Stephen Forde: zefreak: Stephen Forde: The implications are that you want their present conduct to change from what it is now, to something else. You demonstrate, by arguing, that you believe they ought to do X and not Y. That they ought to hold some values, not others. That certain moral positions are preferable for both you and your opponent. And I don't see how you can consistently deny this. Right, I hold certain values and would like other to hold similar values. Certain values are preferable to me. I have never denied this; such an admission does not prove what you think it does. In my statement that you quoted, I said "keeping in mind that I am not asserting the possibility of proving through deduction the value or preferability of such conduct, but simply appealing to a possible commonality in values" and before that, "Of course I cannot argue that you ought to hold similar values. However, I can critique the consistency, logic and truth value of a position assuming we share such similar values. In other words, while I cannot argue that you "should" be logical or consistent, I can argue that you aren't." (in the off chance that, sharing those values, you adopt similar conclusions) There is no contradiction here. You are grasping at straws. I'm not sure what you think an "ought" is. I'm pretty sure it's just an expression of valuing one action over another, in which case, I'm right. Also, I think you are assuming that it is only the content of your arguments that is under dispute. It is actually what is implied by the fact that you are arguing that makes the difference.
zefreak: Stephen Forde: The implications are that you want their present conduct to change from what it is now, to something else. You demonstrate, by arguing, that you believe they ought to do X and not Y. That they ought to hold some values, not others. That certain moral positions are preferable for both you and your opponent. And I don't see how you can consistently deny this. Right, I hold certain values and would like other to hold similar values. Certain values are preferable to me. I have never denied this; such an admission does not prove what you think it does. In my statement that you quoted, I said "keeping in mind that I am not asserting the possibility of proving through deduction the value or preferability of such conduct, but simply appealing to a possible commonality in values" and before that, "Of course I cannot argue that you ought to hold similar values. However, I can critique the consistency, logic and truth value of a position assuming we share such similar values. In other words, while I cannot argue that you "should" be logical or consistent, I can argue that you aren't." (in the off chance that, sharing those values, you adopt similar conclusions) There is no contradiction here. You are grasping at straws.
Stephen Forde: The implications are that you want their present conduct to change from what it is now, to something else. You demonstrate, by arguing, that you believe they ought to do X and not Y. That they ought to hold some values, not others. That certain moral positions are preferable for both you and your opponent. And I don't see how you can consistently deny this.
The implications are that you want their present conduct to change from what it is now, to something else. You demonstrate, by arguing, that you believe they ought to do X and not Y. That they ought to hold some values, not others. That certain moral positions are preferable for both you and your opponent. And I don't see how you can consistently deny this.
Right, I hold certain values and would like other to hold similar values. Certain values are preferable to me. I have never denied this; such an admission does not prove what you think it does. In my statement that you quoted, I said
"keeping in mind that I am not asserting the possibility of proving through deduction the value or preferability of such conduct, but simply appealing to a possible commonality in values"
and before that,
"Of course I cannot argue that you ought to hold similar values. However, I can critique the consistency, logic and truth value of a position assuming we share such similar values. In other words, while I cannot argue that you "should" be logical or consistent, I can argue that you aren't." (in the off chance that, sharing those values, you adopt similar conclusions)
There is no contradiction here. You are grasping at straws.
I'm not sure what you think an "ought" is. I'm pretty sure it's just an expression of valuing one action over another, in which case, I'm right. Also, I think you are assuming that it is only the content of your arguments that is under dispute. It is actually what is implied by the fact that you are arguing that makes the difference.
As per my previous post..
—used to express obligation <ought to pay our debts>, advisability <ought to take care of yourself>, natural expectation <ought to be here by now>, or logical consequence <the result ought to be infinity>
The first one is the one relevant to the discussion. This is a topic regarding morality, after all. The second one is what you are referring to, and, as advice or opinion, does not require bridging the is-ought gap.
“Elections are Futures Markets in Stolen Property.” - H. L. Mencken
zefreak: used to express obligation <ought to pay our debts>, advisability <ought to take care of yourself>, natural expectation <ought to be here by now>, or logical consequence <the result ought to be infinity> The first one is the one relevant to the discussion. This is a topic regarding morality, after all. The second one is what you are referring to, and, as advice or opinion, does not require bridging the is-ought gap.
used to express obligation <ought to pay our debts>, advisability <ought to take care of yourself>, natural expectation <ought to be here by now>, or logical consequence <the result ought to be infinity>
Excellent clarification.
