Hera : QE2

Jim Sinclair: The Financial System Is Less Stable Today Than It Was in 2008

Ron Hera — Sat, 07 May 2011 11:35:00 GMT

The Hera Research Newsletter is pleased to present an in-depth interview with Jim Sinclair, Chairman and CEO of Tanzanian Royalty Exploration and founder of Jim Sinclair's MineSet, which hosts his gold commentary as a free service to the gold investment community.

Jim Sinclair is primarily a precious metals specialist and a commodities and foreign currency trader. He founded the Sinclair Group of Companies in 1977, which offered full brokerage services in stocks, bonds, and other investment vehicles. The companies, which operated branches in New York, Kansas City, Toronto, Chicago, London and Geneva, were sold in 1983.

From 1981 to 1984, Mr. Sinclair served as a Precious Metals Advisor to Hunt Oil and the Hunt family for the liquidation of their silver position as a prerequisite for the $1 billion loan arranged by the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Paul Volcker.

He was also a General Partner and Member of the Executive Committee of two New York Stock Exchange firms and President of Sinclair Global Clearing Corporation (a commodity clearing firm) and Global Arbitrage (a derivative dealer in metals and currencies).

In April 2002, shareholders of Tanzanian Royalty Exploration (formerly Tan Range Exploration) approved the acquisition of a Sinclair managed private company, Tanzania American International, and its exploration assets in Tanzania. Subsequently, Mr. Sinclair became Chairman of Tanzanian Royalty and now leads its efforts to become a gold royalty and development company.

He has authored three books and numerous magazine articles dealing with a variety of investment subjects, including precious metals, trading strategies and geopolitical events and their relationship to world economics and the markets. He is a frequent and popular commentator on financial and market related issues in various news publications, and has been profiled in the New York Times.

In January 2003 Mr. Sinclair launched, Jim Sinclair's MineSet, which now hosts his gold commentary and is intended as a free service to the gold community.

Hera Research Newsletter (HRN): Thank you for speaking with us today. You are one of very few people who have tried to warn investors about OTC derivatives. Why are OTC derivatives a problem in your opinion?

Jim Sinclair: Over the counter (OTC) derivatives are the reason we are going through what we are going through now. An OTC derivative is a kind of wager on what something will do. Up until 2009, most of these wagers had very little, if any, money behind them and, if the direction you bet on didn't come to fruition, the amount of leverage resulted in extraordinary losses. There was a major rollover in derivatives tied to real estate in 2008, as well as in other types, such as those tied to sub-prime auto loans.

HRN: Did OTC derivatives destabilize the financial system in 2008?

Jim Sinclair: Absolutely.

HRN: Don't financial institutions use risk cancellation models to hedge risks using OTC derivatives?

Jim Sinclair: Before the failure of Lehman Brothers, OTC derivatives losses would have almost netted out to zero. You can consider derivatives like a string in a circle with various knots representing all the derivatives transactions. When Lehman went broke, the string broke. When Lehman couldn't meet its obligations on derivatives, they could no longer be netted out to zero. That's why the banks went down, and that's why you had the government bailouts and quantitative easing (QE).

HRN: OTC derivatives are the real reason for the bank bailouts?

Jim Sinclair: That is a fact which can in no way be argued away.

HRN: Hasn't the problem been cleaned up by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act?

Jim Sinclair: The pile of OTC derivatives is over $1 quadrillion. After 2008, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) adopted a new method of valuing them called value to maturity. Value to maturity assumes all of them will function, which is a cartoon. The derivatives pile hasn't contracted. Basically, it has expanded, but value to maturity reduced the notional value from over $1 quadrillion to under $700 trillion. The amount outstanding is the same as it was in the first place.

The flavor of the present moment is credit default swaps against the solvency, or lack thereof, of sovereign nations. New derivatives have some margin behind them, but they only work if they are not called upon. If a nation's debt was in fact to default, it would happen very quickly without a great deal of run up before. Most people would expect a rescue to be coming. Let's say a rescue didn't come, those credit default swaps would simply not be able to function and down again would come the banking system.

HRN: Are you saying that the financial system is less stable today than it was in 2008?

Jim Sinclair: It appears more stable but that's only an appearance. The entire equity rally took place almost to the day from when the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) relaxed the mark-to-market rule. It allowed financial institutions to make up whatever value they wanted for their worthless pieces of paper. If they used the real values, the banks would have come down.

HRN: Wasn't the FASB change a temporary measure to halt the decline in mortgage-backed securities?

Jim Sinclair: It wasn't just mortgage-backed securities. It was all the paper on bank balance sheets. The balance sheets of banks appear to be in good shape but they're not. In fact, they will need a lot more funds.

HRN: Then the financial system is still vulnerable?

Jim Sinclair: They've kicked the can down the road. The purpose of QE, in other words the printing of money, is to maintain some degree of integrity in the financial system. Bear in mind that the grease for the wheels of equity markets is liquidity, meaning that if you create a lot of money, it goes into the hands of banking institutions and international investment houses. So, the equity out of thin air market has been sustained by QE.

HRN: What can the government do to prevent another crisis?

Jim Sinclair: You can assume that what's been done already will be done again. There are no other tools in a practical sense. The idea that there won't be a continuation of QE is nonsense.

HRN: Can the government bail out the banks again?

Jim Sinclair: The central banks will buy the government debt. That's called quantitative easing.

HRN: Doesn't QE undermine the dollar?

Jim Sinclair: The dollar is an exercise in psychology. It's a piece of paper with a promise to pay but there's nothing in which it can be paid. It's legal settlement for debt but there's nothing that it's convertible into. To maintain confidence, it's necessary to maintain the stature of a currency. In an arithmetic sense, if you go into a market to sell a supply of apples, and if you're the only seller, you can get a nice price. If more sellers, meaning more apples, come into the market, there goes the price of apples. QE creates more dollars, which increases the supply.

HRN: If the dollar is losing value because of QE, what about the euro?

Jim Sinclair: If you look at the dollar or the euro or the yen, or even the Swiss franc, it's a race to the bottom amongst all currencies. All countries everywhere are creating more paper every day. It's a relative valuation, rather than a valuation based on an objective reference. What happens in the European Union immediately affects the dollar.

HRN: You mean the sovereign debt crisis?

Jim Sinclair: There's too much focus on the euro countries. There's no difference between the economic union of Europe and the union of the states in the United States. The states of europe have been revealed to be insolvent. How about the states of the United States? Out of New York, Illinois, California, etc., how many are solvent? The focus of the media has been on the euro. The U.S. should stand in front of a mirror. The states of the economic union of America are in no better shape.

HRN: The news media is ignoring the U.S. sovereign debt crisis?

Jim Sinclair: In George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four, there were loud speakers constantly teaching the people what Big Brother wanted. The loudspeakers today are financial television. How much attention has financial TV put on the insolvency of U.S. states? It's been mentioned, but not like the solvency problems of Portugal, Greece, Spain and Ireland, which have gotten hours, days, weeks and months of constant coverage. The solvency of New York, Illinois and California has been brought up but fleetingly at best.

HRN: So, the solvency problems of U.S. states are like an elephant in the room that no one is talking about?

Jim Sinclair: How can you say that the euro is a disaster based on the financial condition of the states of the economic union of Europe, when the states of the economic union of the United States are in equally bad shape and in some cases worse? There's no difference. If you want to analyze the euro based on the weakness of its member states, how can the dollar be strong when the states of the United States are as weak or weaker?

HRN: So, the euro could rise against the U.S. dollar, despite the European sovereign debt crisis?

Jim Sinclair: Sure it can. The question is, can the dollar go lower? The euro could go to $1.50 or higher.

