ladyattis: Pretty much this video sums up my views on this thread entirely... For now.
Pretty much this video sums up my views on this thread entirely... For now.
Huh?
ladyattis: Let me put it another way, if I intend for X, then how by Y is the factor that defines the 'consequence.' Therefore, if my intention to do good by a finite means to achieve it (the how) I must consider each means own end in respect to the intent (and the end in respect to the intent). Whether there's any metaphysical basis for tying one end to one intent is beside the point, it's a matter of whether one is trying to make their ethical or moral judgments sound. As the old saying goes, "The road to Hell is paved with Good Intentions."
Let me put it another way, if I intend for X, then how by Y is the factor that defines the 'consequence.' Therefore, if my intention to do good by a finite means to achieve it (the how) I must consider each means own end in respect to the intent (and the end in respect to the intent). Whether there's any metaphysical basis for tying one end to one intent is beside the point, it's a matter of whether one is trying to make their ethical or moral judgments sound. As the old saying goes, "The road to Hell is paved with Good Intentions."
The road to misery is often paved with good intentions, but not necessarily the road to culpability. Anyway, I still don't know what this has to do with the is/ought divide.
Human Action Comics Issues 1-6
I. Ryan: ladyattis: Pretty much this video sums up my views on this thread entirely... For now. Huh?
Exactly.
"The power of liberty going forward is in decentralization. Not in leaders, but in decentralized activism. In a market process." -- liberty student
Lilburne:The road to misery is often paved with good intentions, but not necessarily the road to culpability. Anyway, I still don't know what this has to do with the is/ought divide.
It has more to do with your overemphasis on intentionality.
[In response to the original post:]
You seem to be assuming that there couldn’t be an “ought” embedded in the very nature of what “is”.
I think our founding fathers answered this question rather beautifully: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights, that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” (emphasis mine)
A justification for natural rights doesn’t need to be deduced, because this moral knowledge is self-evident (call it an extension of our conscience). You wrote candidly below [above] about how we “just know” or “feel” when something is morally wrong (even when we “go ahead and do it anyway”). Each of us has experienced that entire all-too-familiar range of sensations from temptation (a want coupled with a feeling that it "ought not" be done), to the fleeting sweetness of doing it anyway (because "why not?"), and the resulting feeling of guilt that almost immediately follows (as if “someone saw”). So, I think the question becomes, Why? Whence this innate and nagging sense of "ought" and "ought not"?
Again, the answer is above: part of that "is" is the self-evident knowledge of our Creator, under whose authority we live and move and have our being. As his “creation,” we are metaphysically and epistemologically dependent upon him, the absolute person, and are therefore ethically obliged to live according to his design. We all know this as soon as we know anything at all – though we normally refuse to admit and embrace it, just as we normally “go ahead and do it anyway” when our conscience objects. Neither natural rights nor our absed consciences are something we can deduce; they're the self-evident consequence of being a creature always before his Creator.
ladyattis: Exactly.
Ha!
Sorry, new here and didn't quote properly. The above was in response to the original post, since I wasn't sure at which point to jump in, though I've skimmed through a few pages of the conversation.
arongahagan: You seem to be assuming that there couldn’t be an “ought” embedded in the very nature of what “is”. I think our founding fathers answered this question rather beautifully: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights, that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” (emphasis mine) A justification for natural rights doesn’t need to be deduced, because this moral knowledge is self-evident (call it an extension of our conscience). You wrote candidly below about how we “just know” or “feel” when something is morally wrong (even when we “go ahead and do it anyway”). Each of us has experienced that entire all-too-familiar range of sensations from temptation (a want coupled with a feeling that it "ought not" be done), to the fleeting sweetness of doing it anyway (because "why not?"), and the resulting feeling of guilt that almost immediately follows (as if “someone saw”). So, I think the question becomes, Why? Whence this innate and nagging sense of "ought" and "ought not"? Again, the answer is above: part of that "is" is the self-evident knowledge of our Creator, under whose authority we live and move and have our being. As his “creation,” we are metaphysically and epistemologically dependent upon him, the absolute person, and are therefore ethically obliged to live according to his design. We all know this as soon as we know anything at all – though we normally refuse to admit and embrace it, just as we normally “go ahead and do it anyway” when our conscience objects. Neither natural rights nor our absed consciences are something we can deduce; they're the self-evident consequence of being a creature always before his Creator.
