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<?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="http://mises.org/community/utility/FeedStylesheets/rss.xsl" media="screen"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:slash="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/slash/" xmlns:wfw="http://wellformedweb.org/CommentAPI/"><channel><title>Hera : mortgage backed securities, Gross Domestic Product</title><link>http://mises.org/community/blogs/hera/archive/tags/mortgage+backed+securities/Gross+Domestic+Product/default.aspx</link><description>Tags: mortgage backed securities, Gross Domestic Product</description><dc:language>en</dc:language><generator>CommunityServer 2008.5 SP2 (Build: 40407.4157)</generator><item><title>Why Financial Repression Will Fail</title><link>http://mises.org/community/blogs/hera/archive/2012/11/16/why-financial-repression-will-fail.aspx</link><pubDate>Fri, 16 Nov 2012 17:53:00 GMT</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="false">944abf2b-d1be-4bf2-990d-438cb0e377e9:504538</guid><dc:creator>Ron Hera</dc:creator><slash:comments>0</slash:comments><wfw:commentRss xmlns:wfw="http://wellformedweb.org/CommentAPI/">http://mises.org/community/blogs/hera/rsscomments.aspx?PostID=504538</wfw:commentRss><comments>http://mises.org/community/blogs/hera/archive/2012/11/16/why-financial-repression-will-fail.aspx#comments</comments><description>&lt;p&gt;Excessive leverage and risk in the financial system, e.g., using customer funds to speculate, never ends well. Stock market crashes, bank and investment firm failures or economic recessions are all potential consequences. Following the failure of the United States to regulate over the counter (OTC) derivatives and the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, U.S. banks became the largest financial business entities in history. The U.S. real estate bubble, sub-prime lending and mortgage backed securities (MBS), along with unregulated OTC derivatives, then lead to bank insolvencies, a historic stock market crash and a near collapse of the global financial system. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Central banks and governments intervened to prevent systemic collapse but governments were saddled with enormous debts due to bank bailouts, lost tax revenues and massive social welfare costs. Rather than systemic collapse, and perhaps another Great Depression, the post crisis period came to be characterized by (1) market interventions, (2) direct government control over the economy, and (3) ongoing monetization by central banks. Longer term solutions that would have allowed a return to putatively free markets failed to emerge and government debt, particularly in Europe, became a crisis in its own right. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Measures that began as emergency interventions became routine suggesting a new economic paradigm. In the new paradigm, big banks, politicians and academics would decide what market outcomes, e.g., bankruptcies, interest rates or bond yields, would be permitted, as well as when to apply accounting rules, regulations and laws. Despite increased centralization of decision making and greatly expanded powers, however, policymakers were unable to repair the financial system. Instead, mounting government debt led to de facto financial repression. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Financial repression occurs when governments channel funds into their own sovereign bonds in order to reduce debt levels through mechanisms such as directed lending, caps on interest rates, capital controls, debt monetization, or by other means. Economist Carmen M. Reinhart, et al., brought the term back into popular usage in 2011 after a long hiatus. Past examples of financial repression include several South American countries, such as Argentina. The promise of financial repression is that it will hold down government borrowing costs and reduce government debt levels, but critics argue that financial repression merely targets the producers of society, i.e., the middle class, and therefore harms the economy. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p align="center"&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.nber.org/papers/w16893"&gt;&lt;img height="369" width="528" src="http://www.heraresearch.com/articles/financial_repression_01_nber_16893_01.jpg" alt="The Liquidation of Government Debt by Carmen M. Reinhart and M. Belen Sbrancia, NBER Working Paper No. 16893 (Issued in March 2011), National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138 U.S.A." border="0" /&gt; &lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p align="center"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;span style="text-decoration:underline;"&gt;The Liquidation of Government Debt&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;strong&gt;, Carmen M. Reinhart and M. Belen Sbrancia (NBER 16893, 2011)&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Debt monetization, which can be a tool of financial repression, destroys savings while a zero percent interest rate policy (ZIRP), which reduces government borrowing costs, deprives savers and pensioners of interest income and can lead to inflation. What is more important, however, is that financial repression prevents capital formation. Of particular concern in the U.S. is the link between capital formation and new business creation, which is primarily a middle class phenomenon. The vast majority of corporations in the U.S. are small businesses and they account for the majority of jobs. By preventing capital formation, financial repression short circuits the engine of new business creation, increases unemployment and threatens to bring down the middle class. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Governments cannot supply entrepreneurship or innovation in the marketplace, nor can they effectively replace savings (genuine capital derived from surplus production) or private investment with bank credit or with public funds, which represent debt and a transfer of wealth, respectively. The deployed capital, inventions, products and services of new businesses drive innovation, fuel competition, provide jobs and increase the wealth of society. In contrast, financial repression can only produce economic stagnation and result in a net loss of wealth to society. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Crisis and Consequence&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Substantially as a consequence of the financial crisis and global recession, Europe was engulfed in a sovereign debt crisis characterized in the European periphery by austerity measures and Great Depression levels of unemployment. In the U.S., the real estate collapse and stock market crash represented a direct loss of household wealth while bank bailouts represented a transfer of wealth from proverbial Main Street to literal Wall Street. Deficit spending, debt monetization and the Federal Reserve&amp;rsquo;s purchases of MBS and U.S. Treasury bonds expressed a radically inflationary monetary policy and, although much of the money is idle in the banking system, the overall increase in the supply of U.S. dollars is concerning. The True Money Supply (TMS), formulated by famed economist Murray Rothbard, represents the amount of money in the economy that is available for immediate use in exchange. