General

Re: Disappointing David Gordon daily

Clayton — Fri, 19 Oct 2012 20:25:21 GMT

Subjectivists and nihilists have an argumentatively simpler position

I've been thinking about this lately and I think it's not as true as it might at first seem. One of the crucial issues with moral nihilism is that it tends to isolate a specific act and ask, point-blank: Is this act, in isolation from all other considerations, right or wrong?

The root problem here is a denial of causality, something that every form of nihilism is guilty of. The counterpoint is illustrated by these priceless quotes:

“What we do in life ripples through eternity” - Marcus Aurelius.

"No man ever steps in the same river twice" - Heraclitus.

Every action, every thought, every word, every condition, every state of affairs which swirls out from each and every choice we make in life has latent within it the million consequences which will revisit ourselves and countless others. Some of these consequences are administered by our own, often treacherous brain: feelings of guilt, remorse, regret, shame, grief. Some of them are administered by others in the form of revenge, ostracism, oppression, and so on. Some of them are administered by indifferent and implacable Nature herself. Judging choices without regard to their causal antecedents and consequences - as moral nihilism and deontological morality both do - is useless, at best.

So, the key point here is that moral nihilists need to be challenged on the issue of causality. How do they go about living their life while denying causality? Don't they perceive any kind of contradiction in this?

Clayton -

Re: Disappointing David Gordon daily

mikachusetts — Fri, 19 Oct 2012 19:57:30 GMT

So, why shouldn't I steal the book (while encouraging the masses not to steal)? What principle on the individual level should prevent me?

I think the big issue with this question, and a roadblock in a lot of these threads about morality, is that its framed as if its looking for one answer, but it's really searching for something else. As a result, the answers provided are sort of odd half answers addressing both expectations.

I don't think you want to know why you shouldn't steal the book. That question assumes an agreed upon conception of morality that we can point to for justification. In other words, the kind of answer one would give to a question like that would be: stealing violates the rights of others, and as such, is an unjust act. It's a simple answer for a simple question.

And the second question doesn't fare any better. It's phrased as if there is an agreed upon framework already in place. A perfectly good response might be that the unity of virtues requires that you can't fully posses any virtue with aiming to posess them all. But what you want to know is why you should aim for any virtue in the first place. What you really want is for Clayton to essentially put forth the entire case for natural law and virtue ethics.

A while back, someone pointed out that you can't win a debate arguing in favor of anarcho-capitalism because the burden of proof is too much -- the amount of groundwork that needs to get laid down and agreed upon is tremendous (just think how long it takes to explain what money is to some people). I think the same problem applies to debating ethics. Putting forth a positive ethical theory not only requires laying out all the framework, but then filling it in with the content as well. Subjectivists and nihilists have an argumentatively simpler position which works to their advantage in the setting of an internet forum.

Re: Disappointing David Gordon daily

Clayton — Fri, 19 Oct 2012 18:23:42 GMT

One shouldn't dim his car's window more than 30% in MA, because if a cop catches him, he will get a huge fine. Does this mean that tanning windows above some government-dictated level is immoral?

I.e., imprudent does not immoral make.

Well, when you're dealing with a corrupting element within the social order (the State, a mafia gang, a bully, etc.), things get turned on their head. But I think that the difference between prudence and moral behavior is very small - morality (in regards to decision-making) is just prudence.

I think what you're trying to get at is more of a philosophy of morality, which is of course independent of particular nettling issues like window-tints. My view is that we get to a philosophy of morality through the study of virtue. Moral philosophy - in my view - is just an exposition of virtue.

Nobody says: "You better not lie to a Nazi if he asks you if you're hiding Jews, since once you're used to lying, you will lie even in those situation when it may decrease your long-term satisfaction." That's just absurd. So, why should I say the same about stealing: "Don't steal when you cannot get caught, since you may get used to stealing and end up getting caught"? Something like this sounds nice on pages of a philosophical book by someone like John Searle, but in practice, it sounds silly.

Hey, don't knock Searle.

And you're making my point. The only reason a person might even reflect for a moment before lying to the Nazis is precisely because he probably lives by the rule that honesty is the best policy in all other areas of his life. It is only when confronted with an extraordinary situation that he stops to reflect whether this heuristic moral principle applies to this particular situation.

And as for stealing, you've strawmanned my view - "Don't steal (unqualified)... since you may get used to stealing and end up getting caught." There's nothing silly about this at all. Once, when I was really little, I stole a couple candybars from a grocery store. I felt bad about it but it also gives you a high... there's definitely an addictive potential to stealing. Many thieves describe stealing as an almost orgasmic experience. Why would a very wealthy person like Winona Ryder do it? So, you're playing with fire, on this particular issue.

