Political Theory

Re: Natural Rights Justifications

Stephen — Sat, 01 Mar 2008 05:55:51 GMT

pauled:
I agree with all of this. Take two chapters of Aristotle, and call a philosopher in the morning. :)

Sorry, I'm kinda new with the whole quoting other ppl thing. This was supposed to be a response to gplauche. The posting right before your posting. Sorry fot the confusion. I agree with everything you've said on this forum.

Re: Natural Rights Justifications

pauled — Sat, 01 Mar 2008 00:52:34 GMT

Stephen Forde:

I think that we are arguing past each other, and missing each other's main points. A judgement of value can neither be true or false. I agree with you on that point. Whether or not a person holds any particular value judgement, is a matter of truth.

I don't agree that whether a persion holds value judgement is not a matter of truth. Long's example of an "invalid argument" is actually a valid argument,

I disapprove of robbery.
Taxation is robbery.
Therefore, I dissapprove of taxation.
(pg. 151, Wittgenstein, Austrian Economics, and The Logic of Action)

First of all, approval and disapproval are actions. Secondly, the law of non-contradiction applies to actions. I cannot be both typing and not typing this sentence. So unless I think of taxation and robbery differently, disapproving of one is disapproving of the other.

A declares that he ought to go to church on sunday. Now, if he actually does go to church we can say that he actually held this belief. If he does not, than we can say that he did not actually hold this belief.

AE only serves as a negative critique of justifiable norms. It bounds the scope of norms that can be consistently justified without pain of contradiction.

I agree with all of this. Take two chapters of Aristotle, and call a philosopher in the morning. :)

Re: Natural Rights Justifications

a_goedker — Fri, 29 Feb 2008 21:52:57 GMT

I highly recomend John Locke's "Second Treatise on Government".

Re: Natural Rights Justifications

Stephen — Fri, 29 Feb 2008 08:50:36 GMT

I think that we are arguing past each other, and missing each other's main points. A judgement of value can neither be true or false. I agree with you on that point. Whether or not a person holds any particular value judgement, is a matter of truth.

I don't agree that whether a persion holds value judgement is not a matter of truth. Long's example of an "invalid argument" is actually a valid argument,

I disapprove of robbery.
Taxation is robbery.
Therefore, I dissapprove of taxation.
(pg. 151, Wittgenstein, Austrian Economics, and The Logic of Action)

First of all, approval and disapproval are actions. Secondly, the law of non-contradiction applies to actions. I cannot be both typing and not typing this sentence. So unless I think of taxation and robbery differently, disapproving of one is disapproving of the other.

A declares that he ought to go to church on sunday. Now, if he actually does go to church we can say that he actually held this belief. If he does not, than we can say that he did not actually hold this belief.

AE only serves as a negative critique of justifiable norms. It bounds the scope of norms that can be consistently justified without pain of contradiction.

Re: Natural Rights Justifications

pauled — Fri, 29 Feb 2008 08:16:48 GMT

gplauche:
The problem is this. Sure, even accepting the fact-value dichotomy and the is-ought gap one can say that value judgments are facts of reality - in this sense, it is a fact that people make value judgments, that person P has value judgment X about Y. This isn't enough to support any ethical theory, however. And it isn't enough to support Argumentation Ethics. Why? Because from the fact that "I like X" or "I think X is good" it doesn't follow that "X really is good." With strict fact-value dichotomy and the consequently insurmountable is-ought gap, it simply cannot be the case that X really is good as a matter of ontological fact. I just like X. I think it is good. That's it. These subjective preferences, emotions, or what have you, have no truth-value regarding whether X really is good or not. Hence, it is impossible from the perspective of Hoppe's AE to engage in performative contradictions with norms of this kind.

But AE does not merely observe that an arguer may happen to value say, the truth, for instance. It observes that a commitment to truth is implicit in argumentation. A person who argues, implicitly commits to the pursuit of truth and cannot deny this is the case without implicitly demonstrating his denial is false. It is a contradiction to propose that one is not interested in the truth, because the mere stating of any truth proposition implies the opposite - that one is interested in the truth. AE does not simply deal in subjective preferences; it deals with norms that are essential and implied in the act of argumentation. So the question is not whether truth or any other value or norm that one commits to during argumentation "really is good or not", the question is, can one participate in argumentation without implicitly committing to this and other such values or norms. The answer is no; they are unavoidable in argumentation. And therefore, it is impossible to justify norms which contradict these norms.