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p align="center"&gt;&lt;a href="http://mises.org/content/nofed/chart.aspx"&gt;&lt;img height="316" width="528" src="http://www.heraresearch.com/articles/financial_repression_02_mises_tms.jpg" alt="The True Money Supply (TMS). Ludwig von Mises Institute, 518 West Magnolia Avenue, Auburn, Alabama 36832-4501 U.S.A." border="0" /&gt; &lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Despite the 2008 financial crisis, global recession and inflationary policies, confidence in the U.S. dollar, the U.S. stock market, the U.S. federal government and the U.S. economy remained largely intact. Inflationary policies reduced certain risks, such as the risk of a deflationary collapse, and increased liquidity from central bank monetization lifted financial markets, but the effects were only temporary. Confidence was also boosted in Europe by the European Central Bank&amp;rsquo;s (ECB) outright monetary transactions (OMT) program and in the U.S. by the Federal Reserve&amp;rsquo;s quantitative easing III (QE3) program. In Europe, the risks of sharply rising sovereign bond yields, sovereign defaults and the potential breakup of the euro were muted by OMT while European leaders putatively moved toward a permanent solution, such as a fiscal union. Thanks in part to the Federal Reserve&amp;rsquo;s ZIRP and ongoing &amp;ldquo;operation twist,&amp;rdquo; U.S. Treasury yields remained near historic lows. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p align="center"&gt;&lt;a href="http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/WGS10YR"&gt;&lt;img height="316" width="528" src="http://www.heraresearch.com/articles/financial_repression_03_fred_wgs10yr.jpg" alt="10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate (WGS10YR), Weekly, Ending Friday, Not Seasonally Adjusted, Updated: 2012-11-05 3:32 PM CST, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, One Federal Reserve Bank Plaza, St. Louis, MO 63102 U.S.A." border="0" /&gt; &lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On the surface, the fallout of the 2008 financial crisis was effectively managed, but the basic causes of the crisis were never addressed. The lines between depository institutions and securities firms, erased in the U.S. by the final repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999, were not restored and the U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board&amp;rsquo;s (FASB) mark-to-market rule was never reinstated. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Although bank capital ratios have improved, leverage remains excessive, bank balance sheet assets remain troubled and economic conditions have deteriorated compared to the pre-crisis period. Banks deemed &amp;ldquo;too big to fail&amp;rdquo; in 2008 have become bigger and the gross credit exposure associated with high risk OTC derivatives is roughly as large as it was before the financial crisis. By the end of 2013, the Federal Reserve&amp;rsquo;s balance sheet will have exceeded $3.4 trillion. At the same time, the U.S. federal government faces a so-called &amp;ldquo;fiscal cliff.&amp;rdquo; &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;The Road to Stagflation&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For 2012, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects GDP 2.2% growth in Japan and the U.S. and 3.5% globally. Based on the Baltic Dry Index (BDI), which reflects the price of moving major raw materials by sea, the global economy has slowed in 2012. Nonetheless, there has been some improvement in comparison to the depths of the global recession in 2009. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p align="center"&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.dryships.com/pages/report.asp"&gt;&lt;img height="294" width="528" src="http://www.heraresearch.com/articles/financial_repression_04_dryships_bdi.jpg" alt="Baltic Exchange Dry Index (BDI)  Average Value of the Four Main Shipping Routes applicable for each of the 3 types of ships (Cape/BCI, Panamax/BPI and Supramax/BSI/BHMI), DryShips Inc." border="0" /&gt; &lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The BDI is a leading indicator of economic growth because it reflects the demand of manufacturers for raw materials. A decline in the BDI signals falling global demand for manufactured goods. In the U.S., rail carloads also indicate falling demand. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p align="center"&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/2012/11/aar-rail-traffic-mixed-in-october.html"&gt;&lt;img height="376" width="528" src="http://www.heraresearch.com/articles/financial_repression_05_aar_rail_traffic_10_2012.jpg" alt="Association of American Railroads (AAR), Bill McBride, Calculated Risk, Finance and Economics, http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/" border="0" /&gt; &lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In contrast, removing potentially optimistic projections, the U.S. Energy Information Administration&amp;rsquo;s (EIA) liquid fuels consumption data suggests an anemic recovery in the U.S. on a par with 2011. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p align="center"&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/steo/"&gt;&lt;img height="376" width="528" src="http://www.heraresearch.com/articles/financial_repression_06_eia_outlook_15.jpg" alt="U.S. Energy Information Administration, Short-Term Energy Outlook November 2012, U.S. Energy Information Administration, 1000 Independence Ave., SW, Washington, DC 20585 U.S.A." border="0" /&gt; &lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Despite the recent uptick in U.S. manufacturing, manufacturing currently accounts for only 11.7% of U.S. GDP. In the past few decades, U.S. corporations moved production offshore, eliminating domestic jobs. Credit expansion masked the lost income of U.S. consumers but the process inexorably reached its logical conclusion in 2007. The shift of U.S. workers to often lower paying service sector jobs was counterproductive because debt levels rose while income flowed out of the U.S. following on the heels of jobs. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p align="center"&gt;&lt;a href="http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/EMRATIO/"&gt;&lt;img height="317" width="528" src="http://www.heraresearch.com/articles/financial_repression_07_fred_emratio.jpg" alt="Civilian Employment-Population Ratio (EMRATIO), Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, One Federal Reserve Bank Plaza, St. Louis, MO 63102 U.S.A." border="0" /&gt; &lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Although policymakers, including Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, deny it, in fact, U.S. unemployment is a long term, structural problem linked to the still ongoing outflow of U.S. consumer incomes to net exporter countries such as India and China. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p align="center"&gt;&lt;a href="http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/graph/?s%5b1%5d%5bid%5d=BOPBCA"&gt;&lt;img height="317" width="528" src="http://www.heraresearch.com/articles/financial_repression_08_fred_bopbca.jpg" alt="Balance on Current Account (BOPBCA), Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, One Federal Reserve Bank Plaza, St. Louis, MO 63102 U.S.A." border="0" /&gt; &lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The current surplus of U.S. labor, abundant capital and somewhat less expensive energy (partly due to advances in hydraulic fracturing that have increased U.S. domestic oil production) are insufficient to stimulate a broad-based economic recovery. In addition to the U.S. federal government&amp;rsquo;s growing debt and need for increased tax revenues, U.S. consumers remain burdened with high debt levels. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p align="center"&gt;&lt;a href="http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/graph/?s%5b1%5d%5bid%5d=HCCSDODNS"&gt;&lt;img height="317" width="528" src="http://www.heraresearch.com/articles/financial_repression_09_fred_hccdodns.jpg" alt="Debt Outstanding Domestic Nonfinancial Sectors - Household, Consumer Credit Sector (HCCSDODNS), Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, One Federal Reserve Bank Plaza, St. Louis, MO 63102 U.S.A." border="0" /&gt; &lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A U.S. manufacturing renaissance, for example, is unlikely to take hold unless the U.S. dollar weakens significantly and global demand also rises. In a global slowdown it remains unclear where new customers might come from for new U.S. products or services. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Although the financial system has continued to function due to massive infusions of liquidity, economic activity, with some exceptions, has not generally recovered or has continued to deteriorate, e.g., the shrinking number of U.S. citizens participating in the official workforce. Ignoring improvements in the unemployment rate related to the shrinking size of the workforce, much of the U.S. economic recovery in the post crisis period can be attributed to government deficit spending. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p align="center"&gt;&lt;a href="http://market-ticker.org/cgi-mt/akcs-www?singlepost=3057535"&gt;&lt;img height="364" width="528" src="http://www.heraresearch.com/articles/financial_repression_10_denninger_real_gdp.jpg" alt="Karl Denninger, The Market Ticker Commentary on The Capital Markets, http://market-ticker.org/" border="0" /&gt; &lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;U.S. GDP has been boosted by government deficit spending in excess of $1 trillion per year. Removing the temporary effects of extraordinary deficits, U.S. GDP remains negative. Compounding the problem, loose monetary policies, rather than spurring lending to consumers or small businesses, have created inflationary pressures and have lead to stagflation. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Rather than putting Americans back to work, inflationary policies have helped to push prices higher. Based on U.S. Consumer Price Index (CPI), the official inflation rate in the U.S. is roughly 2%, but the CPI does not accurately measure the cost of maintaining a constant standard of living. Using the same methodology as in 1980, the CPI should be 9.3% currently. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p align="center"&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.shadowstats.com/alternate_data/inflation-charts"&gt;&lt;img height="338" width="528" src="http://www.heraresearch.com/articles/financial_repression_11_sgs_cpi.jpg" alt="hadow Government Statistics, American Business Analytics &amp;amp; Research LLC, http://www.shadowstats.com/" border="0" /&gt; &lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Inflationary central bank policies support government borrowing and the banking system but increased liquidity resulting from low interest rates, central bank asset purchases or debt monetization can have destabilizing effects. Excess liquidity can result in price inflation, fuel financial speculation or asset price bubbles, or provoke competitive devaluations (currency wars). Asset purchases and debt monetization by central banks alter the distribution of money, thus of purchasing power over the economy and therefore redistribute wealth. Monetary inflation erodes the value of savings replacing genuine capital distributed throughout the economy with credit concentrated in banks. In the U.S., one of the Federal Reserve&amp;rsquo;s policy assumptions is that asset purchases will help small businesses by making more credit available. While it is true that small businesses rely on bank credit for operations and expansion, it is savings, not credit that fuels small business creation and therefore job growth. Since most U.S. jobs are in small businesses, QE3 and similar policies destroy jobs by redistributing wealth from savers, entrepreneurs and investors to banks and stifling new business creation. The combination of reduced new business creation, continuing high unemployment and inflationary price pressures set against a backdrop of high debt levels precisely defines stagflation. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Reign of Repression&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The stagflationary environment in the U.S. is a mild example of financial repression. Countries in the European periphery, e.g., Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Ireland, where high taxes and austerity measures are already in place, are more pointed examples. In the case of Greece, which has descended into an economic depression, the natural market outcome would have been a Greek default and an exit from the European Monetary Union (EMU) accompanied by losses for European banks and quite probably a number of European bank failures, along with the systemic impact of associated OTC derivatives, such as Credit Default Swaps (CDS). To prevent bank losses and failures, however, policy decisions replaced market outcomes. The normalization of market interventions, direct government control over the economy and ongoing monetization by central banks represented a transition from a market based status quo to a policy based status quo which maintained or increased otherwise unworkable government debt levels. Maintaining the status quo, however, requires financial repression. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Like the emergency measures that preceded it, financial repression has become a fixture in a new economic paradigm, but it is no more likely to provide a permanent solution. Financial repression will remain in place as long as bank failures and sovereign defaults continue to be prevented, e.g., through bailouts, asset purchases or debt monetization by central banks. Overall economic conditions in Western countries can therefore be expected to remain stagnant or to deteriorate. The continued debasement of major currencies, such as the U.S. dollar and the euro, will reduce the real value of debts but monetary inflation cannot create a genuine economic recovery as long as bank balance sheets and government finances remain impaired. Without robust economic growth, however, both the banking system and the finances of Western governments certainly will remain impaired. In other words, financial repression in the U.S. and in Europe is set to remain in place indefinitely. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Under an ongoing regime of financial repression, savings, jobs, economic opportunity and living standards will all suffer. The middle class will be reduced as generations of socioeconomic progress are gradually reversed. Younger people, mired in stagflation, will be left behind in terms of income and economic opportunity, which will have a long term negative impact. Since U.S. banks stand to profit from financial repression, it will increase income disparity and the concentration of wealth. The destructive forces set in motion by financial repression will greatly increase the burden on government social welfare programs. Thus, financial repression will fail to alleviate government debt unless tax increases and austerity measures follow, which could turn the United States into another Greece. In theory, financial repression, together with other measures, can liquidate government debt but, in practice, it is a destructive and highly destabilizing approach that will result in a net loss of wealth to society. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="clear:both;"&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;img src="http://mises.org/community/aggbug.aspx?PostID=504538" width="1" height="1"&gt;</description><category domain="http://mises.org/community/blogs/hera/archive/tags/Federal+reserve/default.aspx">Federal reserve</category><category domain="http://mises.org/community/blogs/hera/archive/tags/CPI/default.aspx">CPI</category><category domain="http://mises.org/community/blogs/hera/archive/tags/deflation/default.aspx">deflation</category><category domain="http://mises.org/community/blogs/hera/archive/tags/inflation/default.aspx">inflation</category><category domain="http://mises.org/community/blogs/hera/archive/tags/GDP/default.aspx">GDP</category><category 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domain="http://mises.org/community/blogs/hera/archive/tags/Carmen+M.