Human Action Comics Issues 1-6
Physiocrat: Lilburne, Do you fancy commenting on my attempted defence of natural rigths based on the argument that nature is good I posted a page or so back? I'll reply to AM response to my criticism of emotivisim when I've got sufficient time.
Lilburne,
Do you fancy commenting on my attempted defence of natural rigths based on the argument that nature is good I posted a page or so back?
I'll reply to AM response to my criticism of emotivisim when I've got sufficient time.
Do you mean this one?
Physiocrat: 1. God is good. 2. God created nature. 3. Therefore nature was created good. Now the question here revolves around....
1. God is good.
2. God created nature.
3. Therefore nature was created good.
Now the question here revolves around....
I very much agree with AM's two responses to it, and I'm not sure I would add too much to them. I don't think you've established that god exists, that goodness is objective, or that to harmonize with nature is objectively good.
I. Ryan: Lilburne, It seems that you missed this response:
It seems that you missed this response:
Thank you for reminding me.
I. Ryan:That does not refute my argument because my argument does indeed show that moral correctness is the same as any other correctness.
It does show that this conception of morality is basically consequentialism. And like I said before, I don't think consequentialism is properly called morality, because then it is simply a technical matter of optimization. What then would distinguish "moral action" from "action in general"?
I. Ryan:The simple truth is that all "ought" statements imply a specific "want". As an Austrian economist, if you wanted to make nonexistent the human race, then you would preach extreme statist and totalitarian ideology. However, if you wanted to be successful, then you would have to pretend that the instillation of such ideology will cause all to prosper because that is, generally, the "want" of humans.
I contend that statements like "one ought to not commit aggression" as a moral statement is an issue of inherent revulsion against aggression and not a utilitarian "for the good of humanity in general" position. The latter such position is not an instance of true morality, but is instead an attempt at an elegent solution to the problems of social engineering. People are not moral agents to the extent that they are social engineers. Social engineering is not fundamental to the human psyche; it is relatively new project of the philosophical set.
Lilburne: And like I said before, I don't think consequentialism is properly called morality, because then it is simply a technical matter of optimization. What then would distinguish "moral action" from "action in general"?
And how exactly is this problem? You and others haven't clarified the real implications of said conclusion about consequentialism.
"The power of liberty going forward is in decentralization. Not in leaders, but in decentralized activism. In a market process." -- liberty student
ladyattis: Lilburne: And like I said before, I don't think consequentialism is properly called morality, because then it is simply a technical matter of optimization. What then would distinguish "moral action" from "action in general"? And how exactly is this problem? You and others haven't clarified the real implications of said conclusion about consequentialism.
Actually, I have...
Lilburne:Outside of utilitarianism, morality could not be consequentialist and universal at the same time, because likely consequences will differ for different people according to different situations (the man/mankind problem). And nothing in utilitarian theory has convinced me why I as an individual ought to strive for the greatest utility for the greatest number, or force anyone else to.
Also, it would seem like a highly unuseful redefinition of a word. When people talk about morality, they don't mean matters of technical optimization like using the appropriate screwdriver or making the best move in chess. If there were no difference between "moral action" and "action" then people should stop using the word "morality" altogether, and just talk about action. But there is a set of motivations which is fundamentally different from the basic motivations of self-preservation and self-promotion. Those are the motivations that most people talk about when they use the word "morality". I don't think it makes sense to remove from that word its useful delimiting function and redefine it as a superfluous synonym of action.
Lilburne:Also, it would seem like a highly unuseful redefinition of a word. When people talk about morality, they don't mean matters of technical optimization like using the appropriate screwdriver or making the best move in chess. If there were no difference between "moral action" and "action" then people should stop using the word "morality" altogether, and just talk about action. But there is a set of motivations which is fundamentally different from the basic motivations of self-preservation and self-promotion. Those are the motivations that most people talk about when they use the word "morality". I don't think it makes sense to remove from that word its useful delimiting function and redefine it as a superfluous synonym of action.
