Juan:I don't see how this comparison is nothing short of terrible, seeing how natural rights is a philosophical theory & gravity is a natural phenomena Isn't 'phenomenon' a basic philosophical concept ? Never mind, carry on...
I don't see how this comparison is nothing short of terrible, seeing how natural rights is a philosophical theory & gravity is a natural phenomena
Gravity can be directly observed, natural rights cannot, leading me to disagree with the comparison. I wasn't aware that philosophy had a monopoly over the english language, either. Your bait is getting cold, btw.
WARNING: This signature violates Rule 5. Stay classy!
February 17 - 1600 - Giordano Bruno is burnt alive by the catholic church. Aquinas : "much more reason is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted of heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put to death."
Juan:How is my underlining the (ridiculous) shortcomings of positivism 'bating' ?
Because your assuming my disagreement is based in positivism, possibly for merely disagreeing with you? I guess anytime, anywhere someone disagrees with an argument, comparison, terms, etc., it is now automatically "positivistic nonsense".
Adam Knott:I bolded and underlined "happiness" above to reinforce my point that when we are dealing with ethics, ultimately this refers to happiness and unhappiness. Then, the theory proposed can only be as accurate and as consistent as the underlying theory of happiness referred to. Thus, it is not optional whether or not to have a theory of happiness and unhappiness when dealing with ethics theory. The question is only one of the accuracy and consistency of the theory of happiness one is working with.
Why is it necessary for an ethical theory to have a theory of happiness? An ethical theory does not have to be self-enforcing. A particular action (such as one person enslaving another) may increase one person's happiness and decrease another's, and how does a purely happiness-centered theory decide whose preference should prevail? If it doesn't decide this, then it becomes devoid of content as an ethical theory, since it only makes statements that are already agreed upon anyway (e.g., the fact that the dictator enjoys being a dictator).
AJ: Zavoi:The argument I have given in this thread more closely resembles Hoppe's own, at least in the beginning where he demonstrates the existence of objective ethics by showing that it is contradictory to deny them. I believe I have refuted this part of Hoppe's argument by demonstrating an equivocation between the usage of the term self-ownership as "range of control" and as "right to control." If you prefer, it might be faster if you could explain any difficulties you find in my analysis (I'm also happy to continue with your derivation - either one you prefer):
Zavoi:The argument I have given in this thread more closely resembles Hoppe's own, at least in the beginning where he demonstrates the existence of objective ethics by showing that it is contradictory to deny them.
I believe I have refuted this part of Hoppe's argument by demonstrating an equivocation between the usage of the term self-ownership as "range of control" and as "right to control." If you prefer, it might be faster if you could explain any difficulties you find in my analysis (I'm also happy to continue with your derivation - either one you prefer):
I don't dispute any of this analysis, but what it's directed against seems to be an entirely different aspect of Hoppe's argument. When I said "at least in the beginning...", I was referring to this argument:
Hence, one must conclude that emotivism falters, because if it were true, then it could not even say and mean what it says—it simply would not exist as a position that could be discussed and evaluated with regard to its validity. But if it is a meaningful position which can be discussed, then this fact belies its very own basic premise. Moreover, the fact that it is indeed such a meaningful position, it should be noted, cannot even be disputed, as one cannot communicate and argue that one cannot communicate and argue. Rather, it must be presupposed of any intellectual position, that it is meaningful and can be argued with regard to its cognitive value, simply because it is presented in a language and communicated. To argue otherwise would already implicitly admit its validity. [TSC, p. 129]
This isn't exactly the same as the argument I have given, so don't think that I don't acknowledge that Hoppe's explanation is unclear and poorly-worded.
AJ: AJ:One could of course meaningfully dispute the right of exclusive control without pressupposing such a right.
AJ:One could of course meaningfully dispute the right of exclusive control without pressupposing such a right.
Indeed, Hoppe must do this if he is to argue that property rights persist despite not being currently utilized. For example, in evicting a crop-stealer from his farm, Hoppe must argue with the thief that the thief does not have the right to steal the crops (which is, after all, an an exercise of the thief's self-ownership).
AJ:Why does this matter? Regardless of the origin of an idea, it needn't be anyone else's motivation for adopting the position (in particular, it's not my motivation or goal in taking this position).
The context in which this position was raised was in an argument between a libertarian and a non-libertarian. We were trying to furnish Bob with an argument that he could use to refute any argument that Alice could make against what he's doing (such as living, earning income, and so on). The objection that you raised was, "But couldn't Alice deny that 'objective obligation' is meaningful?"
AJ:What obligation? Not all propositional statements are statements of obligation.
The point I'm trying to make is this: that this pure (i.e., no obligation attached to the proposition) non-cognitivist/emotivist position is such that a libertarian (like Bob) could consistently agree with all of it and still act in accordance with libertarianism (e.g., by defending first-use property rights, by taking their property back from theives, etc.). By contrast, in order to be consistent the libertarian must reject any claim such as "It is objectively wrong to be a libertarian," either by saying that it's false or by saying that it's meaningless. However, non-cognitivism/emotivism makes no such claim, and so it's perfectly consistent to simultaneously accept the non-cognitivist/emotivist position and be a libertarian (as you yourself demonstrate).
Just as before it was not necessary to show categorically that E is true, it is also not necessary to show categorically that the concept of "objective obligation" is meaningful. All we have to show is that it is impossible to make any claim that is both true and inconsistent with libertarian actions. This is the best "proof of libertarianism" that anyone could ask for.