+Reinhart/default.aspx">Carmen M. Reinhart</category><category domain="http://mises.org/community/blogs/hera/archive/tags/OTC+derivatives.+Glass-Steagall+Act/default.aspx">OTC derivatives. Glass-Steagall Act</category><category domain="http://mises.org/community/blogs/hera/archive/tags/interest+rates/default.aspx">interest rates</category><category domain="http://mises.org/community/blogs/hera/archive/tags/net+loss/default.aspx">net loss</category><category domain="http://mises.org/community/blogs/hera/archive/tags/middle+class/default.aspx">middle class</category><category domain="http://mises.org/community/blogs/hera/archive/tags/consumer+incomes/default.aspx">consumer incomes</category><category domain="http://mises.org/community/blogs/hera/archive/tags/innovation/default.aspx">innovation</category><category domain="http://mises.org/community/blogs/hera/archive/tags/economic+recovery/default.aspx">economic recovery</category></item><item><title>The Unholy Alliance of John Maynard Keynes</title><link>http://mises.org/community/blogs/hera/archive/2012/07/01/the-unholy-alliance-of-john-maynard-keynes.aspx</link><pubDate>Sun, 01 Jul 2012 20:03:00 GMT</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="false">944abf2b-d1be-4bf2-990d-438cb0e377e9:477205</guid><dc:creator>Ron Hera</dc:creator><slash:comments>0</slash:comments><wfw:commentRss xmlns:wfw="http://wellformedweb.org/CommentAPI/">http://mises.org/community/blogs/hera/rsscomments.aspx?PostID=477205</wfw:commentRss><comments>http://mises.org/community/blogs/hera/archive/2012/07/01/the-unholy-alliance-of-john-maynard-keynes.aspx#comments</comments><description>&lt;p&gt;Perhaps the greatest modern champion of central economic planning was the 20th century English economist John Maynard Keynes.&amp;nbsp; Keynes, who was a political socialist and for a time a central banker, advocated the idea that the government should play a large, active role in the economy.&amp;nbsp; Among the consequences of Keynes&amp;#39; economic theories, whether intended or unintended, is the fact that Western economies today are characterized by large, central governments, central banks and massive debts.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;According to Dr. Andrew Gelman, Professor of Statistics and Political Science at Columbia University, &amp;quot;the law of unintended consequences is what happens when a simple system tries to regulate a complex system. &amp;nbsp;The political system is simple. &amp;nbsp;It operates with limited information (rational ignorance), short time horizons, low feedback, and poor and misaligned incentives. &amp;nbsp;Society, in contrast, is a complex, evolving, high-feedback, incentive-driven system. &amp;nbsp;When a simple system tries to regulate a complex system you often get unintended consequences.&amp;quot;&amp;nbsp; Professor Gelman&amp;#39;s statement seems equally apropos to central banking.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Government policies based on Keynesian theories and the institution of central banking form a nexus of central economic planning.&amp;nbsp; Control of the central planning process is a winner-take-all proposition for businesses.&amp;nbsp; In the U.S., the result is an unholy alliance of the U.S. federal government, the Federal Reserve (along with the largest U.S. banks) and the largest U.S. corporations. &amp;nbsp;The logical chain beginning with Keynes&amp;#39; fundamental idea that government, supported by a central bank, should play a large and active role in the economy sets the stage for a centrally planned economy and ultimately produces a corporate state.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The U.S. economy is locked in a downward spiral of economic decline.&amp;nbsp; By growing in size, and by engaging in ever larger economic interventions, the U.S. federal government became itself a material cause of the recession that began in 2007.&amp;nbsp; By attempting to grow the economy through monetary expansion, i.e., consumer spending fueled by debt, the Federal Reserve destroyed savings and fueled a series of disastrous economic bubbles, culminating in the housing bubble.&amp;nbsp; At the same time, the largest U.S. banks engaged in reckless lending and high-stakes gambling on hundreds of trillions in over the counter (OTC) derivatives.&amp;nbsp; OTC derivatives, which amount to risky, largely un-backed wagers, were the root cause of the &amp;quot;too big to fail&amp;quot; doctrine that has virtually bankrupted Western governments since 2008.&amp;nbsp; By seeking ever greater influence over Washington D.C. and by seeking to generate higher profits by cutting production in the U.S., the largest U.S. corporations undermined the U.S. market and economy.&amp;nbsp; The U.S. federal government did virtually nothing to prevent the destructive developments because of the influence of the largest U.S. corporations.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Following Keynesian economic theories, the policy response of the U.S. federal government to the recession that began in 2007 and of the financial crisis that began in 2008 was to expand the government further and at a more rapid pace.&amp;nbsp; In other words, some of the root causes of the economic imbalances that lead to the recession and financial crisis (the relative size of the government and the resulting economic distortions) were compounded.&amp;nbsp; As a consequence, the so-called &amp;quot;double dip recession&amp;quot; in the U.S. that began in the second half of 2011 will be longer and ultimately more severe than the economic downturn of 2007-2009.&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Baltic Dry Index (BDI) indicates international shipping returning to crisis levels.&amp;nbsp; Since the U.S. is the world&amp;#39;s largest economy and has a large trade deficit, the BDI suggests that the U.S. is in a recession.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Leviathan: The Size of the State&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Originally a sea monster referred to in the Bible and, in demonology, one of the seven princes of Hell, as well as its gatekeeper, the name Leviathan was adopted by the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes to refer to an artificial political order, i.e., to the institution of the state. &amp;nbsp;Hobbes was concerned with the distinction between individual rights and the powers of sovereign governments and he elaborated the idea of the social contract.&amp;nbsp; When a government taxes its citizens, it implicitly asserts the right of the government over the property rights of individuals and presupposes that the government can make better use of economic resources than households, individual entrepreneurs, businesses and private investors.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In theory, the government&amp;#39;s use of economic resources accomplishes goals that privately owned businesses cannot, such as national defense or emergency response services, i.e., things that, by their nature, are not economically productive or profitable but still necessary for society.&amp;nbsp; In contrast, embarking upon idealistic projects such as &amp;quot;creating jobs&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;expanding home ownership&amp;quot; encroaches on the productive elements of the economy.&amp;nbsp; However, governments are inefficient compared to privately owned businesses due to the absence of competition.&amp;nbsp; Further, the record of history suggests an inability on the part of central planners to make superior economic decisions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Government encroachment on the private sector, like a self fulfilling prophecy, often magnifies the reasons why government intervention was originally believed to be necessary.