It must drive Juan crazy to see a fellow objective ethicist being so open, helpful, and civil with members of the "church of subjectivism", but this evil subjectivist is deeply grateful for it.
February 17 - 1600 - Giordano Bruno is burnt alive by the catholic church. Aquinas : "much more reason is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted of heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put to death."
Zavoi: So, the non-cognitivist either admits the meaningfulness of at least one objective obligation (the obligation to act in accordance with ethical non-cognitivism), or they make their argument into something that can be disregarded by the libertarian. Either way, the original goal (to refute libertarianism) is not achieved. It may seem that this is just a re-hash of the earlier argument that showed that both E and ~E imply ~W. But that was just to show that it doesn't matter whether or not a particular action is an objective ethical issue; whereas here we step back even further to show that anyone who denies the very meaningfulness of W cannot argue that non-libertarianism is in any way preferable to libertarianism: the best they can do is be neutral with regard to one versus the other.
So, the non-cognitivist either admits the meaningfulness of at least one objective obligation (the obligation to act in accordance with ethical non-cognitivism), or they make their argument into something that can be disregarded by the libertarian. Either way, the original goal (to refute libertarianism) is not achieved.
It may seem that this is just a re-hash of the earlier argument that showed that both E and ~E imply ~W. But that was just to show that it doesn't matter whether or not a particular action is an objective ethical issue; whereas here we step back even further to show that anyone who denies the very meaningfulness of W cannot argue that non-libertarianism is in any way preferable to libertarianism: the best they can do is be neutral with regard to one versus the other.
So basically this.
As far as the justification for the universalizability principle, I like Kinsella's wording on the anti-state.com forum.
Kinsella: There is plenty of literature on this. Do we need to reinvent the wheel on everything? The point is, IF you are trying to *justify* something, without marching ahead and doing it without trying to inquire into its legitimacy, you have already entered the stage of trying to find non-arbitrary reasons. If the reasons are simply arbitrary, tha'ts no better than not seeking to justify it at all.
There is plenty of literature on this. Do we need to reinvent the wheel on everything? The point is, IF you are trying to *justify* something, without marching ahead and doing it without trying to inquire into its legitimacy, you have already entered the stage of trying to find non-arbitrary reasons. If the reasons are simply arbitrary, tha'ts no better than not seeking to justify it at all.
Spence: You ever kill anybody?
Sam: I hurt somebody's feelings once.
Regarding Kinsella's argument, here is what I wrote in response in that thread:
--
Kinsella starts with the notion of legitimacy (presumably, "objective" rightness or wrongness), then instead of sticking with that word he for some reason switches to justifiable and just/unjust. Now we can only assume he still means objective rightness/wrongness when he says just/unjust. But this clarification does not jive well with his challenge:
Kinsella:But if there is no unjust use of force, what is it, exactly, that a rights-skeptic is concerned about?
Plugging in from above, the reader can scarcely be faulted for interpreting this as, "But if there is no objectively wrong use of force, what is it, exactly, that a rights-skeptic is concerned about?" This is no challenge for anyone who does not accept the notion of objective ethics. Kinsella implicitly assumes objective rightness and wrongness are coherent concepts, when that is precisely the underlying issue. [In other words, Kinsella assumes that which he wishes to prove.]
He again assumes objective rightness and wrongness with his usage of the word object (verb):
Kinsella:If there are no rights, as he maintains, then he cannot object to being shot.
Since when did objecting require the implicit assumption of objective (a priori) right and wrong? For Kinsella's purposes, "object" has to mean something other than merely demanding not to be shot and/or providing reasons why pulling the trigger would have consequences the shooter would probably not desire. For Kinsella's purposes only objections appealing to objective moral truths count as objections, but anyone who rejects the notion of objective moral truth would already reject this narrow definition.
In short, Kinsella's critique presupposes the existence of objective or a priori moral truth, which is itself the hardest-to-swallow aspect of natural rights theories. If he wishes to defend natural rights, he would do better to try to defend - or even just clearly define - the underlying concept of objective or a priori ethics he takes as given here.
Think outside the monopoly paradigm. Net-based microsecession | Why anarchy hasn't worked
Zavoi:The "ethical non-cognitivist" position holds that whatever obligations are, they are never something objective, and so the notion of an "objective obligation" is meaningless.
OK.
