Hera : GDP, central banks

Bernanke’s Dilemma: Hyperinflation and the US Dollar

Ron Hera — Wed, 10 Mar 2010 13:13:00 GMT

Ben Bernanke, Chairman of the US Federal Reserve, faces a Sisyphean task because US banks are experiencing debt deflation and, because lending is now at much lower levels, monetary deflation is encumbering the domestic US economy as existing debts continue to be serviced. Government deficit spending can only offset lower consumer spending to a degree, and the mushrooming debt of the US government raises the question of whether the US can repay or roll over its debt obligations, given that tax receipts are likely to fall. Despite deflationary pressure, the value of the US dollar is in a downtrend pointing to higher prices for imported goods and energy. Devaluing the US dollar will reduce the value of debts in real terms, thus it can make debt levels sustainable, but higher prices will exacerbate debt defaults, worsening the condition of US banks. Mr. Bernanke's dilemma is how to salvage the balance sheets of US banks without sparking high inflation or unleashing hyperinflation.

Where the US dollar is concerned, opinions on hyperinflation range from the view that hyperinflation of the world reserve currency is impossible in principle (because, for example, the values of other currencies are linked to that of the US dollar), to the view that hyperinflation of the US dollar has already happened and that all that remains are the consequences. The two most widely accepted theories of hyperinflation are the monetary model, where a positive feedback cycle is caused by a disproportionate increase in the velocity of money as a consequence of increasing the money supply too quickly, and the confidence model, where the monetary authority issuing a given currency is perceived to be insolvent or no longer legitimate.

The view that hyperinflation is the inevitable result of a central bank issuing too much money or of a government taking on too much debt, while correct, both states the obvious and presupposes that some previously known or predictable limit is reached. The ability to service debt is one such measure, but the value of a debt in real terms depends on the value of the currency. In practice, hyperinflation is recognized only after the inexorable death spiral of a currency has begun. Detecting it in advance is another matter entirely.

Mathematical models of hyperinflation, such as predicting years between redenomination based on inflation rates or applying the quantity theory of money, describe what is happening but not why. Using the monetary model alone makes it difficult to explain apparent counterexamples where high levels of sovereign debt compared to a nation's gross domestic product (GDP) or monetization did not result in hyperinflation.

The confidence model seems to suggest that hyperinflation can be explained by crowd psychology where hyperinflation is analogous to a market mania or is an example of mass hysteria. The idea that hyperinflation is only a crisis of confidence, i.e., that it is a psychological phenomenon, not only lacks predictive value but implies that hyperinflation can be prevented by manipulating public opinion regardless of mathematical realities.

When a nation's bond market collapses, so does its currency. The view that hyperinflation is fundamentally caused by failed bond issues suggests that what is of interest are the reasons why a nation's bond market breaks down, along with indications of developing bond market distress.

One fact that is clear in every historical example of hyperinflation is the rejection of the currency of a given country either by other countries or by its own citizens. The simplest explanation of hyperinflation is that when the credibility of a government, or of its central bank, breaks down, the recognition of this fact is expressed as a race to shed the currency and to divest of the government's bonds. One way to evaluate the possibility of hyperinflation is therefore to gauge the transparency, completeness and veracity of government and central bank statements regarding their balance sheets, budgets and bond issues. Incomplete or inaccurate information and propaganda contrary to empirical evidence are proverbial red flags signaling that credibility may be lacking and that confidence is therefore misplaced.

Between Scylla and Charybdis

Growth in the US monetary base has been cited as evidence of incipient hyperinflation but, while a distortion in the US financial system is apparent, the currency in question is not in circulation and the effect is that of re-inflation since US banks have suffered massive losses linked to the US mortgage market.

Chart courtesy of Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

The growth in the US monetary base by over $1 trillion since 2008 represents currency held within the banking system on reserve, which increases the ability of US banks to absorb further losses.

Chart courtesy of Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

While more than doubling the US dollar monetary base in less than 2 years is viewed by some as printing too much money, high inflation or hyperinflation have yet to strike. Although money has shifted out of the broad US economy and into the banking system, the excess liquidity exists in the form of bank reserves and, despite the fact that inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon, if bank reserves are considered separately from interest rates and lending activity they have little direct impact on prices in the broad US economy. In fact, the widest measure of the US money supply is contracting and the broad US economy is in the grip of debt and monetary deflation.