&amp;nbsp; For example, when the U.S. federal government became involved in education through federally guaranteed student loans, the result was that the cost of a college education rose towards the limit of what students could borrow and repay during their careers simply because the loans were guaranteed by the government.&amp;nbsp; The guarantees produced more and riskier loans, larger loans and higher education costs.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When the U.S. federal government promoted home ownership for minorities and the poor, mortgage loan guarantees resulted in higher home prices and contributed to the sub-prime lending debacle where banks originated loans to unqualified borrowers in order to sell them to government sponsored entities (GSEs), i.e., to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and to investors as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and other mortgage backed securities (MBS).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Banks were certainly to blame for knowingly making bad loans, which is fraud, but the conditions that made the problem possible existed substantially because of government intervention in the housing market, i.e., opening the door to fraud was an unintended consequence of policies intended to increase lending to unqualified, low income borrowers.&amp;nbsp; Of course, the U.S. federal government did not compel lenders to commit fraud, thus accountability for the U.S. mortgage disaster is shared by the federal government, which interfered with the free market, pursued misguided policies and failed in terms of regulatory oversight and law enforcement, and by banks, which engaged in widespread mortgage related fraud.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Governments redistribute wealth and manipulate economic activity through taxes, subsidies, guarantees, regulations and so forth, but they do not produce new wealth.&amp;nbsp; Government spending may be for good purposes, or at least stem from good intentions, but it unavoidably favors businesses with close ties to the government over those that are taxed but that do not benefit.&amp;nbsp; Despite the theoretically higher moral purposes of lofty government undertakings, government programs that overlap the private sector divert economic resources to businesses that have the favor of politicians minus the cost of government, thus producing economic distortions and a net loss of wealth for society.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Rahn curve is an economic theory proposing that there is an optimal level of government spending, 15% to 25% of gross domestic product (GDP), to maximize economic growth.&amp;nbsp; As the government grows larger, economic growth is curtailed and, eventually, the economy contracts, crushed under the burden of government.&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp; As the government grows in size relative to the economy, not only is economic growth compromised, but the potential for, and the cost of, government waste, fraud and abuse increases.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;How the Government Destroys Jobs&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;While politicians extol the theoretical benefits of ever more government control of the economy, e.g., through increased regulation, from the standpoint of individual entrepreneurs, businesses and private investors, the government is a nuisance, an impediment to wealth creation, and the source of countless costs and risks.&amp;nbsp; The larger the government becomes relative to the size of the economy, the more it tends to discourage economic activity.&amp;nbsp; Although roughly 70% of U.S. jobs are created by small businesses, ranging from family owned businesses to high technology startups, the burden of government falls disproportionately on them because they have fewer resources with which to administer and to demonstrate compliance with government regulations.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When large companies are audited or investigated by any of several government agencies, their accounting, legal and compliance departments are well equipped to deal with such matters.&amp;nbsp; However, when a small company faces the same hurdles or seeks government permits, licenses or certifications, its operations are directly impacted and the associated accounting, legal and regulatory compliance costs can cause the business to lose money or to fail.&amp;nbsp; In the event of an audit or investigation, small business owners in the U.S. generally seek to comply immediately and often pay fines or penalties without contest in order to end the government&amp;#39;s interference.&amp;nbsp; While large companies can afford to dispute the government, small businesses face the equivalent of extortion.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As a practical matter, small businesses in the U.S. are permitted to operate at the sole discretion of government bureaucrats that can effectively shut down small businesses without any evidence of wrongdoing.&amp;nbsp; Setting aside the fact that small business owners live in constant and well justified fear of their own government, the result is a stifling of economic activity and a net loss of jobs.&amp;nbsp; For example, traditional small businesses in the U.S., i.e., sole proprietorships, increasingly avoid hiring employees.&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Free market competition and the inherent uncertainty of economic conditions provide ample risk for startup businesses.&amp;nbsp; A disproportionately large government relative to the size of the economy damages economic activity and discourages investment in new businesses.&amp;nbsp; The aggregate overhead of government regulations and regulatory compliance, along with taxes and potential penalties, e.g., the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (&amp;quot;Obamacare&amp;quot;), increases business costs, amplifies business risks and further increases the burden of regulatory compliance.&amp;nbsp; The result of systematically increasing the costs and risks of doing business-in lock step with the size of government-is to reduce the rate of business formation and to encourage investors to look elsewhere to find returns.&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If the U.S. government, currently almost 45% of GDP, desired to create jobs, the correct policy would be to greatly reduce the countless regulations, taxes and fees that encumber small businesses.&amp;nbsp; The path to job creation is for the government to reduce job destruction.&amp;nbsp; Since no political will to reduce the size of the government exists, however, continued shrinking real GDP and permanent workforce reduction can be expected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Money Out of Thin Air&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Central banks, such as the Federal Reserve, are examples of central economic planning, i.e., they control the money supply and exercise centralized control over the value and cost of money through interest rates, bank reserve ratios, monetary inflation and by other means.&amp;nbsp; In contrast to the government&amp;#39;s central planning for the putative public good, the Federal Reserve engages in central planning for the benefit of banks.&amp;nbsp; Like the U.S. federal government, the Federal Reserve, through monetary mechanisms, distorts spending and investment patterns, redistributes wealth and preempts the financial and economic decisions of households, individual entrepreneurs, businesses and private investors.