Zavoi:And remember what the original motivation was behind adopting this position: to refute the argument for libertarian ethics.
Why does this matter? Regardless of the origin of an idea, it needn't be anyone else's motivation for adopting the position (in particular, it's not my motivation or goal in taking this position).
Zavoi:So when the non-cognitivist says, "'Objective should' does not correspond to any meaningful concept," the libertarian can ask, "In what sense am I obligated to act in accordance with that belief, rather than in accordance with its negation?"
I don't follow your intent here. The statement "'Objective should' does not correspond to any meaningful concept" is not itself a statement of obligation, so why ask in what sense one is obligated to act in accordance with it? Similarly if I said, "'Pzqpqqt' is meaningless," what would it mean to be "obligated to act in accordance" with that statement (or its negation)?
Zavoi:As you said, the non-cognitivist can mean this obligation to be a command ("Do X") or a consequentialist statement contingent upon some other purpose ("You should do X if you want Y").
What obligation? Not all propositional statements are statements of obligation.
Zavoi:So, the non-cognitivist either admits the meaningfulness of at least one objective obligation (the obligation to act in accordance with ethical non-cognitivism), or they make their argument into something that can be disregarded by the libertarian.
Again, where's the obligation for the non-cognitivist (which, by the way, is not precisely my meta-ethical position)?
Zavoi: AJ:By the way, Zavoi, is there anything you don't find satisfactory about Hoppe's and Rothbard's conceptions of objective ethics? Do you find them flawed, so you decided to come up with a better derivation? I'll answer because you asked, but I don't want to get too far off topic.
AJ:By the way, Zavoi, is there anything you don't find satisfactory about Hoppe's and Rothbard's conceptions of objective ethics? Do you find them flawed, so you decided to come up with a better derivation?
I'll answer because you asked, but I don't want to get too far off topic.
Thank you for your excellent and pithy answer.
Zavoi:The argument I have given in this thread more closely resembles Hoppe's own, at least in the beginning where he demonstrates the existence of objective ethics by showing that it is contradictory to deny them.
I believe I have refuted this part of Hoppe's argument by demonstrating an equivocation between the usage of the term self-ownership as "range of control" and as "right to control." If you prefer, it might be faster if you could explain any difficulties you find in my analysis (I'm also happy to continue with your derivation - either one you prefer):
AJ: Hoppe: Arguing is an activity and requires a person's exclusive control over scarce resources (one's brain, vocal chords, etc.). So far so good. Hoppe:More specifically, as long as there is argumentation, there is a mutual recognition of each other's exclusive control over such resources. Here Hoppe can charitably be interpreted in one of two ways: Recognition = acknowledgment of the fact of "each other's exclusive control over such resources." Recognition = acknowledgment of each other's right of exclusive control over such resources. Hoppe:It is this which explains the unique feature of communication: that while one may disagree about what has been said, it is still possible to independently agree at least on the fact that there is disagreement. Note that this implies Interpretation (1) above, and does not imply Interpretation (2). So far he consistently means (1); no equivocation yet. Hoppe:(Lomasky does not seem to dispute this. He claims, however, that it merely proves the fact of mutually exclusive domains of control, not the right of self-ownership. He errs: Whatever - such as the law of contradiction, for instance - must be presupposed insofar as one argues, cannot be meaningfully disputed, because it is the very precondition of meaningful doubt, and hence must be regarded as indisputable, or a priori valid. This still implies Interpretation (1), and not (2), because at best only the fact of "each other's exclusive control over such resources" need be presupposed, and only that fact cannot be meaningfully disputed. One could of course meaningfully dispute the right of exclusive control without pressupposing such a right. All that is actually required is presupposition of the fact, not the right. Lomasky may be wrong (or not), but in any case Hoppe must still intend Interpretation (1) here if Hoppe is to be interpreted charitably. Note that switching to Interpretation (2) without explicit reference to that switch would be a bald equivocation. So far, Hoppe is in the clear. Hoppe:In the same vein, the fact of self-ownership is a praxeological precondition of argumentation. Anyone trying to prove or disprove anything must in fact be a self-owner. If his argument is to coherently follow from what he wrote above, Hoppe must here define "the fact of self-ownership" as "the fact of 'each other's exclusive control over such resources'." And he must define "self-owner" as "one who has 'exclusive control over such resources'." Hoppe still clearly means Interpretation (1) above. Still no equivocation. Hoppe:It is a self-contradictory absurdity then to ask for any further-reaching justification for this fact. Required, of necessity, by all meaningful argumentation, self-ownership is an absolutely and ultimately justified fact.) From above, all Hoppe is saying here is, "each other's exclusive control over such resources" is an absolutely and ultimately justified fact. But the dear reader will note that this statement - taken at face value - does not imply Hoppe's argumentation ethics (right to exclusive control), only argumentation facts (fact of exclusive control). No, for Hoppe's purposes, the sentence will have to carry the implication that "the right of self-ownership is an absolutely and ultimately justified fact." Sadly, Hoppe can only achieve this by pulling the old switcheroo, by equivocating between Interpretation (1) and Interpretation (2).