HRN: But the U.S. dollar is the world reserve currency. Doesn't that guarantee its value?

Jim Sinclair: Only by default. It remains so because central banks own dollars. If central banks could exchange them for gold or other currencies without a major dislocation, they would.

HRN: Then, as a practical matter, central banks can't get out of the dollar?

Jim Sinclair: The only one that's gotten out of it is China. They've made deals all around the world for metals, materials, energy and manufacturing. If you add it all up, China is no more stuck in the dollar than the man in the moon.

HRN: Doesn't the U.S. maintain a strong dollar policy?

Jim Sinclair: The strong dollar policy has only been a moderate, long-term downtrend that continues lower.

HRN: Don't central banks manage currency exchange rates to prevent disruptive changes, like the recent Japanese yen intervention?

Jim Sinclair: In the Japanese yen intervention, the central banks intervened but how long can they intervene? They have to create money to intervene, which comes back to QE.

HRN: Do you mean the overall affect of currency interventions is to create new money?

Jim Sinclair: Anything that happens around the world, for instance, the Bank of Japan's response to the horrible disaster in Japan, was to go straight to QE. Money is being created everywhere without any discipline but the problems of financial institutions remain because they have make-believe balance sheets with improper values for their OTC derivatives.

HRN: Doesn't the suspension of the FASB mark to market rule buy time for banks to repair their balance sheets?

Jim Sinclair: There are five million homes for sale in the United States if you include the off-market shadow inventory, which is a real inventory. There's no repair coming in the real estate market, therefore, there's no repair coming in the OTC derivatives based on that. That means there's no repair coming in the underlying paper that the banks now value at much higher levels than they could possibly sell them for, if they could sell them at all.

HRN: Will bank balance sheets eventually get better?

Jim Sinclair: As long as confidence remains in place, which depends on the equity market and that comes back to QE.

HRN: Are you saying that the U.S. stock market rally is driven by QE?

Jim Sinclair: There's an inability to stop QE without the whole house of cards coming down on itself. There's no other choice. It's the only tool left. The Federal Reserve can't take a hawkish position on monetary policy and interest rates without this whole thing rolling over. They can talk about it constantly and might have more back-door QE than front-door QE.

HRN: If QE doesn't stop soon, what will happen?

Jim Sinclair: The end game is a virtual reserve currency linked to gold. It will be based on an average of major currencies, which will slow down the movement in the index. The IMF is moving in that direction with Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). The dollar will be just another currency. The dollar's not going to zero. It could loose a significant part of its buying power, which it already has and could again.

HRN: How would a virtual currency work?

Jim Sinclair: There would have to be a broad measure of the money supply, such as M3 used to be for the U.S. dollar, but on an international basis. The price of gold would be related to that measure. Central banks would have to value their gold according to their contribution to or extraction of international liquidity, so the price of gold would rise or fall on its own.

HRN: Wouldn't that be a gold standard?

Jim Sinclair: There'll never be a return to a gold standard in my opinion. The end of all hyperinflations has been a commodity currency. That's exactly what happened in Germany, for example. Gold has the capacity to give confidence to people if there's some relationship between the currency and gold. The virtual currency will be linked to gold but not convertible into gold.

HRN: So, a gold component will restore confidence?

Jim Sinclair: The answer is a commodity currency. That's what happened every time there was this type of situation in monetary history. The rentenmark, which ended the German hyperinflation in 1923, was supposedly backed by all the real estate in Germany, but the government didn't own that real estate. The point is that it wasn't true. There was no great commodity backing for the rentenmark, but it was enough. It was a period when people were searching for anything to restore confidence in the currency.

HRN: Do you expect high inflation in U.S. dollar terms?

Jim Sinclair: The deed is done. Inflation is a pregnancy. The conception has already taken place. There's a delayed effect but if you do the crime, you do the time. The Federal Reserve could stop QE tomorrow and it wouldn't stop what's going to happen because of what they've already done.

HRN: Won't inflation reduce the real value of debt and help to repair bank balance sheets?

Jim Sinclair: Inflation is the way debt will be taken care of. The value of the currency will be so reduced as to reduce the debt load. It will also change the political scene. Whoever has power going into this will not have power coming out of it.

HRN: In other words, inflation is politically destabilizing?

Jim Sinclair: People really haven't seen the big picture. Currency induced cost push inflation is already here. Look at what's going on right now in the Middle East. We are moving from order to lack of order.

HRN: Would you say that inflation in food prices is indirectly driving oil prices higher?

Jim Sinclair: Oil goes right through from fertilizers to farm equipment to transportation and to food prices. The price of food is going to go even higher than we are seeing this year. The price of oil is headed decidedly higher. Peak Oil was a concept of the future. Now it's a concept of now. A car getting 25 miles per gallon will probably be too expensive for the average person to drive.

HRN: How will high oil prices affect the prices of other things?

Jim Sinclair: There will be dislocation in the means of delivery of products. There may be shortages of goods, not because there are no available goods but because the means of distribution breaks down. It's not that there won't be corn or wheat, but the fuel needed to deliver it will be too expensive and people who work in transportation will demand higher pay so they can live. That's where hyperinflation comes in.

HRN: And money to maintain the distribution of goods will be printed out of thin air?

Jim Sinclair: Every nation that has ever done this has turned into a banana republic. People can live in banana republics but there will be few wealthy people. There will be a few super wealthy people and an enormous amount of poverty. You can see it across the border in Nogales, Mexico, where people continue to live in extreme poverty.

HRN: America is becoming like Mexico?

Jim Sinclair: The standard of living is going much lower. People have to realize that the damage is already done. It's not a question of whether the U.S. can be pushed over the edge. We are over the edge. We are watching the consequences play out now.

HRN: What can people do to protect their wealth from inflation?

Jim Sinclair: People have to try to maintain their buying power. Each person can become their own central bank and, to the best of their abilities, focus on the assets that benefit from the disorder that's taking place and that will continue to take place.

HRN: Do you mean buying precious metals or commodities?

Jim Sinclair: I've spoken to people who, over the last ten years, have had this perspective. They have done very well. Even doing it now could protect your wealth.

HRN: What about gold? Do you see gold as a currency that can't be debased?

Jim Sinclair: What is real money? Gold is a currency that has no liability attached to it. It's a measure of value and a store of wealth that's universally acceptable.

HRN: So, gold is an alternative to dollars or euros?

Jim Sinclair: Physical gold is the answer. An individual who holds gold will have more time and ability to function.

HRN: How much higher do you think the price of gold could go?

Jim Sinclair: What's the exchange rate of a currency with no liability attached to it? Gold is going much higher. We could see shocking gold prices, maybe Alf Fields' target of $10,000 per ounce or Martin Armstrong's target of $12,000 per ounce. I think that my price target of $1,650 per ounce gold is going to be so low it will be considered silly.

HRN: Thank you for your time today.

Jim Sinclair: It was my pleasure.

Nicknamed "Mr. Gold" for his incredible timing of the gold market in the 1970's, when he called the top of the market in 1980 to the day, Jim Sinclair, is a legendary precious metals, commodities and currency trader. Mr. Sinclair was influenced by his father, Bert Seligman, who was the business partner of Jesse Livermore, "The Great Bear of Wall Street" famous for short selling in the stock market crashes of 1907 and 1929. Currently Chairman, President and CEO of Tanzanian Royalty Exploration Corporation, part of Mr. Sinclair's strategy to protect his interests from the effects of currency debasement, is to acquire as much gold in the ground as possible without rushing to production because, he believes, the price of gold will go much higher. Mr. Sinclair's famous 2001 gold price target of $1,650 per ounce in 2011-a prediction ten years into the future-fell within 22% of the gold price in January 2011 after a phenomenal 511% increase over a ten year period, from an average price of $265.49 in January 2001 to an average price of $1,356.40 in January 2011 (London p.m. Fix)-one of the most astonishing calls in the history of precious metals trading. As a commentator on precious metals, commodities and currencies, investors ignore Jim Sinclair at their peril.