Chart courtesy of Shadow Government Statistic

In terms of monetary policy, Mr. Bernanke faces an impossible choice. With interest rates near 0% and with unprecedented government debt and deficit spending beyond sustainable levels there is a clear risk of high inflation or hyperinflation if inflationary forces are not counterbalanced with a heavy hand. In theory, high inflation or hyperinflation could be prevented by restricting the flow of money and credit to consumers and businesses. Such a policy would exert deflationary pressure on the US dollar within the domestic US economy since principal and interest payments on existing debt would drain money from circulation. While preventing inflation temporarily, such a policy would not succeed in the long run because, in addition to offsetting inflation, deflation depresses economic activity and results in debt defaults. Concurrent government borrowing and central bank QE to recapitalize banks and sustain government deficit spending (in a Keynesian attempt to compensate for declining consumer and business borrowing), would cause the value of the US dollar to decline against other currencies thus the prices of imported goods would rise. The resulting combination of rising prices for imported goods (energy in particular) and a scarcity of money in the domestic US economy is a formula for business failures and debt defaults that would ultimately worsen the condition of the US economy and US banks regardless of lower prices for domestic goods and services.

Structural Decay

In a mathematically perfect world, growth in the money supply with a constant interest rate and level of lending is a simple exponential function. In theory, this is not problematic but in practice monetary expansion (and the associated debt) tends to grow faster than population or sustainable economic activity and even periodic deflationary episodes are insufficient to maintain a stable currency value.

Chart courtesy of Wikimedia Commons

The tendency to create currency in excess of what is required to support sustainable economic activity causes unsustainable booms where debt rises out of proportion to the ability to service or eventually repay, meaning that total debt in the economy grows faster than the GDP. The result is that for every boom artificially created by monetary expansion there is a corresponding episode of debt and monetary deflation. Nonetheless, the overall pattern of monetary expansion remains clear.

Chart courtesy of Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

From a policy standpoint, restraining debt issuance by private, profit-oriented banks to sustainable levels is impossible in practice because sustainable growth in GDP is an unknown when the interest rates and reserve ratios that moderate lending activity are set. In fact, the goals of the US Federal Reserve, "to promote ... stable prices and moderate long-term interest rates" require the money supply to expand faster than sustainable economic activity:

Sometimes, however, upward pressures on prices are developing as output and employment are softening-especially when an adverse supply shock, such as a spike in energy prices, has occurred. Then, an attempt to restrain inflation pressures would compound the weakness in the economy, or an attempt to reverse employment losses would aggravate inflation. In such circumstances, those responsible for monetary policy face a dilemma and must decide whether to focus on defusing price pressures or on cushioning the loss of employment and output. Adding to the difficulty is the possibility that an expectation of increasing inflation might get built into decisions about prices and wages, thereby adding to inflation inertia and making it more difficult to achieve price stability.

Deflation is anathema because debt defaults harm lenders and governments have no mechanism to tax gains in the value of currency, thus monetary policy always errs toward inflation and over time the result approximates an exponential function. Among the results is the long term devaluation of the currency, which can also be expressed as an exponential function, i.e., exponential decay.

Chart courtesy of Wikimedia Commons

Exponential decay occurs when a quantity, such as the value of a unit of currency, decreases at a rate proportional to its own value. The decay can be expressed as a differential equation where a quantity N decays at a constant rate (a positive number) (lambda) within a given interval of time t.

Central banks implicitly manage the exponential decay in value of their respective currencies while they focus on interest rates, reserve ratios and inflation targets. Although the exponential decay in the value of the US dollar since 1913 has been distorted by episodes of deflation and variations in monetary policy, the overall pattern continues to reflect the structural reality of exponential decay.

Chart courtesy of Federal Reserve Bank of St. Loui

The combination of fiat currency, where currency is created arbitrarily, and central banking, where money and credit are centrally controlled and where there is an inescapable inflationary bias, suggests that all such regimes have a limited lifespan, but this does not allow a hyperinflationary outcome to be predicted. For example, if US citizens had been asked in 1913, when the Federal Reserve was established, if they would use the Federal Reserve's legal tender knowing that $1 would be roughly $0.05 in less than 100 years they would certainly have responded in the negative, but Federal Reserve Notes have not been rejected by the American people. Similarly, there is no necessary or obvious point where the US dollar will be rejected as it continues to decline in value for the same structural reasons. The logical outcome is an eventual redenomination.

Patterns of Hyperinflation

From the perspective of sovereign debt, the commonly understood process of hyperinflation is that if a government responds to declining foreign appetite for its debt with monetization (or in a historical context direct currency debasement) rather than immediate budget cuts, its currency looses value, at first in proportion to the dilution of the money supply and then more quickly as foreign bond holders and the nation's own citizens seek shelter from inflation in other asset classes. The cost of the government's future obligations then tends to rise in nominal terms, creating an apparent need for larger bond issues while bond yields rise, i.e., the cost of borrowing increases since monetization signals greater risk to investors. Exacerbating the problem, tax receipts tend to lag behind as domestic price inflation sets in. Further monetization is the path of least resistance. Although officials certainly believe that monetization is only a temporary measure both confidence in and the credibility of the government fail. Insolvency is eventually recognized as a reality and the nation's currency then collapses entirely.

