Hera : GDP

Why Financial Repression Will Fail

Ron Hera — Fri, 16 Nov 2012 17:53:00 GMT

Excessive leverage and risk in the financial system, e.g., using customer funds to speculate, never ends well. Stock market crashes, bank and investment firm failures or economic recessions are all potential consequences. Following the failure of the United States to regulate over the counter (OTC) derivatives and the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, U.S. banks became the largest financial business entities in history. The U.S. real estate bubble, sub-prime lending and mortgage backed securities (MBS), along with unregulated OTC derivatives, then lead to bank insolvencies, a historic stock market crash and a near collapse of the global financial system.

Central banks and governments intervened to prevent systemic collapse but governments were saddled with enormous debts due to bank bailouts, lost tax revenues and massive social welfare costs. Rather than systemic collapse, and perhaps another Great Depression, the post crisis period came to be characterized by (1) market interventions, (2) direct government control over the economy, and (3) ongoing monetization by central banks. Longer term solutions that would have allowed a return to putatively free markets failed to emerge and government debt, particularly in Europe, became a crisis in its own right.

Measures that began as emergency interventions became routine suggesting a new economic paradigm. In the new paradigm, big banks, politicians and academics would decide what market outcomes, e.g., bankruptcies, interest rates or bond yields, would be permitted, as well as when to apply accounting rules, regulations and laws. Despite increased centralization of decision making and greatly expanded powers, however, policymakers were unable to repair the financial system. Instead, mounting government debt led to de facto financial repression.

Financial repression occurs when governments channel funds into their own sovereign bonds in order to reduce debt levels through mechanisms such as directed lending, caps on interest rates, capital controls, debt monetization, or by other means. Economist Carmen M. Reinhart, et al., brought the term back into popular usage in 2011 after a long hiatus. Past examples of financial repression include several South American countries, such as Argentina. The promise of financial repression is that it will hold down government borrowing costs and reduce government debt levels, but critics argue that financial repression merely targets the producers of society, i.e., the middle class, and therefore harms the economy.

The Liquidation of Government Debt , Carmen M. Reinhart and M. Belen Sbrancia (NBER 16893, 2011)

Debt monetization, which can be a tool of financial repression, destroys savings while a zero percent interest rate policy (ZIRP), which reduces government borrowing costs, deprives savers and pensioners of interest income and can lead to inflation. What is more important, however, is that financial repression prevents capital formation. Of particular concern in the U.S. is the link between capital formation and new business creation, which is primarily a middle class phenomenon. The vast majority of corporations in the U.S. are small businesses and they account for the majority of jobs. By preventing capital formation, financial repression short circuits the engine of new business creation, increases unemployment and threatens to bring down the middle class.

Governments cannot supply entrepreneurship or innovation in the marketplace, nor can they effectively replace savings (genuine capital derived from surplus production) or private investment with bank credit or with public funds, which represent debt and a transfer of wealth, respectively. The deployed capital, inventions, products and services of new businesses drive innovation, fuel competition, provide jobs and increase the wealth of society. In contrast, financial repression can only produce economic stagnation and result in a net loss of wealth to society.

Crisis and Consequence

Substantially as a consequence of the financial crisis and global recession, Europe was engulfed in a sovereign debt crisis characterized in the European periphery by austerity measures and Great Depression levels of unemployment. In the U.S., the real estate collapse and stock market crash represented a direct loss of household wealth while bank bailouts represented a transfer of wealth from proverbial Main Street to literal Wall Street. Deficit spending, debt monetization and the Federal Reserve’s purchases of MBS and U.S. Treasury bonds expressed a radically inflationary monetary policy and, although much of the money is idle in the banking system, the overall increase in the supply of U.S. dollars is concerning. The True Money Supply (TMS), formulated by famed economist Murray Rothbard, represents the amount of money in the economy that is available for immediate use in exchange.

Despite the 2008 financial crisis, global recession and inflationary policies, confidence in the U.S. dollar, the U.S. stock market, the U.S. federal government and the U.S. economy remained largely intact. Inflationary policies reduced certain risks, such as the risk of a deflationary collapse, and increased liquidity from central bank monetization lifted financial markets, but the effects were only temporary. Confidence was also boosted in Europe by the European Central Bank’s (ECB) outright monetary transactions (OMT) program and in the U.S. by the Federal Reserve’s quantitative easing III (QE3) program. In Europe, the risks of sharply rising sovereign bond yields, sovereign defaults and the potential breakup of the euro were muted by OMT while European leaders putatively moved toward a permanent solution, such as a fiscal union. Thanks in part to the Federal Reserve’s ZIRP and ongoing “operation twist,” U.S. Treasury yields remained near historic lows.

On the surface, the fallout of the 2008 financial crisis was effectively managed, but the basic causes of the crisis were never addressed. The lines between depository institutions and securities firms, erased in the U.S. by the final repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999, were not restored and the U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board’s (FASB) mark-to-market rule was never reinstated.

Although bank capital ratios have improved, leverage remains excessive, bank balance sheet assets remain troubled and economic conditions have deteriorated compared to the pre-crisis period. Banks deemed “too big to fail” in 2008 have become bigger and the gross credit exposure associated with high risk OTC derivatives is roughly as large as it was before the financial crisis. By the end of 2013, the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet will have exceeded $3.4 trillion. At the same time, the U.S. federal government faces a so-called “fiscal cliff.”

The Road to Stagflation

For 2012, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects GDP 2.2% growth in Japan and the U.S. and 3.5% globally. Based on the Baltic Dry Index (BDI), which reflects the price of moving major raw materials by sea, the global economy has slowed in 2012. Nonetheless, there has been some improvement in comparison to the depths of the global recession in 2009.

The BDI is a leading indicator of economic growth because it reflects the demand of manufacturers for raw materials. A decline in the BDI signals falling global demand for manufactured goods. In the U.S., rail carloads also indicate falling demand.

In contrast, removing potentially optimistic projections, the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s (EIA) liquid fuels consumption data suggests an anemic recovery in the U.S. on a par with 2011.

Despite the recent uptick in U.S. manufacturing, manufacturing currently accounts for only 11.7% of U.S. GDP. In the past few decades, U.S. corporations moved production offshore, eliminating domestic jobs. Credit expansion masked the lost income of U.S. consumers but the process inexorably reached its logical conclusion in 2007. The shift of U.S. workers to often lower paying service sector jobs was counterproductive because debt levels rose while income flowed out of the U.S. following on the heels of jobs.

Although policymakers, including Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, deny it, in fact, U.S. unemployment is a long term, structural problem linked to the still ongoing outflow of U.S. consumer incomes to net exporter countries such as India and China.

The current surplus of U.S. labor, abundant capital and somewhat less expensive energy (partly due to advances in hydraulic fracturing that have increased U.S. domestic oil production) are insufficient to stimulate a broad-based economic recovery. In addition to the U.S. federal government’s growing debt and need for increased tax revenues, U.S. consumers remain burdened with high debt levels.

A U.S. manufacturing renaissance, for example, is unlikely to take hold unless the U.S. dollar weakens significantly and global demand also rises. In a global slowdown it remains unclear where new customers might come from for new U.S. products or services.

Although the financial system has continued to function due to massive infusions of liquidity, economic activity, with some exceptions, has not generally recovered or has continued to deteriorate, e.g., the shrinking number of U.S. citizens participating in the official workforce. Ignoring improvements in the unemployment rate related to the shrinking size of the workforce, much of the U.S. economic recovery in the post crisis period can be attributed to government deficit spending.

U.S. GDP has been boosted by government deficit spending in excess of $1 trillion per year. Removing the temporary effects of extraordinary deficits, U.S. GDP remains negative. Compounding the problem, loose monetary policies, rather than spurring lending to consumers or small businesses, have created inflationary pressures and have lead to stagflation.

Rather than putting Americans back to work, inflationary policies have helped to push prices higher. Based on U.S. Consumer Price Index (CPI), the official inflation rate in the U.S. is roughly 2%, but the CPI does not accurately measure the cost of maintaining a constant standard of living. Using the same methodology as in 1980, the CPI should be 9.3% currently.

Inflationary central bank policies support government borrowing and the banking system but increased liquidity resulting from low interest rates, central bank asset purchases or debt monetization can have destabilizing effects. Excess liquidity can result in price inflation, fuel financial speculation or asset price bubbles, or provoke competitive devaluations (currency wars). Asset purchases and debt monetization by central banks alter the distribution of money, thus of purchasing power over the economy and therefore redistribute wealth. Monetary inflation erodes the value of savings replacing genuine capital distributed throughout the economy with credit concentrated in banks. In the U.S., one of the Federal Reserve’s policy assumptions is that asset purchases will help small businesses by making more credit available. While it is true that small businesses rely on bank credit for operations and expansion, it is savings, not credit that fuels small business creation and therefore job growth. Since most U.S. jobs are in small businesses, QE3 and similar policies destroy jobs by redistributing wealth from savers, entrepreneurs and investors to banks and stifling new business creation. The combination of reduced new business creation, continuing high unemployment and inflationary price pressures set against a backdrop of high debt levels precisely defines stagflation.

Reign of Repression

The stagflationary environment in the U.S. is a mild example of financial repression. Countries in the European periphery, e.g., Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Ireland, where high taxes and austerity measures are already in place, are more pointed examples. In the case of Greece, which has descended into an economic depression, the natural market outcome would have been a Greek default and an exit from the European Monetary Union (EMU) accompanied by losses for European banks and quite probably a number of European bank failures, along with the systemic impact of associated OTC derivatives, such as Credit Default Swaps (CDS). To prevent bank losses and failures, however, policy decisions replaced market outcomes. The normalization of market interventions, direct government control over the economy and ongoing monetization by central banks represented a transition from a market based status quo to a policy based status quo which maintained or increased otherwise unworkable government debt levels. Maintaining the status quo, however, requires financial repression.

Like the emergency measures that preceded it, financial repression has become a fixture in a new economic paradigm, but it is no more likely to provide a permanent solution. Financial repression will remain in place as long as bank failures and sovereign defaults continue to be prevented, e.g., through bailouts, asset purchases or debt monetization by central banks. Overall economic conditions in Western countries can therefore be expected to remain stagnant or to deteriorate. The continued debasement of major currencies, such as the U.S. dollar and the euro, will reduce the real value of debts but monetary inflation cannot create a genuine economic recovery as long as bank balance sheets and government finances remain impaired. Without robust economic growth, however, both the banking system and the finances of Western governments certainly will remain impaired. In other words, financial repression in the U.S. and in Europe is set to remain in place indefinitely.

Under an ongoing regime of financial repression, savings, jobs, economic opportunity and living standards will all suffer. The middle class will be reduced as generations of socioeconomic progress are gradually reversed. Younger people, mired in stagflation, will be left behind in terms of income and economic opportunity, which will have a long term negative impact. Since U.S. banks stand to profit from financial repression, it will increase income disparity and the concentration of wealth. The destructive forces set in motion by financial repression will greatly increase the burden on government social welfare programs. Thus, financial repression will fail to alleviate government debt unless tax increases and austerity measures follow, which could turn the United States into another Greece. In theory, financial repression, together with other measures, can liquidate government debt but, in practice, it is a destructive and highly destabilizing approach that will result in a net loss of wealth to society.

The Unholy Alliance of John Maynard Keynes

Ron Hera — Sun, 01 Jul 2012 20:03:00 GMT

Perhaps the greatest modern champion of central economic planning was the 20th century English economist John Maynard Keynes. Keynes, who was a political socialist and for a time a central banker, advocated the idea that the government should play a large, active role in the economy. Among the consequences of Keynes' economic theories, whether intended or unintended, is the fact that Western economies today are characterized by large, central governments, central banks and massive debts.

According to Dr. Andrew Gelman, Professor of Statistics and Political Science at Columbia University, "the law of unintended consequences is what happens when a simple system tries to regulate a complex system. The political system is simple. It operates with limited information (rational ignorance), short time horizons, low feedback, and poor and misaligned incentives. Society, in contrast, is a complex, evolving, high-feedback, incentive-driven system. When a simple system tries to regulate a complex system you often get unintended consequences." Professor Gelman's statement seems equally apropos to central banking.

Government policies based on Keynesian theories and the institution of central banking form a nexus of central economic planning. Control of the central planning process is a winner-take-all proposition for businesses. In the U.S., the result is an unholy alliance of the U.S. federal government, the Federal Reserve (along with the largest U.S. banks) and the largest U.S. corporations. The logical chain beginning with Keynes' fundamental idea that government, supported by a central bank, should play a large and active role in the economy sets the stage for a centrally planned economy and ultimately produces a corporate state.

The U.S. economy is locked in a downward spiral of economic decline. By growing in size, and by engaging in ever larger economic interventions, the U.S. federal government became itself a material cause of the recession that began in 2007. By attempting to grow the economy through monetary expansion, i.e., consumer spending fueled by debt, the Federal Reserve destroyed savings and fueled a series of disastrous economic bubbles, culminating in the housing bubble. At the same time, the largest U.S. banks engaged in reckless lending and high-stakes gambling on hundreds of trillions in over the counter (OTC) derivatives. OTC derivatives, which amount to risky, largely un-backed wagers, were the root cause of the "too big to fail" doctrine that has virtually bankrupted Western governments since 2008. By seeking ever greater influence over Washington D.C. and by seeking to generate higher profits by cutting production in the U.S., the largest U.S. corporations undermined the U.S. market and economy. The U.S. federal government did virtually nothing to prevent the destructive developments because of the influence of the largest U.S. corporations.

Following Keynesian economic theories, the policy response of the U.S. federal government to the recession that began in 2007 and of the financial crisis that began in 2008 was to expand the government further and at a more rapid pace. In other words, some of the root causes of the economic imbalances that lead to the recession and financial crisis (the relative size of the government and the resulting economic distortions) were compounded. As a consequence, the so-called "double dip recession" in the U.S. that began in the second half of 2011 will be longer and ultimately more severe than the economic downturn of 2007-2009.

The Baltic Dry Index (BDI) indicates international shipping returning to crisis levels. Since the U.S. is the world's largest economy and has a large trade deficit, the BDI suggests that the U.S. is in a recession.

Leviathan: The Size of the State

Originally a sea monster referred to in the Bible and, in demonology, one of the seven princes of Hell, as well as its gatekeeper, the name Leviathan was adopted by the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes to refer to an artificial political order, i.e., to the institution of the state. Hobbes was concerned with the distinction between individual rights and the powers of sovereign governments and he elaborated the idea of the social contract. When a government taxes its citizens, it implicitly asserts the right of the government over the property rights of individuals and presupposes that the government can make better use of economic resources than households, individual entrepreneurs, businesses and private investors.

In theory, the government's use of economic resources accomplishes goals that privately owned businesses cannot, such as national defense or emergency response services, i.e., things that, by their nature, are not economically productive or profitable but still necessary for society. In contrast, embarking upon idealistic projects such as "creating jobs" or "expanding home ownership" encroaches on the productive elements of the economy. However, governments are inefficient compared to privately owned businesses due to the absence of competition. Further, the record of history suggests an inability on the part of central planners to make superior economic decisions.

Government encroachment on the private sector, like a self fulfilling prophecy, often magnifies the reasons why government intervention was originally believed to be necessary. For example, when the U.S. federal government became involved in education through federally guaranteed student loans, the result was that the cost of a college education rose towards the limit of what students could borrow and repay during their careers simply because the loans were guaranteed by the government. The guarantees produced more and riskier loans, larger loans and higher education costs.

When the U.S. federal government promoted home ownership for minorities and the poor, mortgage loan guarantees resulted in higher home prices and contributed to the sub-prime lending debacle where banks originated loans to unqualified borrowers in order to sell them to government sponsored entities (GSEs), i.e., to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and to investors as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and other mortgage backed securities (MBS).

Banks were certainly to blame for knowingly making bad loans, which is fraud, but the conditions that made the problem possible existed substantially because of government intervention in the housing market, i.e., opening the door to fraud was an unintended consequence of policies intended to increase lending to unqualified, low income borrowers. Of course, the U.S. federal government did not compel lenders to commit fraud, thus accountability for the U.S. mortgage disaster is shared by the federal government, which interfered with the free market, pursued misguided policies and failed in terms of regulatory oversight and law enforcement, and by banks, which engaged in widespread mortgage related fraud.

Governments redistribute wealth and manipulate economic activity through taxes, subsidies, guarantees, regulations and so forth, but they do not produce new wealth. Government spending may be for good purposes, or at least stem from good intentions, but it unavoidably favors businesses with close ties to the government over those that are taxed but that do not benefit. Despite the theoretically higher moral purposes of lofty government undertakings, government programs that overlap the private sector divert economic resources to businesses that have the favor of politicians minus the cost of government, thus producing economic distortions and a net loss of wealth for society.

The Rahn curve is an economic theory proposing that there is an optimal level of government spending, 15% to 25% of gross domestic product (GDP), to maximize economic growth. As the government grows larger, economic growth is curtailed and, eventually, the economy contracts, crushed under the burden of government. As the government grows in size relative to the economy, not only is economic growth compromised, but the potential for, and the cost of, government waste, fraud and abuse increases.

How the Government Destroys Jobs

While politicians extol the theoretical benefits of ever more government control of the economy, e.g., through increased regulation, from the standpoint of individual entrepreneurs, businesses and private investors, the government is a nuisance, an impediment to wealth creation, and the source of countless costs and risks. The larger the government becomes relative to the size of the economy, the more it tends to discourage economic activity. Although roughly 70% of U.S. jobs are created by small businesses, ranging from family owned businesses to high technology startups, the burden of government falls disproportionately on them because they have fewer resources with which to administer and to demonstrate compliance with government regulations.

When large companies are audited or investigated by any of several government agencies, their accounting, legal and compliance departments are well equipped to deal with such matters. However, when a small company faces the same hurdles or seeks government permits, licenses or certifications, its operations are directly impacted and the associated accounting, legal and regulatory compliance costs can cause the business to lose money or to fail. In the event of an audit or investigation, small business owners in the U.S. generally seek to comply immediately and often pay fines or penalties without contest in order to end the government's interference. While large companies can afford to dispute the government, small businesses face the equivalent of extortion.

As a practical matter, small businesses in the U.S. are permitted to operate at the sole discretion of government bureaucrats that can effectively shut down small businesses without any evidence of wrongdoing. Setting aside the fact that small business owners live in constant and well justified fear of their own government, the result is a stifling of economic activity and a net loss of jobs. For example, traditional small businesses in the U.S., i.e., sole proprietorships, increasingly avoid hiring employees.