Re: Natural Rights Justifications

Geoffrey Allan Plauche — Fri, 29 Feb 2008 07:07:59 GMT

Stephen Forde:

Check out the last paragraph in page 19 of Theory and History. Mises says that value judgement are facts of the universe. When a person says "I like chocolate cake", they may be telling the truth, or they may be lying. They may actually like chocolate cake, or not. So existentially, they are subject to the same validification and falsification as any other description of the state of affairs within the universe.

Similarily, if one proposes that they ought to act in a particular manner, they act in accordance with their proposed norm, or they don't. If they do, we can say that they hold their proposed norm to be true. If they don't, then we can say that they do not hold it to be true. We can conclude that existentially, it is false.

Stephen,

The problem is this. Sure, even accepting the fact-value dichotomy and the is-ought gap one can say that value judgments are facts of reality - in this sense, it is a fact that people make value judgments, that person P has value judgment X about Y. This isn't enough to support any ethical theory, however. And it isn't enough to support Argumentation Ethics. Why? Because from the fact that "I like X" or "I think X is good" it doesn't follow that "X really is good." With strict fact-value dichotomy and the consequently insurmountable is-ought gap, it simply cannot be the case that X really is good as a matter of ontological fact. I just like X. I think it is good. That's it. These subjective preferences, emotions, or what have you, have no truth-value regarding whether X really is good or not. Hence, it is impossible from the perspective of Hoppe's AE to engage in performative contradictions with norms of this kind.

For more on this, see chapter 10 of Roderick Long's book draft Wittgenstein, Austrian Economics, and the Logic of Action, especially from page 149 onward. Roderick specifically addresses your remarks about holding something to be true. Holding something to be true is not the same thing as its being true; the former does not necessarily entail the latter.

There are other problems with AE as well, but this one in particular is utterly devastating.

P.S. As I've noted in a previous discussion with Paul, Roderick does mention Hoppe's AE as an attempt to develop an objective ethics but Roderick could and should apply his arguments against Mises's ethical subjectivism against Hoppe's AE as well.

Re: Natural Rights Justifications

Stephen — Fri, 29 Feb 2008 06:41:52 GMT

Check out the last paragraph in page 19 of Theory and History. Mises says that value judgement are facts of the universe. When a person says "I like chocolate cake", they may be telling the truth, or they may be lying. They may actually like chocolate cake, or not. So existentially, they are subject to the same validification and falsification as any other description of the state of affairs within the universe.

Similarily, if one proposes that they ought to act in a particular manner, they act in accordance with their proposed norm, or they don't. If they do, we can say that they hold their proposed norm to be true. If they don't, then we can say that they do not hold it to be true. We can conclude that existentially, it is false.

Re: Natural Rights Justifications

Geoffrey Allan Plauche — Fri, 29 Feb 2008 03:41:52 GMT

pauled:
It transcends the is-ought gap. It ignores and side-steps it. It succeeds regardless of what side of it one comes down on. All AE does is acknowledge what facts and norms are logically implied in the act of argumentation, and observes that no one can deny these facts or norms, without falling into contradiction one's self. All things implied in the act of argumentation must be understood as ultimately justified.

Paul, once again, it can't transcend, ignore, or side-step the is-ought gap and fact-value dichotomy. If these are true, and Hoppe thinks they are, then AE is sunk. The status of norms don't allow for the performative contradiction that is necessary for AE to work. If they aren't true (and I think they aren't), then AE is unnecessary and elaboration of an actual ethical theory is possible.