Economists assume that consumers and businesses respond predictably based on economic incentives and disincentives, but this presupposes that the value of money is stable (at least over the short term). If users of a currency find that it looses value such that savings and wages are perceptibly eroded before they can be utilized at fair value, the rational course of action is to shed the currency as quickly as possible. This sparks a competition to shed currency in favor of real goods and, once the process begins, the rational course of action is to participate in the proverbial rush to the exits. Interestingly, a panic is not required to explain this phenomenon.

In the context of a national economy, the cycle of hyperinflation is driven not precisely by the supply of money but by its velocity because the competition to shed currency concentrates purchasing activity in successively shorter time periods. Within a given interval, more consumers and businesses seek to buy a limited supply of available goods using all available currency, including savings, thus demand is pulled forward while the velocity of money accelerates. If monetary authorities respond by increasing the money supply, the process feeds on itself.

In terms of the quantity theory of money, which is that the money supply has a direct, positive relationship to prices, the equilibrium of prices with the number of items purchased and the money supply with the velocity of money is maintained (where M is the money supply, V is the velocity of money, P is the average price level, and Q is the number of items purchased over a given interval).

The relation holds true even as the value of a currency approaches zero while prices approach infinity. However, while there is no theoretical limit to the money supply, the supply of goods is limited in various ways and shortages of goods spur prices higher, exacerbating the problem.

The competition to shed currency first interacts with prices then with the availability of currency and with the supply of goods. Rising prices result in rising demand for larger amounts and denominations of currency producing a genuine shortage, but increasing the money supply only intensifies the competition to shed currency, like pouring gasoline on a fire.

Crisis of Credibility

A gradual decline in the value of a currency is generally accepted by consumers and businesses because it has little immediate impact and can have short-term benefits, such as making money more accessible and stimulating economic activity and growth. However, when debt increases disproportionately, a deflationary bust is inevitable and if it is postponed by further credit expansion systemic instability results.

Chart courtesy of Karl Denninger

In 1949 Ludwig von Mises pointed out in Human Action (Chapter XX, section 8) that "there is no means of avoiding the final collapse of a boom brought about by credit expansion. The alternative is only whether the crisis should come sooner as the result of a voluntary abandonment of further credit expansion, or later as a final and total catastrophe of the currency system involved."

Among other things, excessive monetary inflation means that the US dollar cannot function as a store of value. Mounting evidence points to systemic instability, a lower US dollar and ultimately to a hyperinflationary outcome:

US federal government debt of $12.3 trillion, unfunded liabilities of $63 trillion, deficit spending of $1.35 trillion for fiscal 2010, and the Obama administration's $3.83 trillion budget all set new records, while federal income tax revenues are expected to fall for a second consecutive year.
It has been reported that to reduce the cost of borrowing, the maturity of debt issued by the US Department of the Treasury has shifted from the long end of the spectrum toward short term debt. At the same time, episodic flights to the perceived safety of the US dollar by global investors favor short-term Treasuries. This situation creates an escalating risk that the US Treasury will be unable to roll over short term debt and that it will resort to monetization.
7 US states are worse off than the financially troubled European nations of Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain resulting in warnings of a US credit rating downgrade possibly indicating an eventual sovereign default.
Unemployment in the US, where more than 2/3 of GDP is consumer spending, should be viewed as a leading, rather than a trailing indicator, thus the perception of recovery based on slowing unemployment is premature. Reported unemployment data seem to exhibit unusually pronounced disparities between initial claims and later revisions and seasonally adjusted numbers.
The widely reported recovery of the US economy is anemic at best since most of the reported forth quarter 2009 GDP growth is not sustainable and preliminary government economic data remains subject to revision by the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
The imminent retirement of the so-called baby boomer generation comes with a combined Social Security and Medicare price tag of more than $60 trillion.
US bank failures and balance sheet deterioration together with the inability of banks to mark assets to market due to a growing commercial real estate problem and ongoing residential mortgage loan problems suggest that the financial crisis that began in 2008 is not over.
The suspension of the US Financial Accounting Standards Board's mark to market rule means that the value of mortgage loan portfolios and mortgage-backed securities (MBS) reported by banks are incorrect, which obfuscates leverage and risk while magnifying apparent profits.
Toxic assets still cripple bank balance sheets since the US Department of the Treasury has been unable to successfully carry out its Public-Private Investment Program (PPIP) making taxpayer money available to select investors that can use the money to buy toxic mortgage-backed securities, retaining any profits while putting little of their own money at risk.
The largest US Banks remain the largest holders of financial derivatives, e.g., credit default swaps (CDSs), which suggests that they may hold liabilities far in excess of amounts that can be paid or that can be bailed out if significant losses occur. The CDS market, which is the single largest class of financial derivatives, represents over $600 trillion dollars, a roughly 10x multiple of world GDP.
The Federal Reserve's plans to phase out some of its emergency programs, adding up to roughly $2 trillion currently, leaves other emergency measures in place. The Term Asset-backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) is set to expire on June 30, 2010 for loans backed by new-issue commercial mortgage-backed securities and on March 31 for loans backed by all other types of collateral but existing loans will not be retired for some time.
Downward pressure on the US dollar caused by the Federal Reserve's near 0% interest rates and ongoing QE has caused a US dollar carry trade affecting asset prices in global markets. While the value of the US dollar has rallied in response to episodic flights to perceived safety in US Treasuries reflecting comparative weakness in the Euro and other currencies, the overall downtrend is persistent, thus the prices of imported goods can be expected to rise.

