Translations

Extract from Rothbard's For a New Libery in Spanish

Mr FixIt — Fri, 10 Jun 2011 14:19:44 GMT

Current revision posted to Translations by Mr FixIt on 6/10/2011 9:19:44 AM

Extract from Rothbard's For a New Libery in Spanish

Filed under: ireland, anarchism, for a new liberty

Ley y justicia en la sociedad celta irlandesa
por Murray Rothbard

El ejemplo histórico más notable de una sociedad con leyes y cortes libertarias, sin embargo, ha sido descuidada por los historiadores hasta muy recientemente. Esta fue también una sociedad donde no sólo habían cortes y leyes libertarias, sino que éstas funcionaban dentro de una sociedad sin gobierno y puramente libertaria. Ésta era la Irlanda antigua -una Irlanda que persistió en esta trayectoria libertaria por unos mil años hasta su conquista brutal por parte de Inglaterra en el decimoséptimo siglo. Y, en contraste con muchas tribus primitivas de funcionamiento semejante (tales como los Ibos en África del oeste, y muchas tribus europeas), la Irlanda de antes de la conquista no era en ningún sentido una sociedad "primitiva": era una sociedad altamente compleja que fue, por siglos, la más avanzada, la más aprendida, y más civilizada en toda la Europa Occidental.

Entonces, por mil años la Irlanda céltica antigua no tuvo ningún Estado o cualquier cosa parecida. Como escribió la autoridad principal en la ley irlandesa antigua: "no había legislatura, ningunos administradores, ninguna policía, ninguna aplicación pública de la justicia… No había rastro de justicia administrada por el Estado. “

¿Cómo era asegurada entonces la justicia? La unidad política básica de la antigua Irlanda era el tuath. Todos los “hombres libres” que poseyeran tierras, todos los profesionales, y todos los artesanos, podían ser miembros de una tuath. Los miembros de cada tuath formaban una asamblea anual que decidía todas las políticas comunes, declaraban la guerra o la paz a otra tuath, y elegían o deponían a sus "reyes." Un punto importante es que, en contraste con las tribus primitivas, nadie era apegado o limitado a una tuath dada, así sea debido a el parentesco o a la localización geográfica. Los miembros individuales eran libres, y a menudo, se separaban de una tuath y ensamblaban una tuath competidora. A menudo, dos o más tuatha decidían combinarse en una sola unidad, más eficiente. Como afirma el profesor Peden, "el tuath es un cuerpo de personas unidas voluntariamente para propósitos sociales beneficiosos y la suma total de los terrenos de sus miembros constituía su dimensión geográfica." En pocas palabras, ellos no tenían al estado moderno con su demanda a la soberanía sobre un área territorial dada (que generalmente se expandía), divorciado de los derechos de propiedad de sus sujetos; por el contrario, los tuatha eran asociaciones voluntarias que solamente abarcaban los territorios propios de sus miembros voluntarios. Históricamente, cerca de 80 a 100 tuatha coexistieron en un momento dado a través de Irlanda.

¿Pero qué hay del "rey elegido"? ¿Constituía él una forma de gobernante de estado? Principalmente, el rey funcionaba como un sumo, presidiendo los rituales de adoración de la tuath, la cual funcionaba como un voluntariado religioso, así como una organización social y política. Como en los sacerdocios paganos y pre-cristianos, la función real era hereditaria, extendiéndose esta práctica a las épocas cristianas. El rey era escogido por la tuath de un grupo de estirpe real (el derbfine), que llevaba la función hereditaria sacerdotal. Políticamente, sin embargo, el rey tenía funciones estrictamente limitadas: él era el líder militar de la tuath, y él presidía sobre las asambleas de la tuath. Pero él solamente podía conducir las negociaciones de guerra o paz como agente de las asambleas; y él en ningún sentido era soberano ni tenía algún derecho de administrar justicia sobre los miembros de la tuath. Él no podía legislar, y cuando él mismo era parte de algún pleito, tenía que someter su caso a un árbitro judicial independiente.

Entonces de nuevo, ¿cómo fueron desarrolladas y mantenidas la ley y la justicia? En primer lugar, la ley en sí misma estuvo basada en un cuerpo de costumbres antiguas e inmemoriales, pasadas de generación en generación primero de forma oral y después escrita por una especie de juristas profesionales llamados brehons. Los brehons no eran en ningún sentido funcionarios públicos o gubernamentales; eran seleccionados simplemente por las partes del conflicto en base a su reputación en sabiduría, conocimiento de la ley-costumbre, y la integridad de sus decisiones. Como indica el profesor Peden:

". . .los juristas profesionales eran consultados por las partes involucradas en los conflictos para consejos sobre cual era la ley que debía aplicarse en casos particulares, y estos mismos hombres actuaban a menudo como árbitros entre los demandantes. Seguían siendo siempre personas privadas, no funcionarios públicos; su funcionamiento dependía de su conocimiento de la ley y de la integridad de sus reputaciones judiciales."

Mucho más importante aún, los brehons no tenían conexión personal alguna con la tuatha individual o con sus reyes. Eran totalmente privados, nacionales en alcance, y fueron utilizados por las partes en conflicto a través de Irlanda. Por otra parte, y éste está un punto vital, en contraste al sistema de abogados romanos privados, el brehon era todo lo que había para ese entonces; no habían otros jueces, ningunos jueces "públicos" de cualquier tipo, en la Irlanda antigua.

Eran los brehons que fueron enseñados en la ley, y que agregaron lustres y usos a la ley para adaptarlas a las condiciones cambiantes. Además, no había monopolio en sentido alguno de los juristas del brehon; en lugar de ello, varias escuelas competentes de jurisprudencia essay serviceexistían y competían por la costumbre de la gente irlandesa.