Re: Natural Rights Justifications

pauled — Fri, 29 Feb 2008 02:36:27 GMT

Inquisitor:
The real problem with AE (and one that Geoffrey has pointed out elsewhere), and the one that shook my confidence in it, is that it accepts the ought-is gap and the fact-value dichotomy. As Geoffrey has mentioned, what exactly is the status of norms if this is taken to be true? Subjective preferences? And here is where AE will run into a problem similar to that that faces emotivism as well as quasi-realism, i.e. that the contradiction involved is neither a logical one nor a performative one, because norms are not truth-apt (should one accept the ought-is gap.) Geoffrey can better elaborate this than I can, but it is a grave problem for it - if the proponent of AE rejects the ought-is gap it is useless, and if they accept it, it fails.

It transcends the is-ought gap. It ignores and side-steps it. It succeeds regardless of what side of it one comes down on. All AE does is acknowledge what facts and norms are logically implied in the act of argumentation, and observes that no one can deny these facts or norms, without falling into contradiction one's self. All things implied in the act of argumentation must be understood as ultimately justified.

Re: Natural Rights Justifications

pauled — Fri, 29 Feb 2008 02:28:50 GMT

Donny with an A:

I'm sorry, but I can't see how you can talk about justice without making any value statement. The claim "Action X is unjust" seems to entail "Action X is bad."

Well, if you study AE, you will see that Hoppe does exactly that. He keeps the entire discussion in the realm of what "is" and must be in play during an argumentation. And this includes certain logical assumptions regarding norms as well as facts. So via an entirely logical and praxeological application of reason to the act of argumentative justification, he deduces the validity of the libertarian ethic.

So, anyone who thinks justice is good, will agree that the libertarian ethic and all that it entails is good. But there are certainly those who do not always think justice is good. They're not libertarians though.

Re: Natural Rights Justifications

Inquisitor — Fri, 29 Feb 2008 02:28:04 GMT

The real problem with AE (and one that Geoffrey has pointed out elsewhere), and the one that shook my confidence in it, is that it accepts the ought-is gap and the fact-value dichotomy. As Geoffrey has mentioned, what exactly is the status of norms if this is taken to be true? Subjective preferences? And here is where AE will run into a problem similar to that that faces emotivism as well as quasi-realism, i.e. that the contradiction involved is neither a logical one nor a performative one, because norms are not truth-apt (should one accept the ought-is gap.) Geoffrey can better elaborate this than I can, but it is a grave problem for it - if the proponent of AE rejects the ought-is gap it is useless, and if they accept it, it fails.

Re: Natural Rights Justifications

Donny with an A — Fri, 29 Feb 2008 02:18:52 GMT

I'm sorry, but I can't see how you can talk about justice without making any value statement. The claim "Action X is unjust" seems to entail "Action X is bad."

Re: Natural Rights Justifications

pauled — Fri, 29 Feb 2008 02:08:11 GMT

Donny with an A:

Thanks, Paul. Perhaps an analogy would help. Let's say we're playing basketball. It seems uncontroversial to say that you are entitled to try to win the game. But it seems equally uncontroversial to say that I am entitled to try to stop you. If I am entitled to try to beat you, then you don't have a right to win the game that is similar to the right of self-ownership. But it would seem odd to say that you have no right to try to win. Does that make sense?

The difference is rooted in two ways of defining the word "right." On one meaning, if I have the right to do something, then it means that I don't act wrongly if I try to do it. But on the other meaning, if I have a right to do something, then it means that you act wrongly if you try to stop me from doing it. I'm saying that argumentation does presuppose a right of the first meaning, but not one of the second meaning. And because Hoppe wants to justify self-ownership, which is a right of the second kind, he fails.

I used to love the analogy. But they just never seem to be similar enough to the question at hand - to the person not presenting it.

So let me go direct to the discussion of the concept of "a right". I understand that you don't see argumentation as demonstrating that one is "wrong" in trying to stop another from arguing. I agree with you. But I think AE totally side-steps the right/wrong question. It does not demonstrate and argumentation does not presuppose that one is wrong to prevent an intended argumentation from taking place. The focus is elsewhere. The focus is "justice" and "justification". While we do tend to see what is "justified" as what is "right/good”, right and wrong (good/bad) are outside of AE. Connecting justice to goodness is a subjective thing. What is not subjective, but is instead entirely grounded in reason, is justice. Logically, while one argues, this person must assume that he can argue, and that also, he is justified in arguing. It's a logically interwoven necessity. To argue is to demonstrate implicitly at least a commitment to the idea that arguing is a valid act for the person to engage in. This is all that AE recognizes and requires. All that comes out of it is that certain facts and norms that are consistent with those necessarily supposed in argumentation are logically justified. And just as you claim, it says nothing about the right or wrong of it. It is only when someone comes along and says something like "Hey, justice is good!" that we finally make the justice-goodness connection. Until then, AE is all about what is justified and what is not. That's it.