Zavoi: Adam Knott:I bolded and underlined "happiness" above to reinforce my point that when we are dealing with ethics, ultimately this refers to happiness and unhappiness. Then, the theory proposed can only be as accurate and as consistent as the underlying theory of happiness referred to. Thus, it is not optional whether or not to have a theory of happiness and unhappiness when dealing with ethics theory. The question is only one of the accuracy and consistency of the theory of happiness one is working with. Question #1: Why is it necessary for an ethical theory to have a theory of happiness? An ethical theory does not have to be self-enforcing. A particular action (such as one person enslaving another) may increase one person's happiness and decrease another's, and how does a purely happiness-centered theory decide whose preference should prevail? If it doesn't decide this, then it becomes devoid of content as an ethical theory, since it only makes statements that are already agreed upon anyway (e.g., the fact that the dictator enjoys being a dictator).
Question #1: Why is it necessary for an ethical theory to have a theory of happiness? An ethical theory does not have to be self-enforcing. A particular action (such as one person enslaving another) may increase one person's happiness and decrease another's, and how does a purely happiness-centered theory decide whose preference should prevail? If it doesn't decide this, then it becomes devoid of content as an ethical theory, since it only makes statements that are already agreed upon anyway (e.g., the fact that the dictator enjoys being a dictator).
Zavoi:
Regarding your question #1, I was referring to the underlined parts of your reply. My point is that ethics theories ultimately refer to some impact on the well-being of the ethical actor (the actor undertaking or planning on some ethical act). The impact on an actor's well-being means broadly some positive or negative effect or impact on something he is concerned about. For example, you write that one person may increase his happiness in enslaving another, and that in becoming a dictator, the dictator will experience enjoyment. These are conceived "positive" impacts on these actors related to some act they undertake or plan to undertake. My point is that ethics theories ultimately do refer to such positive or negative impacts on an actor's well-being.
In Hoppe's argumentation ethics system, there are generally two negative impacts: that of contradiction (logical and/or performative), and that of drastic social consequences (e.g., "then literally no one would be allowed to do anything with anything," or "Neither we, our forefathers, nor our progeny could, do or will surivive.") These are asserted impacts (in this case, negative impacts) that are claimed to occur to actors should they undertake the ethical actions the theory deals with, in this case, advancing a nonlibertarian ethic during argumentation.
The concepts of happiness and unhappiness are simply the most broad concepts denoting positive and negative impacts. Rothbard uses the term 'happiness,' Long uses the term 'eudaimonia,' others use the term 'flourishing', and in your passage above, you chose 'enjoyment.' But these all ultimately refer to the same thing: the positive or negative impact (the loss or gain) asserted to result from specific modes of conduct. My point was that ethics theory ultimately refers to this.
An ethics theorist does not have to put forth an explicit theory of happiness and unhappiniess. He/she can simply refer to those notions in the theory without working out an explicit theory of happiness and unhappiness. But the problem with not having a logically consistent theory of happiness/unhappiness (keeping it implicit, and not working through the logical issues of one's theory of happiness/unhappiness), can be seen in how easy it is then, to show the defects of the theory of happiness/unhappiness being (implicitly) utilized. As you succinctly and powerfully demonstrated previously:
Rothbard explains his natural law theory as follows:
The natural law ethic decrees that for all living things, "goodness" is the fulfillment of what is best for that type of creature; "goodness" is therefore relative to the nature of the creature concerned....
The natural law, then, elucidates what is best for man - what ends man should pursue that are most harmonious with, and best tend to fulfill, his nature. In a significant sense, then, natural law provides man with a "science of happiness," with the paths which will lead to his real happiness. [The Ethics of Liberty, ch. 2]
This is the "fulfillment of human nature" approach, which runs into the problem I mentioned earlier: it is simply not true that Rothbard's norms maximize happiness for every person (consider luxurious dictators and people with cushy government sinecures). Hoppe writes,
It has been a common quarrel with this [natural law/rights] position, even on the part of sympathetic readers, that the concept of human nature is far "too diffuse and varied to provide a determinate set of contents of natural law." [A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism, p. 235]
Rothbard was working with a theory of happiness that wasn't fully consistent, and thus Hoppe dispenses with it in one sentence. This tells me that if one is serious about ethics theory, one may want to consider the possibility that one's ethics theory will only be as strong as the theory of happiness/unhappiness one is working with...
You write:
"...how does a purely happiness-centered theory decide whose preference should prevail? If it doesn't decide this, then it becomes devoid of content as an ethical theory." (my underline)
You are assuming that an ethics theory based on intersubjective norms (TSC p.130) is the only kind of theory that can provide meaningful information about ethical actions. This assumption rules out a priori, necessary accompaniments to ethical acts that can be found or demonstrated, such that if the individual knew of them, he may abstain from the ethical act in question.
A happiness-centered ethics theory shows how different modes of acting (ethical action being one such mode) impact the happiness of the individual actor: "The major function of praxeology---of economics---is to bring to the world the knowledge of these indirect, these hidden, consequences of the different forms of human action." (Man, Economy & State, p.880)
Also, see page 258, "From the standpoint of praxeology proper---the complete formal analysis of human action in all its aspects...." (bold added)
Obviously ethical acts are actions. Ethical acts utilize means and aim at ends. And thus the logical implications of ethical actions can be approached deductively in the same fashion as economic actions can be.
Rothbard (and all those who followed him, e.g., Hoppe, and following Hoppe, you) simply failed to realize that ethical actions are actions, and that the logical science of action (praxeology) is also the logical science of ethical action. As praxeology demonstrates the necessary accompaniments to specific economic means, so it may demonstrate the necessary accompaniments to specific ethical means.
