In another thread I issued the challenge to provide a valid logical proof of any theory of natural law stated using precisely and unambiguously defined terms. (If you'd like to try, feel free to answer in that thread.) However, so far no such proof has been supplied.In light of this, I issue an even easier challenge:Provide a logically meaningful definition of "natural law," in which each term used is unambiguously defined.Or, if you prefer:Provide a logically meaningful definition of "natural rights," in which each term used is unambiguously defined, without making reference to "natural law" (unless you also define "natural law" as above). In so doing, be careful that the resulting theory does not boil down to subjective approval/disapproval, consequentialism/utilitarianism, or mere persuasion or advice - that would seem to defeat the purpose of calling something "natural law" or a "natural right."Note: If you use words with multiple interpretations, such as "ought," "should," "right/wrong," "good/bad," "objective value," or "man's nature," etc., please define these terms precisely and unambiguously.
Think outside the monopoly paradigm. Net-based microsecession | Why anarchy hasn't worked
February 17 - 1600 - Giordano Bruno is burnt alive by the catholic church. Aquinas : "much more reason is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted of heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put to death."
One good start is the Non-Aggression Principle, which is "You can do whatever you want as long as you don't injure anyone else."
Another good start is "Stealing is wrong (when individuals do it)." That rapidly leads to "Stealing is wrong when groups do it." and "Stealing is wrong when government bureaucrats do it." and "Taxation is theft!"
Another important point is "Private property is legitimate." Otherwise, why bother working or doing anything?
When you have an argument, at some point you need to have axioms. I take the above as axioms.
If you have ZERO axioms, you can't prove anything. If your goal is "Starting from absolutely no axioms, prove natural law!", you can't do it. You have to have some assumptions just to get started.
That's like saying "Starting from zero axioms, prove that 2+2=4!" You can't do it. You have to have some axioms about the way arithmetic works, in order to prove that 2+2=4.
I have my own blog at FSK's Guide to Reality. Let me know if you like it.
fsk:Another important point is "Private property is legitimate." Otherwise, why bother working or doing anything?
For example, this appears to be consequentialism. See the OP.
if actions did not have consequences then morality really would be bunk.
Where there is no property there is no justice; a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid
Fools! not to see that what they madly desire would be a calamity to them as no hands but their own could bring
Can I interpret your position as stating that morality is merely advice, as in, "Do this if you want these consequences?"
no.
AJ:Provide a logically meaningful definition of "natural rights," in which each term used is unambiguously defined, without making reference to "natural law" (unless you also define "natural law" as above).
Let me begin by saying that I will not attempt to defend "natural law," if by that we mean attempts to derive ethics from supposedly objective ends such as "the fulfillment of human nature" or "human flourishing." I agree with the OP that these approaches are dead-ends because they are too vague and they assume too much. Wouldn't history suggest that human nature is characterized more by war and statism than by peaceful interaction? And don't people like Stalin and Kim Jong-il "flourish" in their own way? In any case, this sort of natural-law argument does not prove that anyone should do anything.
However, that does not mean that entire concept of objective ethics must be rejected. Indeed, it is impossible to do so consistently, as I hope to demonstrate below.
First of all, an argument between two individuals only arises as a result of an actual disagreement between those individuals. If Alice says "I like chocolate," and Bob says "I don't like chocolate," then there is no actual disagreement because the term "like" refers to subjective preferences, and there is no contradiction involved when subjective preferences differ from one individual to another.
Thus, when Alice argues with Bob about whether something is "good" or "bad," she must assume that there is a standard of good and bad that is objectively valid for both her and Bob, and not merely a subjective preference.
So you might ask, "Why would anyone bother arguing about good or bad? Don't they see that such an argument would be just as meaningless as a debate about whether chocolate tastes good?" I'll get to that in a moment.
When Bob does something that Alice (subjectively) doesn't like, she has a choice: She can object, or she can refrain from objecting. If she does not object, then the question of ethics does not arise, and it would be meaningless to speak of Bob's action as "immoral." If, however, she does object, then she is engaging in an argument, which means that she assumes an objective standard of good and bad. Thus we see that Alice must argue about good and bad if she is to object to Bob's action.
Now that we know that Alice accepts objective ethics in order to object to Bob's action, we know that she must also have a reason why her objection is correct, if she is engaging in an argument. If she says "X is true, because I said so," then Bob will reply, "X is false, because I said so." As with the chocolate example, the lack of an objective standard of truth makes meaningful argumentation impossible.