¿Cómo se hacían cumplir las decisiones de los brehons? A través de un elaborado sistema de “seguro” o de garantes/fiador, voluntariamente desarrollado. Los hombres estaban ligados por una variedad de relaciones de seguridad por las cuales se garantizaban el uno al otro el reparo de los males cometidos, de la aplicación de la justicia y de las decisiones hechas por los brehons. En pocas palabras, los brehons no estaban implicados en la aplicación de las decisiones, se valían de los individuos privados ligados a través de garantes. Había varios tipos de seguridad. Por ejemplo, los garantes garantizarían con su propiedad el pago de una deuda, para después unirse al demandante y exigir el cumplimiento de un juicio de deuda si el deudor rechazaba pagar. En ese caso, el deudor tendría que pagar daños dobles: uno al acreedor original, y otro como remuneración a su garante. Y este sistema se aplicó a todas las ofensas, agresiones y asaltos así como contratos comerciales; es decir, se aplicó a todos los casos de lo que hoy llamaríamos "ley civil" y "penal". Todos los criminales se consideraban "deudores" que debían la restitución y la remuneración a sus víctimas, que se convertían así en sus "acreedores." La víctima juntaría a sus garantes y procedían a aprehender al criminal o proclamar su demanda en público y exigir que el demandado sometiese su pleito al juicio de los brehons. El criminal podía entonces enviar a sus propios garantes para negociar un arreglo o para acordar someter el conflicto a los brehons. Si él no hacía esto, era considerado "forajido" por la comunidad entera cv writer; no pudiendo hacer cumplir más cualquier demanda propia en las cortes, tratándolo como oprobio en toda la comunidad.

Habían "guerras ocasionales" en los mil años de la Irlanda céltica, pero eran reyertas de menor importancia, insignificantes comparadas con las guerras devastadoras que atormentaron el resto de Europa. Como precisa el profesor Peden, "sin el aparato coactivo del estado que pudiese con impuestos y el reclutamiento forzado movilizar cantidades grandes de soldados y de mano de obra, los irlandeses no podían sostener cualquier fuerza militar de gran escala en el campo por un largo tiempo. Las guerras irlandesas. . . eran simples reyertas y peleas de ganado según los estándares europeos."

_________________

Extraído del Libro “For a New Liberty”. Capitulo 12 Sobre el Sector Público: la policía, las leyes y las cortes. Traducción de Ricardo D. Flores. Capítulo en versión digital:http://mises.org/rothbard/newliberty11.asp

Extract from Rothbard's For a New Libery in Spanish

davismax — Thu, 27 May 2010 05:58:32 GMT

Revision 2 posted to Translations by davismax on 5/27/2010 12:58:32 AM

Extract from Rothbard's For a New Libery in Spanish

Filed under: ireland, anarchism, for a new liberty

Ley y justicia en la sociedad celta irlandesa
por Murray Rothbard

Eran los brehons que fueron enseñados en la ley, y que agregaron lustres y usos a la ley para adaptarlas a las condiciones cambiantes. Además, no había monopolio en sentido alguno de los juristas del brehon; en lugar de ello, varias escuelas competentes de jurisprudencia essay service existían y competían por la costumbre de la gente irlandesa.

_________________

Extraído del Libro “For a New Liberty”. Capitulo 12 Sobre el Sector Público: la policía, las leyes y las cortes. Traducción de Ricardo D. Flores. Capítulo en versión digital:http://mises.org/rothbard/newliberty11.asp

Extract from Rothbard's For a New Libery in Spanish

rflores — Thu, 15 Jan 2009 23:10:45 GMT

Revision 1 posted to Translations by rflores on 1/15/2009 5:10:45 PM

Ley y justicia en la sociedad celta irlandesa
por Murray Rothbard

Eran los brehons que fueron enseñados en la ley, y que agregaron lustres y usos a la ley para adaptarlas a las condiciones cambiantes. Además, no había monopolio en sentido alguno de los juristas del brehon; en lugar de ello, varias escuelas competentes de jurisprudencia existían y competían por la costumbre de la gente irlandesa.

¿Cómo se hacían cumplir las decisiones de los brehons? A través de un elaborado sistema de “seguro” o de garantes/fiador, voluntariamente desarrollado. Los hombres estaban ligados por una variedad de relaciones de seguridad por las cuales se garantizaban el uno al otro el reparo de los males cometidos, de la aplicación de la justicia y de las decisiones hechas por los brehons. En pocas palabras, los brehons no estaban implicados en la aplicación de las decisiones, se valían de los individuos privados ligados a través de garantes. Había varios tipos de seguridad. Por ejemplo, los garantes garantizarían con su propiedad el pago de una deuda, para después unirse al demandante y exigir el cumplimiento de un juicio de deuda si el deudor rechazaba pagar. En ese caso, el deudor tendría que pagar daños dobles: uno al acreedor original, y otro como remuneración a su garante. Y este sistema se aplicó a todas las ofensas, agresiones y asaltos así como contratos comerciales; es decir, se aplicó a todos los casos de lo que hoy llamaríamos "ley civil" y "penal". Todos los criminales se consideraban "deudores" que debían la restitución y la remuneración a sus víctimas, que se convertían así en sus "acreedores." La víctima juntaría a sus garantes y procedían a aprehender al criminal o proclamar su demanda en público y exigir que el demandado sometiese su pleito al juicio de los brehons. El criminal podía entonces enviar a sus propios garantes para negociar un arreglo o para acordar someter el conflicto a los brehons. Si él no hacía esto, era considerado "forajido" por la comunidad entera; no pudiendo hacer cumplir más cualquier demanda propia en las cortes, tratándolo como oprobio en toda la comunidad.

_________________

Extraído del Libro “For a New Liberty”. Capitulo 12 Sobre el Sector Público: la policía, las leyes y las cortes. Traducción de Ricardo D. Flores. Capítulo en versión digital:http://mises.org/rothbard/newliberty11.asp

Introduction: Money and Politics

Mr FixIt — Fri, 10 Jun 2011 14:12:33 GMT

Current revision posted to Translations by Mr FixIt on 6/10/2011 9:12:33 AM

Introduction: Money and Politics

By far the most secret and least accountable operation
of the federal government is not, as one might ex-
pect, the CIA, DIA, or some other super-secret intel-
ligence agency. The CIA and other intelligence operations are
under control of the Congress. They are accountable: a Con-
gressional committee supervises these operations, controls
their budgets, and is informed of their covert activities. It is
true that the committee hearings and activities are closed to
the public; but at least the people's representatives in Con-
gress insure some accountability for these secret agencies.

It is little known, however, that there is a federal agency
that tops the others in secrecy by a country mile. The Federal
Reserve System is accountable to no one; it has no budget; it
is subject to no audit; and no Congressional committee
knows of, or can truly supervise, its operations. The Federal
Reserve, virtually in total control of the nation's vital mone-
tary system, is accountable to nobody-and this strange
situation, if acknowledged at all, is invariably trumpeted as
a virtue.

