Wilderness:
"...Rothbard points out that market forces would determine the outcome..."
Here is the passage I'm referring to:
"Specifically, the concrete form of anarchist legal institutions---judges, arbitrators, procedural methods for resolving disputes, etc.---would indeed grow by a market invisible-hand process, while the basic Law Code....would have to be agreed upon by all judicial agencies..." (p.236)
Rothbard is saying that in his vision of AnCap, market forces can determine the concrete structure of, for example, a PDA (who is the president, where its offices are located, who its customers are, etc...).
You seem to be implying that in the Rothbardian vision, maybe the Law Code itself would grow by a market invisible-hand process. My difficulty with this idea is I'm not sure where that idea is clearly articulated. I can see how in this vision individual choice applies to the concrete structure of various institutions within the given Legal Code. I don't see how individual choice applies to the Legal Code itself.
"I asked what principle would determine a logical separation between PDA and Law Code."
Well, in the context of AnCap as Rothbard is outlining it, he has provided a definite separation, since he clearly says that a market invisible-hand process can determine the form of the PDA, but not the Law Code. The Law Code is considered a given, and singular, as I understand this conception. So the distinction or separation you are referring to is coming from Rothbard. You seem to be saying that there need not be a separation between the two in some way. That is a separate issue. If there exists an AnCap vision of PDA and the Law Code as a unified entity, please cite an essay or essay passage where this vision is explained. In other words, please refer to an elaborated explanation where someone is making the argument for not logically separating the PDA and the Law Code as you are arguing.
"I know Kinsella and Rothbard both advocate non-initiation of physical aggression."
I don't deny this, and I believe that this general moral principle is not only admirable and virtuous, but in some sense an original founding principle of libertarianism.
But the problem is that different Law Codes define what constitutes aggression. For the Randian, it is violation of both copyrights and patents, for the Rothbardian, it is violation of copyrights but not patents, and for some present day libertarians, the very institutions of intellectual property themselves constitute aggression. These are essentially three different theories of when someone gets put in jail (i.e., Law Codes).
So the question is simply whether there is individual choice with respect to Law Codes in Rothbard's vision of AnCap?
"Any PDA I choose, I would make an educated determination that such a PDA is in line with natural law"
My point was that in the version of AnCap referred to (pages 236-237 of TEoL), the Law Code is something distinctly different from the PDA.
My general question (which you are under no obligation to answer) is: what about when in your (or someone's) educated determination, the Law Code itself is not in line with natural law? Can they choose another? "Should" they be able to? Etc., etc....
It's a general question posed to this version of AnCap. I'm not saying that private individuals don't have their own ideas about a solution, or that maybe there isn't a written treatment of this question somewhere (if so, people may want to see it). I'm posing the question as against this specific conception as it is outlined in the pages and passages in question. Granted that every social thinker may have their own private opinions. But as to the theory as it is described by the author himself---his intended meaning in expounding the theory---how is this situation conceived? I'm not asking about your private theory. I'm asking about the theory written in The Ethics of Liberty.
"It would be preposterous to assert apodictically that science will never succeed in developing a praxeological aprioristic doctrine of political organization..." (Mises, UF, p.98)
February 17 - 1600 - Giordano Bruno is burnt alive by the catholic church. Aquinas : "much more reason is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted of heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put to death."
Adam Knott: I believe that this general moral principle is...in some sense an original founding principle of libertarianism.
Adam Knott: I don't see how individual choice applies to the Legal Code itself.
I don't see how individual choice applies to the Legal Code itself.
natural right of liberty
Adam Knott: "I asked what principle would determine a logical separation between PDA and Law Code." In other words, please refer to an elaborated explanation where someone is making the argument for not logically separating the PDA and the Law Code as you are arguing.
In other words, please refer to an elaborated explanation where someone is making the argument for not logically separating the PDA and the Law Code as you are arguing.
Adam... This dialogue began with me stating I would shop at a PDA, insurance agency, private detective agency, etc... that is logical. How does a defense agency, the humans acting, not recognize logic? You stated what if they didn't. I stated that's what's happening now and I'm shopping for a new one, etc... I don't like to repeat myself it gets tiresome and becomes a waste of time. I would hope it would for anybody else that has much else to do in their life than dialogue on an internet forum. I like to dialogue here, but I also don't find it fruitful to have to repeat what I said earlier.