Finally, I think the "capstone" of virtue is self-image - can you live with yourself? Even if I knew I could 100% scot-free get away with it, I would still feel bad unless the person was my mortal enemy or something. Sympathetic reflex. It's just not right to take what isn't yours and I wouldn't want to go through life with that icky feeling that I've gotten ahead through a very conscious and purposeful exploitation of another. A lot of people don't seem to have this conscience problem... oh well. That's their loss, in my view. I think a robust capacity for sympathy is a key component of being human. Those who don't have that are, well, soulless.

Clayton -

Re: Disappointing David Gordon daily

Malachi — Fri, 19 Oct 2012 18:11:04 GMT

Its wrong because you gain inaccurate information about the cost of producing/procuring a book, leading you to subsequently miscalculate (in an economic sense).

Re: Disappointing David Gordon daily

FlyingAxe — Fri, 19 Oct 2012 17:49:58 GMT

Epicurus makes an interesting argument that the guilty mind is its own punishment as the individual who has done wrong is never able to completely shake the anxiety that he might one day be discovered.

I don't know how this applies to my example. I am trying to figure out why stealing a book in a store (if you cannot be observed) is wrong. If there is no obvious reason why it's wrong, why should I have a guilty mind? Of course, I can feel bad for the storeowner, but that is a reason enough to prevent me from stealing a book -- but not a good enough general rule to make it immoral (just because I dislike something emotionally, it's not yet immoral; for instance, I dislike split-pea soup, while my wife things salmon is disgusting; neither of us thinks that the other eating the mentioned food is immoral).

Re: Disappointing David Gordon daily

FlyingAxe — Fri, 19 Oct 2012 17:42:02 GMT

Clayton:

1) On the pragmatic/utilitarian level, you shouldn't steal the book because if you get caught, it will be a net loss, not only in material terms (the price of the book versus the cost of restitution), but also in social terms - stigma, lost opportunities, etc. etc. Epicurus makes an interesting argument that the guilty mind is its own punishment as the individual who has done wrong is never able to completely shake the anxiety that he might one day be discovered.

One shouldn't dim his car's window more than 30% in MA, because if a cop catches him, he will get a huge fine. Does this mean that tanning windows above some government-dictated level is immoral?

I.e., imprudent does not immoral make.

2) On the virtue/character level, you shouldn't steal the book as a matter of principle - even if you're pretty sure you could do it without being caught - because (1) is almost always the case. In other words, it's almost always in your best interest not to steal, so it makes sense to live your life according to the rule "don't steal." This is like saying that it's almost always the case that running your finger along the edge of a piece of paper will result in a papercut so it makes sense to live your life according to the rule, "don't run your finger along the edge of a piece of paper."

As I mentioned before, I can have a set of rules for different situations. "If you want something, steal it, unless you're likely to get caught." People have multiple rules in their heads all the time. I consider lying to my wife (e.g.) immoral, but I don't consider lying to a cop or a mugger immoral, if it's done in self-defense from potential aggression (or lying to save someone's life).

Nobody says: "You better not lie to a Nazi if he asks you if you're hiding Jews, since once you're used to lying, you will lie even in those situation when it may decrease your long-term satisfaction." That's just absurd. So, why should I say the same about stealing: "Don't steal when you cannot get caught, since you may get used to stealing and end up getting caught"? Something like this sounds nice on pages of a philosophical book by someone like John Searle, but in practice, it sounds silly.

Re: Disappointing David Gordon daily

MadMiser — Thu, 18 Oct 2012 05:12:14 GMT

Note that there's a Misean argument for not killing someone on an island. Instead of killing them, you could enslave them, benefiting from their productive capacity, or trade with them, benefiting from both their productive capacity and their capacity for innovation/invention. In the long run, the satisfaction gained from the extra bounty this brings to you would likely make up for whatever satisfaction you lost by not killing them.

Re: Disappointing David Gordon daily

Clayton — Thu, 18 Oct 2012 03:24:09 GMT

+1 z... BTW, welcome back (and where have you been?)

I think the word "heuristic" is very appropriate here. Lying would be a better example than stealing. It's not against any libertarian principles to lie. But the fact is, people hate to be lied to and they tend to ostracize people that they feel have lied to them. And the other fact is that there are those times you had better lie to prevent other, greater problems from arising. On balance, honesty is the best policy... but knowing when and how to tell "polite lies" is also a valuable skill. So there is no simple "thou shalt not lie" (something which, by the way, the Ten Commandments do not say!) Cultivating the virtue of honesty takes care of the 95% of the time when telling the truth is the right answer. Those few times you might need to lie, or abridge the truth, or misdirect... well, that's just 5% of the time anyway and you can think through those situations carefully when choosing the right course of action.

Clayton -

Re: Disappointing David Gordon daily

Malachi — Thu, 18 Oct 2012 02:33:30 GMT

He gains inaccurate information about the value of books and subsequently (and necessarily) miscalculates.