Hoppe: Arguing is an activity and requires a person's exclusive control over scarce resources (one's brain, vocal chords, etc.).
Arguing is an activity and requires a person's exclusive control over scarce resources (one's brain, vocal chords, etc.).
So far so good.
Hoppe:More specifically, as long as there is argumentation, there is a mutual recognition of each other's exclusive control over such resources.
Here Hoppe can charitably be interpreted in one of two ways:
Hoppe:It is this which explains the unique feature of communication: that while one may disagree about what has been said, it is still possible to independently agree at least on the fact that there is disagreement.
Note that this implies Interpretation (1) above, and does not imply Interpretation (2). So far he consistently means (1); no equivocation yet.
Hoppe:(Lomasky does not seem to dispute this. He claims, however, that it merely proves the fact of mutually exclusive domains of control, not the right of self-ownership. He errs: Whatever - such as the law of contradiction, for instance - must be presupposed insofar as one argues, cannot be meaningfully disputed, because it is the very precondition of meaningful doubt, and hence must be regarded as indisputable, or a priori valid.
This still implies Interpretation (1), and not (2), because at best only the fact of "each other's exclusive control over such resources" need be presupposed, and only that fact cannot be meaningfully disputed. One could of course meaningfully dispute the right of exclusive control without pressupposing such a right. All that is actually required is presupposition of the fact, not the right. Lomasky may be wrong (or not), but in any case Hoppe must still intend Interpretation (1) here if Hoppe is to be interpreted charitably.
Note that switching to Interpretation (2) without explicit reference to that switch would be a bald equivocation. So far, Hoppe is in the clear.
Hoppe:In the same vein, the fact of self-ownership is a praxeological precondition of argumentation. Anyone trying to prove or disprove anything must in fact be a self-owner.
If his argument is to coherently follow from what he wrote above, Hoppe must here define "the fact of self-ownership" as "the fact of 'each other's exclusive control over such resources'." And he must define "self-owner" as "one who has 'exclusive control over such resources'."
Hoppe still clearly means Interpretation (1) above. Still no equivocation.
Hoppe:It is a self-contradictory absurdity then to ask for any further-reaching justification for this fact. Required, of necessity, by all meaningful argumentation, self-ownership is an absolutely and ultimately justified fact.)
From above, all Hoppe is saying here is, "each other's exclusive control over such resources" is an absolutely and ultimately justified fact. But the dear reader will note that this statement - taken at face value - does not imply Hoppe's argumentation ethics (right to exclusive control), only argumentation facts (fact of exclusive control).
No, for Hoppe's purposes, the sentence will have to carry the implication that "the right of self-ownership is an absolutely and ultimately justified fact." Sadly, Hoppe can only achieve this by pulling the old switcheroo, by equivocating between Interpretation (1) and Interpretation (2).
Zavoi:For example, "Rich people must give some money to the poor": such a norm could conceivably be followed without leading to the extinction of humanity, and it seems at first face to be a "universalizable" norm. Hoppe, believing in absolute first-occupier property rights, would probably say that this norm is not universalizable because it makes a distinction between rich and poor people; still, it is not clear how this distinction any more detracts from the validity of this "socialist" norm than the distinction between first-occupiers and latecomers detracts from the validity of the "capitalist" property rights that Hoppe advocates.
At least prima facie, this seems like quite a blow to Hoppe's notion of universalizability. (I'm not surprised that the notion of an absolute a priori norm first-occupier property rights is problematic, because it seems to me that most ethicists tacitly admit that homesteading theories spring from consequentialist and intuitive considerations.)
twistedbydsign99: Zavoi:"Rich people must give some money to the poor" Not universal, the rich and the poor have different sets of rules.