I asked for a principle that states that a PDA need not recognize logic/law. I can not continue this dialogue if you cannot point out how a PDA and logic (human action) are impossible, which you stated what if they are not (therefore their adjunction is impossible). If it is necessary for human action to resolve scarcity conflicts and argumentation is a specie of human action (denial or affirmation in dialogue), this being, point out to me the principle that logically separates a PDA and Law Code. I can't continue if you don't for I pointed out to you that I will not shop where it is illogical.
Adam Knott: "I know Kinsella and Rothbard both advocate non-initiation of physical aggression." I don't deny this, and I believe that this general moral principle is not only admirable and virtuous, but in some sense an original founding principle of libertarianism. But the problem is that different Law Codes define what constitutes aggression. For the Randian, it is violation of both copyrights and patents, for the Rothbardian, it is violation of copyrights but not patents, and for some present day libertarians, the very institutions of intellectual property themselves constitute aggression. These are essentially three different theories of when someone gets put in jail (i.e., Law Codes).
yeah, various insurance agencies. we've already discussed this. As a side note, Rand, though I haven't read her writings, was not a libertarian and from what I heard she didn't like them. So your example could have included Bush's or Obama's version too.
Adam Knott: My general question (which you are under no obligation to answer) is: what about when in your (or someone's) educated determination, the Law Code itself is not in line with natural law? Can they choose another? "Should" they be able to? Etc., etc....
already answered this.
"I used to see a mountain as a mountain.. Thereafter.. when I saw a mountain; lo! it was not a mountain.. yet now of final tranquillity: I see a mountain just as a mountain as I used to.." - Master Yuan; molon labe
Zavoi: When I said "at least in the beginning...", I was referring to this argument: Hence, one must conclude that emotivism falters, because if it were true, then it could not even say and mean what it says—it simply would not exist as a position that could be discussed and evaluated with regard to its validity. But if it is a meaningful position which can be discussed, then this fact belies its very own basic premise. Moreover, the fact that it is indeed such a meaningful position, it should be noted, cannot even be disputed, as one cannot communicate and argue that one cannot communicate and argue. Rather, it must be presupposed of any intellectual position, that it is meaningful and can be argued with regard to its cognitive value, simply because it is presented in a language and communicated. To argue otherwise would already implicitly admit its validity. [TSC, p. 129] This isn't exactly the same as the argument I have given, so don't think that I don't acknowledge that Hoppe's explanation is unclear and poorly-worded.
When I said "at least in the beginning...", I was referring to this argument:
Hence, one must conclude that emotivism falters, because if it were true, then it could not even say and mean what it says—it simply would not exist as a position that could be discussed and evaluated with regard to its validity. But if it is a meaningful position which can be discussed, then this fact belies its very own basic premise. Moreover, the fact that it is indeed such a meaningful position, it should be noted, cannot even be disputed, as one cannot communicate and argue that one cannot communicate and argue. Rather, it must be presupposed of any intellectual position, that it is meaningful and can be argued with regard to its cognitive value, simply because it is presented in a language and communicated. To argue otherwise would already implicitly admit its validity. [TSC, p. 129]
This isn't exactly the same as the argument I have given, so don't think that I don't acknowledge that Hoppe's explanation is unclear and poorly-worded.
Well, Hoppe's argument here is not unclear, it's just a misunderstanding. He writes as if emotivism is an ethical theory, when it is merely a theory about what people mean when they use ethical language. Emotivism is the position that when people say "Stealing is wrong," all they really mean is "Boo to stealing" or "Down with stealing." But with this definition, Hoppe's paragraph makes no sense:
"[Emotivism] simply would not exist as a position that could be discussed and evaluated with regard to its validity"
But to determine whether emotivism is valid would require no more and no less than figuring out what people intend to mean when they say "Stealing is wrong," which of course is something that can be discussed and evaluated. If Hoppe had written,
"'Boo to stealing' simply does not exist as a position that can be discussed and evaluated with regard to its validity,"
He may have had a point. But emotivism is not "Boo to stealing" or "Boo to" anything. [By the way, emotivism is not my position.]