Rather than a crisis of confidence, hyperinflation results from a crisis of credibility. Hyperinflation results when the social, legal and political structures that create the value of paper money break down. When a government borrows excessively and its promises to repay are contradicted by mathematical realities, the value of its currency cannot be maintained. If a government so lacks credibility that it cannot issue bonds because there are no buyers other than its own central bank, the value of its currency declines faster than money is printed to cover its obligations. Perhaps the most important indicator of impending hyperinflation is whether the statements of a government or of its central bank, e.g., with respect to the government's budget or the central bank's balance sheet, are evidence based or ideological. If they are not evidence based, the credibility of the government or central bank, and its currency, will weaken and eventually fail.

Ordinarily, supply and demand factors govern the value of money and the prices of goods, but money has another, deeper level of value apart from its role as a medium of exchange and unit of account. When money is not redeemable, it is, in effect, a contract and, as such, it can instantly become more worthless than the paper it is printed on if the agreement that gives it value is null and void.

In 1999, referring to the sale of British gold reserves, Alan Greenspan, then Chairman of the US Federal Reserve, said that "Fiat money paper in extremis is accepted by nobody." The reason for this is that there are two fundamental kinds of value. De jure value exists because of, and is dependent upon, social, political and legal arrangements between human beings. In extremis, agreements are often broken and unenforceable. The value of fiat currency and of government bonds are examples of de jure value. Ultimately, de jure value actually exists only in the minds of human beings and does not exist in an absolute sense, in the real world, independent of human belief. De facto value, on the other hand, exists in reality, independent of human thought, e.g., lumber or farmland. The value of real, tangible things of value ultimately devolves to biological survival and to material standards of living. Possessing a physical asset that supports survival does not require human belief in order to have biological value.

When social, political and legal arrangements are strong, reliable and endure over generations de jure value may be preferable for any number of reasons. However, when social, political and legal arrangements prove to be unstable, or fail, de facto value trumps de jure value in every case.

When the balance sheets of US banks are maintained by suspending accounting rules and when banks hold financial derivatives liabilities greater than world GDP, both the stability and credibility of the banks are questionable. When US economic data consistently seems to reflect a Pollyanna bias and the US federal budget contains unrealistic projections of GDP growth and tax revenues, while public debt and government liabilities (which now include unlimited bailouts for government sponsored entities Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) are obviously unworkable and the US government's own central bank is already a major buyer of US Treasuries, the federal government's credibility is questionable. When private financial losses and toxic financial assets are transferred to taxpayers while profits and bonuses abound on Wall Street thanks to accounting rule changes in the midst of the worst economic contraction since the Great Depression, the credibility and competency of the US Treasury and Congress, with respect to the finances of the nation, are questionable. When the US Federal Reserve defies the US Congress, resists independent auditing, engages in ongoing QE and is the lender of last resort for banks that under normal conditions would be insolvent, its credibility is questionable. When the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, who failed to detect the largest asset price bubble in the history of the world and who has been consistently wrong in his assessment of the US economy is reappointed following the worst financial and economic disaster in generations, both his credibility and that of the Obama administration are questionable. The plethora of red flags spewing from Wall Street, from the Federal Reserve and from the federal government point to a breakdown of de jure value that is already in progress, thus to a hyperinflationary outcome for the US dollar.