QE2 and its Consequences (Part II)

Ron Hera — Mon, 21 Feb 2011 13:59:00 GMT

Investors understand that the Federal Reserve’s ongoing purchase of U.S. Treasuries in the open market, known as quantitative easing two (QE2), injects newly created money into the U.S. financial system and economy, but the actual means by which newly created money monetizes U.S. government debt, stimulates the U.S. economy and flows into the U.S. stock market are involved. Proponents of QE2, namely Ben Shalom Bernanke, Ph.D., Chairman of the Federal Reserve, deny that the Federal Reserve is monetizing U.S. government debt and claim that QE2 promotes price stability, stimulates economic growth and helps to create jobs. Critics charge that QE2 is causing price inflation in the U.S. and abroad, as well as a currency war. Given the amount of debt owed by the U.S. federal government, as well as by U.S. states and municipalities, investors are, understandably, liquidating U.S. Treasuries and other government bonds and buying equities and commodities, thus, supporting the U.S. stock market rally and driving commodity prices higher. The Federal Reserve’s purchase of U.S. Treasuries is amplifying the U.S. stock market rally and absorbing the U.S. federal government’s debt.

Chart courtesy of Josh Staiger (www.multpl.com)

The effect of QE on the U.S. Stock market is, to a large extent, accidental, i.e., an unintended consequence. The primary goal of QE2, which is widely misunderstood, is to rebalance the broad money supply with economic activity and debt levels in the U.S. economy, but the Federal Reserve has little control over the flow of funds from QE2.

The Real Reasons for QE2

Understanding QE2 requires a basic knowledge of fractional reserve banking and economics. In an economic recession, the broad money supply contracts and underlying economic activity declines. In a shrinking economy, borrowers come under increasing pressure as money becomes less available and may default on loans, destroying the financial assets of banks, which are loans, and causing banks to fail, which is deflationary. In effect, carrying debt becomes more expensive when money is scarce. Since bank deposits are leveraged through loans, when banks fail, the effects are similar to an old fashioned run on a bank. In a fractional reserve banking system, banks loan out much more money than they have on deposit and when borrowers default, banks may have insufficient capital to cover their liabilities, i.e., their deposits. When banks fail, money in the financial system—on the books of banks—is literally destroyed leaving less money available. In other words, the money supply mathematically shrinks, which is the literal meaning of the word deflation. Setting aside the fact that a shrinking money supply tends to cause prices to fall, when less money is available in the economy, interest rates, which reflect the cost of borrowing money, tend to rise as a function of supply and demand. Since borrowing is the engine of money creation in a fractional reserve banking system, rising interest rates exacerbate declines in economic activity, which is the reason why the Federal Reserve cuts interest rates during recessions.

If debt levels in the economy are excessive, debt service can drain money from the economy faster than money can be created through new borrowing and a deflationary spiral can result. Specifically, a contracting money supply triggered by bank failures, e.g., linked to excessive leverage and financial speculation on the part of banks, results in an increase in defaults while debt service creates a net drain of money from the economy, leading to more bank failures and to a further contraction of the money supply, and so forth. Setting aside the inherently inflationary, cyclical and ultimately unstable nature of the fractional reserve system, if left unchecked, a deflationary spiral will end in an economic depression.

Normally, bad debts are liquidated in a recession and banks are allowed to fail, but that changed in 2008. To prevent the failure of the largest banks, and to head off a deflationary spiral, the Federal Reserve began injecting newly created money into the U.S. financial system and is continuing to do so via QE2. Banks were bailed out in 2008 and the value of their assets was preserved, at least on paper, thus debt levels were largely maintained while the U.S. economy and money supply contracted. In the absence of sufficient new borrowing to maintain the money supply, debt service began to drain money from the broad U.S. economy, threatening to plunge the U.S. into a depression. Since the U.S. dollar, which is a Federal Reserve bank note, is a debt instrument created through the execution of loan contracts, it is logical, at least from a macroeconomic perspective, to alleviate the excessive debt levels in the economy by creating additional money that has no corresponding debt. Obviously, when the Federal Reserve writes a proverbial check, the funds are not debited against any account but, instead, money is created ex nihilo. This is the ultimate reason for QE2.

QE2 is an attempt to rebalance the broad money supply and, eventually, economic activity levels with debt levels, otherwise there would be many more loan defaults, banks would fail and both the money supply and the U.S. economy would contract further. It would be equally fair to say that QE2 is currency debasement, which will reduce the real value of debt. As a scholar of the Great Depression, Bernanke certainly knows that a new, and perhaps greater, depression has been averted only temporarily and has only been held at bay by the Federal Reserve’s printing press. This is the key to understanding Bernanke’s famous helicopter speech. The problem, of course, is finding an exit from money printing before the currency collapses. It follows that QE2 (or QE3, etc.) cannot and will not stop until the broad money supply, i.e., money circulating in the real economy rather than locked in the financial system, along with the level of economic activity, come approximately back in line with debt levels. As guideposts, self sustaining GDP growth, absent radical government deficit spending, should be apparent and unemployment levels should be coming down steadily before stopping QE2.

Chart courtesy of Karl Denninger

Critics of QE2, although they may be correct regarding its unintended consequences, often do not seem to understand the gravity of the situation in terms of debt levels versus economic activity and the money supply, i.e., they underestimate the risks associated with deflation. With respect to unintended consequences, the Federal Reserve has no way to make newly created money flow into sectors of the economy where they can be effective in achieving specific goals such as job creation. In other words, Bernanke is pushing on a proverbial string. Thus, one valid criticism of QE2 is that money seems to be flowing everywhere except where it most needs to go. Amplifying the rebound of the U.S. stock market into a rally that is not adequately supported by economic fundamentals is merely a byproduct of QE2 and excessive government debt, i.e. investors seeking an exit from U.S. Treasuries and other government bonds. Similarly, the debasement of the U.S. dollar is unavoidable, thus rising prices for imported goods in the U.S., disruptive inflows of U.S. dollars into foreign economies, and rising global commodity prices will persist as long as QE2 continues. By the same token, precious metals prices, i.e., silver, gold, platinum and palladium (each of which has an ISO 4217 currency code), will not only continue to rise but, the longer QE2 continues, the more investment demand for precious metals will grow.

Debt and Systemic Liquidity

Primary Dealers, e.g., Goldman Sachs & Co. and JP Morgan Securities, Inc., purchase Treasuries in the open market and when holders of U.S. Treasuries sell them to the Primary Dealers as a consequence of QE2, they receive cash. Primary Dealers buying Treasuries on behalf of the Federal Reserve sell them to the Federal Reserve in exchange for newly created money, thus money is injected at the level of investors that sell Treasuries to the Primary Dealers.

QE2 effectively destroys Treasuries, i.e., it removes them from the marketplace to the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve, replacing them with cash at a rate of roughly $2.5 billion per day. However, Treasury purchases by the Federal Reserve are not taking place at a rate faster than the U.S. Treasury issues new debt, thus, the effect of QE2 is to slow the rate at which the supply of Treasuries in the market increases. Theoretically, this should hold Treasury yields down, but QE2 has not been entirely effective as a means of keeping the borrowing costs of the U.S. federal government down.

Chart courtesy of Doug Short, Ph.D.