Think outside the monopoly paradigm. Net-based microsecession | Why anarchy hasn't worked
Zavoi:The context in which this position was raised was in an argument between a libertarian and a non-libertarian. We were trying to furnish Bob with an argument that he could use to refute any argument that Alice could make against what he's doing (such as living, earning income, and so on). The objection that you raised was, "But couldn't Alice deny that 'objective obligation' is meaningful?"
Sorry, I lost track of the exact context. The thread has gone through quite a few twists and turns, but I think we're still stuck at the beginning with defining the terms.
Zavoi:in order to be consistent the libertarian must reject any claim such as "It is objectively wrong to be a libertarian," either by saying that it's false or by saying that it's meaningless. However, non-cognitivism/emotivism makes no such claim, and so it's perfectly consistent to simultaneously accept the non-cognitivist/emotivist position and be a libertarian (as you yourself demonstrate).
I'm with you here.
Zavoi:All we have to show is that it is impossible to make any claim that is both true and inconsistent with libertarian actions. This is the best "proof of libertarianism" that anyone could ask for.
It sounds like you're saying here, as Hoppe does, that it's impossible to claim any objective ethical position that is both true and inconsistent with libertarian actions. Hence, if any objective ethical theory is true, the libertarian objective ethical theory would have to be the only one. This I can fully agree with, but I also don't think it necessarily says anything significant, because I don't see that "objective ethic" is well-defined, and therefore I don't see that it can be "true" in any sense.
Stephen, underline added, bold portions by AJ: A right is just a claim to something. If A claims to own his body, if he proposes the norm to B that he [ought to?] have control over his body that is uninhibited by B, B is unable to consistently propose a contrary claim. B cannot consistently propose a claim to A's body. For B to do so, he would have to recognize A as an independent decision making unit, and recognize A as being in control of his own body to begin with, as a precondition for A to even consider B's claim in the first place.
A right is just a claim to something. If A claims to own his body, if he proposes the norm to B that he [ought to?] have control over his body that is uninhibited by B, B is unable to consistently propose a contrary claim. B cannot consistently propose a claim to A's body. For B to do so, he would have to recognize A as an independent decision making unit, and recognize A as being in control of his own body to begin with, as a precondition for A to even consider B's claim in the first place.
Assuming you did intend the "ought to" I added (i.e., it is implied in the concept of a norm but I wanted to spell it out), how does the second underlined portion contradict the first? It seems you are saying, in effect, "A claims he ought to have control over his body, but B cannot consistently claim otherwise without recognizing that A has control over his body." Where is the inconsistency for B? B can surely recognize that A has control but still claim he ought not have it.
Stephen: thefreedictionary:Emotivism: the theory that moral utterances do not have a truth value but express the feelings of the speaker, so that murder is wrong is equivalent to down with murder thefreedictionary:Subjectivism: the meta-ethical doctrine that there are no absolute moral values but that these are variable in the same way as taste is thefreedictionary:Relativism: A theory, especially in ethics or aesthetics, that conceptions of truth and moral values are not absolute but are relative to the persons or groups holding them. thefreedictionary:Non-cognitivism: the meta-ethical view that moral statements lack truth-value and do not assert propositions. A noncognitivist denies the cognitivist claim that "moral judgments are capable of being objectively true, because they describe some feature of the world."[1] If moral statements cannot be true, and if one cannot know something that is not true, noncognitivism implies that moral knowledge is impossible
thefreedictionary:Emotivism: the theory that moral utterances do not have a truth value but express the feelings of the speaker, so that murder is wrong is equivalent to down with murder
thefreedictionary:Subjectivism: the meta-ethical doctrine that there are no absolute moral values but that these are variable in the same way as taste is
thefreedictionary:Relativism: A theory, especially in ethics or aesthetics, that conceptions of truth and moral values are not absolute but are relative to the persons or groups holding them.
thefreedictionary:Non-cognitivism: the meta-ethical view that moral statements lack truth-value and do not assert propositions. A noncognitivist denies the cognitivist claim that "moral judgments are capable of being objectively true, because they describe some feature of the world."[1] If moral statements cannot be true, and if one cannot know something that is not true, noncognitivism implies that moral knowledge is impossible
Thanks for posting these definitions.
Stephen:To the extent that they are different, they are just soft variants of each other.
As for emotivism and non-cognitivism, they are both simplistic and easily disproven as far as universal application goes. Just find anyone who merely intends something different - something besides yay/boo or nonsense - by their moral statements and you've disproven both positions. Example: A person who says, "By 'That's wrong' I mean 'People around here don't like that'." Neither emotivism or non-cognitivism applies to such a person.