But from all of this, where do we derive "natural rights" such as the right to life, liberty, and property? I will save that answer for another post, since I first want to know if anyone disagrees with what I have written here, but I'll give an example of the type of reasoning that leads to natural rights:
This proves that "It is not always right to kill another person," but falls short of proving that murder is wrong in all circumstances. In order to prove this, it is necessary to prove that the statement "Murder is right in some circumstances" implies that "Murder is right in all circumstances." (The same applies to the question of theft.) If this is successful, then we will see that there are certain types of actions with which interference cannot be rationally justified without leading to a contradiction. It is these actions that may be referred to as "natural rights."
Well there you have it. Pick it apart as you will.
Thank you, Zavoi.
Zavoi:When Bob does something that Alice (subjectively) doesn't like, she has a choice: She can object, or she can refrain from objecting. If she does not object, then the question of ethics does not arise, and it would be meaningless to speak of Bob's action as "immoral." If, however, she does object, then she is engaging in an argument, which means that she assumes an objective standard of good and bad. Thus we see that Alice must argue about good and bad if she is to object to Bob's action.
Cannot Alice also object on the grounds that she doesn't like the action? And possibly, that if Bob really thought about it he would stop liking it, too? Neither assume an "objective standard of good and bad" (not to mention that we have yet to define "good" and "bad" in this context).
But for the sake of argument, let's go ahead and assume Alice recognizes "objective ethics," ignoring for a moment the possibility that "objective ethics" may be a nonsense term - a possibility that will be important to keep in mind.
Zavoi:Now that we know that Alice accepts objective ethics in order to object to Bob's action, we know that she must also have a reason why her objection is correct, if she is engaging in an argument.
Well now it depends on what kind of reason she has for her objection. If the reason refers to consequences, for example, it is consequentialism. That would constitute a case for objective ethics, but only if "objective ethics" are defined as "helpful advice for achieving certain consequences." Sounds more like praxeology than ethics. Else please define "objective" more precisely to distinguish the two.
Zavoi: I'll give an example of the type of reasoning that leads to natural rights: Suppose that someone claims that "It is always right to kill another person."
I'll give an example of the type of reasoning that leads to natural rights:
I've refrained from asking until absolutely necessary, but here how are you defining "right"? I know it's tempting to say, "Whatever that 'someone' means by it," but then it gets confusing in (2) where you make guesses at what that someone might mean by "right."
Zavoi:2. If this claim is meant to constitute an objection to being interfered with while killing a person, then it must also entail the claim that "It is always wrong to interfere with someone's ability to kill another person."
And note that this allows for the person to merely claim an objection to them being interfered with while killing a person, in which case the conclusion would not follow.
Natural rights are.
Life is.
Liberty is.
Property is.
Without these rights that are, then no defining will happen. No exploring can even occur without these rights. How do you explore human nature or otherwise without living (life), choosing [(liberty) i.e. without being able to choose to explore this, that, or other], or person [(property) i.e. without being the human that you are? can't
As for natural law: A=A
A proof is a human is alive.
"I used to see a mountain as a mountain.. Thereafter.. when I saw a mountain; lo! it was not a mountain.. yet now of final tranquillity: I see a mountain just as a mountain as I used to.." - Master Yuan; molon labe
After reading The Ethics of Liberty for the third time, I think Rothbard has defined 'natural rights' as the methodology in developing ethics from systematic reasoning, contrasted to god, tradition, and arbitrary whim. He has labeled John Locke, Herbert Spencer, and Lysander Spooner as proponents of the 'natural law' methodology.
I think in order to critique Rothbard, one must not critique 'natural law', but to refute his specific approaches in developing ethics. Rothbard has made mistakes similar to Molyneux's Universally Preferable Behavior and Kant's categorical imperative. For instance, I claim the notion of 'universalizability' and the Kantian Golden Rule as meaningless concepts. In addition, I claim the notions that survival presupposes 'natural law' and that 'natural law' necessarily implies that the organism must maintain his future lifespan as non sequiturs. Furthermore, I believe that Rothbard rationalized his 'moral' intuitions in many (but not all) cases.
Life is filled with misinterpretations, misrepresentations, and prodigal folklore.