Thus, ethics doesn't have to be pursued only as a normative discipline, and ethics doesn't have to be based on intersubjective comparisons of happiness or utility. Ethics can be pursued as a branch of praxeology that studies, by methodological individualism, the logic of ethical acts as to their necessary consequences. The individual actor may possibly abstain from ethical actions he was intending, if it can be demonstrated that they entail logically necessary impacts to his own well-being that he was unaware of. ("these indirect, these hidden, consequences of the different forms of human action.")
Those who champion and promote Austrian economics often do so on the basis that from the so-called axiom of action, an entire logical science of action can be constructed. However, the same theorists fail to explain why ethical actions are not actions, or, if they are, why the logical science of action doesn't apply to these actions.
"It would be preposterous to assert apodictically that science will never succeed in developing a praxeological aprioristic doctrine of political organization..." (Mises, UF, p.98)
Adam Knott:You are assuming that an ethics theory based on intersubjective norms (TSC p.130) is the only kind of theory that can provide meaningful information about ethical actions. This assumption rules out a priori, necessary accompaniments to ethical acts that can be found or demonstrated, such that if the individual knew of them, he may abstain from the ethical act in question.
Adam Knott:Thus, ethics doesn't have to be pursued only as a normative discipline, and ethics doesn't have to be based on intersubjective comparisons of happiness or utility. Ethics can be pursued as a branch of praxeology that studies, by methodological individualism, the logic of ethical acts as to their necessary consequences. The individual actor may possibly abstain from ethical actions he was intending, if it can be demonstrated that they entail logically necessary impacts to his own well-being that he was unaware of. ("these indirect, these hidden, consequences of the different forms of human action.")
If I understand you correctly, you're saying that ethics is a way of convincing somebody that they don't "really" want to do what they initially intend to do. So if someone is contemplating committing murder, they could be shown (by applying praxeological axioms and so forth) that murder will lead to some undesirable consequence (a diminishment of happiness, if you will), and so murder is not "really" what they want.
It's not inconceivable that this might happen: If I'm eating a lot a candy, and you point out that eating a lot of candy will lead to tooth decay, then I might very well say, "I suppose you're right; I don't want tooth decay, so I guess I shouldn't eat all this candy after all." But to say that this type of reasoning could be the basis of an ethical system is in contradiction to the fact that an individual's ultimate ends are fundamentally subjective, and it's impossible to resolve all disagreements by this method. If I insist that I don't actually mind tooth decay, then I could accept all of your arguments regarding the consequences of candy-eating but still reject the conclusion that I should abstain from eating candy. At some point, the attempt to convince me otherwise will devolve into "You don't really want tooth decay / Yes I do / No you don't...", and in the final analysis nobody can know my preferences better than I do.
Incidentally, what do you mean by "ethical action" as distinct from simple "action"?
Zavoi: Adam Knott:You are assuming that an ethics theory based on intersubjective norms (TSC p.130) is the only kind of theory that can provide meaningful information about ethical actions. This assumption rules out a priori, necessary accompaniments to ethical acts that can be found or demonstrated, such that if the individual knew of them, he may abstain from the ethical act in question. Adam Knott:Thus, ethics doesn't have to be pursued only as a normative discipline, and ethics doesn't have to be based on intersubjective comparisons of happiness or utility. Ethics can be pursued as a branch of praxeology that studies, by methodological individualism, the logic of ethical acts as to their necessary consequences. The individual actor may possibly abstain from ethical actions he was intending, if it can be demonstrated that they entail logically necessary impacts to his own well-being that he was unaware of. ("these indirect, these hidden, consequences of the different forms of human action.") If I understand you correctly, you're saying that ethics is a way of convincing somebody that they don't "really" want to do what they initially intend to do. So if someone is contemplating committing murder, they could be shown (by applying praxeological axioms and so forth) that murder will lead to some undesirable consequence (a diminishment of happiness, if you will), and so murder is not "really" what they want. It's not inconceivable that this might happen: If I'm eating a lot a candy, and you point out that eating a lot of candy will lead to tooth decay, then I might very well say, "I suppose you're right; I don't want tooth decay, so I guess I shouldn't eat all this candy after all." But to say that this type of reasoning could be the basis of an ethical system is in contradiction to the fact that an individual's ultimate ends are fundamentally subjective, and it's impossible to resolve all disagreements by this method. If I insist that I don't actually mind tooth decay, then I could accept all of your arguments regarding the consequences of candy-eating but still reject the conclusion that I should abstain from eating candy. At some point, the attempt to convince me otherwise will devolve into "You don't really want tooth decay / Yes I do / No you don't...", and in the final analysis nobody can know my preferences better than I do. Incidentally, what do you mean by "ethical action" as distinct from simple "action"?
"If I understand you correctly, you're saying that ethics is a way of convincing somebody that they don't "really" want to do what they initially intend to do."