Another effect of QE2 is to distort the distribution of money over the U.S. economy. As the Federal Reserve creates new money, it flows into the financial system and creates the false appearance of a transfer of money from the broad U.S. economy to financial markets, i.e., from so called Main Street to Wall Street. In fact what is happening is that excessive debt levels in the U.S. economy are causing a net drain of money from the broad U.S. economy, versus normal money creation through lending. In other words, monetary deflation over the whole economy is being offset by monetary inflation in financial markets.

Chart courtesy of Shadow Government Statistics

Direct bidders, e.g., domestic funds and depository institutions, Primary Dealers, as well as foreign investors, participate in U.S. Treasury auctions. Some Treasuries are held to maturity at which time investors receive cash, but the money paid by the U.S. Treasury for Treasuries held to maturity is derived from new borrowing. The total of all new Treasuries to be issued in fiscal year 2011 has been estimated to be $2.25 trillion in net debt, which is more than $800 billion more than the U.S. federal budget deficit.

Chart courtesy of Zero Hedge

As a result of QE2, overall systemic liquidity is increased, thus investors have more cash than they would otherwise have, and the cash they have, either literally or in effect, has been newly created. Of course, funds can also flow into the U.S. Treasury and out again as federal government deficit spending, i.e., government debt can be monetized by the Federal Reserve through transactions intermediated by the Primary Dealers and through multiple other parties that purchase new Treasury debt with funds derived from QE2. In any case, QE2 represents an increased but artificial demand for U.S. Treasuries which, directly or indirectly, helps to fund the U.S. federal government’s deficit spending, and deficit spending temporarily, stimulates the economy.

How QE2 Funds the U.S. Government and Inflates the U.S. Stock Market

Without auditing the Federal Reserve and its Primary Dealers, it is not possible to determine the complete flow of funds or the sums of money involved in all transactions resulting from QE2, aside from the announced rate of U.S. Treasury purchases of $75 billion per month. As newly created money, through successive transactions, circulates further from the point of injection, both the flow of funds and causal relationships become less clear. Closer to the point of injection, however, either the data are known or a higher confidence level is possible.

An outsider analysis of the QE2 flow of funds devolves into (1) known transactions, where the exact sums of money involved in particular transactions may or may not be known, followed by (2) deducible transactions, i.e., transactions that must logically occur but where the sums of money involved are unknown, and (3) a variety of transactions that are possible but that may or may not occur (no probabilities are assumed) and where any sums of money that might be involved are also unknown. Given these limitations, there appear to be no less than seven ways that funds created through QE2 can flow into the U.S. stock market assuming the minimal possible number of transactions so as to remain as close as possible to the point of injection.

When the Primary Dealers buy U.S. Treasuries in the open market on behalf of the Federal Reserve, they either use funds from the Federal Reserve or pre-existing money [1a] to make purchases, and then sell the Treasuries they acquire [2a] to the Federal Reserve, receiving newly created money [3a]. Between U.S. Treasury auctions, the Primary Dealers could invest the new funds in the stock market [3b], liquidating these investments or taking profits [6b] only as needed to make further U.S. Treasury purchases from investors.

U.S. Treasuries are sold at auction to a combination of the Federal Reserve’s Primary Dealers [4a], which re-sell Treasuries to domestic investors [4c] and foreign [4d] investors, and to direct bidders to the U.S. Treasury [4b]. As the Primary Dealers purchase Treasuries in the open market their capital is replaced by new money from the Federal Reserve. In theory, Primary Dealers that purchase new Treasuries at auction could, in effect, if not literally, use newly created money to do so [3c and 6c]. Treasuries sold at auction by the U.S. Treasury [4a, 4b] not only cover current U.S. federal government deficit spending but also roll over debt for Treasuries reaching maturity, thus generating profits for investors, i.e., profits from Treasuries reaching maturity represent additional, newly created money in the hands of investors [5a ,5b, 5c].

Newly created money also flows from the U.S. Treasury to the Primary Dealers [5a] and, directly or indirectly (through Primary Dealers), to both domestic [5b] and foreign investors [5c]. Treasuries reaching maturity, i.e., U.S. government debt that is being rolled over, represent an estimated $800 billion or more annually, above and beyond the U.S. federal government’s budget deficit, which is currently $1.5 trillion. Both profits from Treasuries held to maturity and interest payments could flow into the U.S. stock market [5d, 5e, 5f], back into U.S. Treasuries [5a`, 5b`, 5c`], or elsewhere, e.g., into emerging markets, commodities, etc.

When the U.S. federal government spends borrowed money into the U.S. economy [3d], it supports government employee salaries, payments to government contractors, etc. Money spent into the U.S. economy becomes part of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and contributes to U.S. economic growth statistics. Pension funds and individual retail investors [3f, 3g] can invest money derived from U.S. federal government deficit spending in the U.S. stock market, in US Treasuries, etc.

Finally, as the U.S. stock market rises, profits flow back to investors [6a, 6b, 6d] which can then be recycled in myriad forms of investment or spending. One can imagine the financial system as a hydraulic system where increasing pressure will affect the whole system but it’s not precisely a closed system thus the pressure falls off with distance from its source. Ideally, increased spending on the part of investors taking profits would create a wealth effect where money would trickle down through the economy and stimulate economic activity. Unfortunately, the majority of U.S. financial assets are held by a relatively small percentage of the population, which makes it difficult to substitute investor trickle down for reduced consumer spending.

Chart courtesy of StockCharts.com	Chart courtesy of StockCharts.com
Chart courtesy of StockCharts.com	Chart courtesy of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Since the start of QE2, the rate of increase in some of the major U.S. stock market indices is similar to that of the Federal Reserve’s M1 monetary aggregate over the same interval. The evidence suggests that increased liquidity, flowing from QE2, is amplifying, and perhaps manufacturing, the U.S. stock market rally.

The End of U.S. Dollar as the World Reserve Currency

U.S. federal government deficit spending represents a $1.5 trillion component of U.S. GDP, which is approximately 10%, while U.S economic growth remains anemic and unemployment remains high. At the same time, annual U.S. federal government borrowing represents approximately 3% of world GDP and willingness to lend to the U.S. federal government is waning. It is, therefore, difficult to see how or when QE2 can be stopped without the U.S. economy either stagnating or tipping back into recession, or without the U.S. federal government becoming insolvent pursuant to Treasury auction failures.

Chart courtesy of Shadow Government Statistics

In contrast to poor economic fundamentals, the S&P 500 P/E ratios are above their historical average by approximately 50%, most probably pointing, if not to an imminent correction, to a decoupling of the U.S. stock market from the broad U.S. economy, reinforcing the view that the current stock market rally is artificially enhanced or largely manufactured.

All other things being equal, as long as QE2 continues, the U.S. stock market will most probably remain in an overall rally while the U.S. dollar will continue in an overall decline. Of course, weakness in other currencies can mask the decline of the U.S. dollar and increase exchange rate volatility, but the prices of commodities, as well as precious metals, provide an elucidating standard of comparison.

Chart courtesy of StockCharts.com

In the long term, QE2 is obviously not a sustainable course. Nonetheless, QE2 can continue as long as (1) the United States remains politically stable, (2) the U.S. dollar remains the world reserve currency and (3) the value of the U.S. dollar strengthens, remains flat or decays in a controlled manner, i.e., at a relatively stable, gradual rate. Although Bernanke clearly believes that the risks are contained, the Federal Reserve’s policies are, in fact, debasing the U.S. dollar and have already guaranteed the end of the U.S. dollar as the world reserve currency.