Madmen, Gamblers, Alcoholics, the US Dollar and Gold

Ron Hera — Tue, 01 Dec 2009 14:55:00 GMT

If a lawless gang of madmen, gamblers and alcoholics seized control of a large company, how would you expect the business to perform? How would you expect the story to end? What if, instead of a company, they seized control of the world's largest economy, thus, to some extent, the world financial system?

Unsound monetary policy, reckless risk taking, and out-of-control spending are what characterize the US economy today. The proverbial madmen are central bankers, i.e., the US Federal Reserve, whose polices, inspired by Johannes Gutenberg, threaten to destroy the US dollar in the name of saving US banks from their own irresponsibility and greed. The compulsive gamblers are Wall Street investment banks, along with the largest US banks, which have gone so far as to speculate with government bailout money, having learned little from the near collapse of the world financial system in 2008. If money were liquor, the US federal government would be a band of raging alcoholics in charge of a liquor store. These are the tragic characters upon whom Americans depend for their jobs, for their college and retirement funds, for the financing of their educations, homes and business ventures, for the stability of prices and US financial markets, and for the value of their hard earned savings.

The triangle of dysfunction has not gone without notice. Foreign purchases of US Treasury bonds are being made, essentially, under duress while demand for Treasuries remains tepid and quantitative easing by the Federal Reserve continues. The US dollar has fallen from new low to new low and the skyrocketing price of gold is sounding the alarm, but between Washington DC and Wall Street nary an ear can hear.

The Madmen

The incurable incapacity of a central autocracy to accurately match interest rates and the money supply to the requirements of the diverse, complex markets that make up the US economy is a fundamental flaw in US monetary policy. While the ideology may be different, central economic planning under the name of central banking produces no better result than central economic planning under the name of communism. A series of ever larger economic bubbles coupled with an ever weaker currency is ultimately little better than the economic stagnation of the former Soviet system. Low interest rates may stimulate economic activity, for example, but they may also result in high inflation, unsustainable levels of debt, and asset price bubbles.

For every intervention in the free market, whether by government edict or monetary policy, there are unintended consequences. Government intervention in the US housing market, for example, intended to increase opportunities for home ownership among less successful members of society, played a key role in undermining lending standards. Combined with the Federal Reserve's policy of low interest rates, which fueled speculation in real estate and mortgage backed securities, government intervention ultimately proved disastrous.

Markets have existed since the dawn of human civilization without the blessings either of government subsidies and guarantees or of central banking. An economy is best described as an organic system rather than a machine. Interventions purporting to be the processes required to 'operate' the economy are at best futile if not inevitably disruptive and destructive. Like a living organism, the economy is largely self organizing and self regulating. When governments collapse, for example, currencies may fail but trade marches on. The behavior of an economy is an infinitely complex aggregate of individual human actions driven by self-interest and, while it may be characterized at different times either by rationality or by irrationality, it is self correcting (unlike interventions, which know no bounds). As a result, it is not possible for a small group of experts, no matter how intelligent or well intentioned, who have an imperfect understanding and incomplete, inevitably out-of-date information to successfully control the economy without unintended, unexpected and usually destructive consequences.

The notion that a central authority, even one equipped with sophisticated computer models, can successfully substitute a mathematically-based view from on high for the individual judgments of millions of businesses, entrepreneurs, and consumers across countless regions and industries is not merely the height of hubris but quite simply mad. Fundamentally, it is entrepreneurs deploying private capital, not bankers or economists that create the products, services, business, and jobs that make up the economy. Whether for the sake of social welfare or for the purposes of monetary policy, intervention in the free market invariably distorts the distribution of wealth, causes a net reduction of wealth for society as a whole, and misdirects entrepreneurs into activities eventually revealed as uneconomic. Perhaps the best argument for the futility of central bank monetary policy is that of Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Shalom Bernanke, Ph.D., who said to graduates of the Boston College School of Law on May 22, 2009:

"As an economist and policymaker, I have plenty of experience in trying to foretell the future, because policy decisions inevitably involve projections of how alternative policy choices will influence the future course of the economy. The Federal Reserve, therefore, devotes substantial resources to economic forecasting. Likewise, individual investors and businesses have strong financial incentives to try to anticipate how the economy will evolve. With so much at stake, you will not be surprised to know that, over the years, many very smart people have applied the most sophisticated statistical and modeling tools available to try to better divine the economic future. But the results, unfortunately, have more often than not been underwhelming. Like weather forecasters, economic forecasters must deal with a system that is extraordinarily complex, that is subject to random shocks, and about which our data and understanding will always be imperfect. In some ways, predicting the economy is even more difficult than forecasting the weather, because an economy is not made up of molecules whose behavior is subject to the laws of physics, but rather of human beings who are themselves thinking about the future and whose behavior may be influenced by the forecasts that they or others make."