Zavoi:"Rich people must give some money to the poor"
Not universal, the rich and the poor have different sets of rules.
Rules can be worded so as to make this universal. For example, "All people must give any income over $500,000 a year to a community chest, which will be divided equally among all people" (yes, technically the rich will get some of it back).
Stephen: So basically this. As far as the justification for the universalizability principle, I like Kinsella's wording on the anti-state.com forum.
good quote
"I used to see a mountain as a mountain.. Thereafter.. when I saw a mountain; lo! it was not a mountain.. yet now of final tranquillity: I see a mountain just as a mountain as I used to.." - Master Yuan; molon labe
AJ: twistedbydsign99: Zavoi:"Rich people must give some money to the poor" Not universal, the rich and the poor have different sets of rules. Rules can be worded so as to make this universal. For example, "All people must give any income over $500,000 a year to a community chest, which will be divided equally among all people" (yes, technically the rich will get some of it back).
Still not universalizable, because the distinction is arbitrarily chosen instead of necessarily presupposed by the participants in the discussion. Arbitrary distinctions are by definition, unjustified.
Ah, I see. Perhaps if we take for granted that Hoppe's AE arguments are valid, then universalizability does follow. I'll leave that for Zavoi to answer, because I don't buy Hoppe's preceding AE argument anyway.
Nautral law and natural rights need no proof. They are observed and then described like for example the law of gravity. The single best short explanation of both that I have ever come across is here: http://jim.com/rights.html
If anyone wants to discuss this essay it might be interesting.
Stephen: Still not universalizable, because the distinction is arbitrarily chosen instead of necessarily presupposed by the participants in the discussion. Arbitrary distinctions are by definition, unjustified.
Like homesteading?
scineram: Like homesteading?
Where there is no property there is no justice; a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid
Fools! not to see that what they madly desire would be a calamity to them as no hands but their own could bring
drf1: Nautral law and natural rights need no proof. They are observed and then described like for example the law of gravity.
Nautral law and natural rights need no proof. They are observed and then described like for example the law of gravity.
Only gravity exists regardless of whether or not a person believes in it; I don't see how this similarly applies to natural rights. Gravity will still affect humans in the physical sense regardless if Stephen Hawking or Mel Gibson decide to barrel roll / jump off of a cliff. I don't see how this comparison is nothing short of terrible, seeing how natural rights is a philosophical theory & gravity is a natural phenomena (i.e. a non-artificial event in the physical sense) described to us by science. Do other people still think coercion is a natural law?
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AJ: Kinsella:But if there is no unjust use of force, what is it, exactly, that a rights-skeptic is concerned about? Plugging in from above, the reader can scarcely be faulted for interpreting this as, "But if there is no objectively wrong use of force, what is it, exactly, that a rights-skeptic is concerned about?" This is no challenge for anyone who does not accept the notion of objective ethics.
Plugging in from above, the reader can scarcely be faulted for interpreting this as, "But if there is no objectively wrong use of force, what is it, exactly, that a rights-skeptic is concerned about?" This is no challenge for anyone who does not accept the notion of objective ethics.
The object of any dispute must be presumed to be objective by those engaged in an argument. This is so obvious.
AJ:Kinsella implicitly assumes objective rightness and wrongness are coherent concepts, when that is precisely the underlying issue. [In other words, Kinsella assumes that which he wishes to prove.]
Kinsella correctly recognises that objective rightness and wrongness are coherent concepts, which must be presumed by any individuals arguing over the rightness and wrongness of any particular class of action. [In other words, Kinsella proves that which he wishes to prove.]
AJ:Since when did objecting require the implicit assumption of objective (a priori) right and wrong? For Kinsella's purposes, "object" has to mean something other than merely demanding not to be shot and/or providing reasons why pulling the trigger would have consequences the shooter would probably not desire. For Kinsella's purposes only objections appealing to objective moral truths count as objections, but anyone who rejects the notion of objective moral truth would already reject this narrow definition.
If the skeptic only objects on arbitrary grounds, why the hell should the shooter care? After all, it's the shooter's subjective preference that the skeptic should die. Moral relativism/subjectivism/emotivsm always devolves into might makes right. It's the statist moral doctrine par excellence.