The unintended consequences of QE2 indicate a countdown to the hyperinflationary collapse of the U.S. dollar. In other words, if QE2 is not stopped, the U.S. dollar will eventually fail. The main risk is that (1) a double dip recession in the U.S. that shatters confidence in U.S debt, (2) a rush on the part of domestic or foreign investors to exit U.S. Treasuries, (3) a rapid and widespread rejection of the U.S. dollar abroad, (4) a large, rapid decline in the value the U.S. dollar, regardless of the cause, or (5) runaway price inflation, i.e., cost push inflation, could trigger the collapse of the U.S. dollar. What is important about the risk of a U.S. dollar collapse, is that QE2 escalates all but one of the potential triggers, i.e., QE2 is countering deflation, albeit in a distorted way, thus it is technically preventing a double dip recession, or a depression, in the U.S.

Interview: Jim Rickards on Inflation and Currency Wars

Ron Hera — Fri, 04 Feb 2011 08:31:00 GMT

The Hera Research Newsletter (HRN) is pleased to present an eye opening interview with James G. Rickards, Senior Managing Director of Tangent Capital Partners, a merchant bank specializing in alternative asset management solutions, and also Chief Operating Officer of Oro Capital Advisors, LLC, a commercial real estate advisory firm and Tangent Capital affiliate. He is a counselor, economist and investment advisor with 35 years experience in global capital markets.

Mr. Rickards has held senior executive positions at Citibank, RBS, Long-Term Capital Management and Caxton Associates. In 1998, he was the principal negotiator of the rescue of LTCM sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. His clients include private funds, investment banks and government directorates in national security and he is an advisor on global capital markets to the U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence. He is a frequent speaker at conferences on derivatives and hedge funds and is active in the International Bar Association. He has been interviewed in The Wall Street Journal and the Economist, has appeared on CNBC, Fox, CNN, BBC and NPR and is an Op-Ed contributor to the Financial Times, New York Times and the Washington Post.

Mr. Rickards, who is a visiting lecturer at the Kellogg School and the School of Advanced International Studies, has delivered papers on econophysics at the Applied Physics Laboratory and the Los Alamos National Laboratory and has written articles on cognitive diversity, network science and risk management. Mr. Rickards holds an LL.M. (Taxation) from the New York University School of Law; a J.D. from the University of Pennsylvania Law School; an M.A. in international economics from the School of Advanced International Studies and a B.A. (with honors) from The Johns Hopkins University.

Hera Research Newsletter (HRN): Thank you for taking the time to speak with us today. Let’s talk about the Federal Reserve’s quantitative easing program (QE2). Is there a risk of price inflation?

Jim Rickards: I think there is a definite and highly significant danger of inflation coming from QE and QE2 specifically. A lot of people have said, in fact, the Fed has said, that, if you look at the key price indices, the Producer Price Index (PPI), Consumer Price Index (CPI), and the Personal Consumption (PC) price deflator, they are very, they use the phrase, “well behaved”. For the past year and a half, the critics, and I would include myself, have been saying that this situation is dangerous and unstable. The Fed has been pointing to the price indices and saying that you can’t find inflation under a rock, you can’t find inflation with a microscope, so what are you worried about?

HRN: Why do you think the situation is unstable?

Jim Rickards: There is a lot of inflation, but it is being offset by deflation. I compare it to an arm wrestling match. If you’ve ever seen an arm wrestling match with two really powerful participants, nothing really happens for a long time. The two arms just kind of sit there, then all of a sudden it starts to tip, then one guy just breaks and his arm is slammed down on the table. Just because nothing is happening at the surface doesn’t mean that a lot of things aren’t happening below the surface. In a depression, such as the one that began in 2007, you have very, very strong deflationary forces. I call it a natural deflation that’s being offset by policy inflation. So the fact that the price indices are around zero doesn’t mean that they’re well behaved, it just means that they’re masking the two tectonic forces that are pushing against each other.

HRN: Do you think deflation will win, or will it be inflation?

Jim Rickards: For the past year and a half, I’ve wondered which way it’s going to tip. If I’m right about those two forces, one of them is going to prevail at the end of the day and, on which one it’s going to be, I really reserve judgment because I could argue it both ways. I am now coming down on the side of inflation because the inflation is becoming very, very apparent. So, the first thing is that the well behaved indices are masking more than they’re telling us because, below the surface, there are powerful deflationary and inflationary forces fighting each other.

HRN: Why do you think inflation will win?

Jim Rickards: It’s been known since the 1950’s, as Milton Friedman pointed out, inflationary effects occur with the lag. The fact that you saw QE in 2009 and inflation didn’t show up until the end of 2010 really should not give you a lot of comfort because an 18 to 24 month lag is normal and would be expected. Sure enough, right on schedule, 18 months after QE1 was announced in mid-2009 we’re starting to see the inflation.

HRN: What does inflation in foreign countries have to with QE2?

Jim Rickards: There are some new forces in play since Friedman did his seminal work and, of course, it’s the result of globalization. What has been happening is that what would otherwise have been U.S. inflation is showing up in China and Taiwan and Korea and places like that because of the exchange rate mechanism. I put this under the heading of currency wars. In effect, China has been importing all of our inflation through the peg between the dollar and the yuan.

HRN: How does the yuan-dollar currency peg cause inflation in China?

Jim Rickards: Just think about the mechanics of it. There’s a lot of deleveraging going on, which is where the deflation comes from, so the Fed goes out and prints a whole bunch of dollars and spreads them around. Americans take a lot of those newly printed dollars and buy foreign goods so the dollars go to China, but China doesn’t want the yuan to appreciate because they want to maintain the peg, or at least they have until very recently. So, what do they do? They have to buy up the dollars. Well, in order to buy up the dollars they have to print yuan and basically give the yuan to the exporters in exchange for the dollars. Well, that’s basically flooding China with yuan and so the Fed’s printing press was being sterilized in America by the Chinese who were flooding their own country with their own local currency. So, through the exchange rate mechanism, and through the peg between the dollar and the yuan, our inflation was showing up in China and now it’s showing up in Vietnam, South Korea, Taiwan and other places.

HRN: Can the U.S. keep exporting its inflation?

Jim Rickards: Like I said, inflation in the U.S. was being offset by natural deflation and there is a time lag before inflation shows up. It has taken a while for inflation to show up in China because they also had a lag. U.S. inflation was being exported through the currency exchange rate mechanism, but all good things come to an end. These things are now coming to an end for two specific reasons. Number one, the time lag just works its way through, and I think commodity prices, input prices, are where the inflation is really starting to show up and it will work its way through the supply chain and eventually show up in retail. Number two, the Chinese have now thrown in the towel on the appreciation or revaluation of the yuan and the reason for that is inflation.

HRN: So, the Chinese yuan will rise versus the U.S. dollar?

Jim Rickards: Inflation is just another form of revaluation. What do you do when you revalue your currency? Well, you increase your cost structure relative to other countries. You make your goods more expensive from the view of a U.S. purchaser, let’s say. Well, inflation does the same thing, inflation increases your cost structure. So, inflation and revaluation are the same thing economically with one very important difference; revaluation you can control, but inflation very quickly gets out of control. The Chinese, once they saw the inflation, said, well, look, this is going to happen anyway, our cost structure is going up and there’s nothing we can do about it. Our choice is between control and lack of control and, of course, they’re control freaks, so they’re going to go with control, which means they’re going to go with the revaluation and try to stay ahead of the inflation.

HRN: Do the Chinese have any other option?

Jim Rickards: They thought they had an ability to keep a lid on their domestic inflation through price controls. We all know that price controls always ultimately fail, but they can work in the short run, especially if you have a more coercive society and I would put China in that category. Whether there was going to be a black market or offshore money or the inability to enforce their rules at the local level, I think they quickly realized price controls were a losing battle.