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When a central bank increases the money supply beyond the level necessary to support a sustainable economy or population growth, it destroys the value of savings and wages by diluting the value of money and causing prices to rise. &amp;nbsp;Wall Street embraces the Federal Reserve because easy monetary policies provide an inexpensive way to finance operations and to expand, but there is a cost.&amp;nbsp; Inflationary monetary policies favor speculators over savers and debt over genuine capital formation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Banks do not create wealth.&amp;nbsp; The structure of the financial system, where debt-based money is created &lt;i&gt;ex nihilo&lt;/i&gt;, virtually guarantees banks a piece of the action whenever wealth is created.&amp;nbsp; When debt service (principal and interest payments) is attached to the income streams of consumers and businesses, excess production is diverted from capital formation into the coffers of banks.&amp;nbsp; The Federal Reserve, therefore, is at the core of a system where, over time, wealth accrues to banks while capital formation is reduced, ironically increasing the need to borrow.&amp;nbsp; The majority of entrepreneurs and businesses have little choice but to borrow and, even if they are successful, the economy as a whole may still suffer due to increased debt levels relative to GDP.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Keynesians embrace the Federal Reserve&amp;#39;s un-backed, fiat money because it permits the government to borrow and spend freely based on the theory that stimulating the economy through deficit spending produces economic growth at a faster pace than debt accumulates.&amp;nbsp; However, as a function of debt service, the number of dollars that must be borrowed and spent to generate each new dollar of GDP becomes larger as the total amount of debt grows.&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The result is debt saturation where further debt funded increases in GDP are impossible and where, therefore, existing government debt cannot be retired, i.e., the result of Keynes&amp;#39; theory, taken to an extreme, is government insolvency and sovereign default.&amp;nbsp; Default, of course, can take the form of monetary inflation in order to debase the currency and reduce the real value of debt, e.g., the Federal Reserve&amp;#39;s monetary easing and continued accommodative monetary policy.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Keynes and The Corporate State&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The U.S. economy is anything but a free market today.&amp;nbsp; In fact, the U.S. government increasingly resembles an oligarchy in which the oligarchs are large corporations, i.e., a &amp;quot;corporatocracy&amp;quot;.&amp;nbsp; Thus, the illegitimate offspring of the grand government envisaged by Keynes and the institution of central banking is a corporate state.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Without a large government, businesses have little incentive to influence it, but with the government (local, state and federal) representing nearly half of the U.S. economy, influencing the government is a mission-critical objective for every company.&amp;nbsp; The size of government implied by Keynesian economics provides motive and opportunity but only the largest corporations have the means to succeed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The goals of businesses seeking to influence the government include winning government business, mandating consumption of products and services (from child car seats to health insurance), avoiding taxes, guaranteeing profits, creating regulatory loopholes, protecting markets, eliminating competition, socializing losses and so forth.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"&gt;
&lt;tbody&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td colspan="2" width="265" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p align="center"&gt;&lt;b&gt;Obama&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td colspan="2" width="276" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p align="center"&gt;&lt;b&gt;Romney&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td width="169" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Citigroup Inc &lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="96" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p align="right"&gt;&lt;b&gt;$736,771 &lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="180" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Citigroup Inc &lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="96" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p align="right"&gt;&lt;b&gt;$57,050 &lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td width="169" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Columbia University &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="96" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p align="right"&gt;$547,852 &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="180" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Bain &amp;amp; Co&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="96" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p align="right"&gt;$52,500 &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td width="169" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;General Electric &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="96" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p align="right"&gt;$529,855 &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="180" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Bain Capital&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="96" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p align="right"&gt;$74,500 &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td width="169" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Goldman Sachs &lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="96" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p align="right"&gt;&lt;b&gt;$1,013,091 &lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="180" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Goldman Sachs &lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="96" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p align="right"&gt;&lt;b&gt;$367,200 &lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td width="169" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Google Inc &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="96" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p align="right"&gt;$814,540 &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="180" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Bank of America &lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="96" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p align="right"&gt;&lt;b&gt;$126,500 &lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td width="169" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Harvard University &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="96" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p align="right"&gt;$878,164 &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="180" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Barclays&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="96" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p align="right"&gt;&lt;b&gt;$157,750 &lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td width="169" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;IBM Corp &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="96" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p align="right"&gt;$532,372 &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="180" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Blackstone Group&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="96" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p