Well put, this is my biggest problem with natural law philosophy. It seems to hinge on an unusual definition of the word "ought". I mean, if natural law philosophy is indeed correct then people ought to live in a certain way, there's no reason for that "ought" to be moral.
"You don't need a weatherman to know which way the wind blows"
Bob Dylan
First, consequentialism *is not* utilitarianism. So stop equivocating the two. It's like what some Randroids do with Rationalism (by equivocating everything Kant wrote with that of every other Rationalist before and after him), it's dirty pool, friend. I don't play it. I expect you not to do the same.
Second, it's a given fact that each intent does not always entail the same end. One may intend to save a person's life in the act of being a doctor, but the end may be that his patient may die anyways. Intent may be a good measure of a moral proposition's general aim (of moral or immoral), but it is *not* a sound measure of its functionality in terms of actual ends. To divorce ends from moral propositions (or moral intents) is to invite an anti-causalist approach to all other human affairs (including those of the purely observational/empirical). So, either you include consequence as *part* of the moral debate or you come up with a theory of moral intents, where it's proven ends are overshadowed by intents in a consistent manner.
Lilburne:When people talk about morality, they don't mean matters of technical optimization like using the appropriate screwdriver or making the best move in chess. If there were no difference between "moral action" and "action" then people should stop using the word "morality" altogether, and just talk about action.
You're the one that's conflating the purpose of consequence in moral considerations. I'm simply stating that at the end of a moral consideration (post-intent analysis) that consequences are weighed to see if the ends match up with the intents and vice versa. If this some how an evil optmization process, guess what? Everything in terms of human action does include the pursuit of the optimal. The optimal need not be merely cardinal in quality, it's often ordinal. It's something we measure not in terms of summation, but how it stands as part of a system of values, as a whole. Thus, you're confusing the pursuit of the optimal in human affairs with the pursuit of the optimal in the inanimate world (that of reaching equilibrium). Both may deal with systems, but now each deals with the function of systems is entirely different.
ladyattis:First, consequentialism *is not* utilitarianism. So stop equivocating the two. It's like what some Randroids do with Rationalism (by equivocating everything Kant wrote with that of every other Rationalist before and after him), it's dirty pool, friend. I don't play it. I expect you not to do the same.
I'm not playing dirty pool. I didn't equivocate the two. I characterized utilitarianism as a variant of consequentialism, not as a synonym. That is how I honestly conceive of utilitarianism. If I'm incorrect, feel free to correct me without assuming ill intent.
ladyattis:Second, it's a given fact that each intent does not always entail the same end. One may intend to save a person's life in the act of being a doctor, but the end may be that his patient may die anyways.
Your use of the word "end" here is confusing. Usually, in questions of human action, the word "end" is defined as what you are calling "intent", not as what you are calling "consequence".
I contend that intention is everything, and actual consequences are immaterial, when discussing morality. The morality of a surgery is dependent on whether the doctor had consent to operate and whether he intended to help or harm: not on the ultimate success. I don't know what school of ethics argues otherwise or how this pertains to the "is/ought" question.
ladyattis:Thus, you're confusing the pursuit of the optimal in human affairs with the pursuit of the optimal in the inanimate world (that of reaching equilibrium). Both may deal with systems, but now each deals with the function of systems is entirely different.
So are you saying what distinguishes "moral action" from "action in general" is whether it involves human affairs?
Lilburne:Your use of the word "end" here is confusing. Usually, in questions of human action, the word "end" is defined as what you are calling "intent", not as what you are calling "consequence".
End for me means the end of a set of actions based on a set of intents.
Lilburne:I contend that intention is everything, and actual consequences are immaterial, when discussing morality.
So if a mother saws off her first born's arms, which results in bleeding, because she thought it would be good for her child, then it's good? The same for honor killings/suicides (like those practiced in India), are they good because the intent was to do good? Oops, so much for intent, when the consequences can lead to shitty ends.
All that that seems to matter for your theoretical framework is what is conceived as 'good' intent, and then by what standard is the intent is 'measured' (not cardinally, mind you or as some cognitive psychological theories would suppose)?
Lilburne:So are you saying what distinguishes "moral action" from "action in general" is whether it involves human affairs?