HRN: What about other export nations, like Brazil?

Jim Rickards: The Fed is flooding the world with dollars and, as former U.S. Treasury Secretary John Connally famously said in the 1970’s, “it may be our currency, but it’s your problem”. Raising interest rates, currency debasement and capital controls are all tools in the toolbox that exporters can use to deal with Fed monetary policy and QE2. We’re seeing capital controls in Brazil, for example. Brazil couldn’t really control the appreciation of the real, there was just too much demand, too much hot money flowing into emerging markets, Brazil in particular. So there wasn’t much they could do about it from a currency point of view, so they’re putting in capital controls. The next step down that road, you pretty quickly go from currency wars to trade wars and trade wars lead to tariffs and then export quotas. We’re seeing a little bit of that in China with rare earth elements (REEs), although there’s another agenda with respect to REEs having to do with encouraging manufacturers to put their plants in China so they can get guaranteed access to the REEs.

HRN: Will the revaluation of the yuan and capital controls in other countries cause prices to rise in the U.S.?

Jim Rickards: The inflationary chickens are coming home to roost in the United States. Once the Chinese throw in the towel and revalue the yuan, all of that inflation that Bernanke has been trying to get, but which has been going to China, etc. will show up in the U.S. I think, we’re looking at significant inflationary forces, for all of the reasons I just mentioned, and that’s probably going to be the story of 2011.

HRN: So, the Federal Reserve caused inflation in Asia, South America and elsewhere resulting in currency wars and now there’s a risk of trade wars?

Jim Rickards: Correct.

HRN: If the U.S. economy is recovering, why doesn’t the Federal Reserve stop QE2?

Jim Rickards: When you see data that point in a positive direction, you have to take a step back and say, OK, objectively, the data points in a positive direction but how much of that is policy induced and how much of that is self sustaining? My view is that almost all of it is policy induced and very little of it is self sustaining. I reach that conclusion by looking at data where, if we were in a self sustaining recovery, other things would be getting better and they’re not, such as unemployment. That suggests to me that it’s not a self sustaining recovery, therefore, I conclude that it’s mostly policy induced, which means the Fed is going to have to keep going.

HRN: Can inflation help the U.S. economy to grow and help to reduce unemployment?

Jim Rickards: The main reason the Fed wants inflation has very little to do with growth and everything to do with the debt overhang and the fragility of the banking system. People forget that the Fed exists to help the banks. It’s the whole reason for the Fed.

HRN: Isn’t the purpose of the Federal Reserve to promote price stability and full employment?

Jim Rickards: The Fed was created by banks and it exists to prop up the banking system. The idea that it’s somehow a benign moderator of economic conditions, in my view, is nonsense. The Fed is first and foremost a device to prop up banks and, right now, the biggest problem in the banks is their bad assets.

HRN: Didn’t the bailouts and the Federal Reserve’s purchases of mortgage-backed securities clean up the bad assets?

Jim Rickards: The bad assets haven’t gone anywhere. They were identified in 2007, but they had been there all along. The bad loans were made in 2004, 2005 and 2006 because Greenspan and the Fed’s Board of Governors kept interest rates too low too long, so that’s when the bad loans were made. They were identified as such in 2007 and then we had the panic of 2008, but what’s important to understand is that the bad loans haven’t gone anywhere. It’s not as if they’ve been magically transformed into good loans, it’s not as if they’ve been marked down, it’s not as if they’ve moved from weak hands to strong hands. What’s happened is, they’ve basically been locked in amber, frozen on the balance sheets of the banks.

HRN: So, the Federal Reserve wants inflation to help banks that made bad loans?

Jim Rickards: The Fed is hoping for a couple of things. First of all, they’re hoping that inflation comes back so that, at least, the nominal values get back somewhere closer to where the loans were originated. Of course, the real value has all been eroded, but who cares? If you’re a bank, you just want that nominal value so you don’t have to take the loss and the hit to capital. Second, they’re hoping that, because of the steepness of the yield curve, the banks could eventually earn their way out of the problem and make provisions for the bad loans. Obviously, they’re going to the zero interest rate policy and so, with those two things in mind, the Fed wants the inflation to come and help the banks and give them time to recover.

HRN: Wouldn’t inflation also reduce the real value of the U.S. federal government’s debt?

Jim Rickards: The United States has well over $100 trillion in obligations. Now, that’s not all bonded debt, the actual debt is significantly less than that, but when you throw in contingent obligation arising from Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Federal Housing Authority (FHA), Federal Home Loan Bank, student loans, etc., etc. The point is, you can just go on and on with these obligations. The number is well north of $100 trillion. Now, it’s not all due and payable in the next couple of years, these are 20 year obligations, but then you have to say where are we going to get growth for the next 20 years to meet these obligations? That’s very hard to see.

HRN: So, the U.S. economy can’t grow its way out of debt?

Jim Rickards: I don’t see any feasible combination of growth and taxes that will generate enough income to pay off the debt. People warn about the debt trap, to me it’s already too late. We’ve already fallen into a hole where, mathematically, it’s impossible to earn enough to pay off the debt. The debt is compounding faster than growth is being generated and raising taxes is not a solution because that will kill growth, so you just can’t get there.

HRN: What can the U.S. federal government do about its debt?

Jim Rickards: There are two ways to deal with the debt. One is to just default; I just won’t pay you. The other one, of course, is the one that governments prefer which is inflation. You say, OK, here’s your trillion dollars and good luck buying a loaf of bread with it; it’s just not going to be worth very much. So, that’s what we’re doing and that’s another reason why Bernanke wants inflation. Of course, he doesn’t want hyperinflation, he doesn’t want 10%, but he doesn’t need 10%. If you do 4% a year for 17 years, you cut the value of the debt in half. So, that $100 trillion figure I referred to, in real terms, becomes something more like $50 trillion, which is still a big number, but much more manageable than $100 trillion. He says he wants 2% or slightly less. I think that’s disingenuous, I think what he would like is something more like 3% or 4% where, over a 15 to 20 year period, you could really reduce the value of the debt in real terms very significantly.

HRN: If the U.S. is debasing the dollar, why is there strong demand for U.S. Treasuries?

Jim Rickards: The reason the Treasury auctions are going well is because the Fed is buying. Think about what quantitative easing really is. The amount of quantitative easing over the 6 month period from November to June is approximately equal to the federal deficit. In other words, the federal deficit is running about $1.4 trillion a year, so half of it would be $700 billion and the Fed is out to buy $600 billion. By the way, I don’t think it’s going to end in June and they never said it was going to end in June. What they said was, we propose to buy $600 billion of treasury obligations between November and June, but they never said it was capped at $600 billion. They just said we’re going to buy about $75 billion a month for the next 6 months. I don’t think they will stop there. I view this as much more likely to be a trillion dollar plus program, not $600 billion.

HRN: How does the Federal Reserve’s purchase of U.S. Treasuries in the open market monetize U.S. government debt?

Jim Rickards: These things are pretty fungible. Dollars are totally fungible and Treasury securities are quasi fungible because it’s the same credit in the same currency. So, imagine you’re an institutional investor and you’re holding an off-the-run 7 year note with 5 years to maturity and the government is issuing a new 5 year note. Obviously, the primary dealers mediate this and are the interface between the Fed and the institutional investor. So, the Fed goes out and buys an off-the-run 7 year note from an insurance company, let’s say, and the insurance company replaces that in their portfolio by buying a new 5 year note. From the insurance company’s point of view, they got rid of a 5 year treasury and they bought a 5 year treasury, so nothing happened. From the Fed’s point of view, they bought the 5 year treasury with newly printed money and so there’s some intermediation and there’s multiple parties involved, but the net effect is exactly as if the Fed was monetizing the new debt.