align="right"&gt;$59,800 &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td width="169" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;JPMorgan Chase &amp;amp; Co &lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="96" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p align="right"&gt;&lt;b&gt;$808,799 &lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="180" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;JPMorgan Chase &amp;amp; Co &lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="96" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p align="right"&gt;&lt;b&gt;$112,250 &lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td width="169" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Latham &amp;amp; Watkins &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="96" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p align="right"&gt;$503,295 &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="180" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Credit Suisse Group &lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="96" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p align="right"&gt;&lt;b&gt;$203,750 &lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td width="169" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Microsoft Corp &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="96" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p align="right"&gt;$852,167 &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="180" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;EMC Corp&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="96" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p align="right"&gt;$117,300 &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td width="169" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Morgan Stanley &lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="96" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p align="right"&gt;&lt;b&gt;$512,232 &lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="180" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Morgan Stanley &lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="96" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p align="right"&gt;&lt;b&gt;$199,800 &lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td width="169" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;National Amusements Inc &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="96" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p align="right"&gt;$563,798 &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="180" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;HIG Capital&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="96" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p align="right"&gt;$186,500 &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td width="169" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Sidley Austin LLP &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="96" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p align="right"&gt;$600,298 &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="180" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Kirkland &amp;amp; Ellis&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="96" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p align="right"&gt;$132,100 &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td width="169" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Skadden, Arps et al &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="96" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p align="right"&gt;$543,539 &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="180" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Marriott International&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="96" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p align="right"&gt;$79,837 &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td width="169" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Stanford University &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="96" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p align="right"&gt;$595,716 &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="180" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;PriceWaterhouseCoopers &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="96" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p align="right"&gt;$118,250 &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td width="169" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Time Warner &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="96" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p align="right"&gt;$624,618 &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="180" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Sullivan &amp;amp; Cromwell&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="96" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p align="right"&gt;$79,250 &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td width="169" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;UBS AG &lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="96" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p align="right"&gt;&lt;b&gt;$532,674 &lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="180" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;UBS AG &lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="96" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p align="right"&gt;&lt;b&gt;$73,750 &lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td width="169" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;University of California &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="96" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p align="right"&gt;$1,648,685 &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="180" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Villages&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="96" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p align="right"&gt;$97,500 &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td width="169" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;US Government &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="96" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p align="right"&gt;$513,308 &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="180" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Vivint Inc&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="96" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p align="right"&gt;$80,750 &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td width="169" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;WilmerHale LLP &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="96" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p align="right"&gt;$550,668 &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="180" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Wells Fargo&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="96" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p align="right"&gt;$61,500 &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td width="169" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p align="right"&gt;&lt;b&gt;Total Primary Dealers:&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="96" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p align="right"&gt;&lt;b&gt;$3,603,567&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="180" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p align="right"&gt;&lt;b&gt;Total Primary Dealers:&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width="96" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p align="right"&gt;&lt;b&gt;$810,050&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td colspan="4" width="541" valign="bottom"&gt;
