Aristotelian Liberals

Re: Fellowship of Reason

Eudaimonist — Tue, 03 Nov 2009 14:38:28 GMT

I just happened to surf on in and noticed this question. I'm months late in replying to it! I hope you are still around.

I'm a member of the Fellowship of Reason (FOR). Most members are reasonably described as "eudaimonist post-Objectivists", and that term describes me too. If you are one as well, you'd fit right in, no problem.

FOR is a philosophical community that aims to fill some of the roles for nontheists that church groups play in the lives of theists. However, they don't perform "charity work" (an Ayn Rand influence), but focus instead on providing opportunities for self-development and for socializing with other eudaimonists. For example, they hold a philosophy night where interested members study the ideas of some philosopher, and usually not an Objectivist one! The eudaimonists at FOR generally respect Ayn Rand's accomplishments in philosophy, but seek to expand their intellectual horizons.

Also, FOR is not a political activist group. (Members may do or vote for whatever they want as private individuals, of course.) While the majority hold "libertarian" (or Aristotelian liberal) political views, there is no political litmus test for membership. You'll find anarchocapitalists, constitutional minarchists, and whatnot.

I highly recommend the Fellowship of Reason.

Action as a Basic Axiom? (blog post)

wombatron — Fri, 26 Dec 2008 21:58:22 GMT

Link. Just a little mental masturbation in my spare time

Re: Foundationalism vs. Coherenticism

Jon Irenicus — Tue, 02 Dec 2008 18:19:34 GMT

Keep in mind he was a foundationalist as far as scientific explanation went.

Re: Foundationalism vs. Coherenticism

aestheticbend — Sun, 23 Nov 2008 20:20:55 GMT

The way that I understand the Posterior Analytics specifically Book 1 Ch 2-3 and Ch-19-21 seems to suggest a foundationalist account of knowledge, but given the difficulty of most of Aristotle's epistemological and metaphysical texts, I could be reading this wrong or missing something because of the language involved.

I am trying to figure out how the indemonstrable first principles would not be considered basic axioms from which all other knowledge can be justified? How can one integrate the idea of indemonstrable first principles with the idea of being justified in virtue of other beliefs? Perhaps Long is dealing with a very different brand of coherentism than I am familiar with.

Re: Foundationalism vs. Coherenticism

wombatron — Sun, 23 Nov 2008 19:39:11 GMT

Which section is this? That would be intriguing...

Re: Foundationalism vs. Coherenticism

aestheticbend — Sun, 16 Nov 2008 06:17:11 GMT

I need to read this book by Long....

There is one section from the Prior or Posterior Analytics by Aristotle, that I always read as a flat out rejection of coherentism, and an argument for foundationalism as superior.

A brief expose of neo-Aristotelian ethics

Jon Irenicus — Sun, 03 Aug 2008 16:11:51 GMT

For the benefit of fellow Aristotelians here, read this and please offer any opinions, criticisms or suggestions.

-Jon

Re: Fellowship of Reason

gplauche — Wed, 04 Jun 2008 21:14:08 GMT

[quote user="wombatron"]

Fellowship of Reason

Has anyone else heard about this group? From what I can tell, they are a eudaimonist post-Objectivist group (my kind of people ), with an emphasis on performing the roles traditionally performed by churches. I think that this is very interesting as, although I am not religious, I have seen churches do a lot of good.

[/quote]

Never heard of them before. Thanks for bringing them to my attention. I'll check the Fellowship out and try to remember to come back and give my thoughts.

Fellowship of Reason

wombatron — Fri, 30 May 2008 17:59:25 GMT

Fellowship of Reason

Re: Aristotelian ethics

Jon Irenicus — Fri, 16 May 2008 00:46:32 GMT

I agree. A lot of metaethics stems from bad metaphysics/epistemology (emotivism/quasi-realism being clear examples.) It's as if philosophy has just become a game divorced from real world pursuits, a kind of fetishism. I can't think of a course with more 'isms' than metaethics, although I like its abstract nature, when it does not involve waffling about the spawn of bad epistemology, or an exclusive focus on linguistic analysis. Some of it like Cornell Realism (non-reductive naturalism) and the internalism-externalism debate are interesting. The real difficulty isn't so much in situating Aristotle as it is in situating Kant, not surprisingly, because there are many ways of viewing his project, some of which can't be neatly filed under any one view. A real mess.

Re: Aristotelian ethics

gplauche — Thu, 15 May 2008 23:10:51 GMT

It seems like a pretty muddled subject to me. I'm not sure why academic philosophers have such a hard time understanding Aristotelian philosophy. I guess it is all the crap that has built up in philosophy over the millennia, particularly the past few hundred years, all the false dichotomies, pointless distinctions, and weird ways of thinking. They get it so ingrained in graduate school that they can't think straight anymore.

Moral properties are natural properties, but they supervene on other natural properties, yes. Moral properties are not reducible to them in the sense of being explainable in purely non-moral terms.

Re: Aristotelian ethics

Jon Irenicus — Thu, 15 May 2008 22:45:15 GMT

Non-reductionist in the sense that it is multiply realized by natural properties or supervenient on them. I was struggling to see where Aristotelianism fits in, because metaethics textbooks tend not to mention it past the point of a general description of naturalism. Reductionist naturalism entails reducing moral to non-moral properties.

Re: Aristotelian ethics

gplauche — Thu, 15 May 2008 21:35:00 GMT

[quote user="Jon Irenicus"]

Just wondering, in modern metaethical debate would Aristotelianism count as a non-reductionist naturalistic form of realism that accepts internalism? Or is it a reductionist form of naturalism?

-Jon

[/quote]

Non-reductionist with internalism, I think. How do you mean reductionism and non-reductionism exactly? Moral properties are natural properties but they are supervenient.

Aristotelian ethics

Jon Irenicus — Wed, 14 May 2008 23:54:28 GMT

Just wondering, in modern metaethical debate would Aristotelianism count as a non-reductionist naturalistic form of realism that accepts internalism? Or is it a reductionist form of naturalism?

-Jon

Re: Foundationalism vs. Coherenticism

Jon Irenicus — Tue, 13 May 2008 13:38:45 GMT

This has been a question of mine as well, ever since touching upon coherentism in my Philosophy course (Davidson's version of it.)

-Jon