows, ~P follows, Q follows, X follows. ad infinitum.

once you abandon the principle you abandon thinking rationally. good luck with that.

Yep, I think a lot of thinking people (especially math people) figure that out soon enough. Even Aristotle's rules and propositional logic are like training wheels. If people don't understand logic, I don't think any amount of symbols or rules will help them. There's no substitute for just pondering for long hours by yourself.

Re: Proving Natural Law

Juan — Mon, 20 Jul 2009 23:20:17 GMT

Can you cite an academic source that concurs with you in this nonsense ?

Heh. But that might be a bad move since there are lots of 'academic' sources which can be invoked to support lots of different nonsense...

Re: Proving Natural Law

nirgrahamUK — Mon, 20 Jul 2009 23:01:36 GMT

basically without the principle of contradiction. (which is what the impossibility of true contradiction is called) you cannot prove any thing. you can not argue validly let alone soundly.

if you took first year logic at college/university you would understand that if (P&~P) = true, anything follows. anything. P follows, ~P follows, Q follows, X follows. ad infinitum.

once you abandon the principle you abandon thinking rationally. good luck with that.

Re: Proving Natural Law

AJ — Mon, 20 Jul 2009 22:57:44 GMT

So we have a nifty way of making premises more precise. Suppose we accept that this prototyping is useful. Can you give an example of how it's useful for the purposes of this discussion (natural law, etc.)?

Re: Proving Natural Law

nirgrahamUK — Mon, 20 Jul 2009 22:40:42 GMT

is that true or false? or will i need a Cantorian calculator to figure it out?

Can you cite an academic source that concurs with you in this nonsense>, perhaps they can state their position with more rigour and thus allow me the possibility to engage.

Re: Proving Natural Law

Luming Zhou — Mon, 20 Jul 2009 22:38:04 GMT

Aristotelian logic also categorizes premises as either 'true' or 'false'. However, infinite-valued logic categorizes premises with more precision.

Re: Proving Natural Law

nirgrahamUK — Mon, 20 Jul 2009 22:26:02 GMT

your wordplay is tedious

Re: Proving Natural Law

Luming Zhou — Mon, 20 Jul 2009 22:24:05 GMT

nirgrahamUK:

you dont understand the difference between classification strategies and logic.

prototype theory is not a theory of logic but of classification.

However, we can apply some ideas from prototype theory into the laws of logic to challenge the soundness of the premises.