&lt;p align="center"&gt;&amp;nbsp;Political campaign contributions indicating U.S. Federal Reserve Primary Dealers (Source: opensecrets.org)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/tbody&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The influence of Wall Street over Washington D.C. through political campaign contributions, corporate lobbyists and revolving doors (where the same individuals alternate between closely linked private sector jobs and government posts) is almost absolute.&amp;nbsp; Lobbyists are intimately involved in writing legislation that is often rubberstamped by the U.S. Congress, i.e., passed without reading or meaningful debate.&amp;nbsp; The largest corporations support political candidates through campaign contributions and by funding political action committees that, among other things, use corporate public relations tools for political purposes, i.e., propaganda.&amp;nbsp; Key government posts are consistently held by individuals with clear conflicts of interest and the existence of such conflicts is routinely ignored.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The current reality of the United States is that the largest corporations have hijacked the Keynesian central planning powers of the federal government and have used these powers to encourage ever larger and more direct interventions in the economy for their own benefit, as well as laws and regulations that serve as a barrier to free market competition.&amp;nbsp; U.S. regulators, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Commodities and Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) appear to have been captured by the industries they are intended to regulate.&amp;nbsp; Government regulators selectively enforce regulations, often against small businesses and growing companies, such as organic dairy farmers, protecting the interests of the largest corporations from small businesses, free market competition and consumer choice.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The largest U.S. corporations (including oil companies like ExxonMobil and Chevron; drug companies like Johnson &amp;amp; Johnson, Pfizer and GlaxoSmithKline; agribusiness companies like Archer Daniels Midland, which are heavily subsidized by the U.S. federal government; agricultural biotechnology companies like Monsanto; military contractors like Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Boeing, Raytheon and General Dynamics; and banks like Bank of America, J. P. Morgan Chase, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley) have not only been the beneficiaries of government expansion, deficit spending and central economic planning, but, considering political campaign funding practices, have become the de facto oligarchs of America.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Sliding Into the Keynesian Abyss&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The decline of the U.S. economy is the logical outcome of Keynesian economics, which enshrines central economic planning and embraces central banking.&amp;nbsp; The unholy alliance of the federal government, the Federal Reserve and Wall Street has all but eliminated capitalism and has transformed the United States from a burgeoning free market economy into a failing corporate state.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The U.S. federal government, the Federal Reserve and Wall Street each played a role in the progression from central economic planning and central banking to a corporate state.&amp;nbsp; Politicians used Keynesian economics to justify big government, a welfare state and budget deficits.&amp;nbsp; The Federal Reserve sought to grow the economy through monetary expansion, focusing on consumption but ignoring debt levels and inadvertently encouraging financial speculation.&amp;nbsp; At the same time, Wall Street sought higher profits both by eliminating production (and jobs) in the U.S. and by sparing no expense to influence the government. &amp;nbsp;The resulting corporate state undermined capitalism and the free market in the United States and produced a downward spiral of economic decline from which there is no escape without fundamental reforms.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="clear:both;"&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;img src="http://mises.org/community/aggbug.aspx?PostID=477205" width="1" height="1"&gt;</description><category domain="http://mises.org/community/blogs/hera/archive/tags/Federal+reserve/default.aspx">Federal reserve</category><category domain="http://mises.org/community/blogs/hera/archive/tags/GDP/default.aspx">GDP</category><category domain="http://mises.org/community/blogs/hera/archive/tags/OTC+derivatives/default.aspx">OTC derivatives</category><category domain="http://mises.org/community/blogs/hera/archive/tags/CFTC/default.aspx">CFTC</category><category domain="http://mises.org/community/blogs/hera/archive/tags/SEC/default.aspx">SEC</category><category domain="http://mises.org/community/blogs/hera/archive/tags/Gross+Domestic+Product/default.aspx">Gross Domestic Product</category><category domain="http://mises.org/community/blogs/hera/archive/tags/Securities+and+Exchange+Commission/default.aspx">Securities and Exchange Commission</category><category domain="http://mises.org/community/blogs/hera/archive/tags/Goldman+Sachs/default.aspx">Goldman Sachs</category><category domain="http://mises.org/community/blogs/hera/archive/tags/Morgan+Stanley/default.aspx">Morgan Stanley</category><category domain="http://mises.org/community/blogs/hera/archive/tags/collateralized+debt+obligations/default.aspx">collateralized debt obligations</category><category domain="http://mises.org/community/blogs/hera/archive/tags/Obamacare/default.aspx">Obamacare</category><category domain="http://mises.org/community/blogs/hera/archive/tags/Pfizer/default.aspx">Pfizer</category><category domain="http://mises.org/community/blogs/hera/archive/tags/Commodities+and+Futures+Trading+Commission/default.aspx">Commodities and Futures Trading Commission</category><category domain="http://mises.org/community/blogs/hera/archive/tags/Keynesian+economics/default.aspx">Keynesian economics</category><category domain="http://mises.org/community/blogs/hera/archive/tags/Wells+Fargo/default.aspx">Wells Fargo</category><category domain="http://mises.org/community/blogs/hera/archive/tags/Food+and+Drug+Administration/default.aspx">Food and Drug Administration</category><category domain="http://mises.org/community/blogs/hera/archive/tags/GlaxoSmithKline/default.aspx">GlaxoSmithKline</category><category domain="http://mises.org/community/blogs/hera/archive/tags/Lockheed+Martin/default.aspx">Lockheed Martin</category><category domain="http://mises.org/community/blogs/hera/archive/tags/Bank+of+America/default.aspx">Bank of America</category><category domain="http://mises.org/community/blogs/hera/archive/tags/General+Dynamics/default.aspx">General Dynamics</category><category domain="http://mises.org/community/blogs/hera/archive/tags/MBS/default.aspx">MBS</category><category domain="http://mises.org/community/blogs/hera/archive/tags/federal+government+debt/default.aspx">federal government debt</category><category domain="http://mises.org/community/blogs/hera/archive/tags/Rahn+curve/default.aspx">Rahn curve</category><category domain="http://mises.org/community/blogs/hera/archive/tags/CDOs/default.aspx">CDOs</category><category domain="http://mises.org/community/blogs/hera/archive/tags/mortgage+backed+securities/default.aspx">mortgage backed securities</category><category domain="http://mises.org/community/blogs/hera/archive/tags/Leviathan/default.aspx">Leviathan</category><category domain="http://mises.org/community/blogs/hera/archive/tags/J.P.+Morgan+Chase/default.aspx">J.P. 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