Free market competition and the inherent uncertainty of economic conditions provide ample risk for startup businesses. A disproportionately large government relative to the size of the economy damages economic activity and discourages investment in new businesses. The aggregate overhead of government regulations and regulatory compliance, along with taxes and potential penalties, e.g., the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("Obamacare"), increases business costs, amplifies business risks and further increases the burden of regulatory compliance. The result of systematically increasing the costs and risks of doing business-in lock step with the size of government-is to reduce the rate of business formation and to encourage investors to look elsewhere to find returns.

If the U.S. government, currently almost 45% of GDP, desired to create jobs, the correct policy would be to greatly reduce the countless regulations, taxes and fees that encumber small businesses. The path to job creation is for the government to reduce job destruction. Since no political will to reduce the size of the government exists, however, continued shrinking real GDP and permanent workforce reduction can be expected.

Money Out of Thin Air

Central banks, such as the Federal Reserve, are examples of central economic planning, i.e., they control the money supply and exercise centralized control over the value and cost of money through interest rates, bank reserve ratios, monetary inflation and by other means. In contrast to the government's central planning for the putative public good, the Federal Reserve engages in central planning for the benefit of banks. Like the U.S. federal government, the Federal Reserve, through monetary mechanisms, distorts spending and investment patterns, redistributes wealth and preempts the financial and economic decisions of households, individual entrepreneurs, businesses and private investors.

When a central bank increases the money supply beyond the level necessary to support a sustainable economy or population growth, it destroys the value of savings and wages by diluting the value of money and causing prices to rise. Wall Street embraces the Federal Reserve because easy monetary policies provide an inexpensive way to finance operations and to expand, but there is a cost. Inflationary monetary policies favor speculators over savers and debt over genuine capital formation.

Banks do not create wealth. The structure of the financial system, where debt-based money is created ex nihilo, virtually guarantees banks a piece of the action whenever wealth is created. When debt service (principal and interest payments) is attached to the income streams of consumers and businesses, excess production is diverted from capital formation into the coffers of banks. The Federal Reserve, therefore, is at the core of a system where, over time, wealth accrues to banks while capital formation is reduced, ironically increasing the need to borrow. The majority of entrepreneurs and businesses have little choice but to borrow and, even if they are successful, the economy as a whole may still suffer due to increased debt levels relative to GDP.

Keynesians embrace the Federal Reserve's un-backed, fiat money because it permits the government to borrow and spend freely based on the theory that stimulating the economy through deficit spending produces economic growth at a faster pace than debt accumulates. However, as a function of debt service, the number of dollars that must be borrowed and spent to generate each new dollar of GDP becomes larger as the total amount of debt grows.

The result is debt saturation where further debt funded increases in GDP are impossible and where, therefore, existing government debt cannot be retired, i.e., the result of Keynes' theory, taken to an extreme, is government insolvency and sovereign default. Default, of course, can take the form of monetary inflation in order to debase the currency and reduce the real value of debt, e.g., the Federal Reserve's monetary easing and continued accommodative monetary policy.

Keynes and The Corporate State

The U.S. economy is anything but a free market today. In fact, the U.S. government increasingly resembles an oligarchy in which the oligarchs are large corporations, i.e., a "corporatocracy". Thus, the illegitimate offspring of the grand government envisaged by Keynes and the institution of central banking is a corporate state.

Without a large government, businesses have little incentive to influence it, but with the government (local, state and federal) representing nearly half of the U.S. economy, influencing the government is a mission-critical objective for every company. The size of government implied by Keynesian economics provides motive and opportunity but only the largest corporations have the means to succeed.

The goals of businesses seeking to influence the government include winning government business, mandating consumption of products and services (from child car seats to health insurance), avoiding taxes, guaranteeing profits, creating regulatory loopholes, protecting markets, eliminating competition, socializing losses and so forth.

Obama		Romney
Citigroup Inc	$736,771	Citigroup Inc	$57,050
Columbia University	$547,852	Bain & Co	$52,500
General Electric	$529,855	Bain Capital	$74,500
Goldman Sachs	$1,013,091	Goldman Sachs	$367,200
Google Inc	$814,540	Bank of America	$126,500
Harvard University	$878,164	Barclays	$157,750
IBM Corp	$532,372	Blackstone Group	$59,800
JPMorgan Chase & Co	$808,799	JPMorgan Chase & Co	$112,250
Latham & Watkins	$503,295	Credit Suisse Group	$203,750
Microsoft Corp	$852,167	EMC Corp	$117,300
Morgan Stanley	$512,232	Morgan Stanley	$199,800
National Amusements Inc	$563,798	HIG Capital	$186,500
Sidley Austin LLP	$600,298	Kirkland & Ellis	$132,100
Skadden, Arps et al	$543,539	Marriott International	$79,837
Stanford University	$595,716	PriceWaterhouseCoopers	$118,250
Time Warner	$624,618	Sullivan & Cromwell	$79,250
UBS AG	$532,674	UBS AG	$73,750
University of California	$1,648,685	The Villages	$97,500
US Government	$513,308	Vivint Inc	$80,750
WilmerHale LLP	$550,668	Wells Fargo	$61,500
Total Primary Dealers:	$3,603,567	Total Primary Dealers:	$810,050
Political campaign contributions indicating U.S. Federal Reserve Primary Dealers (Source: opensecrets.org)

The influence of Wall Street over Washington D.C. through political campaign contributions, corporate lobbyists and revolving doors (where the same individuals alternate between closely linked private sector jobs and government posts) is almost absolute. Lobbyists are intimately involved in writing legislation that is often rubberstamped by the U.S. Congress, i.e., passed without reading or meaningful debate. The largest corporations support political candidates through campaign contributions and by funding political action committees that, among other things, use corporate public relations tools for political purposes, i.e., propaganda. Key government posts are consistently held by individuals with clear conflicts of interest and the existence of such conflicts is routinely ignored.

The current reality of the United States is that the largest corporations have hijacked the Keynesian central planning powers of the federal government and have used these powers to encourage ever larger and more direct interventions in the economy for their own benefit, as well as laws and regulations that serve as a barrier to free market competition. U.S. regulators, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Commodities and Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) appear to have been captured by the industries they are intended to regulate. Government regulators selectively enforce regulations, often against small businesses and growing companies, such as organic dairy farmers, protecting the interests of the largest corporations from small businesses, free market competition and consumer choice.

The largest U.S. corporations (including oil companies like ExxonMobil and Chevron; drug companies like Johnson & Johnson, Pfizer and GlaxoSmithKline; agribusiness companies like Archer Daniels Midland, which are heavily subsidized by the U.S. federal government; agricultural biotechnology companies like Monsanto; military contractors like Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Boeing, Raytheon and General Dynamics; and banks like Bank of America, J. P. Morgan Chase, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley) have not only been the beneficiaries of government expansion, deficit spending and central economic planning, but, considering political campaign funding practices, have become the de facto oligarchs of America.

Sliding Into the Keynesian Abyss

The decline of the U.S. economy is the logical outcome of Keynesian economics, which enshrines central economic planning and embraces central banking. The unholy alliance of the federal government, the Federal Reserve and Wall Street has all but eliminated capitalism and has transformed the United States from a burgeoning free market economy into a failing corporate state.

The U.S. federal government, the Federal Reserve and Wall Street each played a role in the progression from central economic planning and central banking to a corporate state. Politicians used Keynesian economics to justify big government, a welfare state and budget deficits. The Federal Reserve sought to grow the economy through monetary expansion, focusing on consumption but ignoring debt levels and inadvertently encouraging financial speculation. At the same time, Wall Street sought higher profits both by eliminating production (and jobs) in the U.S. and by sparing no expense to influence the government. The resulting corporate state undermined capitalism and the free market in the United States and produced a downward spiral of economic decline from which there is no escape without fundamental reforms.

How the U.S. Will Become a 3rd World Country (Part 2)

Ron Hera — Sun, 01 Jul 2012 19:50:00 GMT

The United States is quickly coming to resemble a post industrial neo-3rd-world country. Unemployment, lack of economic opportunity, falling real wages and household incomes, growing poverty and increasing concentration of wealth are major trends in the U.S. today. Behind these growing problems are monetary inflation created by the Federal Reserve's monetary policies, federal government deficit spending and the dominant influence of "too big to fail" banks and large corporations in Washington D.C., which has altered the direction of law in the United States. To make matters worse, the U.S. government faces a historic fiscal crisis.

High unemployment, lack of economic opportunity, low wages, widespread poverty, extreme concentration of wealth, unsustainable government debt, control of the government by international banks and multinational corporations, weak rule of law and counterproductive policies are defining characteristics of 3rd world countries. Other factors include poor public health, nutrition and education, as well as lack of infrastructure-factors that deteriorate rapidly in a failing economy.

Apparently ineffective regulation and relatively little law enforcement action by the federal government in the wake of the sub-prime mortgage meltdown resulted in widespread speculation that special interests had taken priority over the rule of law. Critics have also charged that the federal government's policies threaten to eliminate what remains of the American middle class.

Accelerating Concentration of Wealth

In response to the economic downturn that began in 2007 and the start of the financial crisis in 2008, the U.S. federal government and the Federal Reserve resorted to a radically inflationary policy intended to save banks and to shepherd the U.S. economy through a recession. Instead, radically inflationary policies greatly increased the concentration of wealth.

Under ordinary circumstances, monetary inflation has the effect of redistributing wealth in favor of those who receive newly created money first. The value of money is reduced as a function of the number of currency units in the economy but recipients of newly created money can spend it before it loses value. In a declining economy, however, the wealth redistribution effects of inflation are magnified.

When the Federal Reserve or the federal government supports banks and financial markets through liquidity injections, bailouts, asset purchases, quantitative easing, etc., the lion's share of financial support, i.e., newly created money, is captured by the largest financial institutions and by the wealthiest 1% of Americans. Money printing skews the distribution of money over the economy while the value of money, i.e., the purchasing power of wages and savings, is reduced. The overall effect is a wealth transfer from proverbial Main Street to literal Wall Street.

Looming Fiscal Crisis

U.S. government debt and deficit spending have markedly accelerated over the past decade. For example, The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created and the U.S. military grew to 3 million active duty and reserve personnel, not including contractors. Since 2001, the U.S. spent approximately $1 trillion on military expansion while the total cost of the U.S. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq has been estimated to exceed $3.7 trillion.

Although the U.S. federal government remains in denial, the Congressional debt ceiling debate and subsequent U.S. credit rating downgrade on August 5, 2011 were only the tip of the iceberg. In fact, the United States faces a historic fiscal crisis.

As of 2012, the majority of new federal government debt will stem from interest on existing debt. Treasury bond issues totaled $2.55 trillion in 2010, roughly 2x the federal budget deficit of $1.3 trillion. Artificially low U.S. Treasury bond yields, created by the Federal Reserve's quantitative easing (QE1 and QE2) programs and by its current "Operation Twist," only slow the rate at which the federal debt balloons.

The U.S. federal government's fast growing debt is $14.94 trillion, approximately 100% of GDP. Additionally, future liabilities total $66.6 trillion based on generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP accounting) and using official data from the Medicare and Social Security annual reports and from the audited financial report of the federal government.

Medicare: $24.8 trillion
Social Security: $21.4 trillion
Federal debt: $10.2 trillion* (not including intra-governmental obligations)
State, local government obligations: $5.2 trillion
Military retirement/disability benefits: $3.6 trillion
Federal employee retirement benefits: $2 trillion

The eventual insolvency of the U.S. federal government cannot be averted through any combination of taxes, budget cuts or realistic GDP growth. Inflationary policies, i.e., increasing deficit spending by the federal government and debt monetization by the Federal Reserve, would devalue the U.S. dollar and potentially trigger a hyperinflationary collapse of the currency. To stave off the inevitable, interim measures might include tax increases, exchange controls, nationalization of pension funds or other measures similar to those taken in 3rd world countries.

Dominant Corporate Influence

In a 2009 radio interview on Elmhurst, Illinois' WJJG 1530 AM, Senator Dick Durbin (D-Ill.) explained that "...the banks-hard to believe in a time when we're facing a banking crisis that many of the banks created-are still the most powerful lobby on Capitol Hill. And they frankly own the place." Senator Durbin was unequivocal in saying that the federal government of the United States is controlled by banks. Simon Johnson, former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), had reached the same conclusion one month earlier in his widely read article The Quiet Coup. Johnson explained that the finance industry had effectively captured the U.S. government, a state of affairs typical of 3rd world countries.

Corporate influence over the political process, as well as over the tax and regulatory policies of the United States, is at an all time high. The federal government is the largest single customer in the U.S. economy and, through taxation or regulation, the government can grant or deny market access to private companies and can either prevent or mandate the consumption of their products and services. As a result, virtually every large corporation in the United States seeks to win the government's business and to steer government tax policies and regulations in their favor. Naturally, politicians who accede to the wishes of particular corporations are given campaign funds to ensure their reelection. In the past decade, the amount of money spent on lobbying has more than doubled and there are currently 24 lobbyists for every 1 member of Congress.

The interdependence of elected officials and the largest U.S. corporations reached a new high with the 2008 bank bailouts. The influence of private corporations and de facto industrial cartels (comprising the largest corporations in each major industry) over tax and regulatory policies creates significant economic distortions that ultimately compromise the sustainability and the stability of the economy. Ideally, the government would be an impartial referee, rather than an active business partner that overwhelmingly favors large businesses over small businesses, despite the fact that small businesses account for the vast majority of American jobs.

Impact on the Rule of Law

Corruption, cronyism and weak rule of law are typical of 3rd world countries. The United States exhibits a clear corporate influence over elections and legislation and, arguably, relatively little law enforcement action where large, legally well-equipped corporations are concerned. Reports of so-called crony capitalism have appeared in the U.S. news media, but the term "corruption" has been avoided, along with discussion of fundamental reforms.

A cursory examination of legal developments over roughly the past decade evidences a pattern in which U.S. federal law systematically favors the largest financial institutions, as well as a paradigm in which financial institutions heavily influence both the regulations that putatively govern their activities and the laws that apply to consumers of their products and services. The financial crisis that began in 2008 and the subsequent response of the federal government appear to follow logically from prior legislative events:

1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLB). The Act repealed key provisions of the Banking Act of 1933, commonly known as the Glass-Steagall Act. In the aftermath of the Great Depression, the Glass-Steagall Act prevented depository institutions from engaging in high risk financial speculation.
2000 The Commodity Futures Modernization Act (CFMA). The Act deregulated over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, such as credit default swaps, referred to by Warren Buffett as "financial weapons of mass destruction." OTC derivatives were at the heart of the financial crisis that began in 2008 and are the root cause of the "too big to fail" doctrine. The Act preempted state gaming laws that had prevented banks from speculating in OTC derivatives with no connection to underlying assets.
2001 USA PATRIOT Act. The financial provisions of the Act allow banks to collect additional financial information about account holders, for example, linking business accounts to the personal financial records of business owners, thus weakening both financial privacy and the corporate veil. The Act enhances the ability of creditors to collect and allows federal authorities to monitor financial transactions and to obtain financial records without a subpoena.
2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA). The Act, which was sponsored by banks and credit card companies, effectively eliminated the concept of a "fresh start" by allowing banks and credit card companies to engage in collections activities, in effect, forever. As a result, small business owners who end in bankruptcy are less likely to ever start another business. The Act places banks in front of bankruptcy courts, creates liabilities for bankruptcy attorneys and contains many widely criticized, anti-consumer provisions.
2008 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act. The Act, commonly referred to as a "bank bailout," authorized the United States Secretary of the Treasury to spend $700 billion to purchase distressed assets, especially mortgage-backed securities (MBS). Instead, the funds were given to foreign and domestic banks to offset their risky MBS, OTC derivatives and other losses. The bank bailout set a precedent of socializing losses but keeping gains private. The Act effectively bound the fate of the U.S. Treasury to that of the largest U.S. financial institutions.
2010 Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. The Supreme Court of the United States held that corporate funding of independent political broadcasts in candidate elections cannot be limited under the First Amendment, overruling prior case law and guaranteeing the ability of corporations to influence elections without meaningful restrictions. The Court's decision gave carte blanche to corporations to influence elections, legitimized the interdependence of elected officials and large corporations and created a precedent under which the rights of corporations supersede those of citizens.
2010 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The Act failed to restore critical provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act, significantly regulate OTC derivatives, break up "too big to fail" banks, prevent another financial crisis and prevent further bailouts. The Act created a Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, but did not repeal any provision of BAPCPA or restore the financial privacy of U.S. citizens removed by the USA PATRIOT Act. The Act failed to provide adequate funding to the government's watchdogs, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), potentially hobbling enforcement. The Act has also been criticized for the burden it places on smaller competitors in the financial sector, which could ultimately result in an increased concentration of financial power in "too big to fail" banks.

Critics have alleged that, underlying the sub-prime mortgage meltdown that triggered the financial crisis in 2008 was rampant fraud. Fraud has been alleged at virtually every level from the assessment of property values and credit risk; to the loans themselves and to their securitization as MBS assets; to the ratings of MBS assets as AAA; to hedging or betting against MBS assets in the OTC derivatives market (perhaps including financial firms allegedly betting against MBS assets that they themselves created and sold to clients as AAA assets). After the crisis, a seeming pattern of fraud continued apparently unabated in the robo-signing foreclosure scandal where documents submitted to courts were falsified. Despite an avalanche of alleged crimes under existing federal law, no firm or individual of any significance in the financial crisis has yet been prosecuted.

President Barack Obama said in October 2011 that the mortgage finance practices leading to the economic meltdown were "immoral, inappropriate and reckless ... but not necessarily illegal." Since fraud is, in fact, illegal, critics claim that the U.S. federal government has simply failed to enforce the law. Adding fuel to the fire, the Solyndra loan scandal could be construed to suggest corruption at high levels and the MF Global debacle could be construed as indicative of weak regulation and law enforcement and even of questionable market integrity.

In theory, selective enforcement of the law risks the creation of two sets of laws: one for big banks and corporations, and for their executives, i.e., those with connections in Washington D.C. or on Wall Street, and one for everyone else. Among other things, failure to enforce the law could create an environment in which crime pays, but, for ordinary citizens, hard work, prudent financial decision making, saving and investing for the long term do not.

More than any other aspect of America's progression towards 3rd world status, the federal government's low level of law enforcement action where "too big to fail" banks are concerned is perhaps the most insidious because it raises questions of legitimacy and of the social contract. A financial and legal system of moral hazard implies that victims face double jeopardy while they are deprived of legal recourse, i.e., those allegedly defrauded might face inflation and tax burdens stemming from preferential treatment of favored corporations or from further bailouts.

Destructive Tax Policies

In the face of rising government debt, the rapidly shrinking American middle class is the primary target of the U.S. federal government's tax policies. The eventual extinction of the American middle class would be a key milestone along the road to 3rd world status. Current U.S. tax policies favor the largest corporations and this is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. Although tax increases exacerbate economic downturns, several tax options have been or are being discussed. However, none of them are likely to be put in place.