No. I'm saying that the objective ethics and related approaches (argumenation ethics, Aristotelian virtue ethics) are not the only possible approach to the subject realm of ethics. I'm not saying what ethics "is." I'm saying there is another possible approach to ethical phenomena:
"Bewildered, people had to face a new view of society. They learned with stupefaction that there is another aspect from which human action might be viewed than that of good and bad, of fair and unfair, of just and unjust. In the course of social events there prevails a regularity of phenomena to which man must adjust his action if he wishes to succeed. It is futile to approach social facts with the attitude of a censor who approves or disapproves from the point of view of quite arbitrary standards and subjective judgments of value. One must study the laws of human action and social cooperation as the physicist studies the laws of nature. Human action and social cooperation seen as the object of a science of given relations, no longer as a normative discipline of things that ought to be---this was a revolution of tremendous consequences for knowledge and philosophy as well as for social action."(Human Action, p.2)
I'm saying that ethical actions are actions (they entail means and aim at ends), and thus Mengerian/Misesian praxeology that tries to uncover the laws of human action applies to ethical phenomena, not just economic phenomena. It is the implicit assumption of most, if not all, objective ethicists, that in human action, the concept of "laws" (in the sense of invariant regularity) applies only to economics (catallactics), and not to ethics:
"This procedure [formal praxeological analysis] is perfectly proper for the formal science of praxeology, or economic theory, but not necessarily elsewhere." (The Ethics of Liberty, p.12)
I'm saying this is a mistake.
***
The examples of murder and torture add little to the discussion, because they are examples of norms or values that are already shared by the parties to the discussion. This does nothing to further enlightenment on the nature or origin of the fact that most people are against murder and torture.
I have never seen a definition or conception of praxeology that includes a concept such as what an actor "really wants" as opposed to what he actually chooses. The actor chooses what he chooses. But in many cases, he is unaware of the necessary consequences of his choice.
The idea of praxeology is to find, discover, uncover, etc., consequences to various forms of action that were previously unknown. (see Man, Economy & State, p. 880) This gives people additional reasons to possibly abstain from actions that are also considered harmful by their fellow citizens.
No theory of objective ethics or formal social science can prevent harmful social acts absolutely. Nor can any system of legal punishment. The question is which approach to the phenomena (objective ethics or praxeology) is the most effective means for showing the individual the negative or unwanted consequences of various actions he is considering.
****
"If I'm eating a lot a candy, and you point out that eating a lot of candy will lead to tooth decay, then I might very well say, "I suppose you're right; I don't want tooth decay, so I guess I shouldn't eat all this candy after all." But to say that this type of reasoning could be the basis of an ethical system is in contradiction to the fact that an individual's ultimate ends are fundamentally subjective, and it's impossible to resolve all disagreements by this method. If I insist that I don't actually mind tooth decay, then I could accept all of your arguments regarding the consequences of candy-eating but still reject the conclusion that I should abstain from eating candy. At some point, the attempt to convince me otherwise will devolve into "You don't really want tooth decay / Yes I do / No you don't...", and in the final analysis nobody can know my preferences better than I do."
If we assume that the goal is to change someone's planned actions, I don't see how this can be done other than providing them with something positive to be gained by changing their planned actions, or providing them with some negative consequence from not changing their planned actions.
Once we have provided an actor with all the possible negative consequences of his planned immoral act, including all the consequences that objective ethics and praxeology assert, and including all possible physical and legal consequences, then the individual may still choose to procede with is planned act. The individual still can "reject the conclusion that I should abstain from [the immoral act]." Aside from physically restraining all individuals, there is no way to absolutely prevent all social conduct deemed harmful.
All that can be accomplished, as far as I am aware, is to present the actor with the ramifications of his planned act. The ramifications will ultimately reduce to some positive or negative consequence asserted to happen to him if he proceeds with or abstains from the act in question. That is all that is possible. If more is possible, please elaborate.
The problem with objective ethics is that since it begins with a critique of praxeology and utilitarianism (and therefore disavows them), it is therefore unable to conceive and formulate genuine laws of ethical action. Because it cannot articulate any clear and unambiguous laws of ethical action, and thus demonstrate an incontestable negative consequence to various ethical actions, it must put forth a theory of criminal punishment as a substitution for a scientific demonstration of the negative consequences to various actions.
Thus, owing to its failure to establish social laws of human action in the ethical realm, objective ethics theories ultimately become "justifications" for a theory of legal punishment. The inability to scientifically establish the unintended consequences of ethical actions, manifests as a theory of punishment as the only demonstrable negative consequences objective ethics is able to put forth.
"But to say that this type of reasoning could be the basis of an ethical system..."
Here, you are assuming that ethics "is" the establishment of the type of ethical system you envision. My point is that this is not the only possible approach to the subject realm of ethics.
"...and it's impossible to resolve all disagreements by this method."
I don't believe there is a method that resolves all disagreements.
*****
"Incidentally, what do you mean by "ethical action" as distinct from simple "action"?"
Action is conscious goal-directed activity. (this is the Misesian conception of action, not the Hoppean)
1. I want to move a chair from here to there.
2. I want to change your mind about objective ethics.
3. I want to control my emotions.
These are all actions, since all of them are conscious goal-directed activities.
I'm calling "ethical actions" all actions of the individual that are directed toward other minds (#2).
We might call #1 "simple actions" or "plain actions," and we might call #3 "psychological actions." (goal directed activity aimed at one's own mind)
If action is the general phenomenon of goal directed activity, then we my classify various kinds or types of actions based on various distinctions as above.
AJ, let me put it this way:
A right is just a claim to something. If A claims to own his body, if he proposes the norm to B that he have control over his body that is uninhibited by B, B is unable to consistently propose a contrary claim. B cannot consistently propose a claim to A's body. For B to do so, he would have to recognize A as an independent decision making unit, and recognize A as being in control of his own body to begin with, as a precondition for A to even consider B's claim in the first place.
A's right to his own body is undeniably justified by virtue of the fact that if B were to try to deny it, he would still affirm it.
Just/Unjust are just the normative counterpart to descriptive correct/incorrect. In common language, right/wrong can function as a substitute for the validity of both types of propositions.
Justifying means demonstrating according to some objective criteria.