HRN: Let’s get back to inflation. Can’t the Federal Reserve control inflation if prices start rising?

Jim Rickards: I think these processes are dynamically unstable and once you let the inflation genie out of the bottle, you don’t get 2% or 3%, you go straight to 10% and that’s what happened in the 1970’s. If you look at the late 60’s and early 70’s, inflation was 1% or 2% and then one year it pumped up to 3% and they said, oh my goodness, it’s 3%. After that, it went to 5%, then to 8%, then to 10% and then to 13%. In other words, between 1977 and 1981, in that five year period, cumulative inflation was 50%. The value of the dollar was cut in half over that very short 5-year period of time. So, that’s how it accelerates and gets out of control. I think that’s what’s going to happen again.

HRN: How much will prices go up in the U.S.?

Jim Rickards: Bernanke says 2%, but he actually wants something closer to 4%. I think what he’s going to find is that it goes very quickly to 8% or 9% or 10%, which is borderline hyperinflationary and that’s going to be a huge problem. It’s going to be a shock that the American people are not ready for.

HRN: What can the Federal Reserve do if price inflation starts to accelerate?

Jim Rickards: Well, Bernanke says, oh, don’t worry about high inflation because we have the ways and means of controlling that. If you take Bernanke at his word, which I don’t totally do, but if you do take Bernanke at his word and he says I want 2% and inflation goes to, let’s say, 3% or 4%, he’s saying, well, we can dial it back down to 2%. Well, how are you going to do that? One way is by raising interest rates, but are you really going to raise interest rates when unemployment is close to 10%? Bernanke says he can raise rates, and legally he can, but he’s not actually, politically or economically, going to be able to do it because he’ll be raising interest rates in the face of the greatest sustained period of high unemployment since the Great Depression. So, it’s just not going to be politically possible.

HRN: Couldn’t the Federal Reserve remove liquidity from financial markets to counter inflation?

Jim Rickards: There’s another problem with QE2, which is that the Fed is probably insolvent today if you applied some rigorous mark-to-market tests and that will become more apparent as this process goes forward. Let’s just say Bernanke gets what he wants, and, all of a sudden, inflation starts to creep up and he says; OK, now we have to put on the brakes. Well, how do you do that? The way you do it is by reversing QE. In other words, QE is creating money to buy bonds. The way to reverse that is to sell bonds into the market and take the money out. Well, the problem is you’re going to have massive mark-to-market losses on those bonds. First of all, there’s the Bear Sterns junk and, remember, QE1 was not treasury securities, it was mortgage backed securities. They’re not going to be able to liquidate the bonds without going broke.

HRN: How can the Federal Reserve go bankrupt?

Jim Rickards: The Fed is on its way to a $3 trillion balance sheet. Their capital, in round numbers, is about $60 billion. With $3 trillion on the balance sheet and $60 billion of capital, they’re leveraged 50 to 1. That’s worse than Long-Term Capital Management when they got in trouble in 1998. If you’re leveraged 50 to 1 and you have a 2% decline in assets, just 2%, and the stock market sometimes moves 2% in a single day, you just wiped out your capital. A 2% hair cut on $3 trillion is $60 billion and that takes your capital to zero and the Fed is broke.

HRN: Could the Federal Reserve’s primary dealers sell Treasuries to remove liquidity from the market and help keep inflation in check?

Jim Rickards: The primary dealers can’t create money through auctions or open market operations. The primary dealers can buy and sell securities but they’re doing it with money that already exists whereas when the Fed buys securities or sells securities they are creating or destroying money. The primary dealers can prop up the market in government securities, but they can’t create money the way that the Fed does or make money disappear the way the Fed does.

HRN: So, there’s nothing the Federal Reserve can do to control price inflation?

Jim Rickards: They’ve got to be looking down the road and saying, gee, we say we can get inflation under control, but the tools that we have to do that will basically be raising interest rates with 10% unemployment, which is not going to happen, or selling bonds and going broke, which is not going to happen. So, it’s all talk. The Fed won’t actually be able to keep inflation under control and it’s going to very quickly fly out of control.

HRN: Won’t rising prices make most Americans poorer?

Jim Rickards: The Fed doesn’t care about that. The Fed doesn’t care about people. They don’t care about workers. They don’t care about wages. They say they do, but the Fed only cares about banks.

HRN: Bernanke has been in the media, saying that inflation will stimulate the U.S. economy and help create jobs without causing prices to go up.

Jim Rickards: It’s propaganda. I had a discussion with former Fed governor, no reason to mention the name, who is a very well known economist, and what he said was that behind closed doors the Federal Open Market Committee spends about 10% of their time on policy and 90% of their time on communication. They very quickly arrive at what they’re going to do and then spend the vast majority of their time thinking about messaging and wordsmithing. Well, there’s a name for that. It’s called propaganda.

HRN: Thank you for sharing so many of your insights with us today.

Jim Rickards: It’s my pleasure.

After Words

Jim Rickards is one of the most astute intellectuals today in economics, financial markets and monetary systems, as well as an increasingly outspoken critic of the Federal Reserve’s monetary policies. The debasement of the U.S. dollar—the world reserve currency—through QE2, and due to monetary expansion resulting from low interest rates, is exporting U.S. inflation abroad, disrupting economies in Asia, South America and elsewhere. In addition to putting upward pressure on food prices globally, with potentially disastrous consequences, inflation is a hidden tax on savings and wages and, as prices rise, the living standards of most Americans will decline. Currency wars, caused by the Federal Reserve’s policies, could lead to trade wars or, in the worst case, to economic and political chaos as has been seen in Tunisia and Egypt.

QE2 and its Consequences (Part I)

Ron Hera — Tue, 18 Jan 2011 01:35:00 GMT

The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) announced on November 3, 2010 that it would purchase longer-term Treasury securities at a pace of $75 billion dollars per month through the Federal Reserve’s Permanent Open Market Operations (POMO) facility by the end of the second quarter 2011 and potentially beyond. The Quantitative Easing Two (“QE2”) program, championed by Ben Shalom Bernanke, Ph.D., Chairman of the US Federal Reserve, is expected to total at least $600 billion and the program may total more $600 billion, if Dr. Bernanke and the FOMC deem it to be necessary. Currently, QE2 is expected to continue until the end of 2011, i.e. up to $1.2 trillion, although there is ongoing policy debate within the Federal Reserve amidst growing fears that the policy may backfire.

Chart courtesy of Shadow Government Statistics

Monetary inflation is one result of QE2 because when the Federal Reserve buys US Treasuries it injects newly created money into the financial system, which, in turn, reduces the value of the US dollar (due to the increase in the quantity of dollars). A lower US dollar could stimulate US exports but could have unintended consequences, such as creating excess liquidity that could lead to asset price bubbles in the US. Low interest rates are already fueling a US dollar carry trade that seems likely to create asset price bubbles abroad. In 2010, borrowing in the US and investing abroad yielded significant returns, thus, there is a profitable carry trade in the world’s reserve currency, which has been called the mother of all carry trades by New York University economist Nouriel Roubini because of the US dollar’s increasingly tenuous status as the world reserve currency.