Increasing taxes on corporate profits would result in job losses in the short term and would affect dividends and share prices in the stock market. Lower dividends or share prices would affect pension funds, including government pension funds.
Increasing taxes on capital gains would impact the non-tax-exempt investments of the now retiring "baby boomer" generation and would reduce capital formation thus reducing investment in new businesses or business expansion and hampering job growth.
Increasing payroll taxes would cause companies to downsize resulting in job losses and would have a chilling effect on hiring.
A Value Added Tax (VAT) is impractical in the United States because countless special taxes already exist at all levels of the supply chain. To prevent unpredictable, disruptive consequences, implementing a VAT would require years of study and comprehensive tax reform.
A national sales tax is undesirable because it would overlap and interfere with already existing state sales taxes, which are highly inconsistent across states.
Carbon taxes remain possible but they would encumber businesses and result in job losses or reduce hiring.

Chief among the remaining possibilities is the income tax but, according to the Tax Policy center at the Urban Institute, Brookings Institution, 46% of American households will pay no federal income tax in 2011. The reasons include income tax exemptions for subsistence level income, dependents and nontaxable tax expenditures for senior citizens and low-income working families with children.

Assuming that big banks, multinational corporations and the wealthiest 1% of Americans remain off limits in terms of tax policy, the range of income taxed is likely to widen from the current tax on households earning more than $250,000 per year to progressively lower income levels. In fact, the government's intended revenue source is precisely what remains of the once much larger middle class: professionals, small business owners and dual income families in urban areas, etc. These are the households that have managed to stay ahead of inflation, declining real wages and falling household incomes.

Among other things, U.S. tax policies will erode capital formation within the remnants of the middle class, which is the engine of small business creation and the source of most American jobs. The eventual result will be a three-tier socioeconomic structure consisting of a super rich wealthy class, a much poorer working class and a massive, politically and financially disenfranchised underclass, similar to that of a 3rd world country.

Via Dolorosa

The United States increasingly resembles a 3rd world country in terms of unemployment, lack of economic opportunity, falling wages, growing poverty and concentration of wealth, government debt, corporate influence over government and weakening rule of law. Federal Reserve monetary policies and federal government economic, regulatory and tax policies seem to favor the largest banks and corporations over the interests of small businesses or of the general population. The potential elimination of the middle class could reshape the socioeconomic strata of American society in the image of a 3rd world country. It seems only a matter of time before the devolution of the United States becomes more visible. As the U.S. economy continues to decline, public health, nutrition and education, as well as the country's infrastructure, will visibly deteriorate. There is little evidence of political will or leadership for fundamental reforms. All other things being equal, the U.S. will become a post industrial neo-3rd-world country by 2032.

How the U.S. Will Become a 3rd World Country (Part 1)

Ron Hera — Sun, 01 Jul 2012 19:44:00 GMT

The United States is increasingly similar to a 3rd world county in several ways and is accelerating towards 3rd world status. Economic data indicate a harsh reality that obviates mainstream political debate. The evidence suggests that, without fundamental reforms, the U.S. will become a post industrial neo-3rd-world country by 2032.

Fundamental characteristics that define a 3rd world country include high unemployment, lack of economic opportunity, low wages, widespread poverty, extreme concentration of wealth, unsustainable government debt, control of the government by international banks and multinational corporations, weak rule of law and counterproductive government policies. All of these characteristics are evident in the U.S. today.

Other factors include poor public health, nutrition and education, as well as lack of infrastructure. Public health and nutrition in the U.S., while below European standards, stand well above those of 3rd world countries. American public education now ranks behind poorer countries, like Estonia, but remains superior to that of 3rd world countries. While crumbling infrastructure can be seen in cities across America, the vast infrastructure of the United States cannot be compared to a 3rd world country. However, all of these factors will rapidly deteriorate in a declining economy.

Unemployment and Lack of Economic Opportunity

Unemployment, which is a deep, structural problem in the U.S., is a fundamental challenge to economic opportunity. The U.S. labor market is in a long-term downward trend linked to globalization, i.e., offshoring of manufacturing, outsourcing of jobs and deindustrialization.

The U.S. workforce has declined by approximately 6.5% since its year 2000 peak to roughly 58.2% of working age adults and the U.S. now suffers chronic unemployment of 9.1%. Although the workforce grew in the 1980s and 1990s, as dual income families became the norm, the size of the workforce is shrinking due to a lack of economic opportunity.

Officially, long-term unemployment is 16.5% and the ranks of the long-term unemployed (those jobless for 27 weeks and over) include 5.9 million, 42.4% of those unemployed. However, prior to the Clinton administration, unemployment measures included workers who are now no longer counted as part of the workforce. Using the more accurate pre-Clinton criteria, unemployment exceeds 22%, only 3% below the worst point (24.9%) of the Great Depression. For countries with populations greater than 2 million, Macedonia leads the world with 33.8% unemployment, followed by Armenia at 28.6%, Algeria at 27.3% and the West Bank and the Gaza Strip both at 25.7%.

Compounding the unemployment problem is the fact that an entire generation of young Americans is being left behind in terms of economic opportunity. Student loans exceed $1 trillion while the labor force participation rate for those aged 16 to 29 who are working or looking for work fell to 48.8% in 2011, the lowest level ever recorded. Lack of economic opportunity among the youth, including millions of unemployed college graduates, is a political wildcard reminiscent of countries like Tunisia.

The structural decline of the U.S. labor market will continue as American workers are merged into a global labor pool in which they cannot yet directly compete for jobs with workers in countries like China and India. In China, for example, gross pay, in terms of purchasing power parity, is equivalent to approximately $514 per month, 57% below the U.S. poverty line. According to the Economic Policy Institute, the U.S. trade deficit with China alone caused a loss of 2.8 million U.S. jobs since 2001.

Falling Real Wages and Household Incomes

Workers earning more dollars are actually poorer in terms of purchasing power when the cost of living rises faster than wages,. In fact, if household income is adjusted for inflation, most American families have grown significantly poorer over the past ten years. In 2010, for example, real median household income fell 2.3%. Although the average wage has risen steadily in nominal terms, dwindling purchasing power is a reality for most Americans. When adjusted for inflation, the wages of most Americans have not kept up with the Consumer Price Index (CPI).

According to famed economist Milton Friedman, "inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon." In other words, prices rise when the money supply is increased faster than population or sustainable economic activity. Apparent economic growth created through credit expansion, i.e., by increasing the money supply, has a temporary stimulative effect but also causes prices to rise. True Money Supply is an accurate measure of inflation.

Although CPI is sufficient to illustrate declining real wages, CPI does not measure the cost of living in a realistic way. According to economist John Williams of Shadow Government Statistics, CPI systematically understates inflation.

The decline in real household income has set Americans back to 1996 levels, despite many households now having two incomes rather than one. Dual income families accounted for much of the increase in real median household income during the 1980s and 1990s, but, today, two incomes are barely better than one income was three decades ago. The decline in real wages was obfuscated in the 1980s and 1990s by growth in the workforce, e.g., by women entering the workforce. Real median household income rose while real wages declined because more households had two incomes. As U.S. wages and household income continue to fall in real terms, both poverty and reliance on government assistance programs will continue to rise.

Growing Poverty

According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the poverty rate in the United States rose to 15.7% in 2011, with 47.8 million Americans living in poverty (1 in 6). The official poverty line, determined by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, is $22,314 for a family of four. The number of families living in poverty has risen sharply since 2006 and continues to climb. The U.S. Department of Agriculture's Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), commonly known as "food stamps," serves 45.8 million households as of May 2011. The program now feeds 1 in 8 Americans and nearly 1 in 4 children.

Based on the outlook for employment and wages, both poverty and reliance on government assistance programs will continue to grow. However, the negative trends in employment, wages and poverty have not affected all Americans equally. In fact, the household income and wealth of the wealthiest Americans has increased sharply, despite the overall deterioration of the U.S. economy.

Increasing Concentration of Wealth

Alan Greenspan, former Chairman of the Federal Reserve, warned that, "Ultimately, we are interested in the question of relative standards of living and ... trends in the distribution of wealth, which, more fundamentally than earnings or income, represents a measure of the ability of households to consume." In other words, concentration of wealth undermines the consumer base of the economy, causing GDP to decline and resulting in unemployment, which reduces living standards. Obviously, the total wealth of society is reduced when wealth is highly concentrated because there is a lower overall level of economic activity.

Economic data from several sources, including the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), show that wealth and income in the United States have become increasingly concentrated with the wealthiest 1% of Americans owning 38.2% of stock market assets, e.g., shares of businesses. For the wealthiest 1% of Americans, household income tripled between 1979 and 2007 and has continued to increase while household wealth in the United States has fallen by $7.7 trillion. The Gini Coefficient illustrates the growing disparity in income distribution. In terms of the Gini Coefficient, the United States is now at parity with China and will soon overtake Mexico, a still developing country. It should be noted, of course, that the U.S. remains a far wealthier country overall. If the current trend continues, however, the U.S. will resemble a 3rd world country, in terms of the disparity in income distribution, in approximately two decades, i.e., by 2032.

Welcome to the 3rd World

The United States is quickly becoming a post industrial neo-3rd-world country. Partly as a consequence of worsening unemployment and lack of economic opportunity, falling real wages and household incomes, growing poverty and increasing concentration of wealth, the U.S. government faces a historic fiscal crisis. Dominant corporate influence over the U.S. government, particularly by large banks, weakening rule of law at the federal level and destructive tax policies are compounding the economic problems facing the United States. Barring fundamental reforms or a hyperinflationary collapse of the U.S. dollar (due to the fiscal problems of the U.S. government), the deterioration of the U.S. economy will continue and accelerate. As the U.S. economy continues its decline, public health, nutrition and education, as well as the country's infrastructure, will visibly deteriorate and the 3rd world status of the United States will become apparent.

Interview: Eric Sprott on Gold and QE2

Ron Hera — Mon, 18 Oct 2010 09:23:00 GMT

The Hera Research Newsletter (HRN) is pleased to present the following exclusive interview with Eric Sprott, Chairman, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Investment Officer of Sprott Asset Management LP and Chairman and CEO of Sprott Money, Ltd. With over 35 years of experience in the investment industry, Mr. Sprott is the Senior Portfolio Manager for numerous funds comprising several billion dollars in assets.

After earning his designation as a chartered accountant, Eric entered the investment industry as a research analyst at Merrill Lynch. In 1981, he founded Sprott Securities (now called Cormark Securities Inc.), which today is one of Canada’s largest independently owned securities firms. After establishing Sprott Asset Management Inc. in December 2001 as a separate entity, Eric divested his entire ownership of Sprott Securities to its employees.

Eric’s investment abilities are well represented by his track record in managing the Sprott Hedge Fund L.P., Sprott Hedge Fund L.P. II, Sprott Bull/Bear RSP Fund, Sprott Offshore Funds, Sprott Canadian Equity Fund, Sprott Energy Fund and Sprott Managed Accounts. In December 2004, the Sprott Hedge Fund L.P. was awarded the Opportunistic Strategy Hedge Fund Award at the Canadian Investment Awards. In addition, the Sprott Offshore Fund Ltd. won the 2006 MarHedge Annual Performance Award under the Canada-Based Manager category. Furthermore, in October 2006, Eric was the recipient of the 2006 Ernst & Young Entrepreneur of the Year Award (Financial Services) and the 2006 Ernst & Young Entrepreneur of the Year for Ontario. In December 2007, Eric was named Fund Manager of the Year by Investment Executive, a widely circulated publication for Canadian financial advisers. In October 2008, the Sprott Offshore Fund Ltd. won the award for the Best Long/Short Hedge Fund globally by HFM Week, a leading publication for the global hedge fund industry.

Eric’s predictions on the state of the North American financial markets have been captured throughout the last several years in a series of investment strategy articles entitled “Markets At A Glance”.

Hera Research Newsletter (HRN): Thank you for taking the time to talk to us today. You’ve commented in your articles and elsewhere that the financial problems of the United States are much more serious than one might imagine based on the official statements of the US government.

Eric Sprott: The situation goes back at least to 2000 when we saw the Nasdaq rolling over. Before it rolled over, we’d written about it, in fact, we almost to the day published an article entitled “Speculation is Rampant, Don’t be a Part of It”. From that point on, I’ve believed we’re in a secular bear market. The Nasdaq certainly has been in a secular bear market since then. Somehow they resurrected the S&P and the Dow but in order to do it they had to start a housing mania and a lending mania and now, a government spending mania. We still think that the situation peaked in 2000 and continues today in a secular bear market, but it’s morphing into a bigger problem.

HRN: What is the bigger problem?

Eric Sprott: The bigger problem that we have today is where the sovereign risk stands and the size of the US deficit and I think that the question today is “Does Keynesianism work?” In other words, if you spend money it’s supposed to stimulate your economy, but there have been a number of reports suggesting that the opposite happens, that you get a negative return for government spending. One study was done in Canada by the Fraser Institute and another was done by three Harvard professors and their conclusions were that government spending was not good for private enterprises, period. You can see this if you look at a chart showing the marginal value of each dollar spent by the US government from 1960 to today.

HRN: Do you mean the marginal return on a dollar of debt?

Eric Sprott: The marginal value of government expenditures, yes, debt, essentially the deficit spending. The economic effect of running deficits is now something like negative 40 cents on the dollar. I think Keynesianism is sort of being stood on its ear and it seems quite likely that there is a negative return on deficit spending. For example, if the US government extended unemployment insurance benefits yet again, what do we all think the people receiving unemployment benefits would do? Would they be rushing out to get a job or not rushing out to get a job? You see, deficit spending almost always works against the system. When I look at US GDP, which I think last year probably went up by $400 billion, but, at the end of the day, there was an extra debt of $1.5 trillion and this year it will probably go up by the same amount, any thinking person would realize that if you tack on $3 trillion of debt and you’ve got less than $1 trillion of GDP growth, that’s a formula for bankruptcy.

^{Chart courtesy of} ^{Nathan A. Martin}

HRN: Are you saying government stimulus doesn’t work because debt rises faster than GDP?

Eric Sprott: Yes, it doesn’t work. I’m not even including debt at the state and municipal levels. I’m just using federal debt. Debt at other levels of government in the US is going up too, but not at the rate the federal government debt is increasing.

HRN: What sort of outcome or endgame do you foresee?

Eric Sprott: A few months ago, I wrote an article entitled “Surreality Check Part Two… Dead Government Walking” where I specifically zeroed in on the US government. When I wrote Surreality Check … Dead Men Walking back in November of 2007, I predicted that some companies—I pointed out Citigroup, GM, Fannie, Freddie—were all broke. They had pretty good market caps at the time, but the reality was that they were broke and I think the reality is that the US government is broke. If you take all of the unfunded liabilities—the number is something like $60 trillion or $100 trillion—there’s absolutely no way that it can be repaid. They’re going to have to repudiate some obligation, just as other governments are doing now. For example, the UK and France and maybe even Germany all extended the number of years you have to work before you get a pension. There is a sense of repudiation of what they promised and that will have to happen in the US as well.

HRN: Is debt monetization a repudiation of debt?

Eric Sprott: All of history says we shouldn’t trust government, so why do we trust the money that the government says is worth something when the history of governments is one broken promise after another? The only thing they’ve done, over the last 90 years or so, is to keep gouging the taxpayer, while at the same time racking up increasing debt. There’s very little responsibility at the government level for the financial well being of a country in the long run. Fiat money will all go back to its intrinsic value, which is zero. You need real things to support the valuation of currencies. I find it absolutely shocking that we trust government.

HRN: Since you expect fiat currencies to fall in value, do you also expect real assets to rise in price?

Eric Sprott: I think it depends on the class of the real asset and what determines its value. For example, I always question real estate because a lot of real estate is so indebted. If people have to pay their debts back you can have real estate going down, even though you might be in QE2 or QE3 by the time, because there’s just not enough cash flow being generated. I think of things like agricultural products, oil and gas. I think of things that can be used as a medium of exchange, such as gold and probably silver, or maybe other precious metals but that’s the category I think is the most survivable in terms of holding its value.

HRN: Is that why you’ve invested in precious metals and gold in particular, to survive the bear market?

Eric Sprott: My history with gold goes back to about 2000 when things were bottoming out there and, in fact, coincided with our belief that we were going into a bear market. When you look at any bear market, you think “How do you survive it?” We’ve thought ‘you’ve got to have gold and gold stocks’ and it’s worked out so beautifully that it’s shocking. To think that the markets over the last 10 years are down and gold is up something like 500% and gold stocks are up something like 1200% from their lows. That’s been the place to be.

HRN: It seems a lot of money is flowing into the Sprott Physical Gold Trust (NYSE:PHYS).

Eric Sprott: As it applies to US residents, the tax rate on a capital gain in the Sprott Physical Gold Trust is 15% today whereas if you own the ETF, because gold is considered a collectible by the IRS, the tax rate is 28%. That’s a big reason for people to choose this vehicle versus an ETF. In addition to the tax benefits for US investors, the gold is held at the Royal Canadian Mint in Ottawa and to some people in the US that’s a good thing, because they’d like to see it out of the country. Also, the trustee is not a levered financial institution. The trustees for the gold and silver ETFs are levered financial institutions and therefore, when you have leverage there’s always potential risk. Of course, the reason we started it was that a lot of people realized there’s so much paper gold around that when you go to claim your gold it’s not going to be there.

HRN: I understand there’s a premium of between 5% and 10% for shares in PHYS over the spot price of gold.

Eric Sprott: We wanted people to be able to literally get their physical gold, so there’s a mechanism where, if you can buy a bar, which is 400 ounces, we will deliver it. The physical quality of it—the knowledge that the gold is there—in addition to the tax advantages, creates the premium. I think it’s justified. There are certainly no other North American vehicles where you can get physical gold. That’s why we created this vehicle.

HRN: So, there’s a level of insurance that’s just not there with ETFs like GLD. Do you view gold purely as insurance or do you also view gold as currency?

Eric Sprott: When I first got involved in gold, I came to the conclusion, based on Frank Veneroso’s book, The Gold Book Annual 1998 (Jefferson Financial, 1998), that the gold market was being suppressed by central banks and that that logjam had to break. Veneroso proved that there were sellers of about 400 tons a year. Given enough time, their willingness to sell gold had to run out. Now we are in a situation where central banks, which used to be sellers of gold, have become buyers of gold. The gold market is very small. The mines produce, let’s say, 2,600 tons per year and the central banks used to sell 400 tons. That’s a lot of tons in a 2,600 ton a year market. Now, central banks are buyers of probably 200 tons or more. I think the World Gold Council estimated that central banks bought as much as 400 tons last year. Imagine a shift of going from a seller of 400 to a buyer of 400 in a mine supplied market of 2,600 tons. Where are all of the normal users of gold going to get gold with this huge change at the central bank level?