However, it is surely true that some people sometimes do merely mean "yay/boo" or something non-sensical when they use ethical wording. Or sometimes they mean multiple different things, including but not limited to implications of the legal, religious, consequentialist, group opinionist, or threatening sort. Hence my position on meta-ethics reflects the broad diversity of actual usage senses for these words in the English language at least.
Stephen:If there is no civilized way of settling disputes according to fair rules, might makes right is the only social norm which prevails, since everybodies claims are just as good as anybody else's.
What does this have to do with the foregoing?
We could also say it this way: A proposes that he and B adopt a norm that he have full control over his body uninhibited by B.
Since, you want every vague word to be defined, I am trying to state it in a way that is simple and clear without using any unambiguous language. The "ought to" is unnecessary and redundant. And now the contradiction follows.
Spence: You ever kill anybody?
Sam: I hurt somebody's feelings once.
Note: for the purposes of this post, when I say "libertarian," I mean that as an abbreviation for "someone who lives, uses property, and does all those things that libertarianism holds to be rights": in other words, with regard to action and not mere internal belief.
AJ:But to determine whether emotivism is valid would require no more and no less than figuring out what people intend to mean when they say "Stealing is wrong," which of course is something that can be discussed and evaluated. If Hoppe had written, "'Boo to stealing' simply does not exist as a position that can be discussed and evaluated with regard to its validity," He may have had a point. But emotivism is not "Boo to stealing" or "Boo to" anything.
He may have had a point. But emotivism is not "Boo to stealing" or "Boo to" anything.
This is why I think that Hoppe's isn't the best possible explanation. It is not necessary (from the point of view of the libertarian) to categorically disprove emotivism (or non-cognitivism or whatever -ism), because there is nothing about emotivism per se that is inconsistent with libertarianism. Emotivism as such has nothing to say about libertarianism. It is only when the emotivist begins to make statements about libertarianism (such as, say, "Boo to libertarianism") that the need for a refutation might possibly arise. And one possible refutation is that such statements lack propositional content.
AJ:[By the way, emotivism is not my position.]
By what name would you call your actual position? (Just so I don't have to keep using clumsy circumlocutions.)
AJ: Zavoi:in order to be consistent the libertarian must reject any claim such as "It is objectively wrong to be a libertarian," either by saying that it's false or by saying that it's meaningless. However, non-cognitivism/emotivism makes no such claim, and so it's perfectly consistent to simultaneously accept the non-cognitivist/emotivist position and be a libertarian (as you yourself demonstrate). I'm with you here.
Hopefully, then, you'll also agree that the non-cognitivist/emotivist cannot make any claims that are inconsistent with libertarianism (i.e., claims that the libertarian has to reject in order to be consistent).
AJ:Hence, if any objective ethical theory is true, the libertarian objective ethical theory would have to be the only one. This I can fully agree with, but I also don't think it necessarily says anything significant, because I don't see that "objective ethic" is well-defined, and therefore I don't see that it can be "true" in any sense.
Some people accept the notion of "objective ethics," and others don't. Those that accept it are (presumably) bound to accept libertarian ethics as objectively true. Those that don't accept it do not make any claims that are inconsistent with libertarianism. Therefore, libertarian ethics remains in a uniquely unassailable position.
Consider the ways in which one might object to libertarianism:
Alice1: It's objectively wrong to be a libertarian.
Bob: Since you accept that the notion of "objectively wrong" is meaningful, I can show you that libertarianism is the only correct objective ethic.
Or,
Alice2: It's wrong to be a libertarian, by which I mean, I don't like it / Society disapproves of it / It will result in consequence Y / etc.
Bob: I agree with that fact. So...?
Alice1's claim is (presumably) demonstrably non-true, while Alice2's claim may very well be true but only says things that are already consistent with Bob's libertarianism anyway. Thus, we would have proven that nobody (objective-ethicist or not) can give a coherent refutation of libertarianism.
'Natural laws' outside of logical and scientific laws (that is, real laws) and the 'rights of man' outside of the mights of man are myths cemented into the modern ideology by the French and American revolution, though these specious concepts (like democracy) have origins in the ancient past and are supported by inherent (if subrational) tendencies of the human animal.