Thus, when the first Democratic president in over a
decade was inaugurated in 1993, the maverick and venerable
Democratic Chairman of the House Banking Committee,
Texan Henry B. Gonzalez, optimistically introduced some of [p.3]
his favorite projects for opening up the Fed to public scru-
tiny. His proposals seemed mild; he did not call for full-
fledged Congressional control of the Fed's budget. The
Gonzalez bill required full independent audits of the Fed's
operations; videotaping the meetings of the Fed's policy-
making committee; and releasing detailed minutes of the
policy meetings within a week, rather than the Fed being
allowed, as it is now, to issue vague summaries of its deci-
sions six weeks later. In addition, the presidents of the twelve
regional Federal Reserve Banks would be chosen by the
president of the United States rather than, as they are now,
by the commercial banks of the respective regions.

It was to be expected that Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan
would strongly resist any such proposals. After all, it is in the
nature of bureaucrats to resist any encroachment on their
unbridled power. Seemingly more surprising was the rejec-
tion of the Gonzalez plan by President Clinton, whose power,
after all, would be enhanced by the measure. The Gonzalez
reforms, the President declared, "run the risk of undermining
market confidence in the Fed."

On the face of it, this presidential reaction, though tradi-
tional among chief executives, is rather puzzling. After all,
doesn't a democracy depend upon the right of the people to
know what is going on in the government for which they must
vote? Wouldn't knowledge and full disclosure strengthen the
faith of the American public in their monetary authorities? Why
should public knowledge "undermine market confidence"?
Why does "market confidence" depend on assuring far less
public scrutiny than is accorded keepers of military secrets
that might benefit foreign enemies? What is going on here? [p. 4]

The standard reply of the Fed and its partisans is that
any such measures, however marginal, would encroach on
the Fed's "independence from politics," which is invoked as
a kind of self-evident absolute. The monetary system is
highly important, it is claimed, and therefore the Fed must
enjoy absolute independence.

"Independent of politics" has a nice, neat ring to it, and
has been a staple of proposals for bureaucratic intervention
and power ever since the Progressive Era. Sweeping the
streets; control of seaports; regulation of industry; providing
social security; these and many other functions of govern-
ment are held to be "too important" to be subject to the
vagaries of political whims. But it is one thing to say that
private, or market, activities should be free of government
control, and "independent of politics" in that sense. But these
are government agencies and operations we are talking about,
and to say that government should be "independent of poli-
tics" conveys very different implications. For government,
unlike private industry on the market, is not accountable
either to stockholders or consumers. Government can only
be accountable to the public and to its representatives in the
legislature; and if government becomes "independent of
politics" it can only mean that that sphere of government
becomes an absolute self-perpetuating oligarchy, account-
able to no one and never subject to the public's ability to
change its personnel or to "throw the rascals out." If no
person or group, whether stockholders or voters, can dis-
place a ruling elite, then such an elite becomes more suitable
for a dictatorship than for an allegedly democratic country.
And yet it is curious how many self-proclaimed champions [p. 5]
of "democracy," whether domestic or global, rush to defend
the alleged ideal of the total independence of the Federal
Reserve.

Representative Barney Frank (D., Mass.), a co-sponsor
of the Gonzalez bill, points out that "if you take the principles
that people are talking about nowadays," such as "reforming
government and opening up government-the Fed violates
it more than any other branch of government." On what
basis, then, should the vaunted "principle" of an inde-
pendent Fed be maintained?

It is instructive to examine who the defenders of this
alleged principle may be, and the tactics they are using.
Presumably one political agency the Fed particularly wants
to be independent from is the U.S. Treasury. And yet Frank
Newman, President Clinton's Under Secretary of the Treas-
ury for Domestic Finance, in rejecting the Gonzalez reform,
states: "The Fed is independent and that's one of the under-
lying concepts." In addition, a revealing little point is made
by the New York Times, in noting the Fed's reaction to the
Gonzalez bill: "The Fed is already working behind the scenes
to organize battalions of bankers to howl about efforts to
politicize the central bank" (New York Times, October 12,
1993). True enough. But why should these "battalions of
bankers" be so eager and willing to mobilize in behalf of the
Fed's absolute control of the monetary and banking system?
Why should bankers be so ready to defend a federal agency
which controls and regulates them, and virtually determines
the operations of the banking system? Shouldn't private
banks want to have some sort of check, some curb, upon their
lord and master? Why should a regulated and controlled [p. 6]
industry be so in love with the unchecked power of
their own federal controller?

Let us consider any other private industry. Wouldn't it
be just a tad suspicious if, say, the insurance industry de-
manded unchecked power for their state regulators, or the
trucking industry total power for the ICC, or the drug com-
panies were clamoring for total and secret power to the Food
and Drug Administration? So shouldn't we be very suspi-
cious of the oddly cozy relationship between the banks and
the Federal Reserve? What's going on here? Our task in this
volume is to open up the Fed to the scrutiny it is unfortu-
nately not getting in the public arena.

Absolute power and lack of accountability by the Fed
are generally defended on one ground alone: that any change
would weaken the Federal Reserve's allegedly inflexible
commitment to wage a seemingly permanent "fight against
inflation." This is the Johnny-one-note of the Fed's defense
of its unbridled power. The Gonzalez reforms, Fed officials
warn, might be seen by financial markets "as weakening the
Fed's ability to fight inflation" (New York Times, October 8,
1993). In subsequent Congressional testimony, Chairman
Alan Greenspan elaborated this point. Politicians, and pre-
sumably the public, are eternally tempted to expand the
money supply and thereby aggravate (price) inflation. Thus
to Greenspan:

The temptation is to step on the monetary accelerator or at
least to avoid the monetary brake until after the next elec-
tion.... Giving in to such temptations is likely to impart an
inflationary bias to the economy and could lead to instabil-
ity, recession, and economic stagnation. [p. 7]

The Fed's lack of accountability, Greenspan added, is a
small price to pay to avoid "putting the conduct of monetary
policy under the close influence of politicians subject to
short-term election cycle pressure" (New York Times, October
14,1993).