HRN: It’s curious that central banks would have sold gold as the price was declining and are now buying when the price is rising.

Eric Sprott: Now we have gold ETFs, that didn’t even exist 10 years ago, and they are now among the largest owners of gold in the world. There are also funds like ours and Paulson & Co. or David Einhorn’s fund, Greenlight Capital, as well as various pension funds that now own gold but that never owned gold 10 years ago. Where are these funds getting all of their gold when they weren’t even part of the supply and demand equation 10 years ago? I wonder where all of this gold is coming from. I’ve always been suspicious that it’s surreptitiously coming out of the central banks.

HRN: Central banks manage the exchange rates of currencies, which is no secret. If gold is still treated as a currency, the gold exchange rate might be managed, as it was under the London Gold Pool.

Eric Sprott: Central banks can also influence bond markets, and not just government bonds. Last year the US Federal Reserve bought $1.2 trillion worth of mortgage backed securities.

HRN: That was a huge injection of liquidity.

Eric Sprott: We’ve had a huge shot in the arm both in the financial markets and in the fiscal markets, but we took on huge debts as well. The hand of government in everything has been unbelievable and what do we have to show for it as we sit here today? We’ve seen the economic data fall off a cliff: retail sales, new home sales, consumer confidence, the Baltic Dry Index, the Chinese stock market index. I mean, the things that have fallen off the table have been so dramatic and over such a short time.

^{Chart courtesy of} ^{InvestmentTools.com}

HRN: We’re not seeing much of a recovery in the US.

Eric Sprott: In some of the data you’re seeing, no recovery. Housing, for example, is at a dead, flat bottom. I expect that car sales are going to start doing the same thing. In fact, we’re going negative right now: the leading economic indicators, the ECRI Index, I mean everything. You’ve got to think we’re just going straight down, not even slowly.

HRN: You mentioned the heavy hand of government in these massive interventions.

Eric Sprott: The conclusive evidence is that when governments get involved with things, the impact is negative because you get a misuse of funds. It’s like the Fed goes in and buys a bunch of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) so the housing market stays together but if they stop, the housing market collapses because it was a misallocation of resources. We should not have been encouraging people to be buying houses. We should have been doing the opposite: saving money. We have to learn to save here both at the individual level, the corporate level and at the government level. The government is giving all the wrong signals, they’re getting the wrong people to do exactly the wrong things and it makes the problem that much bigger.

HRN: Would it be fair to say that, in your view, central planning and the economy is just sort of an ineffective strategy?

Eric Sprott: You know, I think we’d all agree when we hear that statement. Central planning doesn’t work, but then when it comes to our own government, all they want to do is centrally plan even though they don’t think they’re centrally planning, but, by god, they are. The US government is saying that to make the economy go they’re going to run a trillion and a half dollar deficit. If that’s not central planning, I don’t know what it is.

HRN: I think the US national debt is expected to reach $20 trillion. Do you think the US is going to be able to borrow and roll over debt at those levels?

Eric Sprott: Where does the money come from? Theoretically, the money has to come from companies or individuals. If we just took one country and said that they should fund themselves from the earnings of companies and savings of individuals and if there were no way, between the individuals and the companies, that they had the money every year to throw into government, it wouldn’t work. The US government funded itself with debt all of last year and certainly into March of this year. The thinking is that between the Fed buying financial assets in the market and the banks buying government debt and not lending, that they’ve been able to fund the government, but we’re going to find that it’s not sustainable. The process of asking people to be indebted to the tune of a trillion and a half dollars per year just at the federal level is impossible; and to do it several years in a row with the growing legacy of the debt is not sustainable. What if interest rates were where they really should be?

HRN: Do you think that, with a weakening dollar, the real interest rate could be negative right now?

Eric Sprott: This 0% interest rate policy, 20 years from now, will be looked at as one of the biggest financial jokes of all time. Of course, the primary beneficiaries are the banks and the government. Banks can borrow for nothing and the government can borrow for next to nothing, but the true interest rate should be much higher. I mean, what’s the point of saving? You’re asking somebody to save to fund the deficit and then you pay them nothing to save. What’s the point? You get nothing for your savings. Why would people save?

HRN: With a second round of quantitative easing, QE2, do you think there could be a loss of confidence in US government debt or in the US dollar?

Eric Sprott: We have a dilemma staring us in the face and I don’t see an easy way out of it. People will start questioning sovereign risk. It started with Ireland; it went to Iceland; it went to Greece; it’s maybe now with Portugal or Spain and it might be washing up on the shores of North America. As you know, the dollar has been quite weak recently and I think, as more and more people assess the problem, they’ll find that there aren’t many safe sovereign places to go. There just aren’t many. They’re very, very rare. Either there will be no QE2 and interest rates will go higher, or, if there is a QE2, interest rates can stay low, but ultimately, if we then go on to QE3 or QE4, the gig will be up because everyone will realize we’re just printing money and we’re not getting out of this problem. If we’re just printing and printing and printing, people will want to convert their bank deposits to something real because they’ll realize that fiat money is not going to hold its value.

HRN: What do you see as a solution here? What’s the path forward for the world?

Eric Sprott: I don’t think there’s a solution. People always say to me, “When would you not be bearish?” I say, “Well, I won’t be bearish when I see people in the central banking community and in the sovereign area start to take responsibility.” One might argue that maybe we’ve seen the first signs of that over in Europe and the UK and Greece with austerity. What’s interesting is that most of these programs start a year later. They don’t start today. It will be interesting to see when we get there, how powerful those programs will be.

HRN: Are the European austerity measures indirect bailouts, preserving sovereign debt?

Eric Sprott: That’s why they announce them. We saw QE with the ECB when they put a trillion dollars in for the Greek bailout. If they hadn’t announced austerity programs what would we all be thinking? You can’t get the bailout and not at least say you’re going to try to stop spending money. It was almost mandatory for people to say at the time. They all had to chime in because the Euro and the European banking system were under immense pressure. Deposits were leaving those countries, so they had to do something.

HRN: How do you foresee the sovereign debt situation unwinding?

Eric Sprott: I think we’re too far gone. There’s way too much debt. Just the federal debt is something like $40,000 for every American, so a family of four has got $160,000 in debt they’ve got to lug around; and that’s forgetting the states. I don’t think we can work our way out of it. We’ve gone for 60 years by expanding debt and, all of a sudden, that era ends and you have a contraction and the contraction will be rather elongated.

HRN: Thank you for sharing your views with us.

Eric Sprott: Thanks a lot.

After Words

Eric Sprott’s track record as a Portfolio Manager and as an entrepreneur in the natural resource sector speaks for itself. Whether one agrees with Eric Sprott’s skepticism regarding the fiscal responsibility of governments, the soundness of fiat currencies, or the stability of debt-laden companies and sovereigns, his contrarian analysis has enabled him to capitalize on the trade of the decade: gold. Between the anemic US economy, the Federal Reserve’s low interest rates and purchases of financial assets, as well as the US federal government’s deficits, and a second round of quantitative easing (QE2), the US dollar will certainly weaken further, fueling demand for gold.

Interview: Dr. Marc Faber on the Federal Reserve and Hyperinflation

Ron Hera — Fri, 24 Sep 2010 00:07:00 GMT

The Hera Research Newsletter (HRN) is delighted to present the following powerful interview with noted speaker and best selling author Dr. Marc Faber, whose newsletter, The Gloom Boom & Doom Report, highlights unusual investment opportunities. Dr. Faber is a popular speaker at investment seminars and conferences around the world and is best known for his contrarian investment approach.

Born in Zurich, Switzerland, Dr. Faber went to school in Geneva and Zurich and finished high school with the Matura. He studied Economics at the University of Zurich and, at the age of 24, obtained a PhD in Economics magna cum laude.

Between 1970 and 1978, Dr. Faber worked for White Weld & Company Limited in New York, Zurich and Hong Kong and, since 1973, has lived in Hong Kong. From 1978 to February 1990, he was the Managing Director of Drexel Burnham Lambert (HK) Ltd.

Dr. Faber’s best selling book Tomorrow’s Gold – Asia's Age of Discovery has been translated into Japanese, Chinese, Korean, Thai and German. Dr. Faber is a regular contributor to several leading financial publications around the world.

Dr. Faber, who is an investment adviser and fund manager associated with a variety of funds, is a member of the Board of Directors of numerous companies around the world.

Hera Research Newsletter (HRN): Thank you for joining us today. You’ve commented that the Federal Reserve’s policies have been linked to past boom and bust cycles in the US economy. Why do you believe that?

Dr. Marc Faber: Booms and busts happen also under the gold standard like we had in the 19th century various railroad and canal booms, and we also had real estate booms, first on the east coast in Chicago, then, at end of the century, in California. What the Federal Reserve has really done is create a lot of economic volatility. If you look back at the various crisis starting with the S&L crisis in 1990, then the Tequila crisis [the Mexican Peso crisis] in 1994, then Long Term Capital Management (LTCM), the NASDAQ bubble and at the current crisis, each crisis actually became worse and worse and the bubbles became bigger and bigger. The Federal Reserve did not pay any attention to excessive credit growth. The reason I am so negative about the Federal Reserve’s policies is that they only target core inflation and argue that they can’t identify bubbles, but when each bubble bursts they flood the system with liquidity that bring about unintended consequences.

HRN: What would be an example of that?

Dr. Marc Faber: Commodity prices peaked in May 2006 and after May 2006, especially in 2007, where there was actually a slowdown in the global economy and so there was no reason for commodity prices to go ballistic, but the Federal Reserve slashed interest rates after September 2007. In a global economy that was going into recession, the price of oil went from $78 to $147 and that burdened the US consumer with additional “tax” of five hundred billion dollars. I am not saying that is the only reason but it helped push the US consumer into recession. The fact is that without the Federal Reserve’s expansionary monetary policy after 2001, we wouldn't have had a housing bubble to the same extent. The Federal Reserve’s policies basically encouraged sub prime lending; it’s not the case that they discouraged it.

HRN: Is there a relationship between monetary expansion and the fact that the US economy depends so heavily on consumption?

Dr. Marc Faber: Basically, if you look at consumption as a percent of the economy and at housing activity, the excessive debt growth began essentially after LTCM and, I have to say, it was a huge mistake of the Treasury and Fed to bailout LTCM because it gave Market participants in the financial sector a signal that there is a Greenspan put, and later on a Bernanke put, with an even higher strike price and this resulted in excess leverage. So, if you have problems, the Federal Reserve will bail you out or the system will bail you out. That’s where I think the Federal Reserve acted irresponsibly—irresponsibly—that has to be said very clearly. They didn't pay attention to credit growth. Every central banker in the world pays attention to credit growth, but not in the US.

HRN: What would you recommend that the Federal Reserve do differently?

Dr. Marc Faber: The first action Mr. Bernanke should take is to resign. If I had messed up the system so badly, as he has done, I would have to resign. He has talked constantly about the Great Depression and what caused the depression but the problem is that he really doesn't understand what caused the depression, which was also excessive leverage at that time. I have to stress that in 1929 the debt to GDP ratio was of course minuscule in comparison what it is today. It was 186% of GDP but you didn't have Social security, Medicare and Medicaid and unfunded liabilities for Social Security and so forth. So, debt today, as a percent of GDP, is 379% and if you add the unfunded liabilities we are at over 800%. The Federal Reserve should pay attention to that.

HRN: With debt levels and liabilities so high, what solution is there for the United States?

Dr. Marc Faber: The solution is, basically, for the government to move out and not intervene in the economy. There are economists who will dispute that the Federal Reserve is partially responsible for the crisis and there are economists that will still tell you that debt doesn’t matter, that deficits don't matter and they want to continue to intervene in the free market constantly. To these economists I respond: What about Fanny Mae and Freddy Mac? It was an intervention by the government into the housing market and into the mortgage market and the biggest bankruptcies—bigger than Citigroup and all the banks—are Fanny Mae and Freddy Mac—government-sponsored enterprises. The same economists will tell you that the government has to intervene and to these economists I say: Well, you have made so many mistakes already with interventions do you think that in the future your interventions will improve anything? Einstein defined insanity as doing the same thing over and over and expecting different results, but these economists and the Federal Reserve think that by more interventions with fiscal measures and more money printing they will improve things. No, they won’t. They will make things worse.

HRN: It seems the US is moving towards more government intervention into the free market rather than less.

Dr. Marc Faber: Yes. That’s why I’m very negative about economic growth in the US. It just won’t happen. Can the US economy grow at 2% per annum or, in the best case scenario, at 3% per annum with current policies? Yes, but it will create a lot of distortions. The best case for an economy that goes into a boom phase, in other words over consumption, is to bring it back into the trend line as quickly as possible. So when you have an excursion into a boom, what you need is a cleansing of the system and that may take a few years to happen in the US because the excesses were built up not just in the last 7 years between 2000 and 2007 but, over the last 25 years. So, to really bring the US back into sanity—into a healthy mode where the economy can grow—might take 5 to 10 years, but it won’t happen under the Obama administration.

HRN: Given the poor prospects for US economic growth, do you foresee a flight of capital from the United States?

Dr. Marc Faber: You would be out of your mind, with health care reforms and with the government interventions and the uncertainty about future taxes in the US, to even consider expanding in the US and this is a problem. I mean people say that loan demand is down because banks are not lending, but maybe nobody wants to borrow any money in the US and nobody wants to expand in the US but they are expanding in China, India, Vietnam, Bangladesh, Africa and Brazil. The business world is an international place today, and if you run a corporation, whether you employee 50 people or 10,000, you can choose where you invest your money in terms of capital spending. Where do you want to expand factories? If I employed people in the US, I would rather think of reducing the 50 employees maybe to only 20.

HRN: Where should American investors put their money?

Dr. Marc Faber: Different people have different investment objectives but I made a presentation recently where I showed, that in terms of goods markets, the emerging world is now larger than the developed world and so I think people should have at least 50% of their money in emerging economies. With interest rates at zero and with the prospect that they will stay at zero, or below zero in real terms for a long time, I think cash is not particularly attractive. I think US government bonds are unattractive in the long run, although they may be attractive for the next three months. I would recommend to people to accumulate precious metals and invest in a basket of shares in emerging economies.

HRN: Are you saying you would consider buying gold even at today’s prices?

Dr. Marc Faber: Yes, I keep accumulating gold although in the next three months it may go down and not up, but maybe it won’t go down. To me, it doesn’t really matter if it goes down by 10% or 20% or whether it stays where it is. I think if in case gold came down 20% it would be because tightening of global liquidity and, in that scenario, equities wouldn’t do particularly well either.

HRN: You mentioned that cash is not attractive. What are the prospects for the US dollar?

Dr. Marc Faber: The dollar has been relatively weak in the last few years. It’s just that the other currencies are not much better. There has been a tendency for the dollar to weaken and certainly it has weakened against the price of oil, against the price of precious metals and raw materials and it's lost its purchasing power. There is no question about the fact that, today, if you have $100,000 you can buy less than 10 years ago or 20 years ago. Just look at the housing market. It has come down somewhat but a house is much more expensive than in 1980.

HRN: Can you comment on inflation versus deflation?

Dr. Marc Faber: In this whole inflation and deflation debate investors have to realize that in a system—say you have a room like this and then the money is dropped from helicopters into this room, it can flow into real estate; it can flow into equities; it can flow into precious metals; it can flow into the art market or it can flow out into other currencies or into commodities that the Federal Reserve doesn’t control. They only control essentially how much money they will drop from the helicopters.

HRN: Is this an example of why central planning of the economy by the Federal Reserve isn’t effective?

Dr. Marc Faber: Yes. Exactly.

HRN: Do you think hyperinflation in the US is possible?

Dr. Marc Faber: The Federal Reserve doesn’t want to create a hyperinflation. I mean Mr. Bernanke may be incompetent, but he’s not an evil person per se. He just doesn’t have sufficient knowledge to be a central banker, in my opinion, and has misguided economic theories, but he’s not evil in the sense that he would not wish to debase the currency entirely. Clearly, if the US economy moves into a double dip recession and you have deflationary pressures reappearing, in the housing market, for example, and if the S&P drops from roughly 1,100 down to say 900, then I think further monetization will happen. I believe that because of the unfunded liabilities and the deficits of the US government, which will stay high for a long time; sooner or later there will be more monetization anyway.

It’s more a question of when it will happen rather than if it will happen. For sure it will happen but will it happen right away, say in September, or maybe only in two years time? Eventually, before everything collapses we’ll have an inflationary bout which may not be so strongly felt in consumer prices, as in stocks or housing or precious metals prices or in commodities like oil; or inflation could occur mostly in foreign currencies, in other words, in Asia where the currencies could appreciate.

HRN: Thank you for being so generous with your time.

Dr. Marc Faber: Thank you.

After Words

Dr. Marc Faber is not only one of the world’s most outspoken critics of the Federal Reserve and of its monetary policy, but is quite possibly the Federal Reserve’s most credible critic. Dr. Faber’s detailed, evidence-based arguments, linking Federal Reserve policy decisions, such as interest rate changes, to economic developments like the US housing bubble and oil price changes are supported by thorough research. Dr. Faber’s research raises serious questions about the results of central economic planning in the form of central bank monetary policy and about the wisdom of intervention into the economy by governments. The evidence suggests that centralized manipulation of money and credit has a destabilizing influence on the economy overall—it increases economic volatility—and has unintended consequences totally outside the control of so-called monetary authorities. History shows that well-intentioned lawmakers and their economic advisers cannot predict the outcomes and unintended consequences of economic interventions. Neither central bankers nor governments have been successful in substituting centrally planned economic agendas for the decentralized decisions of millions of entrepreneurs and owners of private capital, but they persist nonetheless with ever more centralized control and ever larger interventions. Dr. Faber confidently predicts that greater government control over the economy will hamper economic growth rather than stimulate it, and that interventions into the free market, no matter how large or well meaning, will continue to fail as they consistently have in the past.

Rent Seeking and the Flight of Capital

Ron Hera — Tue, 20 Jul 2010 01:00:00 GMT

The productive elements of the US economy are caught between powerful financial interests, e.g., banks seeking speculative gains, political constituencies seeking entitlements and government entities at all levels whose budgets and deficits are too large compared to their revenues. All three factions are competing for the same economic resources and all three are net consumers of wealth. The triumph of any one faction or of any combination thereof, promises to erode capital and to encumber production and economic growth in the future. As a consequence, capital can be expected to flow away from the United States to other parts of the world.

If banks dominate over government, for example, ever larger shares of tax revenues will likely flow to banks as a consequence of interest payments and taxes will certainly rise despite inevitable austerity measures. If government triumphs at the expense of banks, setting aside questions related to bank failures, bailouts or sovereign defaults, there is no reason to believe that government entities will become fiscally responsible or that the pattern of government expansion, as a percent of GDP, will reverse in the foreseeable future. The banking and financial services industries also represent a disproportionate share of US GDP. Political constituencies seeking entitlements are, in part, a reaction against and a consequence of disproportionate growth of government and of the banking and financial services industries. In advocating for or against any of the above factions, what seems to be ignored is where sustainable economic growth will come from in the future.