Mr. Bernanke's comments are not remarkable only for their clarity and candor, or because they are a stark admission of the failure of central bank monetary policy, but because they echo the founding principles of the Austrian school of economics. In fact, Mr. Bernanke provides excellent reasons for the repeal of the US Federal Reserve Act. Despite common misconceptions of economics as a branch of mathematics or as a hard science, economics is in fact a social science, similar to psychology. For example, when we speak of economic incentives we are referring to the manipulation of human behavior through artificial means to achieve policy objectives such as increasing consumer spending, just as pairing the sound of a bell with the introduction of dog food will produce dogs that salivate at the sound of a bell when no food is present (of course the salivation response can eventually be extinguished if no food is provided for an extended period of time).

Psychology, it turns out, has a great deal to say about economics, investment banking, and public finance. Indeed, key psychological themes are common to all three areas of endeavor.

The Illusion of Control

There may be a simple explanation, rooted in human nature, for the ever larger disasters brought about by government interventions in the economy and by the institution of central banking. The illusion of control is persistence in the belief that a given outcome can be controlled when no demonstrable influence exists or where, as Mr. Bernanke stated, outcomes cannot be accurately predicted. Whether intervention is the result of central bank monetary policy or of government legislation, taxation or regulation, it is the inherent unpredictability of the outcomes of intervention that belies the philosophy of interventionism itself. Former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, Ph.D., grappled with this fact in the wake of the financial crisis when, in testimony before the US Congress on October 24, 2008, he said:

"... an ideology is [...] a conceptual framework with the way people deal with reality. Everyone has one. You have to -- to exist, you need an ideology. The question is whether it is accurate or not. And what I'm saying to you is, yes, I found a flaw. I don't know how significant or permanent it is, but I've been very distressed by that fact. [That there is a] flaw in the model that I perceived is the critical functioning structure that defines how the world works, so to speak. ... I was shocked, because I had been going for 40 years or more with very considerable evidence that it was working exceptionally well."

Mr. Greenspan accurately refers to the dominant economic theory, not as a science, but as an ideology that ultimately does not conform to reality. In psychological terms, an irrational belief that cannot be modified by reason or evidence is precisely the definition of the term "delusion." Despite his having been confused for 40 years, Mr. Greenspan clearly recognized and acknowledged a limitation of his economic ideology. In retrospect, perhaps Mr. Greenspan regrets having departed from his original views. Sadly, the same cannot be said for the majority of economists, central bankers and US government officials who do not recognize, as Albert Einstein pointed out, that "the definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results."

The Gamblers

Gambling addiction and belief in the paranormal, e.g., psychokinesis, are examples of the illusion of control. When rolling dice in the casino game craps, for example, people tend to throw harder for high numbers and softer for low numbers when there is no connection between the force with which the dice are thrown and the result. Experimental subjects can even be made to believe that they can affect the outcome of a coin toss through their level of concentration. The illusion of control is a key factor in gambling addiction because it is reinforced by occasional successes and, as has been long established by behavioral psychologists, behaviors conditioned by intermittent reinforcement are the most difficult to extinguish.

Warning signs of gambling addiction include defensiveness, secrecy, and desperation: precisely the attitudes exhibited by Wall Street bankers seeking bailouts from the US government in 2008. Like US banks transferring private losses to taxpayers, gambling addicts may hold others responsible for their financial problems and they may adamantly insist that they be trusted. Gambling addicts tend to be secretive about finances, while at the same time irrationally insisting on having control over money, just as Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke has insisted that Congressional review of the Federal Reserve's books. i.e., to find out what financial institutions received taxpayer dollars, would compromise its vaunted independence and harm the US economy. The more gambling addicts are in debt, the more they feel the need to defend gambling and they often defend a specific theory or model that "guarantees" winning (if only they can get more money to continue gambling).

A gambling addict's savings and assets may mysteriously dwindle, perhaps like crumbling bank balance sheets laden with sub-prime mortgages or bank losses associated with risky financial derivatives, and there may be unexplained loans or cash advances, perhaps like the Federal Reserve's Term Asset-Backed Loan Facility (TALF) program. Like banks jacking up credit card interest rates, gambling addicts become increasingly desperate for money to fund further gambling. The debts of gambling addicts may increase sharply, reflecting a "bet more, win more" mentality that inevitably leads to the gambler going bust. Gambling addicts seek money with increasing desperation, perhaps like former US Treasury Secretary (and former Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Goldman Sachs) Henry M. Paulson's dire warnings of financial Armageddon in 2008. Items easily sold or pawned for money may mysteriously disappear, perhaps like the US government's Fort Knox gold, which is surrounded by rumors and speculation that a long sought (e.g., by the Gold Anti-Trust Action Committee) independent audit could easily dispel.