Obviously, when Kinsella uses the word "object", he means providing, in principle, mutually acceptable grounds for the shooter to not follow through on his whim. Otherwise, the objection would not be any kind of meaningfully constructed argument, but a mere expression of the skeptic's desire, and entirely irrelevant unless the shooter gives a damn how he feels about being shot (and presumeably he doesn't).
AJ:In short, Kinsella's critique presupposes the existence of objective or a priori moral truth, which is itself the hardest-to-swallow aspect of natural rights theories. If he wishes to defend natural rights, he would do better to try to defend - or even just clearly define - the underlying concept of objective or a priori ethics he takes as given here.
Actually, he is using an epistemological technique known as negative demonstration. If the denial of a proposition is clearly contradictory, then it must be assumed to be true. Other propositions which have being demonstrated in this way are the law of non-contradiction, the action axiom, the a priori of argumentation and so on.
@ AJ
I think that once you consider that the recognized control can never be argued against, that is, a participant in a discussion is undeniably justified in having a range of control, the entire quote falls into place. Also, we could replace the work 'right' with other things like 'justified interpersonal norm', 'just claim', et cetera and still have the same result. I don't know why you get so hung up on terminology. Not all words need to be defined in precise terms. Some are just intuitively understood. And 'right' is one of them.
Stephen: The object of any dispute must be presumed to be objective by those engaged in an argument. This is so obvious.
The dispute I am addressing is the objective issue of whether "objectively wrong" has a meaningful definition.
Stephen: AJ:Kinsella implicitly assumes objective rightness and wrongness are coherent concepts, when that is precisely the underlying issue. [In other words, Kinsella assumes that which he wishes to prove.] Kinsella correctly recognises that objective rightness and wrongness are coherent concepts, which must be presumed by any individuals arguing over the rightness and wrongness of any particular class of action.
Kinsella correctly recognises that objective rightness and wrongness are coherent concepts, which must be presumed by any individuals arguing over the rightness and wrongness of any particular class of action.
You're implicitly defining "arguing" to mean "arguing over an objective issue," which is assuming what you're trying to prove (i.e., that "objective rightness and wrongness are coherent concepts"). People can heatedly and actively disagree over the rightness or wrongness of something based on their subjective opinions, whether or not you want to call that "argument."
I don't mind if we limit the scope of the words "argument" and "dispute" to objective issues, but then the subjectivist would simply say that under such definitions it is impossible to argue over whether an action is right or wrong, because they are not objective concepts. (Which puts us back where we started.)
Stephen:If the skeptic only objects on arbitrary grounds, why the hell should the shooter care?
And the shooter would care if he heard an objection on objective grounds? The most effective strategy would likely be to appeal to the shooter's self-interest, and avoiding performative contradictions is probably not very high on his list of priorities.
Stephen:Moral relativism/subjectivism/emotivsm always devolves into might makes right.
First of all, emotivism is a meta-ethical theory purporting to interpret what people mean when they use ambiguous moral language, so it has nothing to say about what is right or wrong - only about what people mean when they say such words. And the subjectivist's position is that right and wrong are matters of his own opinion/feeling/etc., so subjectivism would only result in "might makes right" (for him) if that happened to be his view.
Stephen:It's the statist moral doctrine par excellence.
If you mean that we shouldn't want Statist politicians to be subjectivist and instead it would be better if they all followed the NAP, I fully agree. However, when there is no monopoly on force, what exactly is the worry? Under the AnCap vision, the law would be what consumers want and pay for, and we can only make educated guesses that there will be a strong tendency toward natural law. I am fine with such educated guesses, and I find such a scenario rather plausible. However, even assuming "objective ethics" can be coherently defined - which I am doubting more and more - I don't see what purpose it would serve without the State monopoly.
It strikes me as a relic of the paradigm shift from mini-archism to (p)anarchism, especially when we recall that just a few decades ago minarchism was the dominant libertarian view. Under minarchism, it indeed makes sense to not allow subjective interpretation of the Constitution or consequentialist judgments on whether the president needs "emergency powers," but in the new paradigm you're no longer forced to live under one master, and moreover there is no monopoly capable of ensuring universal compliance with any "objective" standard.
In other words, subjectivism may have been a proximate cause (of government power abuse), but the core problem was the monopoly on force.