Surrounded on all sides are entrepreneurs and private capital, which are the historical engines of US economic growth. As the nation struggles to recover from the unprecedented global recession and the financial crisis that began in 2008, the competition between banks, government entities and political constituencies seeking entitlements represents a diversion of wealth and future production into economically unsustainable pursuits, such as bank profits, government stimulus or social welfare programs. In economic terms, the relationship of banks, government entities and political constituencies seeking entitlements to the productive elements of the economy can be described as one of rent seeking.

Rent seeking is a relationship where an individual, company or other organization seeks income by capturing the production of others through manipulation or exploitation of the financial, legal or political environment, rather than through ordinary market participation or the production of wealth. Analogous to parasitism in biology, rent seeking means obtaining an economic gain at the expense of others without any reciprocal benefit. Common examples of rent seeking include tariffs sought by industries for no purpose other than to boost profit margins and efforts by special interest groups to redistribute wealth in their favor by shifting tax burdens or government spending where there is no reciprocal benefit to any other group in society.

Businesses that produce physical goods, i.e., real production, along with labor and existing capital derived from past production surpluses are the targets of rent seeking strategies. The central question for economists is whether rent seeking is sustainable as an economic paradigm, i.e., as the dominant form of economic relationship in an economy. If so, spending by those who successfully gain control of wealth will stimulate economic activity in a sustainable way and the economy will return to genuine growth. For example, economic growth might return as bank profits trickle down through the economy; or as government borrowing and spending or expansion stimulate the economy and create jobs, e.g., government jobs; or as social entitlements, such as guaranteed retirement incomes or medical care, prove to be more efficient and less costly to society when provided by government and funded by tax revenues rather than by private industry. If it turns out, however, that rent seeking is not a sustainable economic paradigm, then the future of the US economy will be characterized by an erosion of capital and an absence of sustainable economic growth. One question that might arise in the latter scenario is whether capital will stay in the US or migrate to other parts of the world. The answer to this question lies in the nature of capitalism, as well as in the historical origins of American capitalism.

Property and Liberty
In terms of both economics and political philosophy, there are links between rent seeking where government is involved, the fundamental relation of individual citizens to the institution of the state, and macroeconomic developments in the US particularly since 1971. These links became increasingly clear since the start of the global financial crisis that began in 2008.

History bears out that capitalism, compared to other economic systems, has created more wealth, raised the living standards of more people, and has increased individual liberty to a greater extent. The reasons for the success of capitalism lie not only in economics but also in philosophy. The historical innovation and entrepreneurship and the immense industrial production of the United States in the past occurred both in the context of capitalism and in a social and legal framework established by the US Constitution. Going back to the American Revolution and before, the ownership of an individual person of their own body and of the labor that it can produce literally distinguished a free person from a slave. This concept is the common root of private property and of capitalism. The natural right of a person to the fruits of their labor, i.e., to own property, is, therefore prerequisite to other rights. In his seminal book, The Road to Serfdom, F. A. Hayek explained the interdependence of private property, the division of labor and freedom.

“... [T]he system of private property is the most important guaranty of freedom. It is only because the control of the means of production is divided among many people acting independently that we as individuals can decide what to do with ourselves. When all the means of production are vested in a single hand, whether it be nominally that of "society" as a whole or that of a dictator, whoever exercises this control has complete power over us. In the hands of private individuals, what is called economic power can be an instrument of coercion, but it is never control over the whole life of a person. But when economic power is centralized as an instrument of political power it creates a degree of dependence scarcely distinguishable from slavery. It has been well said that, in a country where the sole employer is the state, opposition means death by slow starvation.” – F. A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (1944)

Of course, a human being is much more than an economic unit and the natural rights of individuals do not end with the absence of slavery, thus private property can be viewed as the keystone of all human rights. In fact, provisions of the American Bill of Rights, such as the prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure are an elaboration and enumeration of private property rights vis-à-vis the rights of government. Interestingly, the American Bill of Rights contains broad prohibitions against actions by government, rather than positive rights, such as the right of an individual to a particular social benefit. In the modern world, private property and, therefore, other rights are not threatened directly by violence and coercion as they were prior to the American Revolution, but they are threatened today by excessive growth of government, by private concerns pursuing rent seeking profit strategies and by political constituencies seeking entitlements.

Taxes levied on privately owned businesses or on private individuals for the purposes of social welfare programs function as a proxy for rent seeking in that they affirm a positive right to an economic benefit for one group at the expense of another group that receives no reciprocal benefit. For example, the establishment of a legal right of a person with no means to pay for it, to obtain medical care, takes precedence over the property rights of individuals who have the means to pay for medical care on their own behalf. In the example of medical care, it is likely that those upon whom the financial burden falls have little or no objection to the arrangement because a majority of individuals probably believe that their contribution is for a worthy cause, but the precedent of government intervention over volunteerism is a dangerous one from the standpoint of individual rights.
While one group bears the economic cost, even if the only cost is reduced access to medical care or reduced quality of care, there is a more broad cost to society in terms of the erosion of individual rights. In a rent seeking economic relationship where government is the agent of wealth transfers, it is not only exploited groups that loose rights but, in fact, all citizens. When wealth is transferred or redistributed by government, rights removed from exploited groups are not transferred to groups that receive the resultant economic benefits but rather accrue to the government itself, thus diminishing the rights of all and expanding the power of government, i.e., the power to claim the wealth of it’s citizens for whatever purposes are deemed worthy.

“The preservation of freedom is the protective reason for limiting and decentralizing governmental power. But there is also a constructive reason. The great advances of civilization, whether in architecture or painting, in science or in literature, in industry or agriculture, have never come from centralized government.” – Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (1962)

While wealth transfers may be undertaken with the best intentions, over time, the eventual consequence is an aggregation and concentration of power in government at the expense of individuals. Among other things, a precedent is established whereby rights are granted by government to citizens and not the reverse. Wealth transfers by government, therefore, result in the expansion and centralization of economic and legal power in the government at the expense of the rights of individual citizens.

In the extreme, the flow of rights from individuals to government may eventually result in a totalitarian state structure where rights per se no longer exist, or exist in name only, replaced, in practice, by privileges granted by government at its sole discretion. In terms of political philosophy, a constitutional republic aims to prevent totalitarianism (historically referred to as tyranny) by establishing that the people are sovereign and that the limited rights of government are granted to it at the sole discretion of the people. In contrast, an economic system, based on government redistribution of wealth, is ultimately incompatible with a structure where the people are sovereign, i.e., a constitutional republic, simply because wealth redistribution requires that the rights of government take precedence over the property rights of individuals.

There’s been one underlying basic fallacy in this whole set of social security and welfare measures, and that is the fallacy - this is at the bottom of it - the fallacy that it is feasible and possible to do good with other people’s money. That view has two flaws. If I want to do good with other people’s money, I first have to take it away from them. That means that the welfare state philosophy of doing good with other people’s money, at its very bottom, is a philosophy of violence and coercion. It’s against freedom, because I have to use force to get the money. In the second place, very few people spend other people’s money as carefully as they spend their own. The real problem with government is not the deficit. The real problem with government is the amount of our money that it spends. – Milton Friedman

If the basic economic rights of individuals are undermined and government power expands, becoming more centralized, then controlling government spending may be problematic, particularly if doling out entitlements is central to the political goals of the regime in power, e.g., remaining in power. As has been seen in Europe, government spending for the purposes of expanding entitlements is constrained only by the capacity to borrow and to service debt, which is a pattern that can lead to economic collapse.

“A democracy cannot exist as a permanent form of government. It can only exist until the majority discovers it can vote itself largess out of the public treasury. After that, the majority always votes for the candidate promising the most benefits with the result the democracy collapses because of the loose fiscal policy ensuing, always to be followed by a dictatorship, then a monarchy.” – Scottish historian Alexander Fraser Tytler, Lord Woodhouselee (1747-1813), unverified attribution

Totalitarianism: Public or Private?
Wealth redistribution is not the exclusive domain of government. Inflationary policies by the US Federal Reserve erode the value of money and dilute the share of wealth held by those who depend on the monetary system while transferring wealth either to banks or to those who first receive newly created money. The institution of central banking is itself a form of rent seeking where governments borrow their own currencies into existence from private banks passing the burden of repayment with interest on to taxpayers, e.g., as a value added or income tax, rather than maintaining the national currency as a public facility. Central banking is associated both with economic rent seeking insofar as private interests successfully influence the central bank in their favor, and with political philosophy where the rights of individuals are concerned, e.g., monetary inflation deprives savers of the right to spend tomorrow money obtained in exchange for labor today at a value consistent with the terms of the exchange. In the latter case, the central bank produces a de facto breach of contract that is technically legal. As John Maynard Keynes famously said, “By a continuing process of inflation, government [or private interests that control the central bank] can confiscate, secretly and unobserved, an important part of the wealth of their citizens.” In this regard, one can see the extent of the powers abdicated by governments to central banks. Central banks have the power to redistribute wealth and can do so either at the behest of government or, more importantly, in the service of private concerns.

The advent of bank bailouts, amounting to roughly $4 trillion in the US officially, but perhaps as much as $23.7 trillion, during the global financial crisis that began in 2008 was remarkable for two reasons other than the danger of systemic collapse thus averted and the amounts of money involved. First, it became apparent that large banks, and central banks, had more influence over governments than their own citizens. In fact, a majority of Americans opposed bank bailouts. Second, the power of central banks to transfer wealth was laid bare by the Federal Reserve’s purchase of mortgage backed securities which traded newly created money for what most observers agree was little more than worthless paper in an attempt to render otherwise bankrupt financial institutions solvent again.

The independent actions of the US federal government and Federal Reserve produced record profits and bonuses in the banking sector while, at the same time, household wealth in America fell significantly, creating the popular impression that Wall Street was somehow looting Main Street. The mechanism of wealth transfer, however, was actually the Federal Reserve, which had then been in place for 94 years prior to the crisis and during which, arguably, a similar process of wealth transfer had taken place gradually on a smaller scale. The arbitrary and sweeping nature of the emergency actions taken by the federal government and Federal Reserve in response to the financial crisis revealed the extent to which the powers of both the federal government and Federal Reserve had quietly expanded and become more centralized over a period of less than 100 years to a point of near absolute control over the wealth, i.e., the property, of US citizens. The roots of these developments, however, lay not in the economic bubbles leading up to the financial crisis that began in 2008 but in the 1913 Federal Reserve Act and in the New Deal that followed the resulting Great Depression.

“Legal plunder can be committed in an infinite number of ways; hence, there are an infinite number of plans for organizing it: tariffs, protection, bonuses, subsidies, incentives, the progressive income tax, free education, the right to employment, the right to profit, the right to wages, the right to relief, the right to the tools of production, interest free credit, etc., etc. And it is the aggregate of all these plans, in respect to what they have in common, legal plunder, that goes under the name of socialism.” – Frederic Bastiat, The Law (1848)

After World War II, the United States had embraced labor unions and social programs partly in response to the ideological struggle between the US and the Soviet Union, which was a totalitarian state, but the US, while fighting totalitarianism, planted the seeds of totalitarianism in its own backyard. Following decades during which social welfare programs expanded, and during which both the federal government and the financial sector grew dramatically as percentages of US GDP, the centralization of power revealed in 2008 indicated a largely unrecognized shift in political philosophy toward a totalitarian state structure.

A Monetary Empire in Decline
Perhaps every empire in decline witnesses a transition from surplus production to excess consumption and that is precisely what happened in the United States in the 1970s, marked first (after the establishment of the US Federal Reserve and then of a welfare state by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt) by the final abandonment of the gold standard in 1971 then by the 1975 shift from trade surplus to trade deficit. Both events were a consequence of spending in excess of real wealth production. These events ushered in the era of offshoring in the 1980s and of outsourcing to foreign firms in the 1990s. The idea was simple: exchange higher domestic costs for lower costs abroad and sell virtually the same products to the same domestic customers at higher margins, lower prices to gain market share, or simply hold prices at competitive levels by cutting costs. Under the banner of free trade, and later of globalization, the US government did virtually nothing to curtail these trends and the US economy appeared to expand as US dollars flooded the world in an unprecedented period of monetary expansion. As the accompanying deindustrialization of the United States progressed, two developments, in addition to the then accumulated capital in the US, mitigated the impact of declining US industrial production: (1) growth in service industries and (2) a combination of asset appreciation and increased consumer borrowing and spending (eventually reaching an unsustainable 70% of GDP), but both were fundamentally linked to monetary expansion and neither proved to be sustainable.

Replacing industrial production with a service economy was a flawed concept because as domestic production fell, it was, in fact, debt expansion that replaced the creation of real wealth, thus the US trade deficit soared. As factories closed and as jobs departed US shores for Taiwan, China, India and elsewhere, the selling of equivalent foreign-made goods and offshore services to Americans into a domestic market that included a growing number of displaced workers, became less and less plausible. The idea that displaced American workers would eventually embark upon new, service industry careers and, therefore, maintain their spending levels, in retrospect, was plainly wrong. While perhaps viable in a perfectly balanced global economy, it is difficult to imagine a sustainable domestic economy, in itself, comprising a majority of services since it would have to rely on material goods from abroad, i.e., it would suffer a chronic trade deficit. The answer for American businesses was to expand into global markets but this did little for the domestic economy, thus the US service economy failed to replace declining industrial production. What happened, in reality, was that the percentage of the total US population in the work force simply declined, flooding welfare roles and producing a growing political constituency favoring wealth redistribution.

^{Chart courtesy of the}^{Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis}

One way to characterize the sequence of events in the US is to say that a paradigm shift took place where the US economy moved from production to consumption; from an industrial economy to a (so-called) service economy; from wealth creation to wealth extraction; from increasing living standards to wealth redistribution; from a nation of citizens and workers to a nation of “consumers,” all the while transitioning from the largest lender in the world to the largest debtor nation in the entire history of the world. In terms of US government spending, unsustainable growth in entitlements and pork barrel politics became business as usual in Washington D.C., while Wall Street shifted from investing, in order to participate in dividends and capital gains resulting from production and value creation, to trading based on technical indicators; a competition where participants seek to extract wealth from investors and other traders in what amounts to a casino game, i.e., a rent seeking structure. Flash trading using automated trading systems and high-frequency trading algorithms, for example, is pure rent seeking in the garb of high technology.

Other advanced economies, in varying degrees, have followed the American example, resulting in the emergence of rent seeking as the dominant economic paradigm of Western countries. To make matters worse, rent seeking by private concerns has become confused with capitalism.

The Flight of Capital
In the past, capital and individual entrepreneurs flowed into the United States from around the world because it represented two related things: freedom and economic opportunity. The post bailout world is one where large banks have, to some degree, hijacked the emergent totalitarian powers of governments in a model where perpetual sovereign debt represents a virtually unlimited flow of wealth from the subjects of totalitarian states to the banks that, through the institution of central banking, exert considerable influence over each nation’s government. The post bailout economy seems to be a veritable frenzy of rent seeking activity by banks, governments and political constituencies seeking entitlements. In all three cases, individual liberty, e.g., the right to own property is an impediment and the success of any of the three factions promises to encumber or to prevent entirely future economic growth. It makes little difference to individuals if the fruits of their labor are confiscated by inflation, by taxes to fund unsustainable government expansion, or by taxes to fund social welfare programs. In all three cases, the impetus toward entrepreneurship and the incentives for putting private capital, i.e., private property, at risk in new business ventures are reduced or eliminated. Regardless of which rent seeking faction wins, capitalism, which has created more wealth, raised the living standards of more people and which, because of its intrinsic compatibility with private property, has increased individual liberty more than any other economic system in the history of the world, is set to lose.

Capitalism, rather than ceasing to exist, will obviously adapt, thus capital will migrate away from economies characterized by rent seeking, i.e., by the consumption of wealth, to parts of the world characterized by the production of wealth. Capital may also be driven into black markets as seen under the former Soviet Union. All other things being equal, the next decade is likely to see a massive flight of capital from the United States to countries where property rights are respected (or where government is simply smaller) and where the values of investments are less vulnerable to the ravages of excess monetary expansion, counterproductive taxation and sovereign debt risk or redistribution by government in the service of political constituencies seeking entitlements. Within the latter constraints, China and emerging economies that are rich in natural resources and that produce commodities or physical goods will surely become the new bastions of capitalism.

Into the Abyss: The Cycle of Debt Deflation

Ron Hera — Wed, 02 Jun 2010 12:46:00 GMT

One of the most famous quotations of Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises is that “There is no means of avoiding the final collapse of a boom brought about by credit expansion. The alternative is only whether the crisis should come sooner as the result of a voluntary abandonment of further credit expansion or later as a final and total catastrophe of the currency involved.” In fact, the US economy is in a downward spiral of debt deflation despite the bold actions of the federal government and of the US Federal Reserve taken in response to the financial crisis that began in 2008 and the associated recession. Although the vicious circle of debt deflation is not widely recognized, precisely what von Mises described is happening before our eyes.

A variety of positive economic data has been reported in recent months. Retail sales rose 0.4% in April 2010 as consumer spending rose and the US gross domestic product (GDP) grew at a rate of 3%. In May 2010, home sales rose to a five-month high and consumer confidence rose 17% (from 57.7 to 63.3). Industrial production rose 0.8% and durable goods orders rose 2.9%, more than had been forecast. However, the modest gains reported represent the continuing adaptation of economic activity at dramatically lower levels compared to the pre-recession period and most of the reported gains have been substantially manufactured by massive government deficit spending.

Despite the widely reported green shoots, in May, the unemployment rate rose to 9.9% while paychecks in the private sector shrank to historic lows as a percentage of personal income, and personal bankruptcies rose. Roughly 14% of US mortgages are delinquent or in foreclosure, credit card defaults are rising and consumer spending hit 7 month lows. To make matters worse, the reported increase in consumer credit, in fact, points to a further deterioration because consumers appear to be borrowing to service existing debt. Outside of the federal government, which is borrowing at record levels and expanding as a percentage of GDP, and outside of the bailed out financial sector, debt deflation has continued unabated since 2008.

Money Supply vs. Debt Service

A contraction of the broad money supply is taking place because the influx of money into the US economy, i.e., lending to consumers and non financial businesses, has fallen below the rate at which money is flowing out of general circulation as a function of debt service (interest and principle payments on existing debt), thus a net drain of money from the broad US economy is taking place. As a result, additional borrowing, as consumer spending falls, appears to be servicing existing debt in a pattern that is clearly unsustainable and that signals a further rise in debt defaults in coming months.