So there we have it. The public, in the mythology of the
Fed and its supporters, is a great beast, continually subject to
a lust for inflating the money supply and therefore for sub-
jecting the economy to inflation and its dire consequences.
Those dreaded all-too-frequent inconveniences called "elec-
tions" subject politicians to these temptations, especially in
political institutions such as the House of Representatives
who come before the public every two years and are there-
fore particularly responsive to the public will. The Federal
Reserve, on the other hand, guided by monetary experts
independent of the public's lust for inflation, stands ready at
all times to promote the long-run public interest by manning
the battlements in an eternal fight against the Gorgon of
inflation. The public, in short, is in desperate need of absolute
control of money by the Federal Reserve to save it from itself
and its short-term lusts and temptations. One monetary
economist, who spent much of the 1920s and 1930s setting
up Central Banks throughout the Third World, was com-
monly referred to as "the money doctor." In our current
therapeutic age, perhaps Greenspan and his confrères would
like to be considered as monetary "therapists," kindly but
stern taskmasters whom we invest with total power to save
us from ourselves.

But in this administering of therapy, where do the pri-
vate bankers fit in? Very neatly, according to Federal Reserve [p. 8]
officials. The Gonzalez proposal to have the president in-
stead of regional bankers appoint regional Fed presidents
would, in the eyes of those officials, "make it harder for the
Fed to clamp down on inflation." Why? Because, the "sure
way" to "minimize inflation" is "to have private bankers
appoint the regional bank presidents." And why is this pri-
vate banker role such a "sure way"? Because, according to
the Fed officials, private bankers "are among the world's
fiercest inflation hawks" (New York Times, October 12,1993).

The worldview of the Federal Reserve and its advocates
is now complete. Not only are the public and politicians
responsive to it eternally subject to the temptation to inflate;
but it is important for the Fed to have a cozy partnership with
private bankers. Private bankers, as "the world's fiercest
inflation hawks," can only bolster the Fed's eternal devotion
to battling against inflation.

There we have the ideology of the Fed as reflected in its
own propaganda, as well as respected Establishment trans-
mission belts such as the New York Times, and in pronounce-
ments and textbooks by countless economists. Even those
economists who would like to see more inflation accept and
repeat the Fed's image of its own role. And yet every aspect
of this mythology is the very reverse of the truth. We cannot
think straight about money, banking, or the Federal Reserve
until this fraudulent legend has been exposed and demol-
ished.

There is, however, one and only one aspect of the
common legend that is indeed correct: that the overwhelm-
ingly dominant cause of the virus of chronic price inflation
is inflation, or expansion, of the supply of money. Just as an [p. 9]
increase in the production or supply of cotton will cause
that crop to be cheaper on the market; so will the creation
of more money make its unit of money, each franc or dollar,
cheaper and worth less in purchasing power of goods on the
market.

But let us consider this agreed-upon fact in the light of
the above myth about the Federal Reserve. We supposedly
have the public clamoring for inflation while the Federal
Reserve, flanked by its allies the nation's bankers, resolutely
sets its face against this short-sighted public clamor. But how
is the public supposed to go about achieving this inflation?
How can the public create, i.e., "print," more money? It
would be difficult to do so, since only one institution in the
society is legally allowed to print money. Anyone who tries
to print money is engaged in the high crime of "counterfeit-
ing," which the federal government takes very seriously
indeed. Whereas the government may take a benign view of
all other torts and crimes, including mugging, robbery, and
murder, and it may worry about the "deprived youth" of the
criminal and treat him tenderly, there is one group of crimi-
nals whom no government ever coddles: the counterfeiters.
The counterfeiter is hunted down seriously and efficiently,
and he is salted away for a very long time; for he is commit-
ting a crime that the government takes very seriously: he is
interfering with the government's revenue: specifically, the
monopoly power to print money enjoyed by the Federal
Reserve.

"Money," in our economy, is pieces of paper issued by
the Federal Reserve, on which are engraved the following:
"This Note is Legal Tender for all Debts, Private, and Public." [p. 10]
This "Federal Reserve Note," and nothing else, is money, and
all vendors and creditors must accept these notes, like it or
not.

So: if the chronic inflation undergone by Americans, and
in almost every other country, is caused by the continuing
creation of new money, and if in each country its governmen-
tal "Central Bank" (in the United States, the Federal Reserve)
is the sole monopoly source and creator of all money, who
then is responsible for the blight of inflation? Who except the
very institution that is solely empowered to create money,
that is, the Fed (and the Bank of England, and the Bank of
Italy, and other central banks) itself?

In short: even before examining the problem in detail,
we should already get a glimmer of the truth: that the drum-
fire of propaganda that the Fed is manning the ramparts
against the menace of inflation brought about by others is
nothing less than a deceptive shell game. The culprit solely
responsible for inflation, the Federal Reserve, is continually
engaged in raising a hue-and-cry about "inflation," for which
virtually everyone else in society seems to be responsible.
What we are seeing is the old ploy by the robber who starts
shouting "Stop, thief!" and runs down the street pointing
ahead at others. We begin to see why it has always been
important for the Fed, and for other Central Banks, to invest
themselves with an aura of solemnity and mystery For, as
we shall see more fully, if the public knew what was going
on, if it was able to rip open the curtain covering the inscru-
table Wizard of Oz, it would soon discover that the Fed, far
from being the indispensable solution to the problem of
inflation, is itself the heart and cause of the problem. What [p. 11]
we need is not a totally independentresume help, all-powerful Fed; what
we need is no Fed at all.

Introduction: Money and Politics

Joseph E Hammer — Wed, 30 Mar 2011 23:34:41 GMT

Revision 5 posted to Translations by Joseph E Hammer on 3/30/2011 6:34:41 PM

Introduction: Money and Politics

The Fed's lack of accountability, Greenspan added, is a
small price to pay to avoid "putting the conduct of monetary
policy under the close influence of politicians subject to
short-term election cycle pressure" (New York Times, October
14,1993).