The Alcoholics

The original Twelve Steps published by Alcoholics Anonymous include admitting that one's life, or in this case the US economy has become unmanageable and that a power beyond one's self (i.e., beyond current economic theories and government policies) is necessary to restore sanity. Contrary to the views of current Goldman Sachs CEO Lloyd Blankfein, the Higher Power cannot be one's self. The self regulating dynamics of a free market, for example would certainly adjust US housing prices to sustainable levels and promote sound lending standards, but this has been prevented by the interventions of the Federal Reserve and US government. Not coincidentally, it was the Federal Reserve and the US government, respectively, that originally caused the inflation of housing prices and undermined lending standards.

Breaking the grip of alcohol addiction requires a searching and fearless moral inventory, admitting the exact nature of one's wrongs, and an unreserved willingness to change and to make amends with those who have been harmed. Sadly, neither the Federal Reserve, nor Wall Street bankers, nor the US Congress, which is committed to borrowing its way out of debt, seem likely to repent.

The destructive behavior of alcoholics is often enabled by dysfunctional, co-dependent relationships. A dysfunctional relationship is one that creates more emotional turmoil than satisfaction, or in the case of the US economy, more destruction of wealth than creation. Warning signs of a dysfunctional relationship include, for example, addictive or obsessive attitudes, an imbalance of power, or a superiority complex on the part of one person. Co-dependency is a pattern of detrimental behavioral interactions within a dysfunctional relationship, most commonly a relationship with an alcohol or drug abuser, but equally possible in a relationship with a gambling addict. The co-dependent is a person who perpetuates the addiction or pathological condition of someone close to them in a way that impedes recovery.

The US government appears trapped, together with the Federal Reserve and Wall Street banks, in a destructive web of dysfunctional, co-dependent relationships. The US government is addicted to the easy money created by the Federal Reserve at the expense of taxpayers who eventually suffer a loss of purchasing power. According to Mr. Greenspan's 1966 article Gold and Economic Freedom, "deficit spending is simply a scheme for the confiscation of wealth." Wall Street bankers depend on US government bailouts and guarantees, as well as on the Federal Reserve's lax monetary policy, and the Federal Reserve depends directly on the US government for the legalization of its unaccountable monopoly and indirectly on the continuation of the largest US banks. While a dysfunctional triangle of co-dependency is merely descriptive, the interdependence of the Federal Reserve, the largest US banks and the US government is a fact in reality.

Unfortunately, it is no more possible to spend one's way to prosperity or to borrow one's way out of debt than it is to drink one's self sober. Nonetheless, thanks to the Federal Reserve's 7 day per week, 24 hour per day money printing service, the US government plans to do precisely this. If creating wealth were as simple as printing money, the dominant school of economics would be led by Robert Mugabe, President of Zimbabwe, and Gideon Gono, governor of Zimbabwe's Reserve Bank (and winner of the 2009 Ig Nobel Prize in Mathematics), who share with Mr. Bernanke a love for the feel of crisp paper and for the smell of fresh ink.

As Milton Friedman once said "The real problem with government is not the deficit. The real problem with government is the amount of our money that it spends."

The wealth destroyed by the collapse of the US real estate bubble and the stock market crash of 2008 has not been and cannot be brought back by bailouts, stimulus spending or outright money printing. While averting a deflationary spiral is necessary, propping up asset prices by dropping money from a helicopter redistributes wealth and interferes with the price mechanism of the free market. Devaluing the US dollar may help to hold up asset prices but it also prevents housing prices from falling to sustainable levels while at the same time adding the risk of eventually far higher prices, or, in the worst case, hyperinflation. There is no historical example of a successfully re-inflated economic bubble. What is more important, however, is that the unintended consequences of currency debasement, i.e., the result of an inflationary monetary policy marked by near 0% interest rates, are likely to outweigh the goals of the policy even if they are achieved.