Frederick the Great“I begin by taking. I shall find scholars later to demonstrate my perfect right.”"Religion is the idol of the mob; it adores everything it does not understand.”
Stephen: We could also say it this way: A proposes that he and B adopt a norm that he have full control over his body uninhibited by B. Since, you want every vague word to be defined, I am trying to state it in a way that is simple and clear without using any unambiguous language. The "ought to" is unnecessary and redundant. And now the contradiction follows.
Then what is inhibited and uninhibited control?
Zavoi:It is not necessary (from the point of view of the libertarian) to categorically disprove emotivism (or non-cognitivism or whatever -ism), because there is nothing about emotivism per se that is inconsistent with libertarianism. Emotivism as such has nothing to say about libertarianism. It is only when the emotivist begins to make statements about libertarianism (such as, say, "Boo to libertarianism") that the need for a refutation might possibly arise.
Fully agree.
Zavoi: AJ:[By the way, emotivism is not my position.] By what name would you call your actual position?
By what name would you call your actual position?
Perhaps AJ's meta-meta-ethical observation of definitional dependence? That's cumbersome, but perhaps necessitated by all the meta-ethical theories out there, and that they all simply revolve around a given speaker's intended meaning. I think it's cleaner just to acknowledge that each person may have their own intended meanings in any ethical (or so-called ethical) statement they make.
Words are just vehicles for transmitting meaning, and they rarely are able to tell the full story. My observation just points this out, and expects by corollary that specific ethical theories fully spell out what meaning is intended by their ethical statements or propositions. Because of the inherently ambiguous and multifaceted nature of ethical language in English, this is perhaps not an easy task. Nevertheless, that's what I think needs to be achieved in order to expound an ethical theory that could be logically accepted or rejected.
Zavoi:Hopefully, then, you'll also agree that the non-cognitivist/emotivist cannot make any claims that are inconsistent with libertarianism (i.e., claims that the libertarian has to reject in order to be consistent).
You mean the emotivist of noncognitivist libertarian?
Zavoi:Some people accept the notion of "objective ethics," and others don't. Those that accept it are (presumably) bound to accept libertarian ethics as objectively true.
Perhaps? But even if so...
Zavoi:Therefore, libertarian ethics remains in a uniquely unassailable position.
This still rests on the notion of "objective ethics" being a meaningful concept. You could substitute "pangalactic ethics" for "objective ethics" and what you wrote still holds:
"Some people accept the notion of 'pangalactic ethics,' and others don't. Those that accept it are (presumably) bound to accept libertarian ethics as pangalactically true. Those that don't accept it do not make any claims that are inconsistent with libertarianism. Therefore, libertarian ethics remains in a uniquely unassailable position."
Zavoi:Alice1's claim is (presumably) demonstrably non-true, while Alice2's claim may very well be true but only says things that are already consistent with Bob's libertarianism anyway. Thus, we would have proven that nobody (objective-ethicist or not) can give a coherent refutation of libertarianism.
Right, so all we are saying is that Bob holds a view that Alice does not hold, and the fact that Alice doesn't hold it does not count as a refutation of it. But the reverse is also true.
I don't understand why we are assuming that a libertarian ethic is the only possible objective ethic. In the following scenario:
Person A: "Humans are inherently evil. We are inhibiting nature from achieving some teleological optimum."
the proposition is about an objective moral truth. Perhaps the speaker is a religious figure, with claims to a deeper understanding of the world, including a particularly sensitive moral intuition. He can "pick up" on moral truths that we can barely intuit.
According to your claim, either
A: he is contradicting himselfB: his proposition is consistent with libertarianismC: we are discussing two different concepts using the words 'objective truth'
Which is it?
“Elections are Futures Markets in Stolen Property.” - H. L. Mencken
zefreak: I don't understand why we are assuming that a libertarian ethic is the only possible objective ethic.
I don't understand why we are assuming that a libertarian ethic is the only possible objective ethic.
Good point zefreak.
There are other objective ethical systems besides libertarian ones.
Many leftists do not believe that the views they express refer merely to their own subjective point of view. They believe their ethic is an objective truth, and that those who don't see these same truths are by definition either ignorant (not intelligent enough to see the truth) or immoral (intelligent enough, but dishonest, greedy, callous, etc...)