So there we have it. The public, in the mythology of the
Fed and its supporters, is a great beast, continually subject to
a lust for inflating the money supply and therefore for sub-
jecting the economy to inflation and its dire consequences.
Those dreaded all-too-frequent inconveniences called "elec-
tions" subject politicians to these temptations, especially in
political institutions such as the House of Representatives
who come before the public every two years and are there-
fore particularly responsive to the public will. The Federal
Reserve, on the other hand, guided by monetary experts
independent of the public's lust for inflation, stands ready at
all times to promote the long-run public interest by manning
the battlements in an eternal fight against the Gorgon of
inflation. The public, in short, is in desperate need of absolute
control of money by the Federal Reserve to save it from itself
and its short-term lusts and temptations. One monetary
economist, who spent much of the 1920s and 1930s setting
up Central Banks throughout the Third World, was com-
monly referred to as "the money doctor." In our current
therapeutic age, perhaps Greenspan and his confrères would
like to be considered as monetary "therapists," kindly but
stern taskmasters whom we invest with total power to save
us from ourselves.

But in this administering of therapy, where do the pri-
vate bankers fit in? Very neatly, according to Federal Reserve [p. 8]
officials. The Gonzalez proposal to have the president in-
stead of regional bankers appoint regional Fed presidents
would, in the eyes of those officials, "make it harder for the
Fed to clamp down on inflation." Why? Because, the "sure
way" to "minimize inflation" is "to have private bankers
appoint the regional bank presidents." And why is this pri-
vate banker role such a "sure way"? Because, according to
the Fed officials, private bankers "are among the world's
fiercest inflation hawks" (New York Times, October 12,1993).

The worldview of the Federal Reserve and its advocates
is now complete. Not only are the public and politicians
responsive to it eternally subject to the temptation to inflate;
but it is important for the Fed to have a cozy partnership with
private bankers. Private bankers, as "the world's fiercest
inflation hawks," can only bolster the Fed's eternal devotion
to battling against inflation.

There we have the ideology of the Fed as reflected in its
own propaganda, as well as respected Establishment trans-
mission belts such as the New York Times, and in pronounce-
ments and textbooks by countless economists. Even those
economists who would like to see more inflation accept and
repeat the Fed's image of its own role. And yet every aspect
of this mythology is the very reverse of the truth. We cannot
think straight about money, banking, or the Federal Reserve
until this fraudulent legend has been exposed and demol-
ished.

There is, however, one and only one aspect of the
common legend that is indeed correct: that the overwhelm-
ingly dominant cause of the virus of chronic price inflation
is inflation, or expansion, of the supply of money. Just as an [p. 9]
increase in the production or supply of cotton will cause
that crop to be cheaper on the market; so will the creation
of more money make its unit of money, each franc or dollar,
cheaper and worth less in purchasing power of goods on the
market.

But let us consider this agreed-upon fact in the light of
the above myth about the Federal Reserve. We supposedly
have the public clamoring for inflation while the Federal
Reserve, flanked by its allies the nation's bankers, resolutely
sets its face against this short-sighted public clamor. But how
is the public supposed to go about achieving this inflation?
How can the public create, i.e., "print," more money? It
would be difficult to do so, since only one institution in the
society is legally allowed to print money. Anyone who tries
to print money is engaged in the high crime of "counterfeit-
ing," which the federal government takes very seriously
indeed. Whereas the government may take a benign view of
all other torts and crimes, including mugging, robbery, and
murder, and it may worry about the "deprived youth" of the
criminal and treat him tenderly, there is one group of crimi-
nals whom no government ever coddles: the counterfeiters.
The counterfeiter is hunted down seriously and efficiently,
and he is salted away for a very long time; for he is commit-
ting a crime that the government takes very seriously: he is
interfering with the government's revenue: specifically, the
monopoly power to print money enjoyed by the Federal
Reserve.

"Money," in our economy, is pieces of paper issued by
the Federal Reserve, on which are engraved the following:
"This Note is Legal Tender for all Debts, Private, and Public." [p. 10]
This "Federal Reserve Note," and nothing else, is money, and
all vendors and creditors must accept these notes, like it or
not.

So: if the chronic inflation undergone by Americans, and
in almost every other country, is caused by the continuing
creation of new money, and if in each country its governmen-
tal "Central Bank" (in the United States, the Federal Reserve)
is the sole monopoly source and creator of all money, who
then is responsible for the blight of inflation? Who except the
very institution that is solely empowered to create money,
that is, the Fed (and the Bank of England, and the Bank of
Italy, and other central banks) itself?

In short: even before examining the problem in detail,
we should already get a glimmer of the truth: that the drum-
fire of propaganda that the Fed is manning the ramparts
against the menace of inflation brought about by others is
nothing less than a deceptive shell game. The culprit solely
responsible for inflation, the Federal Reserve, is continually
engaged in raising a hue-and-cry about "inflation," for which
virtually everyone else in society seems to be responsible.
What we are seeing is the old ploy by the robber who starts
shouting "Stop, thief!" and runs down the street pointing
ahead at others. We begin to see why it has always been
important for the Fed, and for other Central Banks, to invest
themselves with an aura of solemnity and mystery For, as
we shall see more fully, if the public knew what was going
on, if it was able to rip open the curtain covering the inscru-
table Wizard of Oz, it would soon discover that the Fed, far
from being the indispensable solution to the problem of
inflation, is itself the heart and cause of the problem. What [p. 11]
we need is not a totally independent resume help, all-powerful Fed; what
we need is no Fed at all.

Introduction: Money and Politics

Kelly11 — Mon, 14 Mar 2011 11:39:55 GMT

Revision 4 posted to Translations by Kelly11 on 3/14/2011 6:39:55 AM

Introduction: Money and Politics

The Fed's lack of accountability, Greenspan added, is a
small price to pay to avoid "putting the conduct of monetary
policy under the close influence of politicians subject to
short-term election cycle pressure" (New York Times, October
14,1993).

So there we have it. The public, in the mythology of the
Fed and its supporters, is a great beast, continually subject to
a lust for inflating the money supply and therefore for sub-
jecting the economy to inflation and its dire consequences.
Those dreaded all-too-frequent inconveniences called "elec-
tions" subject politicians to these temptations, especially in
political institutions such as the House of Representatives
who come before the public every two years and are there-
fore particularly responsive to the public will. The Federal
Reserve, on the other hand, guided by monetary experts
independent of the public's lust for inflation, stands ready at
all times to promote the long-run public interest by manning
the battlements in an eternal fight against the Gorgon of
inflation. The public, in short, is in desperate need of absolute
control of money by the Federal Reserve to save it from itself
and its short-term lusts and temptations. One monetary
economist, who spent much of the 1920s and 1930s setting
up Central Banks throughout the Third World, was com-
monly referred to as "the money doctor." In our current
therapeutic age, perhaps Greenspan and his confrères would
like to be considered as monetary "therapists," kindly but
stern taskmasters whom we invest with total power to save
us from ourselves.