^{Chart courtesy of}^{Shadow Government Statistics}

The estimate of the broad money supply (the Federal Reserve’s M3 monetary aggregate) is crashing and the Federal Reserve’s M1 Money Multiplier, a measure of how much new money is created through lending activity, fell off of a cliff in 2008, and remains practically flat-lined.

^{Chart courtesy of the}^{Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis}

The contraction of the broad money supply points to a potential slowing of economic activity and indicates that consumers and non financial businesses will be less able to service existing debt. Despite easing somewhat in March 2010, credit card losses are expected to remain near 10% over the next year and mortgage delinquencies, are currently at a record highs, and these dismal predictions implicitly assume a stable or growing money supply.

A tsunami of eventual mortgage defaults seems to be building and loan modifications have been a failure thus far. There have been only a small number of permanent loan modifications (295,348) under the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) in 2009, out of 3.3 million eligible (60 days delinquent) loans and more than half of modified loans default.

^{Chart courtesy of}^{Calculated Risk}

Although it has been reported that American consumers are saving at a rate of 3.4%, the contraction of the broad money supply suggests savings liquidation. Given a contracting money supply, ongoing debt defaults and declining consumer spending, the increase in non-mortgage consumer loans indicates that consumers are borrowing where possible to consolidate debts, cover debt service, or borrowing to continue operating financially as their total debt grows, thus as they approach insolvency.

^{Chart courtesy of the}^{Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis}

The increase in non-mortgage consumer loans has not prevented an overall decline in total household debt attributed to ongoing deleveraging by consumers. While deleveraging (paying down debt) has been interpreted as caution on the part of consumers, or as low consumer confidence, the decline in outstanding credit reflects a reduced ability to borrow, i.e., to service additional debt. This suggests that the recovery of the US economy may be illusory and that the economy is likely to contract further in coming months.

^{Chart courtesy of the}^{Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis}

Commercial borrowing has declined more sharply than household debt suggesting that the nominal return to growth estimated at 3% has not been matched by debt financed expansion in the private sector.

^{Chart courtesy of the}^{Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis}

The broad US money supply is no longer being maintained or expanded by normal lending activity. If federal government deficit spending ($1.5 trillion annually), debt monetization and emergency actions by the Federal Reserve (totaling an estimated $1.5 trillion since 2008) to recapitalize banks are considered separately, there remains a net drain effect on the broad money supply. The scarcity of money hampers economic activity, i.e., money is less available for investment, and directly exacerbates debt defaults as consumers and businesses experience cash shortfalls, while at the same time being less able to borrow. Since unemployment is a key indicator of recession, then if the US economy were contracting, it would be evident in unemployment statistics.

Structural Unemployment

Unemployment and labor force data suggest that the US labor market is in a structural decline, i.e., millions of jobs have been and are being permanently eliminated, perhaps as a long term consequence of offshoring, outsourcing to other countries and the ongoing deindustrialization of the United States. However, the immediate meaning of the term “structural” has to with the fact that jobs created or sustained during the unprecedented expansion of debt leading to the financial crisis that began in 2008, e.g., a substantial portion of service sector jobs created in the past two decades now appear not to be viable outside of a credit expansion.

Officially, the US unemployment rate rose to 9.9% in April 2010, which represents the percentage of workers claiming unemployment benefits. However, the total number of unemployed or underemployed persons, including so-called “discouraged workers” (Bureau of Labor Statistics U-6), rose to 17.1%. Using the same methods that the BLS had used prior to the Clinton administration, U-6 would be approximately 22%, rather than the official 17.1% statistic.

^{Chart courtesy of}^{Shadow Government Statistics}

With official U-6 unemployment of 17.1% and a workforce of 154.1 million there are roughly 26,197,000 people officially out of work. Using the pre-Clinton U-6 unemployment calculation of approximately 22%, there would be 33.9 million unemployed. If the average US household consists of 2.6 persons and if 33% of the unemployed are sole wage earners, then 55.5 million US citizens currently have no means of financial support (17.9% of the population).

^{Chart courtesy of}^{Calculated Risk}

While it has been reported that the labor force is shrinking, the characterization of workers permanently exiting the workforce by choice may be inaccurate. While a shrinking workforce could reflect demographic changes, the rate of change suggests that tens of millions of Americans are simply unemployed.

^{Chart courtesy of the}^{Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis}

Setting aside the question of whether or not those “not in the workforce” are, in fact, permanently unemployed, the workforce, as a percentage of the total US population, is currently at 1970s levels. Since many more households today depend on two incomes to meet their obligations, compared to the 1970s, a marked drop in the percentage of the population in the workforce points to a decline in the labor market more significant than official unemployment statistics suggest. What is more important, however, is that structural unemployment suggests structural government deficits, e.g., unemployment benefits, welfare, food stamps, etc. Since more than 2/3 of US GDP (roughly 70%) consists of consumer spending, a sustainable recovery from recession seems improbable if unemployment is worsening or if the labor force is in a structural decline, since that would imply unsustainable government deficits, whether or not they are masked by nominal GDP gains thanks to economic stimulus measures.

Government and GDP Growth

The US federal government is a growing portion of GDP, thus reported GDP growth is largely a byproduct of government deficit spending and stimulus measures, i.e., reported GDP growth is unsustainable. Total government spending at the local, state and federal levels accounts for as much as 45% of GDP, thus nominal gains would be expected when government deficit spending increases. According to some measures, reported gains in GDP are a byproduct of relatively new statistical methods and, using earlier methods of calculation, GDP remains negative.

^{Chart courtesy of}^{Shadow Government Statistics}

Government borrowing and spending may have offset declines in the private sector but only to a degree and only temporarily. The resulting growth in US public debt has an eventual mathematical limit: insolvency. Of course, the actual limit to US borrowing remains unknown. The continuing solvency of the US depends on the ability and willingness of governments, banks and investors around the world to lend to the US, which in turn depends on the tolerance of lenders for the US government’s profligacy and money printing by the Federal Reserve, e.g., quantitative easing and exchanging new cash for worthless bank assets. US Treasury bond auctions will fail if lenders conclude that a sufficiently large portion of their investment will be diluted into oblivion by proverbial money printing. In that event, the US dollar will surely plummet, despite deflationary pressures within the domestic US economy, and the cost of foreign goods, e.g., oil, will rise causing high inflation or triggering hyperinflation.

^{Chart courtesy of the}^{Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis}

According to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the federal budget deficit increased from 3.1% of GDP in 2007 to 9.2% in 2010. Rather than being the result of one-time expenses, such as temporary stimulus measures, much of the deficit represents permanent increases in government spending, e.g., due to the growing number of federal employees. If increased government spending is removed, GDP appears to be declining significantly.

^{Chart courtesy of}^{Karl Denninger}

Of course, sustainability has more to do with total debt than with deficit spending because a deficit assumes that there is an underlying capacity to service additional debt.

Unsustainable Debt

While asset prices have declined, e.g., real estate and equities, debt levels have remained high due to the federal government’s policy of preserving bank balance sheets, which had ballooned prior to the financial crisis to the point that overall debt in the US economy reached unsustainable levels.

^{Chart courtesy of}^{Karl Denninger}

The absolute debt to GDP ratio of the US economy peaked in 2007 when debt levels exceeded the ability of the economy to service debt from income based on production, even at low interest rates. Although US GDP began to decline prior to the advent of the global financial crisis, debt coverage had been in decline approximately since the 1970s, coincidentally, around the time that the US dollar was decoupled from gold.

^{Chart courtesy of}^{Karl Denninger}

Government deficit spending cannot correct the situation because, for every dollar of new borrowing, the gain in GDP is negligible and some have argued that the US economy has passed the point of “debt saturation.”

^{Chart courtesy of}^{Nathan A. Martin}

In a growing economy, additional debt can result in a net gain in GDP because the money supply grows and economic activity is stimulated by transactions that flow through the economy as a result. The debt saturation hypothesis is that, as debt levels rise, additional debt has less impact on GDP until a point is reached where new debt causes GDP to decline, i.e., the capacity of the economy to service debt has been exceeded and, not only is it impossible for the economy to grow at a rate sufficient to service existing debt (since interest compounds), but economic activity actually declines further as a function of additional debt.

A Downward Spiral

The process of debt deflation is straightforward. New lending at levels that would maintain or expand the broad money supply is impossible for two reasons: (1) asset values and incomes have fallen and millions remain unemployed; and (2) debt levels remain excessive compared to GDP, i.e., real economic activity (outside of the government and financial services industry) cannot service additional debt. The inability to lend, actually the result of prior excess lending, results in a net drain of money from the economy. The drain effect, in turn, leads to further defaults as cash strapped consumers and businesses fail to service existing debt, and as debt defaults impact bank balance sheets, putting a damper on new lending and completing the cycle of debt deflation.

Keynesian economic policies, i.e., government deficit spending, are irrelevant vis-à-vis excessive debt levels in the economy and bailing out banks is not a solution since it cannot stop the deterioration of their balance sheets. The process is self-perpetuating and cannot be stopped by any government or monetary policy because it is not a matter of policy, but rather one of mathematics.

Since the presence of excess debt (beyond what can be supported by a stable GDP, or by sustainable GDP growth) impacts the broad money supply, efforts to preserve bank balance sheets, i.e., to keep otherwise bad loans on the books of banks at full value, will ultimately cause bank balance sheets to deteriorate more than they would have otherwise. The fact that US banks issued trillions in bad loans cannot be corrected by changing accounting rules, nor can the consequences be avoided by government deficit spending or by unlimited bailouts, and the problem cannot be papered over by dropping freshly printed money from helicopters flying over Wall Street. The major problems facing the US economy today—a tsunami or debt defaults, structural unemployment, massive government budget deficits, a contraction of the broad money supply outside of the federal government and the financial system, and a lack of sustainable growth—cannot be addressed as long as excess debt levels are maintained. As von Mises clearly understood, sound economic conditions cannot be restored unless and until the excess debt, which resulted from a boom brought about by credit expansion, is purged from the system. The alternative, and the current policy of the United States, is a downward spiral into a bottomless economic abyss.

Bernanke’s Dilemma: Hyperinflation and the US Dollar

Ron Hera — Wed, 10 Mar 2010 13:13:00 GMT

Ben Bernanke, Chairman of the US Federal Reserve, faces a Sisyphean task because US banks are experiencing debt deflation and, because lending is now at much lower levels, monetary deflation is encumbering the domestic US economy as existing debts continue to be serviced. Government deficit spending can only offset lower consumer spending to a degree, and the mushrooming debt of the US government raises the question of whether the US can repay or roll over its debt obligations, given that tax receipts are likely to fall. Despite deflationary pressure, the value of the US dollar is in a downtrend pointing to higher prices for imported goods and energy. Devaluing the US dollar will reduce the value of debts in real terms, thus it can make debt levels sustainable, but higher prices will exacerbate debt defaults, worsening the condition of US banks. Mr. Bernanke's dilemma is how to salvage the balance sheets of US banks without sparking high inflation or unleashing hyperinflation.

Where the US dollar is concerned, opinions on hyperinflation range from the view that hyperinflation of the world reserve currency is impossible in principle (because, for example, the values of other currencies are linked to that of the US dollar), to the view that hyperinflation of the US dollar has already happened and that all that remains are the consequences. The two most widely accepted theories of hyperinflation are the monetary model, where a positive feedback cycle is caused by a disproportionate increase in the velocity of money as a consequence of increasing the money supply too quickly, and the confidence model, where the monetary authority issuing a given currency is perceived to be insolvent or no longer legitimate.

The view that hyperinflation is the inevitable result of a central bank issuing too much money or of a government taking on too much debt, while correct, both states the obvious and presupposes that some previously known or predictable limit is reached. The ability to service debt is one such measure, but the value of a debt in real terms depends on the value of the currency. In practice, hyperinflation is recognized only after the inexorable death spiral of a currency has begun. Detecting it in advance is another matter entirely.

Mathematical models of hyperinflation, such as predicting years between redenomination based on inflation rates or applying the quantity theory of money, describe what is happening but not why. Using the monetary model alone makes it difficult to explain apparent counterexamples where high levels of sovereign debt compared to a nation's gross domestic product (GDP) or monetization did not result in hyperinflation.

The confidence model seems to suggest that hyperinflation can be explained by crowd psychology where hyperinflation is analogous to a market mania or is an example of mass hysteria. The idea that hyperinflation is only a crisis of confidence, i.e., that it is a psychological phenomenon, not only lacks predictive value but implies that hyperinflation can be prevented by manipulating public opinion regardless of mathematical realities.

When a nation's bond market collapses, so does its currency. The view that hyperinflation is fundamentally caused by failed bond issues suggests that what is of interest are the reasons why a nation's bond market breaks down, along with indications of developing bond market distress.

One fact that is clear in every historical example of hyperinflation is the rejection of the currency of a given country either by other countries or by its own citizens. The simplest explanation of hyperinflation is that when the credibility of a government, or of its central bank, breaks down, the recognition of this fact is expressed as a race to shed the currency and to divest of the government's bonds. One way to evaluate the possibility of hyperinflation is therefore to gauge the transparency, completeness and veracity of government and central bank statements regarding their balance sheets, budgets and bond issues. Incomplete or inaccurate information and propaganda contrary to empirical evidence are proverbial red flags signaling that credibility may be lacking and that confidence is therefore misplaced.

Between Scylla and Charybdis

Growth in the US monetary base has been cited as evidence of incipient hyperinflation but, while a distortion in the US financial system is apparent, the currency in question is not in circulation and the effect is that of re-inflation since US banks have suffered massive losses linked to the US mortgage market.

Chart courtesy of Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

The growth in the US monetary base by over $1 trillion since 2008 represents currency held within the banking system on reserve, which increases the ability of US banks to absorb further losses.

Chart courtesy of Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

While more than doubling the US dollar monetary base in less than 2 years is viewed by some as printing too much money, high inflation or hyperinflation have yet to strike. Although money has shifted out of the broad US economy and into the banking system, the excess liquidity exists in the form of bank reserves and, despite the fact that inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon, if bank reserves are considered separately from interest rates and lending activity they have little direct impact on prices in the broad US economy. In fact, the widest measure of the US money supply is contracting and the broad US economy is in the grip of debt and monetary deflation.

Chart courtesy of Shadow Government Statistic

In terms of monetary policy, Mr. Bernanke faces an impossible choice. With interest rates near 0% and with unprecedented government debt and deficit spending beyond sustainable levels there is a clear risk of high inflation or hyperinflation if inflationary forces are not counterbalanced with a heavy hand. In theory, high inflation or hyperinflation could be prevented by restricting the flow of money and credit to consumers and businesses. Such a policy would exert deflationary pressure on the US dollar within the domestic US economy since principal and interest payments on existing debt would drain money from circulation. While preventing inflation temporarily, such a policy would not succeed in the long run because, in addition to offsetting inflation, deflation depresses economic activity and results in debt defaults. Concurrent government borrowing and central bank QE to recapitalize banks and sustain government deficit spending (in a Keynesian attempt to compensate for declining consumer and business borrowing), would cause the value of the US dollar to decline against other currencies thus the prices of imported goods would rise. The resulting combination of rising prices for imported goods (energy in particular) and a scarcity of money in the domestic US economy is a formula for business failures and debt defaults that would ultimately worsen the condition of the US economy and US banks regardless of lower prices for domestic goods and services.

Structural Decay

In a mathematically perfect world, growth in the money supply with a constant interest rate and level of lending is a simple exponential function. In theory, this is not problematic but in practice monetary expansion (and the associated debt) tends to grow faster than population or sustainable economic activity and even periodic deflationary episodes are insufficient to maintain a stable currency value.

Chart courtesy of Wikimedia Commons

The tendency to create currency in excess of what is required to support sustainable economic activity causes unsustainable booms where debt rises out of proportion to the ability to service or eventually repay, meaning that total debt in the economy grows faster than the GDP. The result is that for every boom artificially created by monetary expansion there is a corresponding episode of debt and monetary deflation. Nonetheless, the overall pattern of monetary expansion remains clear.

Chart courtesy of Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

From a policy standpoint, restraining debt issuance by private, profit-oriented banks to sustainable levels is impossible in practice because sustainable growth in GDP is an unknown when the interest rates and reserve ratios that moderate lending activity are set. In fact, the goals of the US Federal Reserve, "to promote ... stable prices and moderate long-term interest rates" require the money supply to expand faster than sustainable economic activity:

Sometimes, however, upward pressures on prices are developing as output and employment are softening-especially when an adverse supply shock, such as a spike in energy prices, has occurred. Then, an attempt to restrain inflation pressures would compound the weakness in the economy, or an attempt to reverse employment losses would aggravate inflation. In such circumstances, those responsible for monetary policy face a dilemma and must decide whether to focus on defusing price pressures or on cushioning the loss of employment and output. Adding to the difficulty is the possibility that an expectation of increasing inflation might get built into decisions about prices and wages, thereby adding to inflation inertia and making it more difficult to achieve price stability.

Deflation is anathema because debt defaults harm lenders and governments have no mechanism to tax gains in the value of currency, thus monetary policy always errs toward inflation and over time the result approximates an exponential function. Among the results is the long term devaluation of the currency, which can also be expressed as an exponential function, i.e., exponential decay.

Chart courtesy of Wikimedia Commons

Exponential decay occurs when a quantity, such as the value of a unit of currency, decreases at a rate proportional to its own value. The decay can be expressed as a differential equation where a quantity N decays at a constant rate (a positive number) (lambda) within a given interval of time t.

Central banks implicitly manage the exponential decay in value of their respective currencies while they focus on interest rates, reserve ratios and inflation targets. Although the exponential decay in the value of the US dollar since 1913 has been distorted by episodes of deflation and variations in monetary policy, the overall pattern continues to reflect the structural reality of exponential decay.

Chart courtesy of Federal Reserve Bank of St. Loui

The combination of fiat currency, where currency is created arbitrarily, and central banking, where money and credit are centrally controlled and where there is an inescapable inflationary bias, suggests that all such regimes have a limited lifespan, but this does not allow a hyperinflationary outcome to be predicted. For example, if US citizens had been asked in 1913, when the Federal Reserve was established, if they would use the Federal Reserve's legal tender knowing that $1 would be roughly $0.05 in less than 100 years they would certainly have responded in the negative, but Federal Reserve Notes have not been rejected by the American people. Similarly, there is no necessary or obvious point where the US dollar will be rejected as it continues to decline in value for the same structural reasons. The logical outcome is an eventual redenomination.