Global Outcry against QE2

The announcement of QE2 touched off an international firestorm of controversy. QE2 has been widely criticized by financial and political leaders representing US creditors, exporters and emerging economies. Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz has become an outspoken critic of QE2, warning that it poses a risk to emerging economies where asset price bubbles are already apparent. European Central Bank (ECB) President Jean-Claude Trichet expressed the same concern. The growing consensus on the part of emerging economies, such as Brazil, India, China, Argentina, Taiwan, Thailand, South Korea, Peru and Indonesia, is that capital controls are necessary to prevent excessive capital inflows, which can be highly inflationary. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), which bailed out a number of smaller countries in 2008, has supported capital controls since February 2010. The dilemma for exporters is that they must seek to control inflation, e.g., by raising interest rates, but must also debase their currencies to maintain their exports. The only other option is to institute capital controls. One of many critics, Brazil’s Finance Minister, Guido Mantega, warned that the US-led currency war “…is turning into a trade war.”

The growing consensus is that inflation in Asia will damage Asian economies before Western countries, which are debasing their currencies, fully recover from the recession that began in 2007. The trade relationship of the US and China is in the eye of the storm and fears of a trade war are growing. Debasing the US dollar reduces the value of China’s US Treasury holdings while China relies on exports to the US, totaling between $200 and $300 billion annually. For exporters, QE2 is a doubly destructive policy since capital inflows are inflationary while exports are reduced due to currency appreciation. The potential effects of a downturn in manufacturing resulting from falling exports, coincident with the bursting of an asset price bubble, is a formula for disaster. As more countries begin to conduct international trade without using US dollars, the world could be split into two camps. For example, talks are taking place between the US and Japan regarding the establishment of trans-Pacific free trade.

Interestingly, QE2 has the potential to “cash out” favored holders of US Treasuries in exchange for US dollars at their current value, i.e., before the US dollar declines further. China, Russia and Brazil are already reducing their US Treasury holdings and could be favored sellers of US Treasuries to the Federal Reserve (through its intermediaries). However, given the size of the US federal deficit, the simplest explanation is that the Federal Reserve is simply funding the US government.

Keeping the Wolfpack at Bay

While it may stimulate US exports and help to create conditions for renewed economic growth in the US (rather than relying mainly on the stimulation of consumer spending), QE2 represents a debasement of the US dollar and suggests that demand for US debt may be weakening. The current facts regarding the US economy do not justify the AAA rating of US sovereign debt. In February 2010, Moody’s publicly warned that it might have to cut the rating on US government debt. The warning was reiterated in December, while American politicians debated tax policy, and surfaced again in January. Until the US economy shows stronger growth, and until the US federal government gets its budget deficit under control, confidence in US sovereign debt and in the US dollar will continue to deteriorate.

US Treasury yields began to rise after the announcement of QE2 and, in December, US Treasuries experienced an unprecedented sell-off causing speculation that the US may become the next target of the so-called wolfpack, comprising short sellers of sovereign debt that are also OTC derivatives (credit default and interest rate swaps) traders. Artificial demand for US Treasuries created by QE2 could potentially head off the shorting of US Treasury bonds to generate credit default and interest rate swap related profits. Short sellers seeking to drive up yields run the risk that the Federal Reserve will step in and buy aggressively to drive yields back down, thus QE2 may preempt the wolfpack. The United States is not immune to such predatory practices might because the notional value of OTC derivatives is currently more than $605 trillion (approximately 10 times world GDP).

Chart courtesy of StockCharts.com

Artificial demand for US Treasuries could hold down bond yields thus supporting an inflationary monetary policy but the Federal Reserve’s own Primary Dealers forecast higher bond yields for 2011. The Federal Reserve’s control over US Treasury bond yields appears to be limited, ironically, as a consequence of currency debasement. Even if US Treasury bond yields rise, however, QE2 might still provide a means of keeping the wolfpack at bay.

Let them Eat Dollars

While QE2 has been generally positive for equities in the short term, the FOMC announcement in November 2010 triggered a sharp rise in commodity prices with gold closing over $1400 and silver closing over $30 at the end of 2010 and with the Commodity Channel Index (CCI) and global food prices at new highs. Rapidly rising global food prices pose an escalating risk of food shortages or worse, particularly in poorer countries, leading analysts to conclude that the world is one poor harvest away from chaos. President of the World Bank, Robert Zoellick, warned that rising food prices are “a threat to global growth and social stability.” Food riots, for example, have already begun to break out in Africa. In the US, consumers and businesses paid an additional $25 billion for gasoline between September 2010 and January 2011 and gasoline prices have continued higher.

Chart courtesy of StockCharts.com

Since the corrosive effects of expanding the money supply in excess of the rate of increase in sustainable economic activity, i.e., inflation, could not so quickly have resulted from QE2, QE2 seems to have damaged global confidence in the US dollar and in US Treasury debt. The January pullback in gold and silver showed that the sharp rise in prices after the announcement of QE2, in November 2010, was in part reactionary. Nonetheless, the strengthening of the US dollar can be largely attributed to the ongoing debt crisis in Europe and the ongoing bull market in commodities and precious metals points to a continuing influx of capital and to a reduced preference for the US dollar and US Treasuries. Had it not been for the revelation of Ireland’s economic troubles along with those of other European countries, the US dollar would certainly have fallen further compared to the Euro towards the end of 2010. What is more important is that the Euro, the US dollar and the Japanese yen have the same fundamental problem in common, which is a combination of high debt levels and economic fundamentals that, in the best case, do not inspire confidence.

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All other things being equal, if the QE2 program were terminated, the US dollar would certainly rally and demand for US debt would certainly strengthen, lowering demand for commodities and precious metals. The termination of QE2 or an announcement of its impending termination is a potential short term risk for investors. Conversely, as QE2 continues indefinitely, the current commodities bull market, which has been amplified by the weakening US dollar, will continue And precious metals prices, which are currently consolidating, will move higher.

The emerging pattern since the announcement of QE2 is bullish for commodities and precious metals. Episodic flights to safety have tended to cause the US dollar to rally, despite poor economic conditions in the US, i.e., in response to economic instability in countries such as Dubai, Greece, Ireland or Spain. The pattern of US dollar-centric flights to safety has begun to break down, suggesting that investors may increasingly favor commodities and precious metals over US dollars and US Treasuries as hedges against inflation and sovereign debt risk.

Diminishing US Credibility

The credibility of the US government and the Federal Reserve is gradually deteriorating. In the worst case, a total collapse of confidence could trigger a race to divest of US Treasuries and to shed US dollars, i.e., a hyperinflationary currency event. The declining US dollar and the diminishing desirability of US debt and of the Federal Reserve bode well for commodities and precious metals while warning away any sane investor from US Treasuries.

In the face of indefinite QE2, it remains unclear (1) when the disintegration of the US dollar’s status as the world reserve currency might accelerate and a new reserve currency will be established, (2) if and when holders of US Treasuries seeking a way out might reach critical mass potentially triggering a proverbial rush to the exits (i.e., a collapse of US Treasuries despite the Federal Reserve’s artificial demand), or (3) if and when a race, whether global or domestic, to shed US dollars in favor of equities, hard assets, alternative currencies, precious metals or other real goods might begin. The first and second processes (removal of the US dollar’s world reserve status and the divestment of US Treasuries) are already under way and the Federal Reserve’s current policies are on track to eventually trigger the third.

Fundamentally, the Federal Reserve cannot prevent rising prices while the US dollar moves lower due to QE2 and due to the US’ deteriorating creditworthiness and credibility, nor can it control the flow of liquidity resulting from its actions or, therefore, resulting asset price bubbles, whether in the US or abroad. In light of the Federal Reserve’s current policies, it seems likely that, in the next 12 months, global economic volatility related to inflation, currency debasement and, potentially, developing currency and trade wars will increase while the financial stability of the US and of the Eurozone countries continues to decline and while commodity and precious metals prices continue to move higher.