But in this administering of therapy, where do the pri-
vate bankers fit in? Very neatly, according to Federal Reserve [p. 8]
officials. The Gonzalez proposal to have the president in-
stead of regional bankers appoint regional Fed presidents
would, in the eyes of those officials, "make it harder for the
Fed to clamp down on inflation." Why? Because, the "sure
way" to "minimize inflation" is "to have private bankers
appoint the regional bank presidents." And why is this pri-
vate banker role such a "sure way"? Because, according to
the Fed officials, private bankers "are among the world's
fiercest inflation hawks" (New York Times, October 12,1993).

The worldview of the Federal Reserve and its advocates
is now complete. Not only are the public and politicians
responsive to it eternally subject to the temptation to inflate;
but it is important for the Fed to have a cozy partnership with
private bankers. Private bankers, as "the world's fiercest
inflation hawks," can only bolster the Fed's eternal devotion
to battling against inflation.

There we have the ideology of the Fed as reflected in its
own propaganda, as well as respected Establishment trans-
mission belts such as the New York Times, and in pronounce-
ments and textbooks by countless economists. Even those
economists who would like to see more inflation accept and
repeat the Fed's image of its own role. And yet every aspect
of this mythology is the very reverse of the truth. We cannot
think straight about money, banking, or the Federal Reserve
until this fraudulent legend has been exposed and demol-
ished.

There is, however, one and only one aspect of the
common legend that is indeed correct: that the overwhelm-
ingly dominant cause of the virus of chronic price inflation
is inflation, or expansion, of the supply of money. Just as an [p. 9]
increase in the production or supply of cotton will cause
that crop to be cheaper on the market; so will the creation
of more money make its unit of money, each franc or dollar,
cheaper and worth less in purchasing power of goods on the
market.

But let us consider this agreed-upon fact in the light of
the above myth about the Federal Reserve. We supposedly
have the public clamoring for inflation while the Federal
Reserve, flanked by its allies the nation's bankers, resolutely
sets its face against this short-sighted public clamor. But how
is the public supposed to go about achieving this inflation?
How can the public create, i.e., "print," more money? It
would be difficult to do so, since only one institution in the
society is legally allowed to print money. Anyone who tries
to print money is engaged in the high crime of "counterfeit-
ing," which the federal government takes very seriously
indeed. Whereas the government may take a benign view of
all other torts and crimes, including mugging, robbery, and
murder, and it may worry about the "deprived youth" of the
criminal and treat him tenderly, there is one group of crimi-
nals whom no government ever coddles: the counterfeiters.
The counterfeiter is hunted down seriously and efficiently,
and he is salted away for a very long time; for he is commit-
ting a crime that the government takes very seriously: he is
interfering with the government's revenue: specifically, the
monopoly power to print money enjoyed by the Federal
Reserve.

"Money," in our economy, is pieces of paper issued by
the Federal Reserve, on which are engraved the following:
"This Note is Legal Tender for all Debts, Private, and Public." [p. 10]
This "Federal Reserve Note," and nothing else, is money, and
all vendors and creditors must accept these notes, like it or
not.

So: if the chronic inflation undergone by Americans, and
in almost every other country, is caused by the continuing
creation of new money, and if in each country its governmen-
tal "Central Bank" (in the United States, the Federal Reserve)
is the sole monopoly source and creator of all money, who
then is responsible for the blight of inflation? Who except the
very institution that is solely empowered to create money,
that is, the Fed (and the Bank of England, and the Bank of
Italy, and other central banks) itself?

In short: even before examining the problem in detail,
we should already get a glimmer of the truth: that the drum-
fire of propaganda that the Fed is manning the ramparts
against the menace of inflation brought about by others is
nothing less than a deceptive shell game. The culprit solely
responsible for inflation, the Federal Reserve, is continually
engaged in raising a hue-and-cry about "inflation," for which
virtually everyone else in society seems to be responsible.
What we are seeing is the old ploy by the robber who starts
shouting "Stop, thief!" and runs down the street pointing
ahead at others. We begin to see why it has always been
important for the Fed, and for other Central Banks, to invest
themselves with an aura of solemnity and mystery For, as
we shall see more fully, if the public knew what was going
on, if it was able to rip open the curtain covering the inscru-
table Wizard of Oz, it would soon discover that the Fed, far
from being the indispensable solution to the problem of
inflation, is itself the heart and cause of the problem. What [p. 11]
we need is not a totally independent resume help, all-powerful Fed; what
we need is no Fed at all.

Introduction: Money and Politics

Anonymous Coward — Tue, 23 Sep 2008 18:35:13 GMT

Revision 3 posted to Translations by Anonymous Coward on 9/23/2008 1:35:13 PM

Introduction: Money and Politics

Anonymous Coward — Tue, 23 Sep 2008 05:32:14 GMT

Revision 2 posted to Translations by Anonymous Coward on 9/23/2008 12:32:14 AM

Introduction: Money and Politics

Anonymous Coward — Tue, 23 Sep 2008 02:07:43 GMT

Revision 1 posted to Translations by Anonymous Coward on 9/22/2008 9:07:43 PM

Introduction: Money and Politics

"For a New Liberty" in Spanish

Mr FixIt — Fri, 10 Jun 2011 13:07:57 GMT

Current revision posted to Translations by Mr FixIt on 6/10/2011 8:07:57 AM

"For a New Liberty" in Spanish

Filed under: fanl, rothbard

Hi, I'm new here and I thought I'd contribute with something.

I found a pdf version of Rothbard's FANL in Spanish and was wondering if you guys were interested in having it in the Mises.org archivescustom essays. How can I upload it?

Thanks in advance for the help/advice.

Daniel

"For a New Liberty" in Spanish

Kelly11 — Mon, 14 Mar 2011 11:41:22 GMT

Revision 2 posted to Translations by Kelly11 on 3/14/2011 6:41:22 AM

"For a New Liberty" in Spanish

Filed under: fanl, rothbard

Hi, I'm new here and I thought I'd contribute with something.