Patterns of Hyperinflation

From the perspective of sovereign debt, the commonly understood process of hyperinflation is that if a government responds to declining foreign appetite for its debt with monetization (or in a historical context direct currency debasement) rather than immediate budget cuts, its currency looses value, at first in proportion to the dilution of the money supply and then more quickly as foreign bond holders and the nation's own citizens seek shelter from inflation in other asset classes. The cost of the government's future obligations then tends to rise in nominal terms, creating an apparent need for larger bond issues while bond yields rise, i.e., the cost of borrowing increases since monetization signals greater risk to investors. Exacerbating the problem, tax receipts tend to lag behind as domestic price inflation sets in. Further monetization is the path of least resistance. Although officials certainly believe that monetization is only a temporary measure both confidence in and the credibility of the government fail. Insolvency is eventually recognized as a reality and the nation's currency then collapses entirely.

Economists assume that consumers and businesses respond predictably based on economic incentives and disincentives, but this presupposes that the value of money is stable (at least over the short term). If users of a currency find that it looses value such that savings and wages are perceptibly eroded before they can be utilized at fair value, the rational course of action is to shed the currency as quickly as possible. This sparks a competition to shed currency in favor of real goods and, once the process begins, the rational course of action is to participate in the proverbial rush to the exits. Interestingly, a panic is not required to explain this phenomenon.

In the context of a national economy, the cycle of hyperinflation is driven not precisely by the supply of money but by its velocity because the competition to shed currency concentrates purchasing activity in successively shorter time periods. Within a given interval, more consumers and businesses seek to buy a limited supply of available goods using all available currency, including savings, thus demand is pulled forward while the velocity of money accelerates. If monetary authorities respond by increasing the money supply, the process feeds on itself.

In terms of the quantity theory of money, which is that the money supply has a direct, positive relationship to prices, the equilibrium of prices with the number of items purchased and the money supply with the velocity of money is maintained (where M is the money supply, V is the velocity of money, P is the average price level, and Q is the number of items purchased over a given interval).

The relation holds true even as the value of a currency approaches zero while prices approach infinity. However, while there is no theoretical limit to the money supply, the supply of goods is limited in various ways and shortages of goods spur prices higher, exacerbating the problem.

The competition to shed currency first interacts with prices then with the availability of currency and with the supply of goods. Rising prices result in rising demand for larger amounts and denominations of currency producing a genuine shortage, but increasing the money supply only intensifies the competition to shed currency, like pouring gasoline on a fire.

Crisis of Credibility

A gradual decline in the value of a currency is generally accepted by consumers and businesses because it has little immediate impact and can have short-term benefits, such as making money more accessible and stimulating economic activity and growth. However, when debt increases disproportionately, a deflationary bust is inevitable and if it is postponed by further credit expansion systemic instability results.

Chart courtesy of Karl Denninger

In 1949 Ludwig von Mises pointed out in Human Action (Chapter XX, section 8) that "there is no means of avoiding the final collapse of a boom brought about by credit expansion. The alternative is only whether the crisis should come sooner as the result of a voluntary abandonment of further credit expansion, or later as a final and total catastrophe of the currency system involved."

Among other things, excessive monetary inflation means that the US dollar cannot function as a store of value. Mounting evidence points to systemic instability, a lower US dollar and ultimately to a hyperinflationary outcome:

US federal government debt of $12.3 trillion, unfunded liabilities of $63 trillion, deficit spending of $1.35 trillion for fiscal 2010, and the Obama administration's $3.83 trillion budget all set new records, while federal income tax revenues are expected to fall for a second consecutive year.
It has been reported that to reduce the cost of borrowing, the maturity of debt issued by the US Department of the Treasury has shifted from the long end of the spectrum toward short term debt. At the same time, episodic flights to the perceived safety of the US dollar by global investors favor short-term Treasuries. This situation creates an escalating risk that the US Treasury will be unable to roll over short term debt and that it will resort to monetization.
7 US states are worse off than the financially troubled European nations of Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain resulting in warnings of a US credit rating downgrade possibly indicating an eventual sovereign default.
Unemployment in the US, where more than 2/3 of GDP is consumer spending, should be viewed as a leading, rather than a trailing indicator, thus the perception of recovery based on slowing unemployment is premature. Reported unemployment data seem to exhibit unusually pronounced disparities between initial claims and later revisions and seasonally adjusted numbers.
The widely reported recovery of the US economy is anemic at best since most of the reported forth quarter 2009 GDP growth is not sustainable and preliminary government economic data remains subject to revision by the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
The imminent retirement of the so-called baby boomer generation comes with a combined Social Security and Medicare price tag of more than $60 trillion.
US bank failures and balance sheet deterioration together with the inability of banks to mark assets to market due to a growing commercial real estate problem and ongoing residential mortgage loan problems suggest that the financial crisis that began in 2008 is not over.
The suspension of the US Financial Accounting Standards Board's mark to market rule means that the value of mortgage loan portfolios and mortgage-backed securities (MBS) reported by banks are incorrect, which obfuscates leverage and risk while magnifying apparent profits.
Toxic assets still cripple bank balance sheets since the US Department of the Treasury has been unable to successfully carry out its Public-Private Investment Program (PPIP) making taxpayer money available to select investors that can use the money to buy toxic mortgage-backed securities, retaining any profits while putting little of their own money at risk.
The largest US Banks remain the largest holders of financial derivatives, e.g., credit default swaps (CDSs), which suggests that they may hold liabilities far in excess of amounts that can be paid or that can be bailed out if significant losses occur. The CDS market, which is the single largest class of financial derivatives, represents over $600 trillion dollars, a roughly 10x multiple of world GDP.
The Federal Reserve's plans to phase out some of its emergency programs, adding up to roughly $2 trillion currently, leaves other emergency measures in place. The Term Asset-backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) is set to expire on June 30, 2010 for loans backed by new-issue commercial mortgage-backed securities and on March 31 for loans backed by all other types of collateral but existing loans will not be retired for some time.
Downward pressure on the US dollar caused by the Federal Reserve's near 0% interest rates and ongoing QE has caused a US dollar carry trade affecting asset prices in global markets. While the value of the US dollar has rallied in response to episodic flights to perceived safety in US Treasuries reflecting comparative weakness in the Euro and other currencies, the overall downtrend is persistent, thus the prices of imported goods can be expected to rise.

Rather than a crisis of confidence, hyperinflation results from a crisis of credibility. Hyperinflation results when the social, legal and political structures that create the value of paper money break down. When a government borrows excessively and its promises to repay are contradicted by mathematical realities, the value of its currency cannot be maintained. If a government so lacks credibility that it cannot issue bonds because there are no buyers other than its own central bank, the value of its currency declines faster than money is printed to cover its obligations. Perhaps the most important indicator of impending hyperinflation is whether the statements of a government or of its central bank, e.g., with respect to the government's budget or the central bank's balance sheet, are evidence based or ideological. If they are not evidence based, the credibility of the government or central bank, and its currency, will weaken and eventually fail.

Ordinarily, supply and demand factors govern the value of money and the prices of goods, but money has another, deeper level of value apart from its role as a medium of exchange and unit of account. When money is not redeemable, it is, in effect, a contract and, as such, it can instantly become more worthless than the paper it is printed on if the agreement that gives it value is null and void.

In 1999, referring to the sale of British gold reserves, Alan Greenspan, then Chairman of the US Federal Reserve, said that "Fiat money paper in extremis is accepted by nobody." The reason for this is that there are two fundamental kinds of value. De jure value exists because of, and is dependent upon, social, political and legal arrangements between human beings. In extremis, agreements are often broken and unenforceable. The value of fiat currency and of government bonds are examples of de jure value. Ultimately, de jure value actually exists only in the minds of human beings and does not exist in an absolute sense, in the real world, independent of human belief. De facto value, on the other hand, exists in reality, independent of human thought, e.g., lumber or farmland. The value of real, tangible things of value ultimately devolves to biological survival and to material standards of living. Possessing a physical asset that supports survival does not require human belief in order to have biological value.

When social, political and legal arrangements are strong, reliable and endure over generations de jure value may be preferable for any number of reasons. However, when social, political and legal arrangements prove to be unstable, or fail, de facto value trumps de jure value in every case.

When the balance sheets of US banks are maintained by suspending accounting rules and when banks hold financial derivatives liabilities greater than world GDP, both the stability and credibility of the banks are questionable. When US economic data consistently seems to reflect a Pollyanna bias and the US federal budget contains unrealistic projections of GDP growth and tax revenues, while public debt and government liabilities (which now include unlimited bailouts for government sponsored entities Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) are obviously unworkable and the US government's own central bank is already a major buyer of US Treasuries, the federal government's credibility is questionable. When private financial losses and toxic financial assets are transferred to taxpayers while profits and bonuses abound on Wall Street thanks to accounting rule changes in the midst of the worst economic contraction since the Great Depression, the credibility and competency of the US Treasury and Congress, with respect to the finances of the nation, are questionable. When the US Federal Reserve defies the US Congress, resists independent auditing, engages in ongoing QE and is the lender of last resort for banks that under normal conditions would be insolvent, its credibility is questionable. When the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, who failed to detect the largest asset price bubble in the history of the world and who has been consistently wrong in his assessment of the US economy is reappointed following the worst financial and economic disaster in generations, both his credibility and that of the Obama administration are questionable. The plethora of red flags spewing from Wall Street, from the Federal Reserve and from the federal government point to a breakdown of de jure value that is already in progress, thus to a hyperinflationary outcome for the US dollar.

The Ultimate Bubble and the Mother of All Carry Trades

Ron Hera — Sun, 31 Jan 2010 15:14:00 GMT

Among the many opinions expressed by billionaire investor George Soros over the course of the 2010 World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland was his statement on January 28 in an interview with Maria Bartiromo, host of CNBC's Closing Bell, that "When interest rates are low we have conditions for asset bubbles to develop, and they are developing at the moment. The ultimate asset bubble is gold." New York spot gold closed at $1085.40 down $1.80, but the price of gold is not as much about gold as it is about the value of currencies, particularly the US dollar.

Since new currency is created through lending activity, very low or 0% US interest rates and government deficit spending are fueling a US dollar carry trade and monetary inflation in the US dollar resulting in rising asset prices and global speculation. According to Zhu Min, deputy governor of the People’s Bank of China, “[The US dollar carry trade] is a massive issue; estimates are that it is $1.5 trillion, which is much bigger than Japan’s carry trade.” The close relationship of global commodity prices, particularly the gold price, to the value of the US dollar can be seen by comparing the changing value of the US Dollar Index to an inverted US dollar spot gold price chart.

^{Chart courtesy of}^{StockCharts.com}

The inverted gold price chart follows the USDX closely and while the fluctuations are not strictly proportional the overall trends as well as the peaks and troughs generally correspond, thus the asset price bubbles noted by Mr. Soros are reflections in asset prices of both the US dollar carry trade (the effective value of the US dollar) and, ultimately, of the long-term devaluation of the US dollar, thus the value of the US dollar in real terms.

^{Chart courtesy of}^{StockCharts.com}

An “ultimate bubble” in gold could be an offspring of the mother of all carry trades, but its magnitude would depend not only on the effective value and rate of change in value of the US dollar while the carry trade is booming, but also on the actual, eventual value of the US dollar (in real terms) after the carry trade has come to an end. Although the value of the US dollar will certainly recover to some degree when the carry trade ends, it will remain significantly lower in value for other reasons.

US Dollar Devaluation

In the above mentioned interview, Mr. Soros went on to say that "Some countries, like the US and European countries have plenty of room to increase their deficits; [although] the political resistance to doing so increases the chances of a double dip [recession] in the [global] economy in 2011 and after that." Since further monetary inflation as a consequence of government deficit spending may be necessary to maintain economic stimulus measures and financial system life support, Mr. Soros anticipates further devaluation of the US dollar. Devaluation of the US dollar will have both beneficial and harmful effects on the US economy.

Devaluation of the US dollar will reduce the value of debts in real terms, reducing the overall debt to GDP ratio of the US economy, and stimulate nominal GDP growth as domestic prices and wages (at different rates) adjust to the altered value of the US dollar, while at the same time helping to create conditions where US banks can resume lending to consumers and small businesses. Unfortunately, currency devaluation also has deleterious effects, such as higher prices, a loss in the value of savings and a reduction in the real value of wages. There is also a risk of uncontrolled domestic price inflation (although prices can be held in check without raising interest rates by curtailing the flow of money and credit to consumers and small businesses).

^{Chart courtesy of}^{Karl Denninger}

In addition to reducing the US debt to GDP ratio, devaluation of the US dollar will lessen the risk of higher interest rates resulting in greater deficit spending by the US government as a consequence of increased debt service ($145.4 billion in fiscal 2009) since it will allow the US federal government’s tax receipts to grow faster than the increase in debt service resulting from higher interest rates.

Currently projected US federal government borrowing (or, alternatively, quantitative easing) will maintain downward pressure on the value of the US dollar through the year 2019. According to the US Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) baseline projection of current policy, federal deficits will total between $7 and $9 trillion for fiscal 2010 through fiscal 2019 and the US public debt will grow from $12.3 trillion to more than $16 trillion in 2019. Other estimates indicate that US federal government debt will exceed $18 trillion in 2019, setting aside the net present value of unfunded federal liabilities based on Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). According to David M. Walker, former Comptroller General of the United States from 1998 to 2008 and current President and CEO of the Peter G. Peterson Foundation, current federal liabilities and unfunded obligations total approximately $63 trillion. As a result, further devaluation of the US dollar is inevitable.

Disparate US Dollar Values

Curiously, the US dollar has two different and diverging values, one within the US financial system and another in the broad US economy. As a result of the US financial system rescue, which included purchases of various assets from banks at book value by the US Treasury and Federal Reserve, the US monetary base has expanded roughly 150% since the beginning of the global financial crisis in 2008, but the newly created currency has not filtered into the broad US economy where, in contrast, deflationary pressures persist.

^{Chart courtesy of}^{Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis}

Although it is not apparent in the broad US economy, the value of the US dollar has been dramatically altered and its devaluation cannot be isolated indefinitely within the financial system independent of the broad US economy. The counterbalancing, but much smaller, contraction of the broad US money supply, as measured by the M3 monetary aggregate, also cannot continue indefinitely.

^{Chart courtesy of}^{Shadow Government Statistics}

At some point, the two disparate values of the US dollar (that found within the financial system versus that found in the broad US economy) will be reconciled and, unless current policies are reversed, the outcome will be a substantially less valuable US dollar. The consequences of the eventual reconciliation will certainly include price inflation in the US, higher US dollar prices for commodities that are subject to global demand, such as oil and gold, as well as higher nominal values for US dollar denominated assets. However, the potential unintended consequences of a falling US dollar include high domestic price inflation, a further reduction in international demand for US debt or a collapse in demand, a disruptive decline in trade, i.e., US imports, or in the worst case, rejection of the US dollar as the world reserve currency or a hyperinflationary collapse of the US dollar.

Is Gold in an Asset Price Bubble?

Diversification for the purposes of risk mitigation and wealth preservation is a rational response to unstable market conditions and is not comparable to a market mania, like the dot-com bubble. Similarly, a long-term shift in asset allocation favoring one general category of assets over another based on fundamentals, while it may result in rising prices, does not by itself describe an asset price bubble.

An asset price bubble, such as the Dutch tulip mania of the 1630s, is an irrational and economically unsustainable investment trend that holds sway over investors only temporarily and that inevitably collapses violently. Asset price bubbles end when a tipping point is reached where the awareness of and tolerance for escalating risk exceed irrational exuberance producing a panic. So long as the great majority of market participants discount risk, individual participants may rely on the irrational exuberance of others. In contrast, rational confidence does not depend on a majority of market participants behaving irrationally and is based instead on sound fundamentals.

The view that rising global commodity prices, fundamentally, are asset price bubbles in various stages of formation unreasonably discounts the risks associated with financial institutions, governments and currencies. If we are to learn anything from Iceland, the Baltic states, Dubai, and Greece it is that if irrational exuberance exists in the financial markets today it is exactly confidence that is not based on sound fundamentals in financial institutions, governments and currencies.

In the 1980 asset price bubble, gold rose from an inflation adjusted low using constant 2009 dollars of $392.57 per Troy ounce on August 31, 1976 ($104 1976 dollars) to its January 21, 1980 peak of what would have been $2,358.04 in 2009 dollars ($850 1980 dollars), a gain using constant 2009 dollars of more than 500% in 4 years. The 1980 asset price bubble in gold violently collapsed in same year, returning to 1979 levels by 1982.

^{Chart courtesy of}^{Bianco Research, L.L.C.}

On April 4, 2001, the gold price would have been $315.78 in constant 2009 dollars, the lowest value since 1970 adjusted for inflation. From that point, the gold price rose from a nominal low of $255.95 on April 4, 2001 to a nominal high of $1,212.50 on December 2, 2009 (London PM fix), a gain of roughly 375% over approximately 10 years (284% using constant 2009 dollars).

^{Chart courtesy of}^{Kitco Metals Inc.}

Over the past decade, the US dollar has declined from its 2002 high by roughly 33% compared to other major currencies and approximately 40% from is 2000 high compared to the Euro. At the same time, most of the currencies in the major indices have been debased alongside the US dollar since 2008 for the same reasons, thus the value of the US dollar in real terms is not apparent from the index alone.

^{Chart courtesy of}^{Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis}

The alternate US Dollar Indices published by Shadow Government Statistics (SGS) suggest that the Federal Reserve’s trade weighted exchange index of major currencies, which includes the Euro zone, Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Australia, and Sweden, may be an optimistic formulation.

^{Chart courtesy of}^{Shadow Government Statistics}

The decline of a national currency, particularly that of a nation with a large trade deficit, is first apparent in international trade while domestic prices do not at first fully reflect the devaluation of the currency. As a result, the prices of commodities that are subject to global demand tend to rise before the general increase in domestic prices that results from currency devaluation, thus the prices of commodities such as gold would be expected to rise faster than domestic measures such as the US Consumer Price Index (CPI).

^{Chart courtesy of}^{Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis}

The alternate CPI measure provided by SGS may represent a more accurate method of estimating the US dollar prices of commodities that are subject to global demand. The SGS alternate data show accelerating price inflation over the past decade leading up to the global financial crisis in 2008.

^{Chart courtesy of}^{Shadow Government Statistics}

If the SGS alternate CPI data are applied to the gold price it is apparent why Shadow Government Statistics’ John Williams stated in an interview with Bloomberg reporter Pham-Duy Nguyen that if the same methodology of measuring inflation were used today as in 1980, the 1980 gold price would be equivalent to $7,150.

^{Chart courtesy of}^FGMR

While gold certainly has enjoyed tremendous gains over the past decade, including the effect on the gold price of central bank gold demand, the current gold price, following on the heels of an unprecedented global financial crisis, has little in common with the 1980 asset price bubble. The current gold price reflects a rational diversification into hard assets for the purposes of risk mitigation and wealth preservation and can be explained in terms of monetary inflation and associated loss in the value of the US dollar independent of the US dollar carry trade. The continuing devaluation of the US dollar will result in a further rise in the prices of commodities that are subject to global demand, thus the gold price will continue to rise also.