A justification for natural rights doesn’t need to be deduced, because this moral knowledge is self-evident (call it an extension of our conscience). You wrote candidly below about how we “just know” or “feel” when something is morally wrong (even when we “go ahead and do it anyway”). Each of us has experienced that entire all-too-familiar range of sensations from temptation (a want coupled with a feeling that it "ought not" be done), to the fleeting sweetness of doing it anyway (because "why not?"), and the resulting feeling of guilt that almost immediately follows (as if “someone saw”). So, I think the question becomes, Why? Whence this innate and nagging sense of "ought" and "ought not"?
It (morality) does not require a creator. If no creator exists, then the self-evidence of morality and rights can be attributed to the evolutionary process. If it were "fun" to murder people, then do you believe that people would exist? No; we would have become extinct.
Arong, then what if there's no God? Then the nature of is implying ought leads nowhere? For me, is and ought are categorically distinct. Is merely means that which is a fact (It's 95F in Wichita, KS in my neighborhood...). Ought means a prefered course of action (based on one's own intention) (I ought to turn on the damn AC if I don't want to cook in my house...). The so-called divide for me is illusionary and ignorant, simply put.
ladyattis: Arong, then what if there's no God? Then the nature of is implying ought leads nowhere? For me, is and ought are categorically distinct. Is merely means that which is a fact (It's 95F in Wichita, KS in my neighborhood...). Ought means a prefered course of action (based on one's own intention) (I ought to turn on the damn AC if I don't want to cook in my house...). The so-called divide for me is illusionary and ignorant, simply put.
Excellent. As always, an "ought" implies a "want". And, analogously, a universal "ought" (i.e., human rights theories) imply a universal "want".
Bingo. Ought is the method of connecting a prefered end to some set of actions that can fulfill it.
I. Ryan: ladyattis: Arong, then what if there's no God? Then the nature of is implying ought leads nowhere? For me, is and ought are categorically distinct. Is merely means that which is a fact (It's 95F in Wichita, KS in my neighborhood...). Ought means a prefered course of action (based on one's own intention) (I ought to turn on the damn AC if I don't want to cook in my house...). The so-called divide for me is illusionary and ignorant, simply put. Excellent. As always, an "ought" implies a "want". And, analogously, a universal "ought" (i.e., human rights theories) imply a universal "want".
There exists an implicit 'ought': One 'ought' to satisfy his or her wants.
Life is filled with misinterpretations, misrepresentations, and prodigal folklore.
in my op, you are taking all the morality out of it.
can we not disciminate between two kinds of 'oughts' ?
1)you ought do this if such and such is your goal. because it is a suitable means (maybe the best?) to your goal.
which is different from the moral ought, which stubbornly suggests
2) you ought do it because to do otherwise would be wrong, regardless of your personal subjective goals. even if your goal is to be wrong, you 'should' frustrate your goal and not be wrong. (this is peculiar, but it captures the distinctive sense of what morality is)
Where there is no property there is no justice; a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid
Fools! not to see that what they madly desire would be a calamity to them as no hands but their own could bring
I. Ryan:If you believe that the category of "moral action" is a subcategory of "action", then, in order to understand moral action, you must ascertain and then explicitly state the differentia. If you continue to employ the term "moral" or "morality" without explicitly defining such a term via an explicit statement of the differentia, then your arguments will remain incomplete and unconvincing.
Actually, I have defined it in this thread:
Lilburne:In plain language, morality has never been about general optimization in action. People don't say it is immoral to go skydiving without a helmet or to have an un-diversified stock portfolio. What sets moral choices apart from other choices is that the former involves possible choices which might be selected with full knowledge that it is likely to be to the detriment of the moral actor's material well-being: risking one's life to save another, abstaining from a tempting crime which would likely go unpunished, etc. Those choices are a distinctive part of human action. That part ought to have a name. It's traditional name is morality. It makes no sense to extend that name to all human action.
Regarding evolution, I have always claimed that the subjective evaluations of morality arise out of nature, which is why certain moral impulses are preponderant. But it is two different things (a) for morality to arise out of natural laws and (b) for those natural laws to be considered to make up morality.
I. Ryan:Although, as you correctly indicated, the so-called science of "social engineering" is a relatively new scientific demarcation, it is merely an explicitization of the nature of a certain demarcation of human action
To me such "explicitization" is basically a futile attempt to become a deus ex machina. Our moral urges may be a result of the "natural social engineering" of Darwinian forces; that doesn't mean it makes sense to internalize that engineering project, any more than it makes sense for a couple to eschew romance since "it's all ultimately about the propagation of the species".
I. Ryan:Do you believe that praxeology "is not fundamental to the human psyche" because "it is [a ] relatively new project of the philosophical set"?