Objectivity arises in norms from the fact that normative propositions must also be logically consistent in order to be valid in the same way that descriptive propositions must be logically consistent to be valid.
As far as all of this defining goes, I think some concepts are simply foundational, and cannot be explained in terms of other words in greater detail.
Spence: You ever kill anybody?
Sam: I hurt somebody's feelings once.
thefreedictionary:Emotivism: the theory that moral utterances do not have a truth value but express the feelings of the speaker, so that murder is wrong is equivalent to down with murder
thefreedictionary:Subjectivism: the meta-ethical doctrine that there are no absolute moral values but that these are variable in the same way as taste is
thefreedictionary:Relativism: A theory, especially in ethics or aesthetics, that conceptions of truth and moral values are not absolute but are relative to the persons or groups holding them.
thefreedictionary:Non-cognitivism: the meta-ethical view that moral statements lack truth-value and do not assert propositions. A noncognitivist denies the cognitivist claim that "moral judgments are capable of being objectively true, because they describe some feature of the world."[1] If moral statements cannot be true, and if one cannot know something that is not true, noncognitivism implies that moral knowledge is impossible
To the extent that they are different, they are just soft variants of each other. If there is no civilized way of settling disputes according to fair rules, might makes right is the only social norm which prevails, since everybodies claims are just as good as anybody else's.
Adam Knott:No. I'm saying that the objective ethics and related approaches (argumenation ethics, Aristotelian virtue ethics) are not the only possible approach to the subject realm of ethics. I'm not saying what ethics "is." I'm saying there is another possible approach to ethical phenomena:
So you're proposing "praxeological ethics" as an alternative, not as the only ethical system, correct? If so, it would seem that praxeological ethics does not contradict any of the objective ethics that I have proposed, but exists alongside of it as one possible method of persuasion.
Adam Knott:The idea of praxeology is to find, discover, uncover, etc., consequences to various forms of action that were previously unknown. (see Man, Economy & State, p. 880) This gives people additional reasons to possibly abstain from actions that are also considered harmful by their fellow citizens.
Could you give an example of a praxeological analysis that uncovers a previously-unknown bad consequence of some ethical act?
Adam Knott:No theory of objective ethics or formal social science can prevent harmful social acts absolutely. Nor can any system of legal punishment. The question is which approach to the phenomena (objective ethics or praxeology) is the most effective means for showing the individual the negative or unwanted consequences of various actions he is considering.
Adam Knott:All that can be accomplished, as far as I am aware, is to present the actor with the ramifications of his planned act. The ramifications will ultimately reduce to some positive or negative consequence asserted to happen to him if he proceeds with or abstains from the act in question. That is all that is possible. If more is possible, please elaborate.
No one claims to be able to prevent crime solely by armchair philosophy. Once a set of norms has been proven by objective ethics, it requires additional effort to transform society such that those norms are by and large followed. To this end, one might propose the creation of PDAs, DROs, and so forth, but this aspect (the "presentation of ramifications") is just a practical issue, and is not part of the theory of objective ethics as such. Objective ethics shows that certain acts are right or wrong, but by itself does not guarantee that anyone will follow these norms.
Indeed, the only way to have an ethical system that by itself absolutely prevents crimes is to propose a norm such as "Anything that someone is capable of is ethical, and anything that someone is incapable of is unethical." Of course, this norm is trivially self-enforcing, but it is just as useless as the norm "It is unethical to violate the laws of physics."
Adam Knott:Because it cannot... demonstrate an incontestable negative consequence to various ethical actions... [Emphasis added]
How can any theory demonstrate an "incontestable negative consequence"? Aren't preferences subjective, and thus not incontestable?
In short: Because of the subjectivity of value, it is impossible to "scientifically" demonstrate a negative consequence for a particular ethical action - whether by praxeology, by objective-ethics, or by any other method. We therefore should not fault objective ethics for failing to do this.
"...it would seem that praxeological ethics does not contradict any of the objective ethics that I have proposed, but exists alongside of it as one possible method of persuasion."
Yes, correct. But previously I thought you only believed there was one approach to the subject realm of ethics; that of establishing a system of norms (of rights and wrongs, goods and bads, justs and unjusts).
"Could you give an example of a praxeological analysis that uncovers a previously-unknown bad consequence of some ethical act?"
Yes. The analysis would go like this: First, we define happiness as an actor attaining things, and we define unhappiness as the attempt to attain things. Then, we define "ethical action," as mentioned in the previous post, in terms of acting in regard to other minds (i.e., my trying to change your mind about objective ethics). If your mind is something I can "attempt" to change, but this change is something I cannot attain (because your thoughts are fundamentally non-perceptible to me), then in acting towards your mind (ethical action), I can only "attempt" which is defined as unhappiness, as mentioned. And thus a connection can be demonstrated between ethical action and the unhappiness of the individual actor.
(It isn't my intention to bore you or other readers with a theory they aren't interested in. So no need to follow up and debate the theory. My intention was to provide an example of this kind of analysis as you asked for. For the sake of this limited discussion, let's assume my example is faulty and the theory is wrong. My point is that this type of analysis is possible.)
".... Once a set of norms has been proven by objective ethics, it requires additional effort to transform society such that those norms are by and large followed. To this end, one might propose the creation of PDAs, DROs, and so forth, but this aspect (the "presentation of ramifications") is just a practical issue, and is not part of the theory of objective ethics as such. Objective ethics shows that certain acts are right or wrong, but by itself does not guarantee that anyone will follow these norms."