Reducing the value of debts in real terms through currency debasement requires a commensurate loss of purchasing power, thus while housing prices may be prevented from falling further, savings will be destroyed and wages will lag behind prices once they inevitably begin to rise. Although consumer prices in the US currently lag behind the downtrend of the US Dollar Index (USDX), an inflation tax will eventually be levied. Under the name "economic stimulus", wealth is being dissipated by the US government at an alarming rate with no sustainable benefit. US government programs like Cash for Clunkers only impact short-term economic data while, in reality, destroying wealth, increasing debt and diverting consumer spending into already bankrupt industries. At the same time, the US government is eager to increase tax revenues to offset deficit spending and it has all manner of businesses, as well as wealthy individuals in its crosshairs. German-born Presbyterian clergyman William Boetcker (1873-1962) wrote:

"You cannot bring about prosperity by discouraging thrift. You cannot help small men by tearing down big men. You cannot strengthen the weak by weakening the strong. You cannot lift the wage-earner by pulling down the wage-payer. You cannot help the poor man by destroying the rich. You cannot keep out of trouble by spending more than your income..."

Boetcker's words are profound. It is not possible to repair the US economy through stimulus spending or to increase the wealth of consumers by inflating asset values via currency debasement. Supporting asset prices, thus bank balance sheets, via currency debasement, in the best case, can spread debt defaults over time, perhaps delaying the collapse of bankrupt financial institutions. However, currency debasement promises to move Americans closer to the financial status of Zimbabweans due to the destruction of the purchasing power of the US dollar. A less valuable US dollar will reduce consumer spending in real terms, and reduced consumer spending will impact businesses and, therefore, jobs.

The US Dollar and Gold

The price of gold indicates a lack of confidence in the US dollar and in the US economy and it reflects poorly on the credibility of the Federal Reserve and of the US government. The changing composition of central bank reserves, e.g., increasing gold holdings, is a direct effect of the currently weak US economy and US dollar, which has lost considerable value in recent months. In contrast, gold is the only financial asset, in fact a currency that has no counterparty risk. This simple, but often overlooked fact goes a long way to explain current investment demand for gold.

Chart courtesy of StockCharts.com

All other things being equal, strong economies offer investors superior returns and lower risk compared to weak economies, thus the currencies of stronger economies are always preferred over those of weaker ones and have a higher relative value as a function of supply and demand. Of course, monetary inflation and monetary deflation also influence the value of a currency in terms of supply.

In a world financial system composed entirely of fiat currencies, where no currency is redeemable in terms of hard assets, money is an abstract claim on production and the value of one national currency relative to another can only, ultimately be a reflection of the performance of the underlying economy that the currency represents (performance being inclusive of the consequences of its monetary policy), i.e., a claim on its production. Thus, if an economy is in decline, i.e., its production is falling, its currency, over time, must also decline. Conversely, there can be no doubt that if the US economy were exhibiting credible and significant growth, i.e., if production were increasing, the US dollar would certainly gain value, but that is not the case.

Chart courtesy of StockCharts.com

The fact that central banks are reducing US dollar holdings and increasing holdings of other currencies, including gold, is simply a matter of preserving the value of their reserves in the face of developments influencing the value of the US dollar, such as the burgeoning US dollar carry trade. Having gone "all in" to save the largest banks, the Federal Reserve and US government continue to assume that the crisis can be managed, despite the fact that their policies are making the situation worse in terms of sustainable housing prices, public debt and the value of the US dollar. In the mean time, Wall Street bankers have gone back to the casino, nonchalantly cashing in their bailout chips and pocketing the gains.

The rationale of buying time for US banks and of supporting US real estate prices seems reasonable on its face but this probably doomed policy is already proving counterproductive. Despite the patina of economic recovery sprinkled over the news media like fairy dust, small business and commercial real estate failures, as well as ongoing residential mortgage and credit card defaults, are rippling through the weak US economy, while unemployment continues to rise undermining consumer spending thus, ultimately, bank balance sheets. Setting aside the understandable reluctance of US banks to make new loans, no amount of tenuous good news, no matter how exaggerated, has been able to rekindle the frenzy of consumer borrowing that formerly characterized the US economy.

The illusion of control is a temporary state of affairs. The triangle of dysfunction and co-dependency formed by the Federal Reserve, Wall Street banks, and the US government is like a story about a madman, a gambler and an alcoholic, where each traps the others in their respective downward spirals. The illusion of control, common to all three, is gradually bringing about a situation that will inevitably be entirely out of control, but, as with gambling addicts and alcoholics, the point where control is lost can only become apparent after the fact, just as the financial crisis of 2008 caught the vast majority of experts by surprise.

Investors, governments and central banks around the world are seeking safety outside the US dollar, particularly in gold, as well as outside of the US stock market, e.g., in emerging economies. The more borrowed money the US government spends, the more money the Federal Reserve prints and the longer zombie banks are kept on life support, the worse the eventual condition of the US economy, the weaker the US dollar and the higher the price of everything in US dollars will ultimately be, particularly gold.