I'm not looking for proof or refutation here, just an unambiguous definition.
since you are facilitating these natural rights, then you are also able to do this yourself...
to pick an analogy it's time to cut the cord and walk on your own...
Lysander Spooner: The question still remains, how comes such a thing as "a nation" to exist? How do millions of men, scattered over an extensive territory --- each gifted by nature with individual freedom; required by the law of nature to call no man, or body of men, his masters; authorized by that law to seek his own happiness in his own way, to do what he will with himself and his property, so long as he does not trespass upon the equal liberty of others; authorized also, by that law, to defend his own rights, and redress his own wrongs; and to go to the assistance and defence of any of his fellow men who may be suffering any kind of injustice --- how do millions of such men come to be a nation, in the first place? How is it that each of them comes to be stripped of his natural, God-given rights, and to be incorporated, compressed, compacted, and consolidated into a mass with other men, whom he never saw; with whom he has no contract; and towards many of whom he has no sentiments but fear, hatred, or contempt? How does he become subjected to the control of men like himself, who, by nature, had no authority over him; but who command him to do this, and forbid him to do that, as if they were his sovereigns, and he their subject; and as if their wills and their interests were the only standards of his duties and his rights; and who compel him to submission under peril of confiscation, imprisonment, and death? Clearly all this is the work of force, or fraud, or both.
<Bush>No definitions there. How 'bout over here? Nope, no definitions here. Those definitions gotta be somewhere.</Bush>
definition, a way to explain to someone the meaning of a word they are unfamiliar with by describing the meaning of that word through a collection of some other words. (which they are familiar with)
so, please provide a list of all the words you are familiar with.
nirgrahamUK:so, please provide a list of all the words you are familiar with.
Include a french copy. I am working on a second language over here.
If you find something evil that wobbles, push it. - Gary North
liberty student: nirgrahamUK:so, please provide a list of all the words you are familiar with. Include a french copy. I am working on a second language over here.
I wish they would just expel Quebec and save us all the headache. Of course, our unemployment level would go up by the number of French teachers.
I see your point, that might take a while.........
AJ:Cannot Alice also object on the grounds that she doesn't like the action?
If all that Alice claimed was that she didn't like Bob's action, then this does not constitute an actual objection because it does not contradict anything that Bob is claiming—just as Alice's claim "I like chocolate" is not an objection to Bob's claim "I don't like chocolate." It would be as if Bob said "The sky is blue", and Alice replied "The ocean is blue." If there is no disagreement, there can be no real objection.
AJ:And possibly, that if Bob really thought about it he would stop liking it, too? [Emphasis added]
This is more interesting. Notice that it is only possible for Alice to make such a sure statement of cause-and-effect if she has determined the standard by which Bob likes or dislikes things. If Bob's likes and dislikes ("values") are subjective, then he is able to determine them for himself, and Alice cannot know for sure whether her claim is true. If, however, Alice's claim is true, then Bob's values are independent of his preferences, and are therefore objective, at least as far as Alice and Bob are concerned (see the definition for "objective" below).
AJ:Well now it depends on what kind of reason she has for her objection. If the reason refers to consequences, for example, it is consequentialism. That would constitute a case for objective ethics, but only if "objective ethics" are defined as "helpful advice for achieving certain consequences." Sounds more like praxeology than ethics.
I haven't gotten into the types of reasons that might be supplied as justifications for an objection. All I wanted to show is that some reason must be supplied (rather than no reason at all) if the objection is to be a meaningful one.
AJ:Else please define "objective" more precisely to distinguish the two.
"Objective" means "true or false independent of the preferences of people." It contrasts with "subjective," which refers to statements that do nothing more than describe someone's preferences, as in the chocolate example.
AJ:I've refrained from asking until absolutely necessary, but here how are you defining "right"? I know it's tempting to say, "Whatever that 'someone' means by it," but then it gets confusing in (2) where you make guesses at what that someone might mean by "right.
By "right," the person means "consistent with the objective ethical standard whose existence must be accepted by those who disagree with my claim."
AJ:And note that this allows for the person to merely claim an objection to them being interfered with while killing a person, in which case the conclusion would not follow.
The claim disproven by the numbered argument is the claim that "killing is always right." This is just one of many claims that a killer could use to justify their objection to being interfered with in a particular instance. The killer could also say "Killing is right in circumstance X, but not in circumstance Y," and indeed I have not here succeeded in disproving this claim, only in disproving the stronger and more generalized one.
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