Libertarianism, Socialism, and Religion, all have their objective ethics.
all people have their subjective and objective whatever... this isn't anything new. so go deeper than the fixation of subjective and objective and discuss the values. If somebody wants to delineate what they mean by objective or subjective within a particular context all the power to them. But to continue to boil issues down to objective or subjective without a relevant context teeters on a fetish more than anything.
wilderness: all people have their subjective and objective whatever... this isn't anything new. so go deeper than the fixation of subjective and objective and discuss the values. If somebody wants to delineate what they mean by objective or subjective within a particular context all the power to them. But to continue to boil issues down to objective or subjective without a relevant context teeters on a fetish more than anything.
If values are subjective then debate is largely meaningless except as a persuasive tool. It would be like debating chocolate vs. vanilla.
If I didn't understand your point, please forgive me. It's like you generate your posts with a Monte Carlo engine.. grammatically correct but meaning is illusory.
zefreak: If values are subjective...
If values are subjective...
That's my point. Values are not always subjective nor objective. Values can be delineated without ever having brought up objective or subjective. I think to bring up objective and subjective is fine but to veer the debate only upon those concepts is to then forget the values that can be delineated without objective or subjective.
For instance, liberty. I didn't say if it is subjective or objective. In fact, I'm talking about negative liberty. It's a concept that can be easily understood without getting stuck on bringing up objective or subjective. Same goes for my heart or a tree. The emotions or axioms any one person gives, etc... I didn't label anything subjective or objective in this whole paragraph.
zefreak: then debate is largely meaningless except as a persuasive tool. It would be like debating chocolate vs. vanilla.
then debate is largely meaningless except as a persuasive tool. It would be like debating chocolate vs. vanilla.
That has nothing to do with what I am saying other than you did say something that didn't point out subjective this or objective that.
zefreak: If I didn't understand your point, please forgive me. It's like you generate your posts with a Monte Carlo engine.. grammatically correct but meaning is illusory.
It's well thought out.
AJ:You mean the emotivist of noncognitivist libertarian?
Not specifically; I meant noncognitivists/emotivists in general.
AJ:This still rests on the notion of "objective ethics" being a meaningful concept.
How so?
I'm not saying that "objective libertarian ethics" are unassailable; I just mean that regardless of what conception of ethics anyone has, they cannot use it to refute libertarianism (i.e., prove a statement that is contradictory to libertarianism).
AJ:Those that don't accept [pan-galactic ethics as meaningful] do not make any claims that are inconsistent with libertarianism.
There's no reason why this has to be the case. For example, Zefreak's Person A is making a claim that is inconsistent with libertarianism, but probably doesn't accept this whole "pan-galactic" notion either.
Although, if we were to set that aside, and grant the premise as true, then this would in fact be a sound argument for libertarianism. It would be of the form:
The argument is valid, regardless of whether "wqxfzogyt" means anything or not. And if the basic concept of "wqxfzogyt" is at least well-defined enough that the three premises can be shown to be true (as it seems can be done with the term "objectively right"), then we arrive at the conclusion without ever having to precisely define "wqxfzogyt," or indeed, having to assume that it means anything at all.
AJ:But the reverse is also true.
Do you mean to say that likewise the mere fact that Bob disagrees with Alice is not a refutation of Alice's view? This isn't a problem for Bob, because Alice's claim is not something that Bob has to refute. It's as if Bob were to say, "Socrates is mortal," and Alice replied, "But the sky is blue!" Bob does not need to refute Alice's claim; all he has to say is, "Yeah, so?"
zefreak:I don't understand why we are assuming that a libertarian ethic is the only possible objective ethic.
The proof of this is what I referred to earlier as "Argument G." The point of the current discussion is to build a framework into which Argument G can be inserted to form a complete proof of libertarianism. It's easier to imagine how one might prove that "Objective ethics implies libertarian objective ethics" than to imagine how one might prove "Libertarian objective ethics" from scratch.
zefreak: According to your claim, either A: he is contradicting himselfB: his proposition is consistent with libertarianismC: we are discussing two different concepts using the words 'objective truth' Which is it?
My claim is A: that he is contradicting himself. A more detailed analysis of Person A's statement will show that it requires a contradictory set of beliefs. At least, that's what I think. Proving this is the next step, but I haven't gotten there yet.
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