Mr. Soros is certainly correct in that low interest rates contribute to the formation of asset price bubbles, but neither the value of the US dollar or the price of gold depend only on interest rates or on the US dollar carry trade. The view that a gold price over $1000 per Troy ounce represents the “ultimate bubble” ignores the ongoing devaluation of the US dollar, discounts risks associated with the stability of financial institutions, governments and currencies, and does not reflect confidence consistent with sound fundamentals.

Madmen, Gamblers, Alcoholics, the US Dollar and Gold

Ron Hera — Tue, 01 Dec 2009 14:55:00 GMT

If a lawless gang of madmen, gamblers and alcoholics seized control of a large company, how would you expect the business to perform? How would you expect the story to end? What if, instead of a company, they seized control of the world's largest economy, thus, to some extent, the world financial system?

Unsound monetary policy, reckless risk taking, and out-of-control spending are what characterize the US economy today. The proverbial madmen are central bankers, i.e., the US Federal Reserve, whose polices, inspired by Johannes Gutenberg, threaten to destroy the US dollar in the name of saving US banks from their own irresponsibility and greed. The compulsive gamblers are Wall Street investment banks, along with the largest US banks, which have gone so far as to speculate with government bailout money, having learned little from the near collapse of the world financial system in 2008. If money were liquor, the US federal government would be a band of raging alcoholics in charge of a liquor store. These are the tragic characters upon whom Americans depend for their jobs, for their college and retirement funds, for the financing of their educations, homes and business ventures, for the stability of prices and US financial markets, and for the value of their hard earned savings.

The triangle of dysfunction has not gone without notice. Foreign purchases of US Treasury bonds are being made, essentially, under duress while demand for Treasuries remains tepid and quantitative easing by the Federal Reserve continues. The US dollar has fallen from new low to new low and the skyrocketing price of gold is sounding the alarm, but between Washington DC and Wall Street nary an ear can hear.

The Madmen

The incurable incapacity of a central autocracy to accurately match interest rates and the money supply to the requirements of the diverse, complex markets that make up the US economy is a fundamental flaw in US monetary policy. While the ideology may be different, central economic planning under the name of central banking produces no better result than central economic planning under the name of communism. A series of ever larger economic bubbles coupled with an ever weaker currency is ultimately little better than the economic stagnation of the former Soviet system. Low interest rates may stimulate economic activity, for example, but they may also result in high inflation, unsustainable levels of debt, and asset price bubbles.

For every intervention in the free market, whether by government edict or monetary policy, there are unintended consequences. Government intervention in the US housing market, for example, intended to increase opportunities for home ownership among less successful members of society, played a key role in undermining lending standards. Combined with the Federal Reserve's policy of low interest rates, which fueled speculation in real estate and mortgage backed securities, government intervention ultimately proved disastrous.

Markets have existed since the dawn of human civilization without the blessings either of government subsidies and guarantees or of central banking. An economy is best described as an organic system rather than a machine. Interventions purporting to be the processes required to 'operate' the economy are at best futile if not inevitably disruptive and destructive. Like a living organism, the economy is largely self organizing and self regulating. When governments collapse, for example, currencies may fail but trade marches on. The behavior of an economy is an infinitely complex aggregate of individual human actions driven by self-interest and, while it may be characterized at different times either by rationality or by irrationality, it is self correcting (unlike interventions, which know no bounds). As a result, it is not possible for a small group of experts, no matter how intelligent or well intentioned, who have an imperfect understanding and incomplete, inevitably out-of-date information to successfully control the economy without unintended, unexpected and usually destructive consequences.

The notion that a central authority, even one equipped with sophisticated computer models, can successfully substitute a mathematically-based view from on high for the individual judgments of millions of businesses, entrepreneurs, and consumers across countless regions and industries is not merely the height of hubris but quite simply mad. Fundamentally, it is entrepreneurs deploying private capital, not bankers or economists that create the products, services, business, and jobs that make up the economy. Whether for the sake of social welfare or for the purposes of monetary policy, intervention in the free market invariably distorts the distribution of wealth, causes a net reduction of wealth for society as a whole, and misdirects entrepreneurs into activities eventually revealed as uneconomic. Perhaps the best argument for the futility of central bank monetary policy is that of Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Shalom Bernanke, Ph.D., who said to graduates of the Boston College School of Law on May 22, 2009:

"As an economist and policymaker, I have plenty of experience in trying to foretell the future, because policy decisions inevitably involve projections of how alternative policy choices will influence the future course of the economy. The Federal Reserve, therefore, devotes substantial resources to economic forecasting. Likewise, individual investors and businesses have strong financial incentives to try to anticipate how the economy will evolve. With so much at stake, you will not be surprised to know that, over the years, many very smart people have applied the most sophisticated statistical and modeling tools available to try to better divine the economic future. But the results, unfortunately, have more often than not been underwhelming. Like weather forecasters, economic forecasters must deal with a system that is extraordinarily complex, that is subject to random shocks, and about which our data and understanding will always be imperfect. In some ways, predicting the economy is even more difficult than forecasting the weather, because an economy is not made up of molecules whose behavior is subject to the laws of physics, but rather of human beings who are themselves thinking about the future and whose behavior may be influenced by the forecasts that they or others make."

Mr. Bernanke's comments are not remarkable only for their clarity and candor, or because they are a stark admission of the failure of central bank monetary policy, but because they echo the founding principles of the Austrian school of economics. In fact, Mr. Bernanke provides excellent reasons for the repeal of the US Federal Reserve Act. Despite common misconceptions of economics as a branch of mathematics or as a hard science, economics is in fact a social science, similar to psychology. For example, when we speak of economic incentives we are referring to the manipulation of human behavior through artificial means to achieve policy objectives such as increasing consumer spending, just as pairing the sound of a bell with the introduction of dog food will produce dogs that salivate at the sound of a bell when no food is present (of course the salivation response can eventually be extinguished if no food is provided for an extended period of time).

Psychology, it turns out, has a great deal to say about economics, investment banking, and public finance. Indeed, key psychological themes are common to all three areas of endeavor.

The Illusion of Control

There may be a simple explanation, rooted in human nature, for the ever larger disasters brought about by government interventions in the economy and by the institution of central banking. The illusion of control is persistence in the belief that a given outcome can be controlled when no demonstrable influence exists or where, as Mr. Bernanke stated, outcomes cannot be accurately predicted. Whether intervention is the result of central bank monetary policy or of government legislation, taxation or regulation, it is the inherent unpredictability of the outcomes of intervention that belies the philosophy of interventionism itself. Former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, Ph.D., grappled with this fact in the wake of the financial crisis when, in testimony before the US Congress on October 24, 2008, he said:

"... an ideology is [...] a conceptual framework with the way people deal with reality. Everyone has one. You have to -- to exist, you need an ideology. The question is whether it is accurate or not. And what I'm saying to you is, yes, I found a flaw. I don't know how significant or permanent it is, but I've been very distressed by that fact. [That there is a] flaw in the model that I perceived is the critical functioning structure that defines how the world works, so to speak. ... I was shocked, because I had been going for 40 years or more with very considerable evidence that it was working exceptionally well."

Mr. Greenspan accurately refers to the dominant economic theory, not as a science, but as an ideology that ultimately does not conform to reality. In psychological terms, an irrational belief that cannot be modified by reason or evidence is precisely the definition of the term "delusion." Despite his having been confused for 40 years, Mr. Greenspan clearly recognized and acknowledged a limitation of his economic ideology. In retrospect, perhaps Mr. Greenspan regrets having departed from his original views. Sadly, the same cannot be said for the majority of economists, central bankers and US government officials who do not recognize, as Albert Einstein pointed out, that "the definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results."

The Gamblers

Gambling addiction and belief in the paranormal, e.g., psychokinesis, are examples of the illusion of control. When rolling dice in the casino game craps, for example, people tend to throw harder for high numbers and softer for low numbers when there is no connection between the force with which the dice are thrown and the result. Experimental subjects can even be made to believe that they can affect the outcome of a coin toss through their level of concentration. The illusion of control is a key factor in gambling addiction because it is reinforced by occasional successes and, as has been long established by behavioral psychologists, behaviors conditioned by intermittent reinforcement are the most difficult to extinguish.

Warning signs of gambling addiction include defensiveness, secrecy, and desperation: precisely the attitudes exhibited by Wall Street bankers seeking bailouts from the US government in 2008. Like US banks transferring private losses to taxpayers, gambling addicts may hold others responsible for their financial problems and they may adamantly insist that they be trusted. Gambling addicts tend to be secretive about finances, while at the same time irrationally insisting on having control over money, just as Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke has insisted that Congressional review of the Federal Reserve's books. i.e., to find out what financial institutions received taxpayer dollars, would compromise its vaunted independence and harm the US economy. The more gambling addicts are in debt, the more they feel the need to defend gambling and they often defend a specific theory or model that "guarantees" winning (if only they can get more money to continue gambling).

A gambling addict's savings and assets may mysteriously dwindle, perhaps like crumbling bank balance sheets laden with sub-prime mortgages or bank losses associated with risky financial derivatives, and there may be unexplained loans or cash advances, perhaps like the Federal Reserve's Term Asset-Backed Loan Facility (TALF) program. Like banks jacking up credit card interest rates, gambling addicts become increasingly desperate for money to fund further gambling. The debts of gambling addicts may increase sharply, reflecting a "bet more, win more" mentality that inevitably leads to the gambler going bust. Gambling addicts seek money with increasing desperation, perhaps like former US Treasury Secretary (and former Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Goldman Sachs) Henry M. Paulson's dire warnings of financial Armageddon in 2008. Items easily sold or pawned for money may mysteriously disappear, perhaps like the US government's Fort Knox gold, which is surrounded by rumors and speculation that a long sought (e.g., by the Gold Anti-Trust Action Committee) independent audit could easily dispel.

The Alcoholics

The original Twelve Steps published by Alcoholics Anonymous include admitting that one's life, or in this case the US economy has become unmanageable and that a power beyond one's self (i.e., beyond current economic theories and government policies) is necessary to restore sanity. Contrary to the views of current Goldman Sachs CEO Lloyd Blankfein, the Higher Power cannot be one's self. The self regulating dynamics of a free market, for example would certainly adjust US housing prices to sustainable levels and promote sound lending standards, but this has been prevented by the interventions of the Federal Reserve and US government. Not coincidentally, it was the Federal Reserve and the US government, respectively, that originally caused the inflation of housing prices and undermined lending standards.

Breaking the grip of alcohol addiction requires a searching and fearless moral inventory, admitting the exact nature of one's wrongs, and an unreserved willingness to change and to make amends with those who have been harmed. Sadly, neither the Federal Reserve, nor Wall Street bankers, nor the US Congress, which is committed to borrowing its way out of debt, seem likely to repent.

The destructive behavior of alcoholics is often enabled by dysfunctional, co-dependent relationships. A dysfunctional relationship is one that creates more emotional turmoil than satisfaction, or in the case of the US economy, more destruction of wealth than creation. Warning signs of a dysfunctional relationship include, for example, addictive or obsessive attitudes, an imbalance of power, or a superiority complex on the part of one person. Co-dependency is a pattern of detrimental behavioral interactions within a dysfunctional relationship, most commonly a relationship with an alcohol or drug abuser, but equally possible in a relationship with a gambling addict. The co-dependent is a person who perpetuates the addiction or pathological condition of someone close to them in a way that impedes recovery.

The US government appears trapped, together with the Federal Reserve and Wall Street banks, in a destructive web of dysfunctional, co-dependent relationships. The US government is addicted to the easy money created by the Federal Reserve at the expense of taxpayers who eventually suffer a loss of purchasing power. According to Mr. Greenspan's 1966 article Gold and Economic Freedom, "deficit spending is simply a scheme for the confiscation of wealth." Wall Street bankers depend on US government bailouts and guarantees, as well as on the Federal Reserve's lax monetary policy, and the Federal Reserve depends directly on the US government for the legalization of its unaccountable monopoly and indirectly on the continuation of the largest US banks. While a dysfunctional triangle of co-dependency is merely descriptive, the interdependence of the Federal Reserve, the largest US banks and the US government is a fact in reality.

Unfortunately, it is no more possible to spend one's way to prosperity or to borrow one's way out of debt than it is to drink one's self sober. Nonetheless, thanks to the Federal Reserve's 7 day per week, 24 hour per day money printing service, the US government plans to do precisely this. If creating wealth were as simple as printing money, the dominant school of economics would be led by Robert Mugabe, President of Zimbabwe, and Gideon Gono, governor of Zimbabwe's Reserve Bank (and winner of the 2009 Ig Nobel Prize in Mathematics), who share with Mr. Bernanke a love for the feel of crisp paper and for the smell of fresh ink.

As Milton Friedman once said "The real problem with government is not the deficit. The real problem with government is the amount of our money that it spends."

The wealth destroyed by the collapse of the US real estate bubble and the stock market crash of 2008 has not been and cannot be brought back by bailouts, stimulus spending or outright money printing. While averting a deflationary spiral is necessary, propping up asset prices by dropping money from a helicopter redistributes wealth and interferes with the price mechanism of the free market. Devaluing the US dollar may help to hold up asset prices but it also prevents housing prices from falling to sustainable levels while at the same time adding the risk of eventually far higher prices, or, in the worst case, hyperinflation. There is no historical example of a successfully re-inflated economic bubble. What is more important, however, is that the unintended consequences of currency debasement, i.e., the result of an inflationary monetary policy marked by near 0% interest rates, are likely to outweigh the goals of the policy even if they are achieved.

Reducing the value of debts in real terms through currency debasement requires a commensurate loss of purchasing power, thus while housing prices may be prevented from falling further, savings will be destroyed and wages will lag behind prices once they inevitably begin to rise. Although consumer prices in the US currently lag behind the downtrend of the US Dollar Index (USDX), an inflation tax will eventually be levied. Under the name "economic stimulus", wealth is being dissipated by the US government at an alarming rate with no sustainable benefit. US government programs like Cash for Clunkers only impact short-term economic data while, in reality, destroying wealth, increasing debt and diverting consumer spending into already bankrupt industries. At the same time, the US government is eager to increase tax revenues to offset deficit spending and it has all manner of businesses, as well as wealthy individuals in its crosshairs. German-born Presbyterian clergyman William Boetcker (1873-1962) wrote:

"You cannot bring about prosperity by discouraging thrift. You cannot help small men by tearing down big men. You cannot strengthen the weak by weakening the strong. You cannot lift the wage-earner by pulling down the wage-payer. You cannot help the poor man by destroying the rich. You cannot keep out of trouble by spending more than your income..."

Boetcker's words are profound. It is not possible to repair the US economy through stimulus spending or to increase the wealth of consumers by inflating asset values via currency debasement. Supporting asset prices, thus bank balance sheets, via currency debasement, in the best case, can spread debt defaults over time, perhaps delaying the collapse of bankrupt financial institutions. However, currency debasement promises to move Americans closer to the financial status of Zimbabweans due to the destruction of the purchasing power of the US dollar. A less valuable US dollar will reduce consumer spending in real terms, and reduced consumer spending will impact businesses and, therefore, jobs.

The US Dollar and Gold

The price of gold indicates a lack of confidence in the US dollar and in the US economy and it reflects poorly on the credibility of the Federal Reserve and of the US government. The changing composition of central bank reserves, e.g., increasing gold holdings, is a direct effect of the currently weak US economy and US dollar, which has lost considerable value in recent months. In contrast, gold is the only financial asset, in fact a currency that has no counterparty risk. This simple, but often overlooked fact goes a long way to explain current investment demand for gold.

Chart courtesy of StockCharts.com

All other things being equal, strong economies offer investors superior returns and lower risk compared to weak economies, thus the currencies of stronger economies are always preferred over those of weaker ones and have a higher relative value as a function of supply and demand. Of course, monetary inflation and monetary deflation also influence the value of a currency in terms of supply.

In a world financial system composed entirely of fiat currencies, where no currency is redeemable in terms of hard assets, money is an abstract claim on production and the value of one national currency relative to another can only, ultimately be a reflection of the performance of the underlying economy that the currency represents (performance being inclusive of the consequences of its monetary policy), i.e., a claim on its production. Thus, if an economy is in decline, i.e., its production is falling, its currency, over time, must also decline. Conversely, there can be no doubt that if the US economy were exhibiting credible and significant growth, i.e., if production were increasing, the US dollar would certainly gain value, but that is not the case.

Chart courtesy of StockCharts.com

The fact that central banks are reducing US dollar holdings and increasing holdings of other currencies, including gold, is simply a matter of preserving the value of their reserves in the face of developments influencing the value of the US dollar, such as the burgeoning US dollar carry trade. Having gone "all in" to save the largest banks, the Federal Reserve and US government continue to assume that the crisis can be managed, despite the fact that their policies are making the situation worse in terms of sustainable housing prices, public debt and the value of the US dollar. In the mean time, Wall Street bankers have gone back to the casino, nonchalantly cashing in their bailout chips and pocketing the gains.

The rationale of buying time for US banks and of supporting US real estate prices seems reasonable on its face but this probably doomed policy is already proving counterproductive. Despite the patina of economic recovery sprinkled over the news media like fairy dust, small business and commercial real estate failures, as well as ongoing residential mortgage and credit card defaults, are rippling through the weak US economy, while unemployment continues to rise undermining consumer spending thus, ultimately, bank balance sheets. Setting aside the understandable reluctance of US banks to make new loans, no amount of tenuous good news, no matter how exaggerated, has been able to rekindle the frenzy of consumer borrowing that formerly characterized the US economy.

The illusion of control is a temporary state of affairs. The triangle of dysfunction and co-dependency formed by the Federal Reserve, Wall Street banks, and the US government is like a story about a madman, a gambler and an alcoholic, where each traps the others in their respective downward spirals. The illusion of control, common to all three, is gradually bringing about a situation that will inevitably be entirely out of control, but, as with gambling addicts and alcoholics, the point where control is lost can only become apparent after the fact, just as the financial crisis of 2008 caught the vast majority of experts by surprise.

Investors, governments and central banks around the world are seeking safety outside the US dollar, particularly in gold, as well as outside of the US stock market, e.g., in emerging economies. The more borrowed money the US government spends, the more money the Federal Reserve prints and the longer zombie banks are kept on life support, the worse the eventual condition of the US economy, the weaker the US dollar and the higher the price of everything in US dollars will ultimately be, particularly gold.

Faces of Death: The US Dollar in Crisis

Ron Hera — Sun, 11 Oct 2009 08:45:00 GMT

The US economy has been in crisis since 2008 and despite optimistic statements by officials and commentators there are no fundamental signs that the crisis will end in the foreseeable future. Current economic data suggests a number of diverging and unsustainable...(read more)