What you seem to be saying is the following: Objective ethics as theory does not demonstrate any consequences to ethical actions (lying to another person, coercing another person, being truthful to another person, helping another person). Instead, objective ethics, by abstract reasoning, shows which ethical acts are right and which are wrong. So objective ethics is the theory and the abstract reasoning. The only reason a person should change from the moral or ethical system they adhere to now, to the one being proposed by, for example, Rothbard or Hoppe, is the punishment they will receive from the PDA, that is enforcing the abstract theory of right and wrong adhered to by Rothbard, Hoppe, and their supporters.
What objective ethics says to someone who does not now subscribe to the particular ethical code being advanced by Rothbard and Hoppe (and this includes many libertarians) is this: if they read objective ethics theory, this theory, as such, will not show them how acting immorally or unethically is harmful to their own interests. It will only tell them what is right and wrong in abstract terms. It will tell them what to do, and what not to do, but none of these things they may do are harmful to them per se, or have harmful consequences (harmful ramifications). Thus, as far as the theory goes, they may continue along with their current conduct, and no reason is given, in terms of self-interest, why they may want to change their conduct.
The reason they should change from the moral and ethical code they subscribe to now, and adopt the code proposed by Rothbard and Hoppe, is that the PDA hired by Rothbard and Hoppe will administer punishment if they do not adhere to it. The objective ethics theory, as such, contains no information on how acting immorally or unethically is detrimental to one's self-interest (the "presentations of ramifications"). (any such 'consequential' demonstration within objective ethics is more or less trivial or incidental to the essential thrust of objective ethics) In objective ethics as you conceive it, the only negative ramifications of individual immoral or unethical conduct is the punishment administered by the PDA that Rothbard and Hoppe enlist to enforce the moral code presented in their objective ethics theory.
Is this a fair statement of your position?
"In short: Because of the subjectivity of value, it is impossible to "scientifically" demonstrate a negative consequence for a particular ethical action - whether by praxeology, by objective-ethics, or by any other method. We therefore should not fault objective ethics for failing to do this."
OK Here, I'll grant you that based on the traditional conception of subjective value, and praxeology as Mises conceived it, that the scientifically demonstrated consequences of different modes of action are not conceived as "negative" per se. In Misesian praxeology the consequences are necessary, and often unintended, but not necessarily "negative." And thus, if someone doesn't mind lowering the purchasing power of a unit of currency, or mind the other consequences it is asserted may follow, one has been provided no reason by praxeology to abstain from creating additional units. In this sense, the asserted consequences are not "negative."
As a practical matter, the praxeologist will usually be interested in finding those necessary but hidden consequences that the acting person will likely consider to be negative consequences. The necessary consequences demonstrated by praxeology are then negative consequences. For example, as Hoppe writes on page 15 of Economic Science and the Austrian Method, the economic law that: Whenever minimum wage laws are enforced that require wages to be higher than existing market wages, involuntary unemployment will result."
This is a "demonstration of ramifications," to the effect that if unemployment is a "negative consequence" to an actor, then he may want to consider abstaining from increasing the legal minimum wage above the market wage. The significance of the law is to be found in the fact that unemployment is considered a "negative consequence" to many people including even opponents of libertarianism. And thus most of them will not propose making the minimum wage meaningfully higher (as they would otherwise do), since they do not want to suffer the necessary consequences of unemployment (which to them are negative). Thus, a "libertarian" scientific demonstration (an economic law), has an effect on the nonlibertarian's ethical conduct, even though the nonlibertarian does not support libertarianism generally.
"We therefore should not fault objective ethics for failing to do this."
But the consequences demonstrated by Misesian praxeology, even when not "negative" are necessary. Rothbardian objective ethics articulates no necessary consequences, negative or otherwise.
"How can any theory demonstrate an "incontestable negative consequence"? Aren't preferences subjective, and thus not incontestable?"
I'll repeat the brief analysis I wrote above:
The analysis would go like this: First, we define happiness as an actor attaining things, and we define unhappiness as the attempt to attain things. Then, we define "ethical action," as mentioned in the previous post, in terms of acting in regard to other minds (i.e., my trying to change your mind about objective ethics). If your mind is something I can "attempt" to change, but this change is something I cannot attain (because your thoughts are fundamentally non-perceptible to me), then in acting towards your mind (ethical action), I can only "attempt" which is defined as unhappiness, as mentioned. And thus a connection can be demonstrated between ethical action and the unhappiness of the individual actor.
(again, my point isn't t initiate a debate on this particular theory. You asked how any theory could demonstrate incontestable negative consequences. So I provided a demonstration how, in principle, this problem might be approached. For the sake of this limited discussion, we could just assume that this example is faulty. But it answers the question how it could possibly be demonstrated, granted that people can always disagree with a theory.)
Adam Knott: It will only tell them what is right and wrong in abstract terms. It will tell them what to do, and what not to do, but none of these things they may do are harmful to them per se, or have harmful consequences (harmful ramifications). Thus, as far as the theory goes, they may continue along with their current conduct, and no reason is given, in terms of self-interest, why they may want to change their conduct.
It will only tell them what is right and wrong in abstract terms. It will tell them what to do, and what not to do, but none of these things they may do are harmful to them per se, or have harmful consequences (harmful ramifications). Thus, as far as the theory goes, they may continue along with their current conduct, and no reason is given, in terms of self-interest, why they may want to change their conduct.
i know for me, and i have no idea what cubical i fit in (Hoppe, Rothbard, consequentialist, etc...), but I do know this. If what a PDA offers in the market isn't logical, then I'm not shopping there. Justice is virtuous and fair. I would value scarcity conflicts to be resolved logically and then what follows from that will be discovered. Same as now. Scarcity isn't resolved fairly, but through monopoly (aka government). Therefore I'm currently shopping around, looking for something more appealing to what I want. If it's not logical to begin with, then I think it fails virtue and thus in truth it fails the reality of human action. That's how i shop in these circumstances.