More or less, basically, if humans didn't direct it, then it has its own operational parameters that are separate (not necessarily exclusive) from that of human affairs. An example would be the random fluke of a meteor striking someone on the head, or a support beam in a building breaking due to random percularities of the composition (that couldn't have been known to the makers). Or some such events.
For me, intent guides or drives to ends (results), thus the pursuit of optimality is part of the pursuit of intent in morality. They're reflective to one and other.
consequentialism is moral theory that is obsessed with consequences, and other moral theories stake their claim by distancing themselves from it. but its a question of emhpasis or degree, every moral theory has an eye on 'consequence' broadly speaking. even supposing your intentionalism you must concede that if your intentions never caused or informed your actions and did not lead to led judgeable outcomes they would hardly be worth discussing. indeed, the kind of intentions you have in mind are consequence orientated. the doctor who intends helpful surgery, intends so with the consequences of such an intention in mind, i.e. he has the intention to bring about the consequence of healing, (whhether or not that is what is obtained by his acting)
Where there is no property there is no justice; a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid
Fools! not to see that what they madly desire would be a calamity to them as no hands but their own could bring
Let me put it another way, if I intend for X, then how by Y is the factor that defines the 'consequence.' Therefore, if my intention to do good by a finite means to achieve it (the how) I must consider each means own end in respect to the intent (and the end in respect to the intent). Whether there's any metaphysical basis for tying one end to one intent is beside the point, it's a matter of whether one is trying to make their ethical or moral judgments sound. As the old saying goes, "The road to Hell is paved with Good Intentions."
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I. Ryan: .
WAT
ladyattis:End for me means the end of a set of actions based on a set of intents.
That usage is likely to lead to a lot of confusion in discussion with other Misesians... (emphasis added)
The result sought by an action is called its end, goal, or aim. One uses these terms in ordinary speech also to signify intermediate ends, goals, or aims; these are points which acting man wants to attain only because he believes that he will reach his ultimate end, goal or aim in passing beyond them. Strictly speaking the end, goal, or aim of any action is always the relief from a felt uneasiness. -Human Action, Chapter 4
The result sought by an action is called its end, goal, or aim. One uses these terms in ordinary speech also to signify intermediate ends, goals, or aims; these are points which acting man wants to attain only because he believes that he will reach his ultimate end, goal or aim in passing beyond them. Strictly speaking the end, goal, or aim of any action is always the relief from a felt uneasiness.
-Human Action, Chapter 4
ladyattis:So if a mother saws off her first born's arms, which results in bleeding, because she thought it would be good for her child, then it's good?
I am a subjectivist, in economics as well as ethics. So to me the question is "good according to whom"? The arm-sawing is not good according to me, or according to the preponderance of humanity. If the woman is mad, however, it may very well be good according to her.
ladyattis: More or less, basically, if humans didn't direct it, then it has its own operational parameters that are separate (not necessarily exclusive) from that of human affairs. An example would be the random fluke of a meteor striking someone on the head, or a support beam in a building breaking due to random percularities of the composition (that couldn't have been known to the makers). Or some such events.
No, what I mean is: Do you distinguish moral human action from human action in general according to whether it involves other humans or whether it involves inanimate objects?
Lilburne:I am a subjectivist, in economics as well as ethics. So to me the question is "good according to whom"? The arm-sawing is not good according to me, or according to the preponderance of humanity. If the woman is mad, however, it may very well be good according to her.
Subjectivity always is yielded by the decoupling of goal and action (of end and mean [as you prefer to use the terms]). If you deny that means can indeed alter the end, or the end can alter the means, then you deny all causality at some level. That even physics is merely a 'metanarrative' or some such construct. Turtles all the way down, yet again.
Lilburne:No, what I mean is: Do you distinguish moral human action from human action in general according to whether it involves other humans or whether it involves inanimate objects?
The categories means and ends are analogous to the categories causes and effects. Therefore, the "end" of an action is the effect of that action. And, therefore, in order to describe the intended effect of an action, one may say the "intended end".
I think that that removes any possible ambiguity. Also, I think that, in that quote, Mises erred because he did indeed, at some point, say that the categories means and ends are analagous to the categories causes and effects.
Pretty much this video sums up my views on this thread entirely... For now.
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