Re: Natural Rights Justifications

pauled — Fri, 29 Feb 2008 01:35:39 GMT

Before i answer that, i wanted to present my own rip off of your Socrates-Jones debate. It's not meant to be as much of a logical rebuttal, as just something i find really funny as well. Well, without further ado:

Jones: "That fellow has stabbed you in the back; has taken your silver, and he is now leaving you to die. That's not right!"

Socrates: "This has nothing to do with right and wrong. I might have tried to stop him if you had mentioned him sooner. But I don't see any reason why my interest in not being robbed and murdered is inherently more important than his interest in robbing and murdering me, such that he would be wrong to try to profit at the expense of my life."

Jones: "So then do you not want me to seek justice on your behalf?"

Socrates: "Hold on, Jones. You're getting ahead of yourself. Let's get out in the open that I agree that ethical systems should apply to all people; if I have the right to self-ownership, then you do too. We agree on that, right?"

Jones: "Yes, and there is some objective or logical basis on which we can say he was not justified in robbing, stabbing, and leaving you to die."

Socrates: "I don't think so. If I wanted to rob and kill him, I would be perfectly within my limits to try to rob and kill him, and he would be just as well within his limits to try to stop me."

Jones: "I guess. But that doesn't mean that he was justified in robbing, stabbing, and leaving you to die!"

Socrates: "Well no, not if "being justified" means that I have the right not to be murdered. Just as it's okay for him to murder me, it's okay for me to try to stop him. To argue otherwise would be contradictory. But as I said, when I argue, I don't need to presuppose that I have the right not to be interfered with - or a right not to be murdered."

Jones: <Blank stare>.

Socrates: "Think about it this way: if he is entitled to try to rob and murder me, then clearly I don't own myself, right?"

Jones: "That's right."

Socrates: "But even if he is entitled to try to rob and murder me, surely I am entitled to try to stop him, right?"

Jones: "I think that's clearly true, Socrates."

Socrates: "So in the same way, if he is entitled to try to stop me from arguing, then clearly I don't own myself. But even if he is entitled to try to stop me from arguing, I am surely entitled to try to argue. Therefore, I need not own myself in order to be entitled to try to argue."

Jones: "But..."

Socrates: "But nothing. My arguing is in no way inconsistent with my view that I do not own myself, and that you do not own yourself either. Accordingly, the universe is as it should be - I think I'll die now."

Jones: "But, before you do… So I guess I should not try to seek retribution for this, since no injustice has occurred?"

Socrates: "Just as he is entitled to try to rob and murder me, and just as surely I am entitled to try to stop him, you are just as entitled to seek retribution from him on my behalf."

Jones: "And yet i suppose he is just as entitled to deny any form of repayment for his actions against you?"

Socrates: "Of course. Duh!"

Jones: "Bummer."

Re: Natural Rights Justifications

Donny with an A — Fri, 29 Feb 2008 00:37:04 GMT

Thanks, Paul. Perhaps an analogy would help. Let's say we're playing basketball. It seems uncontroversial to say that you are entitled to try to win the game. But it seems equally uncontroversial to say that I am entitled to try to stop you. If I am entitled to try to beat you, then you don't have a right to win the game that is similar to the right of self-ownership. But it would seem odd to say that you have no right to try to win. Does that make sense?

The difference is rooted in two ways of defining the word "right." On one meaning, if I have the right to do something, then it means that I don't act wrongly if I try to do it. But on the other meaning, if I have a right to do something, then it means that you act wrongly if you try to stop me from doing it. I'm saying that argumentation does presuppose a right of the first meaning, but not one of the second meaning. And because Hoppe wants to justify self-ownership, which is a right of the second kind, he fails.