"I used to see a mountain as a mountain.. Thereafter.. when I saw a mountain; lo! it was not a mountain.. yet now of final tranquillity: I see a mountain just as a mountain as I used to.." - Master Yuan; molon labe
wilderness: .... If what a PDA offers in the market isn't logical, then I'm not shopping there. .... I would value scarcity conflicts to be resolved logically and then what follows from that will be discovered. .... Therefore I'm currently shopping around, looking for something more appealing to what I want. If it's not logical to begin with, then I think it fails virtue and thus in truth it fails the reality of human action. That's how i shop in these circumstances.
.... If what a PDA offers in the market isn't logical, then I'm not shopping there. .... I would value scarcity conflicts to be resolved logically and then what follows from that will be discovered. .... Therefore I'm currently shopping around, looking for something more appealing to what I want. If it's not logical to begin with, then I think it fails virtue and thus in truth it fails the reality of human action. That's how i shop in these circumstances.
Wilderness:
What if the entire PDA system of resolving scarcity conflicts is not logical in your opinion? What then? Can you shop around for a different system?
Choosing a PDA and choosing a Law Code are not the same thing:
"...the basic Law Code...would have to be agreed upon by all judicial agencies..." "Any agencies that transgressed the basic...code would be open outlaws and agressors..." (The Ethics of Liberty, p. 236-237)
So you may choose your PDA, but someone else seems to choose the Law Code (which is the really important part). Who is choosing the Law Code if not you?
I think that's an important question in the context of libertarian social theory.....
Adam Knott: wilderness: .... If what a PDA offers in the market isn't logical, then I'm not shopping there. .... I would value scarcity conflicts to be resolved logically and then what follows from that will be discovered. .... Therefore I'm currently shopping around, looking for something more appealing to what I want. If it's not logical to begin with, then I think it fails virtue and thus in truth it fails the reality of human action. That's how i shop in these circumstances. Wilderness: What if the entire PDA system of resolving scarcity conflicts is not logical in your opinion? What then? Can you shop around for a different system?
I hope so. I'm trying to now to a certain degree that involves fear of retaliation and suppression by a monopoly at the moment that deters such actions. Actions that are undoubtedly capable in a free market that I think only ever exists and has only ever existed. Obviously the free market is plagued by increasing and decreasing times of hostility by criminals (some as sophisticated as governments and others pursued by desperation by individuals that are not so smart, etc...).
Adam Knott: Choosing a PDA and choosing a Law Code are not the same thing: "...the basic Law Code...would have to be agreed upon by all judicial agencies..." "Any agencies that transgressed the basic...code would be open outlaws and agressors..." (The Ethics of Liberty, p. 236-237) So you may choose your PDA, but someone else seems to choose the Law Code (which is the really important part). Who is choosing the Law Code if not you? I think that's an important question in the context of libertarian social theory.....
as far as my foresight brings me, i see the Code of Law being attached to a PDA. I don't know why they would necessarily have to be separated. Can you on principle point out to me this "not the same thing" when it comes to PDA and Law Code?
Historically and currently there has been not only private law and public/government law side by side (even the U.S. Constitution in the Bill of Rights discusses "Grand Jury('s)" which are a different path through the current court system though obviously in the end still monopolized by a Supreme Court). Even individual judges today are sought after by the prosecutor and defensive attorney when it comes to who they think will sign off on a warrant based on which judge they individually think will be inclined to give out the warrant. There is a certain degree of competitiveness in that respect.
What law code wins out - the prosecuters or defendants? I don't know that depends on the circumstances of the civil society at any given time in history or future. Cause even to say it would be the victims is stating a rule that archs over differing PDA's or insurance agencies. I think in time these arching norms may be geographical, like differing dialects of languages. How it evolves from point A to B isn't mapped out exactly. Lots of spontaneous events take place whenever I walk from one side of the hill to the other side let alone looking into crystal ball for 20 years down the path. To even set-up a company of any sort involves honesty and yet if the company is not being honest that may take some time to filter out into the rest of the community before enough people realize they simply are not going to shop there. And that's simple honesty. Now what about arbitrary PDA's or code laws defining the conditions of any particular individual. Again a particular region may have been able to apply this just remedy that makes a lot of people happy. Then somebody comes along and points out the hardships of any particular outcomes that have involved this PDA or law code. It may take a decade or a century but a new agency has arisen and has outcompeted the corrupt one (in the eyes of the people of that region shown by some enlightened individual some generations before them that had started the change). The whole question you ask of is answered by human history and it's development whether pessimistic or optimistic about the liberty of a human able to exercise such to discover or not discover what to do about universally everything. I would call myself an educated consumer.
wilderness: Can you on principle point out to me this "not the same thing" when it comes to PDA and Law Code?
Can you on principle point out to me this "not the same thing" when it comes to PDA and Law Code?
Yes. The Law Code is the code of laws arrived at by natural-law or natural-rights type theorizing, the kind of objective ethics Zavoi is talking about. The PDA's, in Rothbard's conception of AnCap, are all bound to obey a singular Law Code that has been arrived at by objective ethicists such as Rothbard, Hoppe, and those who agree with them. (at least this is my understanding. I don't read him as meaning that the PDA's all offer different Law Codes. If they do, then this is a different matter....)