Stephen:If the denial of a proposition is clearly contradictory, then it must be assumed to be true.
This only works for proving propositions that have coherent meaning, but the coherency of the meaning is the very issue.
AJ: Stephen:Moral relativism/subjectivism/emotivsm always devolves into might makes right. It's the statist moral doctrine par excellence. First of all, emotivism is a meta-ethical theory purporting to interpret what people mean when they use ambiguous moral language, so it has nothing to say about what is right or wrong - only about what people mean when they say such words. And the subjectivist's position is that right and wrong are matters of his own opinion/feeling, so subjectivism would only result in "might makes right" (and for him only) if that happened to be his sentiment.
Stephen:Moral relativism/subjectivism/emotivsm always devolves into might makes right. It's the statist moral doctrine par excellence.
First of all, emotivism is a meta-ethical theory purporting to interpret what people mean when they use ambiguous moral language, so it has nothing to say about what is right or wrong - only about what people mean when they say such words. And the subjectivist's position is that right and wrong are matters of his own opinion/feeling, so subjectivism would only result in "might makes right" (and for him only) if that happened to be his sentiment.
Thank for clearing the air on that common misconception!
Human Action Comics Issues 1-6
Stephen:I think that once you consider that the recognized control can never be argued against, that is, a participant in a discussion is undeniably justified in having a range of control, the entire quote falls into place.
This only makes sense if "argued against" means "argued to be objectively wrong," and "justified" means "objectively justified (in the ethical/moral sense)".
Stephen:Also, we could replace the work 'right' with other things like 'justified interpersonal norm', 'just claim', et cetera and still have the same result. I don't know why you get so hung up on terminology. Not all words need to be defined in precise terms. Some are just intuitively understood. And 'right' is one of them.
In Kinsella's example, all of "justified," "just," and right" would be meant to presume "objective" ethical content, so all the words carry the same level of meaningless for me. How do you know you're understanding "right" intuitively (in a logical sense) and not just instinctively or based on your cultural norms or upbringing, etc.? (If you cannot define it unambiguously.)
I don't see how this comparison is nothing short of terrible, seeing how natural rights is a philosophical theory & gravity is a natural phenomena
well, NR are not Natural Law (such as the law of excluded middle, etc...). Now life, liberty, and property do exist whether or not a person believes them or not. Even in communism it comes down to somebody handing out orders on what to do with the damn thing.
so i agree that NR is a philosophical theory, but one in which law, order, and justice is formulated upon rebutted by for human nature to be, human nature is to be (A is A). In that sense they are laws, right laws. When the larger context of the theory is inquired, such as human prosperity, flourishing, etc... then there is a right way and a wrong way to go about performing such an act. And in the honor of justice such laws based upon the right way to go about living as a human (without initiating coercion) are absolutely understandable. And that larger context considered, then human nature to be what it is: human nature (A is A), instead of going on the path of consciously chosen extinction, a natural order can be discovered that choosing life, liberty, and property is the right way to go. There's definitely much else to this. The theory has a lot to consider. The violations of such rights do not mean the rights disappear. The counter-winds of a lack of prosperity in consideration of high-time preference events, etc... do erode human nature upon unnecessarily risky ventures (the contraries of NR for humans are death, death, and death so these are not human nature flourishing, but of untimely - deaths.) Since a person can muster the foresight that protecting life, liberty, and property are good, prosperous of human nature, in other words, flourishing to the nature of a human, it isn't surprising that particular people would come along and have the knowledge to point this out: Protect your life, liberty, and property and you will have a better life - a life in general - as opposed if protecting these was absolutely not something a person did, thus, willing death. It would be the end of an individuals NR when death is called upon and visited. And in general to all humans such a violation is extinction. But with foresight humans have, as said, found it an act of will to protect such basics of living.
in this sense natural rights are observable by noticing human action and instead of needing reminded presently, the foresight of such can lead to all kinds of preparedness (by answering such questions how to best achieve self-defense, what would lead to a more prosperous society that is comfortable in more peaceful relations as opposed to conflictive relations, etc...)
And i see not what this has anything to do with subjective nor objective, so, for those that be, I'm not talking about either of those class conflicts. I'm discussing the deeper values of consideration. I say this now to avoid the confusion that is apparent of being stuck in a dialogue upon such terms as I find there explanatory power to be extremely weak.
good night
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