The science of praxeology is not fundamental to the human psyche, but that which it studies is.
nirgrahamUK: in my op, you are taking all the morality out of it. can we not disciminate between two kinds of 'oughts' ? 1)you ought do this if such and such is your goal. because it is a suitable means (maybe the best?) to your goal. which is different from the moral ought, which stubbornly suggests 2) you ought do it because to do otherwise would be wrong, regardless of your personal subjective goals. even if your goal is to be wrong, you 'should' frustrate your goal and not be wrong. (this is peculiar, but it captures the distinctive sense of what morality is)
No. Any disconnect between "ought" and "want" implies coercion and then eventually totalitarianism.
im not sure how you derive that. it seems non-sequitor-ish but perhaps you have reasons....
if you object to 2, does your understanding of morality mean that people with personal goals to do harm to other innocents are not per se being wrong, and ought not avoid doing wrong ? isnt that absurd?
ladyattis:For me, is and ought are categorically distinct. [...] The so-called divide for me is illusionary and ignorant, simply put.
They are categorically distinct, yet their division is illusory and ignorant? Can you explain this Heraclitean puzzle for me?
nirgrahamUK:even if your goal is to be wrong, you 'should' frustrate your goal and not be wrong.
If, as Ryan says, an "ought" implies a "want", then whose "want" is implied by "you ought to frustrate your goal"?
Lilburne: Lilburne:In plain language, morality has never been about general optimization in action. People don't say it is immoral to go skydiving without a helmet or to have an un-diversified stock portfolio. What sets moral choices apart from other choices is that the former involves possible choices which might be selected with full knowledge that it is likely to be to the detriment of the moral actor's material well-being: risking one's life to save another, abstaining from a tempting crime which would likely go unpunished, etc. Those choices are a distinctive part of human action. That part ought to have a name. It's traditional name is morality. It makes no sense to extend that name to all human action. Regarding evolution, I have always claimed that the subjective evaluations of morality arise out of nature, which is why certain moral impulses are preponderant. But it is two different things (a) for morality to arise out of natural laws and (b) for those natural laws to be considered to make up morality.
The words 'subjective' and 'objective' can have entirely different meanings depending on context and perspective.
Morality can be 'objective' in this sense: Humans have evolved certain 'moral' impulses such as cooperation and generosity. Genes encode those 'moral' impulses. Those genes 'objectively' exist in reality. Therefore, 'morality' is 'objective' in the sense that genes encode the hardwired 'moral' impulses.
Morality can be 'objective' in another sense. Objectivists, Post-Objectivists, and Molyneuvians define 'objectivity' as the methodology of constructing moral prescriptions from science, reason, and consistent logic—without any biases, logical contradictions, or distortions from short-term gut-feelings. XOmniverse from YouTube defined 'objective morality' in this way.
I agree with 'moral objectivism' in those two above senses. I have continually advised the different meanings of 'subjective' and 'objective', which can lead to terminological confusion and equivocation.
This doesn't really contribute much, if anything, but I thought I add some of my thoughts.
I think the ought-ness of a thing has to correspond with it's nature and it's purpose. Like I said earlier about how the wall ought to slow my car down. Yes, I'm using ought as an expectation, but why would I expect the wall to slow my car? Assuming the wall that looks like brick is indeed brick, then we know certain things about the nature of brick. We know about it's hardness and it's weight. We know with what general purpose man manufactured it and placed it. Knowing these things about bricks and brick walls, we can then expect it to respond a certain way. If I drove my car into the wall and the wall responded by actually speeding the car up, continuing it along it's current trajectory, that would be unexpected. The wall would not be acting according to it's nature nor fulfilling the purpose with which man has manufactured and placed it.
If objects don't react the way we expect them to, we attribute this not to these objects "acting" outside their nature or outside the laws of nature, but we attribute it to an error in our judgment, evaluation or expectation. Objects don't choose to act however they please, they're compelled. Therefore, objects have no duty or ought-ness in the sense that an uncompelled man may have. Yes, we're still subject to laws of nature, based on things like our strength, our chemical makeup, etc., but we can also make choices. I can choose to finish typing this sentence or I can choose to delete it.
I think the oughtness of man is based in part upon his adherence to his nature and upon his adherence to the purpose for which he was manufactured. Man can also create his own purposes, but if those purposes, which bring along with them, "oughts", are in discord with his nature (e.g., i must eat to live) or in discord with the purpose for which he was made, then the degree to which we err will be the degree to which we suffer.
"The best way to bail out the economy is with liberty, not with federal reserve notes." - pairunoyd
"The vision of the Austrian must be greater than the blindness of the sheeple." - pairunoyd
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