Re: Disappointing David Gordon daily

Adam Knott — Thu, 18 Oct 2012 02:14:21 GMT

nirgrahamUK:

"the praxeological result of A+B (where these are NAP violating acts/descriptions) seems always to be that the welfare analysis fails the pareto unanimity rule."

The point that FlyingAxe raised was, what is the inhibition to the individual's act on an individual level?

"So, why shouldn't I steal the book (while encouraging the masses not to steal)? What principle on the individual level should prevent me?"

FlyingAxe will steal a book (an action). Then what consequence will befall him?

Re: Disappointing David Gordon daily

z1235 — Thu, 18 Oct 2012 00:50:02 GMT

I'm with Clayton here. The cost in fear, stress, calculation, precaution, measurement, and data acquisition necessary to keep a certain act of yours away from the eyes of other humans which may dislike it is, on average, far too large. The aura/energy of calmness, peace of mind, and wisdom that emanates from someone leading a "good" life attracts other humans and invites them to open up for interaction (division of labor, trade) easier.

So go ahead and steal a book when you think no one is watching. My bet is that not stealing it would yield you many more books (and other stuff) in the long run.

I'm not religious but "Give and you will receive" makes a ton of sense.

Re: Disappointing David Gordon daily

nirgrahamUK — Thu, 18 Oct 2012 00:03:51 GMT

the praxeological result of A+B (where these are NAP violating acts/descriptions) seems always to be that the welfare analysis fails the pareto unanimity rule. see Rothbards welfare economics.

Re: Disappointing David Gordon daily

Adam Knott — Wed, 17 Oct 2012 23:22:04 GMT

Mikachusetts:

"It seems self evident that a necessary result of lying (A) is that you are being dishonest (B). A necesary result of stealing (A) is that you are taking that which doesn't belong to you (B). A necessary result of coercing (A) is that you are being unjust (B).

"I'm assuming that these aren't the kinds of answers you're looking for?"

Yes, correct. What I mean is the necessary consequence of A + B in your example. The consequence of lying and being dishonest; the consequence of stealing and taking something that doesn't belong to you; the consequence of coercing and, as you assert, being unjust.

Re: Disappointing David Gordon daily

mikachusetts — Wed, 17 Oct 2012 16:56:18 GMT

Adam Knott:
The problem for libertarian ethics and libertarian social science, is that no way has been found to demonstrate a necessary consequence of this type that results from actions such as lying, stealing, coercing, etc.

Really? It seems self evident that a necessary result of lying is that you are being dishonest. A necesary result of stealing is that you are taking that which doesn't belong to you. A necessary result of coercing is that you are being unjust.

I'm assuming that these aren't the kinds of answers you're looking for?

Re: Disappointing David Gordon daily

Clayton — Wed, 17 Oct 2012 08:07:28 GMT

Clayton, the simple argument that I am making is that moral choices are made by individuals, not societies; hence, moral rules and moral imperatives must be for the individuals, not societies.

OK, so far, so good.

Action X may be distabilizing to the society if performed by many individuals. Therefore, X may be considered bad for the society, as a societal rule. But what does this have to do with the individual motivation?

If many individuals perform X, it will diminish my satisfaction. But that doesn't mean that if I personally do X once (without anyone finding out), that this will diminish my satisfaction. In fact, the opposite. If I quietly steal a book I really want in a bookstore and not tell anyone, then I have increased my satisfaction by performing an act that, if endorsed by the society at large, would be quite distabilizing.

OK, but the book's owner already has the incentive to stop you from stealing his book (whether through passive security measures or through threats of retaliation, or whatever). No additional incentives need to be added on top of this as some kind of "collective action problem."

So, why shouldn't I steal the book (while encouraging the masses not to steal)? What principle on the individual level should prevent me?

1) On the pragmatic/utilitarian level, you shouldn't steal the book because if you get caught, it will be a net loss, not only in material terms (the price of the book versus the cost of restitution), but also in social terms - stigma, lost opportunities, etc. etc. Epicurus makes an interesting argument that the guilty mind is its own punishment as the individual who has done wrong is never able to completely shake the anxiety that he might one day be discovered.

2) On the virtue/character level, you shouldn't steal the book as a matter of principle - even if you're pretty sure you could do it without being caught - because (1) is almost always the case. In other words, it's almost always in your best interest not to steal, so it makes sense to live your life according to the rule "don't steal." This is like saying that it's almost always the case that running your finger along the edge of a piece of paper will result in a papercut so it makes sense to live your life according to the rule, "don't run your finger along the edge of a piece of paper."

For this reason, the wise individual (the individual who takes his own satisfaction/happines seriously) will cultivate the virtue of non-theft and even industriousness and diligence. Is there some "Thou shalt not steal" inscribed upon the fundamental particles of the Universe? I think not. But you're best off living your life as if there were.

Clayton -