I found a pdf version of Rothbard's FANL in Spanish and was wondering if you guys were interested in having it in the Mises.org archives custom essays. How can I upload it?

Thanks in advance for the help/advice.

Daniel

"For a New Liberty" in Spanish

Daniel — Wed, 29 Sep 2010 10:38:37 GMT

Revision 1 posted to Translations by Daniel on 9/29/2010 5:38:37 AM

Hi, I'm new here and I thought I'd contribute with something.

I found a pdf version of Rothbard's FANL in Spanish and was wondering if you guys were interested in having it in the Mises.org archives. How can I upload it?

Thanks in advance for the help/advice.

Daniel

Fed

Anonymous Coward — Wed, 24 Sep 2008 08:39:20 GMT

Current revision posted to Translations by Anonymous Coward on 9/24/2008 3:39:20 AM

Fed

The Case Against The Fed

Murray N. Rothbard

[[translate:Introduction: Money and Politics|Introduction: Money and Politics]]
[[translate:The Genesis of Money|The Genesis of Money]]
[[translate:What is the Optimum Quantity of Money|What is the Optimum Quantity of Money]]?
[[translate:Fed:Monetary Inflation and Counterfeiting|Monetary Inflation and Counterfeiting]]
Legalized Counterfeiting
Loan Banking
Deposit Banking
Problems for the Fractional-Reserve Banker: The Criminal Law
Problems for the Fractional-Reserve Banker: Insolvency
Booms and Busts
Types of Warehouse Receipts
Enter the Central Bank
Easing the Limits on Bank Credit Expansion
The Central Bank Buys Assets
Origins of the Federal Reserve: The Advent of the National Banking System
Origins of the Federal Reserve: Wall Street Discontent
Putting Cartelization Across: The Progressive Line
Putting a Central Bank Across: Manipulating a Movement, 1897-1902
The Central Bank Movement Revives, 1906-1910
Culmination at Jekyll Island
The Fed at Last: Morgan-Controlled Inflation
The New Deal and the Displacement of the Morgans
Deposit "Insurance"
How the Fed Rules and Inflates
What Can Be Done?
Index

The Ludwig von Mises Institute acknowledges with gratitude the generosity of Mr. Doug Casey and the Eugene B. Casey Foundation and the Hon. Ron Paul and CTAF, Inc., who made the publication of this book possible.

Copyright © 1994 by Murray N. Rothbard
All rights reserved. Written permission must be secured from the publisher to use or reproduce any part of this book, except for brief quotations in critical reviews or articles.

Published by the Ludwig von Mises Institute,
Auburn, Alabama 36849-5301.
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 94-073591
ISBN: 0-945466-17-X

Fed

Anonymous Coward — Tue, 23 Sep 2008 05:40:02 GMT

Revision 4 posted to Translations by Anonymous Coward on 9/23/2008 12:40:02 AM

Fed

The Case Against The Fed

Murray N. Rothbard

[[translate:Introduction: Money and Politics|Introduction: Money and Politics]]
[[translate:The Genesis of Money|The Genesis of Money]]
[[translate:What is the Optimum Quantity of Money|What is the Optimum Quantity of Money]]?
Monetary
[[translate:Fed:Monetary Inflation and CounterfeitingCounterfeiting|Monetary Inflation and Counterfeiting]]
Legalized Counterfeiting
Loan Banking
Deposit Banking
Problems for the Fractional-Reserve Banker: The Criminal Law
Problems for the Fractional-Reserve Banker: Insolvency
Booms and Busts
Types of Warehouse Receipts
Enter the Central Bank
Easing the Limits on Bank Credit Expansion
The Central Bank Buys Assets
Origins of the Federal Reserve: The Advent of the National Banking System
Origins of the Federal Reserve: Wall Street Discontent
Putting Cartelization Across: The Progressive Line
Putting a Central Bank Across: Manipulating a Movement, 1897-1902
The Central Bank Movement Revives, 1906-1910
Culmination at Jekyll Island
The Fed at Last: Morgan-Controlled Inflation
The New Deal and the Displacement of the Morgans
Deposit "Insurance"
How the Fed Rules and Inflates
What Can Be Done?
Index

Fed

Anonymous Coward — Tue, 23 Sep 2008 05:31:01 GMT

Revision 3 posted to Translations by Anonymous Coward on 9/23/2008 12:31:01 AM

Fed

The Case Against The Fed

Murray N. Rothbard

[[translate:Introduction: Money and Politics|Introduction: Money and Politics]]
[[translate:The Genesis of Money|The Genesis of Money]]
[[translate:What is the Optimum Quantity of Money|What is the Optimum Quantity of Money]]?
Monetary Inflation and Counterfeiting
Legalized Counterfeiting
Loan Banking
Deposit Banking
Problems for the Fractional-Reserve Banker: The Criminal Law
Problems for the Fractional-Reserve Banker: Insolvency
Booms and Busts
Types of Warehouse Receipts
Enter the Central Bank
Easing the Limits on Bank Credit Expansion
The Central Bank Buys Assets
Origins of the Federal Reserve: The Advent of the National Banking System
Origins of the Federal Reserve: Wall Street Discontent
Putting Cartelization Across: The Progressive Line
Putting a Central Bank Across: Manipulating a Movement, 1897-1902
The Central Bank Movement Revives, 1906-1910
Culmination at Jekyll Island
The Fed at Last: Morgan-Controlled Inflation
The New Deal and the Displacement of the Morgans
Deposit "Insurance"
How the Fed Rules and Inflates
What Can Be Done?
Index