"...the basic Law Code....would have to be agreed upon by all the judicial agencies..." (TEoL, p.236)
So this is something familiar to us. For example, you can now purchase from almost any business that sells products (let's say, here in the US), but all those businesses have to operate according to the basic Law Code of the US and of the particular state. If they don't, they are considered "open outlaws and aggressors" and fined and/or imprisoned.
Rothbard is simply proposing to substitute his Law Code for the existing Law Code. And the proposal is that then, under his Law Code, anyone can start their own PDA, and customers can purchase from the PDA of their choice, since all PDA's will be enforcing the same Law Code, just as today, all businesses are operating under the same Law Code.
But someone will have to choose the Law Code. That is an important issue. Who chooses the Law Code the PDA's are enforcing?
You get to choose your PDA. Who gets to choose the Law Code?
Example:
Law Code #1 Anyone violating a copyright or patent will be imprisoned. (Ayn Rand)
Law Code #2 Anyone violating a copyright will be imprisoned, no patents are allowed. (Rothbard)
Law Code #3 No copyrights or patents are allowed. (Kinsella)
Here are three Law Codes. Obviously, there are many many examples like this that could be used. So all the judicial agencies have to agree on the same Law Code. Who chooses the Law Code?
Choosing your PDA and choosing a Law Code are not the same thing.
utilitarianism at its 'best'...:If the government of a free country forces every citizen to cooperate fully in its designs to repel the aggressors and every able-bodied man to join the armed forces, it does not impose upon the individual a duty that would step beyond the tasks the praxeological law dictates.
Adam Knott: wilderness: Can you on principle point out to me this "not the same thing" when it comes to PDA and Law Code? I don't read him as meaning that the PDA's all offer different Law Codes. If they do, then this is a different matter....)
I don't read him as meaning that the PDA's all offer different Law Codes. If they do, then this is a different matter....)
I'm not asking what Rothbard or Hoppe are saying. I asked you if you can point out a principle that states that it would be logical to A) a PDA and Law Code are necessarily the same thing B) they are possibly the same, C) they are impossibly the same thing. You didn't answer the question which is not a fault of either you nor I, quite possibly, it is a matter of dialogue to flush this out.
Adam Knott: "...the basic Law Code....would have to be agreed upon by all the judicial agencies..." (TEoL, p.236) So this is something familiar to us. For example, you can now purchase from almost any business that sells products (let's say, here in the US), but all those businesses have to operate according to the basic Law Code of the US and of the particular state. If they don't, they are considered "open outlaws and aggressors" and fined and/or imprisoned. Rothbard is simply proposing to substitute his Law Code for the existing Law Code.
Rothbard is simply proposing to substitute his Law Code for the existing Law Code.
That's not true. In another thread this link was brought up and if that "chapter" is further read Rothbard points out that market forces would determine the outcome. He also discusses that he is not talking about a "monopoly" (his word). I don't think that quote that you have pasted (or what have you) is very clear. I don't see how what you say is in line with that quote. The context of that quote doesn't add up to what you are saying it says.
That aside. I asked what principle would determine a logical separation between PDA and Law Code. I wait your response.
Adam Knott: And the proposal is that then, under his Law Code, anyone can start their own PDA, and customers can purchase from the PDA of their choice, since all PDA's will be enforcing the same Law Code, just as today, all businesses are operating under the same Law Code.
And the proposal is that then, under his Law Code, anyone can start their own PDA, and customers can purchase from the PDA of their choice, since all PDA's will be enforcing the same Law Code, just as today, all businesses are operating under the same Law Code.
I didn't see that anywhere in the context of that whole quote. honestly.
Adam Knott: But someone will have to choose the Law Code. That is an important issue. Who chooses the Law Code the PDA's are enforcing? You get to choose your PDA. Who gets to choose the Law Code? Example: Law Code #1 Anyone violating a copyright or patent will be imprisoned. (Ayn Rand) Law Code #2 Anyone violating a copyright will be imprisoned, no patents are allowed. (Rothbard) Law Code #3 No copyrights or patents are allowed. (Kinsella) Here are three Law Codes. Obviously, there are many many examples like this that could be used. So all the judicial agencies have to agree on the same Law Code. Who chooses the Law Code?
I think they sit down and negotiate the terms ahead of time with foresight. I know Kinsella and Rothbard both advocate non-initiation of physical aggression. But I already discussed the development of ideas amidst differing regions and societies in my previous post.
Secondly, I don't think you are accurately providing a deliberation on the Rothbard quote above, so, I don't know about what Ayn Rand nor Kinsella would say. ask Kinsella since he's still alive?
Adam Knott: Choosing your PDA and choosing a Law Code are not the same thing.
I don't see how they are not. I am not saying they necessarily are "not the same", as you seem to be. I am saying they are possibly the same and possibly not the same. Any PDA I choose, I would make an educated determination that such a PDA is in line with natural law. That's my position. I wouldn't hire a defense team that in my eyes are unlawful.
Nitroadict: Gravity can be directly observed, natural rights cannot, leading me to disagree with the comparison. I wasn't aware that philosophy had a monopoly over the english language, either. Your bait is getting cold, btw.
What does gravity look like? I must admit I have never seen gravity. I've never seen an electron either. I'm not a proponent of Natural Rights, but to claim to have seen gravity seems extremely suspect. Most of modern physics deals with theories that posit entities that cannot be directly experienced, but it doesn't follow that we should act as if gravity and electrons don't exist.
"I cannot prove, but am prepared to affirm, that if you take care of clarity in reasoning, most good causes will take care of themselves, while some bad ones are taken care of as a matter of course." -Anthony de Jasay
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