This question is about ownership in non-human resources. Take self-ownership as a given. I want to better understand the basis for supporting the homesteading principle. Rothbard and Hoppe support the homesteading principle by dismissing the other alternatives.
If Crusoe picks some berries and Friday catches a fish, then either:
1. Crusoe owns the berries and Friday owns the fish (homesteading) 2. Friday owns the berries and Friday owns the fish (slavery). 3. Both men own half the berries and both men own half the fish (communism).
3 is dismissed as unfeasible. 2 is dismissed because it fails universalizability. But isn't there another possibility, which is both feasible and universalizable? Namely:
4. Friday owns the berries and Crusoe owns the fish ("reciprocal" homesteading).
This ethic could be extended to larger groups:
This seems feasible (slightly impractical, but not impossible like communism), and universalizable: everyone owns what the 'next man' appropriates.
Would Rothbard/Hoppe be including this possibility within one of the other two? If so, which one?
Truth and Liberty
"No army can stop an idea whose time has come." - Victor Hugo
(3) certainly isn't infeasible, especially with prior arrangements to formalize such a structure. It becomes increasingly impractical as new people arrive, each (by universality principle) accorded an equal share of total "property".
The alternative fourth possibility which you describe, appears to me an exercise in ridiculousity. One obvious implication is that, if there aren't other people around, A owns whatever he finds/homesteads. For what reason would this change, just because someone else shows up?
The other comment is that it lends itself to reductio: I mean, there could be a fifth possibility: everything I find belongs to my dog. Right? And everything my dog finds, belongs to me?
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David Z
"The issue is always the same, the government or the market. There is no third solution."
I agree it's a ridiculous ethic. It sounds like you reject it on the same grounds as (3)... impractical. But it is a distinct possibility, so if the justification for homesteading is to be that all other possibilities are either impractical or nonuniversalizable, this possibility should really be mentioned and knocked down as impractical.
Or did Rothbard think it was just too ridiculous to even mention, like your dog example?
Like I said, I don't put much stock in the "it's impractical" argument, because clearly it's not impractical in many circumstances.
I'd fall back on the universality principle, really.
But it passes the universalization test, doesn't it?
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