Fed

Anonymous Coward — Tue, 23 Sep 2008 02:06:35 GMT

Revision 2 posted to Translations by Anonymous Coward on 9/22/2008 9:06:35 PM

Fed

The Case Against The Fed

Murray N. Rothbard

Introduction
- [[translate:Introduction: Money and Politics|Introduction: Money and Politics
- The Politics]]
- [[translate:The Genesis of Money
- What Money|The Genesis of Money]]
- [[translate:What is the Optimum Quantity of MoneyMoney|What is the Optimum Quantity of Money]]?
- Monetary Inflation and Counterfeiting
- Legalized Counterfeiting
- Loan Banking
- Deposit Banking
- Problems for the Fractional-Reserve Banker: The Criminal Law
- Problems for the Fractional-Reserve Banker: Insolvency
- Booms and Busts
- Types of Warehouse Receipts
- Enter the Central Bank
- Easing the Limits on Bank Credit Expansion
- The Central Bank Buys Assets
- Origins of the Federal Reserve: The Advent of the National Banking System
- Origins of the Federal Reserve: Wall Street Discontent
- Putting Cartelization Across: The Progressive Line
- Putting a Central Bank Across: Manipulating a Movement, 1897-1902
- The Central Bank Movement Revives, 1906-1910
- Culmination at Jekyll Island
- The Fed at Last: Morgan-Controlled Inflation
- The New Deal and the Displacement of the Morgans
- Deposit "Insurance"
- How the Fed Rules and Inflates
- What Can Be Done?
- Index
The Ludwig von Mises Institute acknowledges with gratitude the generosity of Mr. Doug Casey and the Eugene B. Casey Foundation and the Hon. Ron Paul and CTAF, Inc., who made the publication of this book possible.

Copyright © 1994 by Murray N. Rothbard
All rights reserved. Written permission must be secured from the publisher to use or reproduce any part of this book, except for brief quotations in critical reviews or articles.

Published by the Ludwig von Mises Institute,
Auburn, Alabama 36849-5301.
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 94-073591
ISBN: 0-945466-17-X

Fed

Anonymous Coward — Tue, 23 Sep 2008 01:59:06 GMT

Revision 1 posted to Translations by Anonymous Coward on 9/22/2008 8:59:06 PM

The Case Against The Fed

Murray N. Rothbard

Introduction: Money and Politics
The Genesis of Money
What is the Optimum Quantity of Money?
Monetary Inflation and Counterfeiting
Legalized Counterfeiting
Loan Banking
Deposit Banking
Problems for the Fractional-Reserve Banker: The Criminal Law
Problems for the Fractional-Reserve Banker: Insolvency
Booms and Busts
Types of Warehouse Receipts
Enter the Central Bank
Easing the Limits on Bank Credit Expansion
The Central Bank Buys Assets
Origins of the Federal Reserve: The Advent of the National Banking System
Origins of the Federal Reserve: Wall Street Discontent
Putting Cartelization Across: The Progressive Line
Putting a Central Bank Across: Manipulating a Movement, 1897-1902
The Central Bank Movement Revives, 1906-1910
Culmination at Jekyll Island
The Fed at Last: Morgan-Controlled Inflation
The New Deal and the Displacement of the Morgans
Deposit "Insurance"
How the Fed Rules and Inflates
What Can Be Done?
Index

READ ME

Anonymous Coward — Tue, 23 Sep 2008 05:35:34 GMT

Current revision posted to Translations by Anonymous Coward on 9/23/2008 12:35:34 AM

READ ME

There seems to be a bug with the 'Parent Page' feature where it isn't possible for the wiki to make a tree of pages but puts everything on the top level.

Anyone who figures this out feel free to fix the mess I've made so far.

Going to stop with the Case Against the Fed for now so since it is will be a PITA to fix if I make all the chapter pages in the top level.

[[translate:Test|Test]]

READ ME

Anonymous Coward — Tue, 23 Sep 2008 02:13:17 GMT

Revision 2 posted to Translations by Anonymous Coward on 9/22/2008 9:13:17 PM

READ ME

There seems to be a bug with the 'Parent Page' feature where it isn't possible for the wiki to make a tree of pages but puts everything on the top level.

Anyone who figures this out feel free to fix the mess I've made so far.

Going to stop with the Case Against the Fed for now so since it is will be a PITA to fix if I make all the chapter pages in the top level.

READ ME

Anonymous Coward — Tue, 23 Sep 2008 02:10:30 GMT

Revision 1 posted to Translations by Anonymous Coward on 9/22/2008 9:10:30 PM

There seems to be a bug with the 'Parent Page' feature where it isn't possible for the wiki to make a tree of pages but puts everything on the top level.

Anyone who figures this out feel free to fix the mess I've made so far.

Main

Anonymous Coward — Tue, 23 Sep 2008 05:34:08 GMT

Current revision posted to Translations by Anonymous Coward on 9/23/2008 12:34:08 AM

Main

Main page to get the ball rolling.

The Case Against the FedFed

Not translated but OCRed and (mostly) edited to correct mistakes.

Main

Anonymous Coward — Tue, 23 Sep 2008 02:02:38 GMT

Revision 2 posted to Translations by Anonymous Coward on 9/22/2008 9:02:38 PM

Main

Main page to get the ball rolling.

The Case Against the Fed

Not translated but OCRed and (mostly) edited to correct mistakes.

Main

Anonymous Coward — Tue, 23 Sep 2008 01:56:25 GMT

Revision 1 posted to Translations by Anonymous Coward on 9/22/2008 8:56:25 PM

Main page to get the ball rolling.

Translations

Extract from Rothbard's For a New Libery in Spanish

Extract from Rothbard's For a New Libery in Spanish

Extract from Rothbard's For a New Libery in Spanish

Extract from Rothbard's For a New Libery in Spanish

Extract from Rothbard's For a New Libery in Spanish

Introduction: Money and Politics

Introduction: Money and Politics

Introduction: Money and Politics

Introduction: Money and Politics

Introduction: Money and Politics

Introduction: Money and Politics

Introduction: Money and Politics

Introduction: Money and Politics

Introduction: Money and Politics

Introduction: Money and Politics

Introduction: Money and Politics

Introduction: Money and Politics

Introduction: Money and Politics

Introduction: Money and Politics

Introduction: Money and Politics

Introduction: Money and Politics

Introduction: Money and Politics

"For a New Liberty" in Spanish

"For a New Liberty" in Spanish

"For a New Liberty" in Spanish

"For a New Liberty" in Spanish

"For a New Liberty" in Spanish

Fed

Fed

The Case Against The Fed

Murray N. Rothbard

Contents

Fed

Fed

The Case Against The Fed

Murray N. Rothbard

Contents

Fed

Fed

The Case Against The Fed

Murray N. Rothbard

Contents

Fed

Fed

The Case Against The Fed

Murray N. Rothbard

Contents

Fed

The Case Against The Fed

Murray N. Rothbard

Contents

READ ME

READ ME

READ ME

READ ME

READ ME

Main

Main

Main

Main

Main